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Abstract
In 1865? Aden was an insecure, undervalued, Indian 
outpost. Non-intervention in Yemeni affairs was official 
policy. British influence inland was non-existent; and 
in the Gulf of Aden it was declining.
By 1905? Aden was a major Imperial base, an 
international trading, shipping and telegraphic centre; 
and its population had doubled. Britain dominated the 
Gulf of Aden.
In 1866-67 Resident W. Merewether disregarded 
official policy and destroyed Fadhli tribal power. This 
benefitted Aden and the Abdali chiefs. The Abdalis 
expanded their territory and influence, as British clients. 
Britain purchased the Little Aden peninsula; and, when 
the Ottoman reoccupation of Yemen threatened the Abdalis, 
British pressure enforced an Ottoman withdrawal*
Strategic British requirements dictated the 
acquisition of more Abdali territory,, in 1882, and 
agreements with Arabian coastal chiefs, between I876 and 
1888. By the acquisition of British Somaliland (188^-88), 
foreign bases were virtually excluded from the Gulf of 
Aden.
Official British policy in the Yemen interior from
1&86 was to allow the reoccupation of the •Amiri* area 
by the Ottomans, but successive Residents supported the 
Amir against Ottoman pressure* During the Boundary 
Commission (1902 - 1905), Aden officials circumvented 
their conciliatory India Office instructions, and with 
Lord Curzon*s support and the Ambassador^ co-operation 
at Constantinople, the Cabinet was bamboozled into an 
expansionist policy. The Ottomans were bullied into 
surrendering territory.
British expansion, notably between 1865 and 1888, 
was a triumph of character by the limited Residency 
staff over adverse circumstances, with occasional timely 
naval visits. It owed much to three Britons and one 
Persian-Arab. The acquisition of Somaliland was the 
personal achievement of Major F.M* Hunter.
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a tj
Note on the spelling of Arabic and Ottoman names, and 
on references
For simplicity, diacritical dots and the letters 
hamza. and *ain have been omitted* Thus the accepted 
English usage Aden is written instead of *Aden*
Ottoman names and titles are spelt like the Arabic 
names and titles*
Some Aden file references give only the folio 
number and not the date of the letter. Some Aden files 
were partly termite-eaten and full details were therefore 
not always available*
References to published book titles are gjtK)er.lined; in 
single inverted commas, while article titles are in 
double inverted commas.
Abbreviations, for manuscript sources, are listed 
in an appendix at the end.
‘Foreign Office* is used throughout for the British
Foreign Office; and fForeign Department* is used for 
the Government of India*s Foreign Department.
Section 1 Introduction!
The area described in this thesis covers the 
southernmost portion of the Republic of the Yemen, the 
greater part of the People*s Democratic Republic of 
Yemen, and the adjoining part of Dhofar (1)* The French 
territory of Afars and Issas, and the adjoining coastal 
region of the Republic of Somalia, as far west as, and 
slightly south of, Cape Guardafui are also included (1)*
So is the island of Socotra (1). The area, in relation 
to Arabia, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, is shown in 
Map A* During the period under discussion, the British 
used the term fthe Yemen1 to describe the area between 
Asir and the Gulf of Aden (2). The Yemen was bordered by
(1) Introductory remarks to the Somali Coast, Socotra 
and Dhofar are given in their respective Chapters 
(6 and 5)•
(2) E.g. Sketch map facing p.87j
F.M. Hunter1s Account of the British Settlement of 
Aden', 1877? reprinted London, 1968. (Hereafter 
Hunter, 'Aden').
Maj. Gen. Maitland1s preface, page x of G.W. Bury's 
•The Land of Uz1, London 1911* Maitland was Officiating 
Resident, Aden 1901 - 190**. (Hereafter Bury, 'Uz1).
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the Red Sea to the west and by the desert fringes of 
Hadhramaut to the east. Aden was a Yemeni port. The 
British habit of distinguishing between *the Yemen* under 
the Imam, and *the British Protectorate of Aden* arose 
after 1920* That distinction emphasized an artificial, 
political, separation between two parts of the Yemen* In 
Arabic, *the Yemen* was applied originally to all the 
country on the right-hand side of anobserver in Mecca, 
looking eastwards* That included all S*W. Arabia* 
Subsequently, the district of Asir was distinguished as 
a separate area (1) * Within the Yemen, a tribesman would 
refer to himself by his tribe, and a non-tribesman would 
refer to his village or town area, to describe his place 
of origin (£).
Hadhramaut lies to the east of the Yemen (3). The 
territory of the Bal Ubaid Confederation and of the Wahidi 
tribes forms the western boundary to Hadhramaut. To the 
north is the Rub AlKhali desert. The Gulf of Aden is to
(1) tthe rough* is a mountainous area.
(2) Cf* N. Malcolm *Five Years in a Persian Town*, p*39-^0> 
London* 19°5*
(3) See Map A*
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the south and the country of the Mahra is to the east*
In 1936, Harold Ingrams, as First Political Officer at 
the Aden Residency^gave the local usage for the name as 
covering the coast between Ealhaf on the west and Seihut 
on the east, and the Valley of the Hadhramaut and its 
tributaries in the interior (1). In this thesis the area 
stretches as far west as the Wadi Hajr only* Balhaf was 
the harbour for Azzan, the Wadi Meifaa and the Upper 
Aulaqi area to the north. Balhaf therefore properly 
belongs to the Yemen (2). Apart from the small and 
isolated anchorage and settlement of Bir Ali, the coast 
east of Balhaf is barren and empty. The Wadi Hajar 
therefore makes a fitting western border for Hadhramaut*
To the people of S.W. Arabia the geographical and tribal 
borders of the Yemen and Hadhramaut were clearly defined. 
Strong local loyalties existed. Men's home origins were 
discernible by variations in dialect (3)? and, to a lesser
(1) Colonial Office Publication No. 123#on Hadhramaut, 
H.M.S.O. 1936. p.7 (Hereafter Colonial 123)*
(2) Ibid p.72. This usage is supported by the Aden Trade 
Registration Office1s exclusion of Balhaf, and of 
Bir Ali to the east, from the list of Hadhrami ports.
(3)W.Thesiger 'Arabian Sands1, Penguin reprint, 1968.
p.152. (Hereafter Thesiger, 'Sands').
l.b
extent, in dress and behaviour (1)* The Hadhramis, and 
the Bedouin to the north and the west of Hadhramaut, 
referred to the Bedouin inhabitants of Jauf and Nejran, 
collectively* as 'the people in the direction towards 
which prayer was made*(2). The Yemenis referred to the 
Bedouin, to their east, as 'the people of the sunrise* (3)*
+ + + + +
The populations in the Yemen and in Hadhramaut lived 
under conditions that had changed little in the previous 
thousand years (b). Each community was organised on a 
tribal basis (5)* There were well-marked social 
differences between the classes of the people. At the 
top were the tribal chiefs, who held their position so
Cl) Hunter ‘Aden* pA5*
(2) <J^ >I (Ahl AlGSlibleh) G*W. Bury ‘Arabia
Infelix* ♦ London,; 1915 P*32* (Hereafter, Bury 'Arabia').
(3) J U l  (Ahl AlMushriq) ibid.
(b) H.F. Ingrams 'Arabia and the Isles', London 19*+2* P*95« 
(Hereafter Ingrams, 'Arabia1).
(5) For details of the Kathiri tribal system in 1936 see 
Colonial 123, p.Bb*
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long as they retained tribal support (1). The leader of 
a confederation of tribes needed to retain the support 
of the tribal leaders (2) whose tribes belonged to, or 
were coerced into, the confederation (3)* Similarly* 
tribal leaders needed the support of the heads of their 
tribal sections, even as section leaders needed to retain 
the support of the families in their sections. These 
tribesmen included settled and nomadic groups; and, 
sometimes, sections of both groups were to be found in 
one tribe. But no contemporary papers are available to 
show what proportion of the population was settled. Much 
of the area was still unknown to British officers, and 
the Foreign and India Offices discouraged British, and 
still more foreign, visitors (^ f). Outside the main towns, 
non-tribal Muslims were dominated by their tribal neighbours. 
With the exception of Sultans1 followers, non-tribesmen 
did not usually carry arms. The Jews of Habban were 
probably the only Jewish exception. But all men carried
(1) Bury 'Uz1, p.3^.
(2) Colonial 123, p A l
(3) Diagram A shows the structure of a Confederation.
(if) 10L. L/P&S/10 File 1202/1912. Sir Edward Grey -
HBMA, Copenhagen., 11*7*11
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a general purpose knife which could be used for fighting*
In this thesis, 'tribe' is used where the Arabic 
word 'qabilah' ( ^L^ a-9 ) would be used locally*
Confederation would often be more accurate, in 
anthropological terms, since, in many such ‘tribes', the 
members of the confederation did not share a common 
ancestor (1)* Instead, one tribe had elected a leader 
from their own members, or from some alien stock, and 
that leader then secured, or imposed, some degree of 
suzerainty over the neighbouring, and previously independent, 
tribes* The Fadhli 'tribe' illustrates this process.
It was named after Fadhl bin Uthman, whose father was 
selected by the Merqashi tribesmen, because of his 
intelligence and character, to be their chief (2). By 
local tradition Uthman was b o m  about 1600 A-D*, the son 
of an Arab woman who was, reputedly, with child by a.
Sultan of Turkey. His mother was brought to Shuqra from 
Constantinople by a Seiyid. The child Uthman was brought 
up at AlSarriyah £ amongst the Merqashi tribe(3)*
(1) Cf. Bury, 'Uz', p.3^.
(2) Assistant Adviser's Handing-Over Notes for the 
Central Area, W.A.P. 1957* Writer's copy.
(3) This is written as spelt and not as pronounced 
AsSarriyah*
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Similarly, the Abdali, Aulaqi, Amiri, Haushabi, and 
possibly the Alawi ‘tribes1 had chiefs of alien stock..
In the Hadhramaut, the Quaiti chief was of immigrant,
Yafai, stock.
There were South Arabian confederations, and tribes,, 
who traced their origins back to a common ancestor, but 
even such tribes adopted sections from other tribal stock 
as fellow tribesmen.
Diagram A provides examples of alien Murri tribesmen 
adopted into the Manahil tribe (1). There is therefore 
some similarity to the old Scotch clan system, where 
•broken men1, either as individuals, or as a group, from, 
another tribe were accepted into another tribal structure (2). 
There, too, another clan, too small to protect itself, 
might enter into an agreement with a neighbouring clan 
for protection and mutual assistance (3)* Thus, in 
Diagram A, the small Somiah clan was bound with the 
neighbouring Manahil (*+) ., As in Scotland, clans and septs 
could separate into a larger number of distinct septs 
founded by clansmen who had become powerful, or in some
(1) Note 6 Diagram A
(2) G.R. Bain ‘The Clans & Tartans of Scotland*,: Gla sgow, 
1938. (Hereafter Bain, ‘Clans*) p.37*
(3) Bain, ‘Clans*, p.^0.
(^ f) Note 8 Diagram A.
1.8
way prominent (1) ♦ The Bait Hashaush, Bait Atoni and 
Bait Rawan septs of the Bait alMaashani subtribe of the 
Manahil illustrate how new septs could arise. Following 
a disagreement within the Bait Hashaush, after the 
killing of a neighbouring AlKathir tribesmanr the sept 
broke into three. The old Bait Hashaush and the new 
Bait Rawan septs arranged a peace agreement with AlKathir, 
from which the new Bait Atoni sept was excluded. This 
internal division within the Bait Hashaush, and the 
killing which gave rise to it, weakened the position of 
the Bait Hashaush, who had held the chiefship within the 
Bait AlMaashani. The chiefship then passed into the 
Bait Salmin sept (2). The best interest of the whole 
tribal community was the decisive factor in selecting 
tribal leaders. Where a confederation was based on force, 
and not on a blood relationship, there was a tendency for 
such a 'tribe* to expand under a dominant leader and to 
contract under a weak one. Natural 'tribes', by contrast,
had amore stable territorial basis and a greater common
\
identity of interest.
+ + + + +
(1) Bain, 'Clans', p.37«
(2) Note Diagram A.
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The influential social class of the Seiyids 
existed outside the tribal structure (1)* They claimed 
direct descent from the Prophet through his son-in-law,
Ali* They kept outside tribal quarrels and did not 
generally carry arms. They were respected for their 
ancestry, and for their religious knowledge which was 
the only formal schooling of the area. They were o&ten 
the mediators in personal* and in inter-tribal, quarrels (2). 
But the execution of their awards depended upon the 
litigants1 acceptance of the Seiyids1 decisions* In the 
Hadhramaut, all Seiyids claimed descent from Seiyld 
Ahmed bin Isa AlMuhajir (3)* They had their own system 
for regulating affairs between themselves (*0. Their 
social system had similarities with the local tribal
Cl) Colonial 1239 p*36-*fO deals with the position of-^---------
the Seiyids in Hadhramaut*
(2) Cf* Colonial 123, P*86 on their meditation in a 
dispute at the Hadhrami village of Ghurfa.
(3) Freya Stark ‘The Southern Gates of Arabia1, p.1.85,
London 19^0*
(*f) The A1 Ba Alawi Agreement, Arabic copy, made in 1965
in Tarim by Seiyld Alawi AbdArRahman bin Shahab from 
family papers*
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system, and many families kept careful genealogies 
showing their connections with very distant branches: 
living abroad. That made it more difficult for a 
stranger to declare himself, unjustifiably, to be a 
Seiyid, and so to benefit by their privileges. Most of 
these Seiyid families were settled, but there were semi- 
nomadic families living amongst some Bedouin tribes (1).
All Seiyids preserved their exclusiveness, outside 
the tribal system, because their womenfolk might not 
marry a non-Seiyid. Seiyids, however, could marry women 
of all communities. By judicious marriages with the 
daughters of prominent tribesmen individual Seiyids were 
able to gain increased tribal support. Indeed, amongst 
the Zaidi tribes, in the Yemen, their Imam had to be 
a Seiyid (2). He was a political, as well as a religious 
leader. Only if the Imam lacked the necessary qualities 
could an additional, political and military, leader,, who 
was not a Seiyid, be recognised by the tribesmen (2).
+ + + +  *
(1) Colonial 123, Note 1, pAO.
(2) IOL AF File No. 528 of 1928.
A. note on the Zaidi Imamate of Sanaa by Captain 
M. Fazluddin, I.M.S., Political Officer, Hodaida, 
1918-1921+. (Hereafter Fazluddin, 'Notes1)•
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Another small, but locally influential group was 
that of the various families of Mushaikh (1). In theory 
they neither raided, nor were raided by, tribesmen. In 
practice, both Seiyids and Mushaikh could have their 
property looted (2). But a personal request to the 
offender's chief might secure restoration. The term 
'Mushaikh' meant 'people with knowledge' (1). There were 
both settled and nomadic Mushaikh, including some small 
Bedouin septs. Like the Seiyids, the Shaikhs filled the 
roles of inter-tribal peace-makers. They probably 
replaced, or continued from, the priesthood of the pre- 
Islamic religion as the principal arbitrators and, in 
settled areas, scholars, until partly displaced in their 
turn by the incoming Seiyids in the ninth century. They 
even acquired political power. One of the AlBureik 
Mushaikh of the Shabwa area established a dynasty which 
ruled over Shihr and the adjacent coast of Hadhramaut (3)»
(1) Handing Over Notes, Northern Desert Areas, Aden 
Protectorate 1958. Writer's Copy.
(2) 10L LA Res. No. 800 of 23.12.65 to SGE reported a 
Seiyid pleading with the Fadhli chief for the return 
of a looted donkey.
(3) *+.11 n.2
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The exact status of the Mushaikh in the South Arabian 
social system at this time remains obscure.
+ + + +
Slaves in the Yemen and in Hadhramaut were generally 
in the possession of the more pox^erful rulers of settled 
areas (1). They were employed as servants and as armed 
retainers (2). They were not influential amongst the 
settled tribesmen and were rare amongst the Bedouin (3)*
The latter had no inducement to keep slaves. On the 
whole, slaves were treated well in Arabia (*+). But, even 
when they were freed, they were still regarded as 
belonging to a separate, and lower, caste from the rest 
of the population (5)* In the areas under British
(1) Colonial 123, p.^3 for Hadhramaut in 1936. Conditions 
had probably changed little in the previous 70 years.
(2) Bury »Uz‘ p..297
(3) W.,G. Palgrave Central and Eastern Arabia*, p*27l/272,
London, 1871 (Hereafter Palgrave Arabia1)
(Lh) Bury ‘Uz1, p.301.
C.M. Doughty Vol. 1 ‘Travels in Arabia Deserta', Cambridge, 
1858, reprinted London, Jan. 19^9 p-601* (Hereafter 
Doughty ‘Deserta1)
Lt. Col. Sir A.T. Wilson ‘The Persian Gulf1 Oxford, 1928. 
p.2lk/5, referring particularly to E. Arabia.
(5) Bury ‘Uz1, p.278
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influence there was probably most intermarriage between 
slaves and Arabs, in Lahej (1). On the west coast of the 
Yemen it was common (2).
+ + Hh + +
Stability in the Yemen, or in Hadhramaut, depended 
largely upon the quality of leadership and on the 
relations between leaders at the head of the tribal 
groupings (3)* The tribal leader was the ultimate judge 
in disputes between individuals,; sections, or tribes, 
in tribal areas (^ f) * Until the partial Ottoman 
re-occupation, beginning in 1872, there was not even a 
nominal single administrative authority for the Yemen.
(1) Bury ’Uz1 p.3*f8*
(2) G.W. Bury 1Arabia1 p.29.
(3) Colonial 123 p.80 and p.8*f.
C^ f) Ibid. p.132-133 for an assessment of the role of the 
chief amongst the Kathiris; and Tape-recording by 
AlBukheit bin Salim bin Laksar of the Bait Atoni 
Manahil on the role of the Mugaddam amongst the 
Manahil. Recorded in Aden, 1966, by the writer.
1.1>*
Even after 1872, Ottoman authority was limited and rarely 
secure (1). Hadhramaut never had a regional administration 
during this period. By 1936 f... there were getting on 
for 2000 separate Governments in the Hadhramaut . ♦.* (2)* 
The notion of one central 1 Government* was therefore only 
known to Yemenis or Hadhramis who had had experience of 
Ottoman rule in the Tihama ports; or, of British rule 
in Aden; or, to those who had travelled outside the area. 
Local loyalties, only, not national ones, were strong* 
Natural disasters, such as disease, drought, and 
locust plagues also affected stability. So did political 
changes in adjacent areas, which gave rise to boundary 
disputes, and to opportunities for rivalry and intrigues^ 
over territory by each new and expansionist Power.
The resident population of the Yemen had little 
experience of other races and religions. The resident 
Hadhramis had less* Most of the Bedouin tribes had none. 
Slaves were the most obvious ‘foreigners1; but those 
imported from Africa adopted Islam (3); and slave children
(1) 10th Edition, Encyclopaedia Britannica 1902, p*5l8 
Article on Arabia by Sir T.H. Holdich, K.C.I.E. 
(Hereafter Brit&nnica 1Arabia *).
(2) ' „ Ingrams Arabia p.3W.
(3) Doughty ‘Deserta1 I p*605.
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b o m  in Arabia were brought up as Moslems. The other 
main, foreign, element was the Ottoman presence in the 
coastal ports of the Tihama. There were also some 
Somalis and a few Indians in coastal ports. Aden‘s large 
polyglot foreign community was exceptional.
The Yemen had a considerable, long established,
Jewish community, but they lived on suffrance (1). They 
had no direct political influence, and they could not 
afford to show signs of affluence. They were not allowed 
to build houses higher than two storeys. But in some 
areas the Jews were, by local standards, wealthy (2).
Their relative wealth, in some areas, and their skill 
as craftsmen, gave them an indirect local influence with 
their tribal neighbours. They were allowed to travel 
throughout the Yemen, despised but tolerated by the 
feuding tribesmen who needed their skills. They obtained 
local protection by virtue of the taxes they paid to
(1) Rev. A. Sinker. Memorials of the Hon. I. Keith-Falconer, 
Cambridge, 1 8 8 8 .  p p . 1 6 2 - 1 6 3 .  (Hereafter Sinker 
‘Keith-Fal coner1)•
(2) Bury ‘Uz* p.1 8 .  Dhala was one such area.
Bury ‘Arabia1 p . 3 ° »
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their tribal neighbours. But, like all travellers in 
the Yemen, their journeys were not always safe from 
robbery. There were no Jews in Hadhramaut.
The Yemenis and Hadhramis considered all ‘Europeans1 
as a single group, like ‘the Arabs*. Europeans were 
synonymous with ‘Christians1. Even individual Britons 
from Aden were, long after, referred to as ‘the Christian1 
or ‘the European* by the Yemenis from outside Aden (1). 
While in local correspondence with the Aden Residency, 
the British were, understandably, referred to as 'the 
English'. Indeed Europeans were personally unknown to 
most South Arabians who had not travelled abroad, for 
there was little contact with them outside the coastal 
ports. Few Europeans travelled in the interior; and 
those who did moved on the roads without the security 
that Muslims were entitled to expect, but did not always 
receive, once beyond the areas under Ottoman administration
(1) Lord Belhaven. ‘The Uneven Road*. Murray,
London 1 9 5 5 *  p *1 2 6  referring to the 1 9 3 C ‘ s
(Hereafter Belhaven 'Road').
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or under effective British influence (1)* Indeed the 
difficulties of travel perpetuated tribal separateness 
and suspicion. In the Yemen, the main mountainous range 
ran from north to south and made travel difficult down
f
the length of the counljy (2). So trade flowed naturally 
from the highlands to the west coast ports, or from 
south-east Yemen to Aden, when political conditions 
provided sufficient security on the roads (2). By 1902 
the greater part of the Yemen1s external trade went to 
Aden by land or by coastal shipping (3)*
+ + + + +
(1) Thesiger 1 Sands1 p.239 and p*2*f8 describing recent 
tribal religious prejudices against Christian and 
European travellers in S.E. Arabia*
F. Stark *Seen in the Hadhramaut1 London 1938, 
pages XIII-XV referring to the absence of Christians* 
right to free movement in the local view. (Hereafter 
Stark 1Hadhramaut*)•
(2) Bury *Arabia* p*ll5«
(3) Brj^tannica ‘Arabia* p.518.
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Physical characteristics of S.W. Arabia*
The Asir-Yemen highland area was particularly 
productive because its fertile soil was watered by the 
autumnal monsoon and by moisture from the constant up- 
current of air from the Red Sea (1)* The Yemen highlands 
rose steeply from the Tihama to heights varying from 
6,000 ft to almost 11,000 ft (2)* To the eastwards, the 
land sloped gradually to the desert. Over the Yemen, 
rainfall decreased towards the south and east and little 
regular rain fell on the south Yemen coast (3)? on the 
desert to the east, or on Hadhramaut* So the areas which 
British influence began to expand into from 186? supported 
relatively small populations* The southern coastal 
plain was narrow, and largely unproductive* It was 
broken, east of Shuqra, at Muqatatain where the coastal 
hills reached the shore. It reappeared briefly at the '
(1) Col* R. Meinertzhagen !Birds of Arabia1, Edinburgh
195^ p.5.
(2) tyj The Coastal plain along the south-western and
southern shores of the Arabian Peninsula?. Hans Wehr 
'A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic1 p.98.
Wiesbaden, Germany, 1961. (Hereafter 'Wehr's dictionary). 
In this thesis 'Tihama1 is used for the S.W. coast only.
(3) Bury ■Uz1 p.307.
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mouth of the Wadi Ahwar. The next areas of agricultural 
coastal land were in Wadi Meifaa and in Wadi Hajr.
Beyond, the coastal plain began again east of Bururu 
It vanished at Mukalla, where the hills again reached 
the coast. Another area of plain stretched from the 
east of Mukalla to Ras Baghashwah. But, by European 
standards, prospects for coastal Hadhramaut might* ^ .7}
from an agricultural point of view, be considered non-
)
existent (1)..*The coastal plain stretched on again 
beyond Mukalla, with intermittent breaks, to Ras Sharwain 
at the western extremity of the bay on which the Mahri 
centre of Qishn stood.
(1) Colonial 123 p.63 quoting an English agricultural 
expert about 1920.
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The Aden Residency and the Yemen tribes
1865 -  1872
British relations with the Yemeni tribes near Aden 
depended upon the personality of each Resident rather than 
upon official Indian Government policy* The Foreign 
Department of the Government of India (1) wished to 
avoid intervention in tribal affairs. Intervention cost 
money and led to military commitments which were not 
justified by any local commercial opportunities. Aden 
was wanted only as the most convenient coaling station, 
in the absence of a suitable island, on the route to 
Suez. Career bureaucrats in the Foreign Department could 
take this detached view (2). Residents, and still more 
their staffs with longer service in Aden, could not.
They were in touch with people from all over the Gulf of 
Aden, and therefore human emotions influenced the way 
in which Residents interpreted their official instructions
(1) Hereafter 1Foreign Department1 as opposed to the 
British *Foreign Office*.
(2) Cf. Lord Roberts 1Forty-One Years in India* cheap 
edn. London 1905 p*21+6. (Hereafter Roberts
*India1).
2 .2
on Indian Government policy in the area.
The Residents were soldiers, trained to act on 
their own initiative in a local emergency, to he jealous 
of national honour, and to consider the strategic 
requirements of their commands. In the absence of cable 
connections between India and Aden, until 1870* the 
Resident at Aden could exercise considerable discretion 
in his use of local British resources. So long as his 
initiative was successful, and involved no apparent new 
commitments, it was unlikely to be disowned* It was 
difficult to challenge such action, in a little-known 
area. Aden*s administration was based on the Foreign 
Department and the Government of Bombay trusting the 
Resident to observe the spirit of his orders. After 1870» 
with the opening of the cable from Bombay to Aden, the 
Residents lost their justification for individual 
initiations in an emergency (1). The power to take action 
was then centralized in the Foreign Department* The 
Viceroy1s Government, too, came more closely under the 
control of the Secretary of State for India and the Home 
Government through the cable connection between Aden and 
Egypt and so to Europe*.
(1) FO78 2753 Sir B. Frere to Sir Henry Elliot 2.1*73
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In 1865 a new era was dawning in the Gulf of Aden, 
because of growing European interest even before the 
opening of the Suez Canal, Local British hegemony was 
to be challenged by maritime Powers other than the French. 
Previously, French warships had provided virtually the 
only other foreign naval presence in the area, and France 
had no effective local base nearer than the island of 
Reunion. The Foreign Department was, however, slow to 
heed successive Residents, from 1865, when they urged a 
revision of the traditional policy of non-intervention 
in the Yemen. Britain could not otherwise maintain her 
local influence. But it was not until 1873 that the 
Foreign Departments resistance suddenly collapsed, 
under pressures which Aden Residents had begun to forecast 
in I869 (1). The opening of the Suez Canal stimulated 
existing interest and brought in new foreign interests.
+ + + + +
How Merewether established local Abdali dominance, 1865-6?.
Famine was widespread in the Yemen from l86*f to
(1) AAR 1868/69, para. 68.
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1866 (1); the drought was accompanied hy cattle disease 
and by a cholera epidemic (2); and there were locust 
swarms on the coast (3)* The rhythm of local life was 
unbalanced. Starving immigrants came into Aden, 
confirming the acute suffering in the interior#
Merewether noted that cholera deaths in Aden occurred 
only amongst these immigrants; the better-fed townspeople 
recovered C1*)* Tribesmen in the interior reverted to 
raiding neighbouring areas and caravan routes. In 
January 1865? Resident Major W. Merewether reported raids 
by Abdali Azaibi tribesmen on passing caravans ( 5 ) *
Fadhli tribesmen also raided their neighbours. The 
natural disasters had forced the coastal tribesmen to 
revert to their traditional raiding habits. Security 
deteriorated on the plain near Aden.
The Fadhli tribesmen were pastoralists, with 
subsistence grain crops from flood irrigation in normal
(1) Hunter 1Aden8 p#178.
(2) Hunter 'Aden1 p.176-177
(3) LA R es-S  of S 2 8 . 1 . 6 5
(1+) LA Res-S  of S 1 7 * 6 . 6 5
(5) LA r e s - S  of S 3 * 1 . 6 5
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years but few wells. When their livestock died and their 
grain stocks were exhausted they had little to exchange 
for imported grain in Aden. The Abdalis were, in general, 
more fortunate; sub-surface water could be tapped in 
the most populated, northern, Abdali area. Some Abdalis 
had money and bought grain in Aden (1). But the Azaibi 
Abdalis, between Lahej and Aden, were mainly pastoralists; 
they suffered like the Fadhlis. Merewether claimed that 
even the Abdalis lost ?00 dead from cholera and famine, 
and that many Abdalis had to leave the Lahej area to seek 
food elsewhere (2).
+ + + + +-
Merewether*s Annual Report for l863/6*f was summarized 
in Bombay as f... on the whole satisfactory ...;l (3) but, 
before the end of 186**, Merewether was complaining of a 
recrudescence of tribal raiding (*f). The first Fadhli
(1) LA, Res - S of S, 17.6.65
(2) LA, Res - S of S, 18.12.65
(3) LB, 1863-66, S&B - S of S, 12.11.6**-
(If) LA, Res - S of S, 3.1.65
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raid described was by hill tribesmen (1), not directly 
under the Fadhli Chief, on a caravan from Shaikh Othman.
Merewether maintained that Ahmad bin Abdullah could^have
!
controlled the raiders ifhe wished to. That was possibly 
true under normal conditions. Merewether may not/have 
appreciated, initially, the extent, and the effect, of 
the calamities affecting the interior. He required the 
Fadhli Chief to make restitution for the *f0 looted camels 
and their loads (2). The raid was not a British concern; 
so Merewether*s demand was an unauthorised intervention 
in internal Yemeni affairs; and Merewether himself noted 
that the raiders were not directly under Ahmed bin Abdullah.
There are no contemporary figures for camel prices;
12 years later F.M. Hunter valued baggage camels at 
MT 025 to *f0 each (3)* Merewether was possibly demanding 
a payment exceeding the annual Fadhli stipend. The much 
larger Abdali stipend was divided between members of the
(1) Possibly Merqashis who would have been amongst the 
first to feel the scarcity.
<2) LA, Res - S of S, 3.1.65 
Q ) Hunter *Aden> p.71.
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chiefly family (1); and the Abdali Chief claimed that 
he lacked the money needed for caravan escorts, even 
though tribal leaders were held to be responsible for the 
safety of caravan routes within their own areas, in 
return for their stipends. It is possible that the 
Fadhli Chief lacked the means to meet Merewether1s 
demands; it is probable that he felt no obligation to 
do so. Merewether described his reply as unsatisfactory.
The chief then participated in a foraging raid into 
Abdali territory in January, 1865; Merewether considered 
that to be ‘hostile1 and ‘most insulting1 to the British (2). 
Within the context of local tribal life Merewether1s 
descriptions were unjustified (3)* Merewether was 
probably trying to pick a quarrel. He subsequently asked 
Bombay for permission to take punitive action, (*+) but 
that was refused.
Anticipating approval, Merewether had encouraged
Cl) LA, Res - S of S, 28.1.65* quoting Coghlan early in 1863*
(2) LA, Res - S of S, 17.1.65
(3) Cf. Colonial 123 p.^5
(If) LA, Res - S of S and SGB, 3*1*65
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the Abdali Chief to plan a joint attack against the 
Fadhlis with the Lower Aulaqi Chief. Merewether assisted 
the Abdali preparations with a payment of and
he proposed to assist Abdali Aulaqi liaison by carrying 
the Abdali negotiators in the Government steamer to 
Ahwar, the Aulaqi centre. Bombay1s rejection of his 
proposals meant that Merewether had to recover the 
MT#50°0, or to repay it himself. He never notified itsr 
recovery; it is probable that the payment remained 
outstanding as an advance against the Abdali Chief, 
recoverable from his annual stipend of &^LT6b921 until 
1866. Merewether regretted the rejection of his proposals: 
in a long letter to the Secretary of State. He reported 
Fadhli raiding, the local food shortage and insecurity 
within the Abdali area. He made a proposal for restoring 
security and so reviving Abdali agriculture, and thereby 
reducing the cost of rationing the British garrison, by 
raising a troop of horse (1). Merewether announced that 
he had stopped payment of the Fadhli subsidy, alleging 
that it would have been *... most unbecoming ... to have 
continued ...' it (1). He blamed the insecurity on
(1) LA, Res - S of S, 28.1.65
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the Fadhli Chief.
Merewether reviewed his own close relations with 
the Abdali Chief and his participation in the settlement 
of the Abdali succession dispute (l). He praised the 
whole-hearted co-operation of the Abdali Chief, who 
was ’...heart and soul with us, and only anxious to be 
told what to do to execute it at once...' .He deplored 
the insecurity leading to the carrying of arms everywhere 
for personal security. It is possible that quarrels within 
the Abdali chiefly family following the disputed 
succession contributed to local insecurity (l). Merewether 
compared the Yemenis with the Baluchi tribesmen he knew 
from his time in Sind (l). He argued that crushing the 
Fadhli capacity for raiding could be as beneficial for 
local Abdali agricultural development as his own defeat 
of the Buqtis had been for Sind (2). Aden would benefit 
as Karachi had done; but Merewether received no 
encouragement from London or Bombay.
In June, 1865, Merewether recorded the growing 
scarcity of food in the interior and the dangerous drop 
in Aden's imported grain stocks (3). The summer was a
(1) LA, Res - S of S, 28.1.65.
(2) Cf.T.A.Heathcote, London University Thesis,1969/70, 
"British Policy and Baluchistan 1854 - 1876" on 
Merewether1s actions and experience there.
(3) LA, Res - S. of .S, 17.6.65-.
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dangerous season for shipping travelling between Bombay 
and Aden; Merewether had understandable cause for 
anxiety with only 2 months supplies in Aden. The Fadhlis 
had looted a Sindi vessel, freighted with grain, and a 
Somali vessel, which both came into Shuqra Bay for water. 
Merewether condemned the Fadhli chief; '...the plunder 
received his countenance and sanction if [it wasjnot done 
by his orders...'. When the Fadhlis were starving, it 
is questionable whether their chief could have prevented 
the looting. Merewether's condemnation may have been 
influenced by his own concern at Aden* s loss of the grain 
cargo. Yet, though an Indian ship had been robbed in 
the port where the Fadhli Chief lived, Merewether asked 
for no purely naval action to demand compensation.
Instead he asked for, but was refused, naval support for 
a sea-borne landing to destroy the inland Fadhli 
commercial centre of Assala (l). That implied a wish 
to destroy a Fadhli market rival to Lahej.
In September, Merewether reported the attack by 
Fadhli tribesmen on a caravan, within British limits, 
but outside Aden's defences (2). Merewether described
(1) LA, Res - S of S, 17.6.65.
(2) LA, Res - S of S, 18.9.65.
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the site as 'on acknowledged British ground1, one and 
a half miles from the Barrier Gate* '... Two hundred 
Foodlees suddenly appeared on the road (1);
possibly the Fadhlis pursued the caravan onto British 
claimed territory* But, there were no buildings between 
the defences and Imad; there were no boundary marks; 
and both the Abdalis and the Fadhlis disputed possession 
of the coast between Imad and Aden. Technically, 
Merewether was probably correct. Haines' sketch map 
of 1839 indicated the British limits in the area that 
Merewether mentioned (2)* But raiding within sight of 
Aden was not unusual (3) • It is unlikely that the Fadhli 
action was intended to insult the British, as Merewether 
claimed. But, by tribal custom, no tribe, still less a 
European Power, could let an incident on their territory 
pass unchallenged without loss of face, even if they were 
not involved in the incident (b)•
(1) LA, Res - S of S, 18.9.6?
(2) Map B.
(3) LA, Res - S of S, 28.1*6?
(^ f) J.N. Ellis, OBE, last R.A*,. E.A.P., in a letter. 
of ?*7rl971j to the writer commenting on this 
incident.
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Merewether could take no retaliatory action with 
Aden's resources; and he was not even the garrison 
commander. Campaigning inland was impractical, locally, 
from May to mid October. Dust storms were not uncommon. 
The Aden garrison had neither cavalry nor camelry; and 
the infantry and artillery had no chance of pursuing 
mounted raiders. They also lacked baggage animals. The 
season was even unfavourable for naval operations; and, 
since the disbandment of the Indian Navy in 1863, the 
Residency had suffered from lack of naval support.
On 13th December, Muhammad bin Mohsin, the Abdali 
chief's favourite brother, escorted a highland caravan 
into Aden; he visited Merewether and l... begged that 
some assistance might be rendered ...' to the Abdalis (1). 
He had been sent as Sultan Fadhl's representative to 
forecast that the Fadhlis, under their Chief, were about 
to occupy the southerly Bir Said area (2), '... a part 
of the country which had been fortunate in the extent 
of its cultivation ...' (1), and to harvest its crops.
The Fadhlis, Muhammad alleged, also planned to close the
(1) LA, Res - S of S, 18.12.1865 and to SGB
(2) Described as 1? miles S.S.E. of Lahej (para. *f, 
note 1); it is not marked on Aden maps.
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roads to Aden, knowing '... that the British could do 
nothing about it ...'• It is possible that this statement, 
was inserted by Merewether to justify action against the 
Fadhlis. Merewether wrote l... It was clear to me that 
something must be immediately done to save those crops 
and to show the Fadhli Chief that he would not be allox/ed 
to close the roads or brave us with impunity ...' (1). 
Muhammad claimed that the Abdalis had only enough men to 
defend Lahej•
Merewether applied to the Garrison Commander to 
hold a force in readiness for operations against the 
Fadhlis; and he wrote to Bombay, asking for permission 
to take action and for authority to subsidise the Abdali 
Chief with #MT5000 (1). It is possibly no coincidence 
that this was the original sum earlier advanced to 
Fadhl bin Mohsin by Merewether without authority. 
Merewether accepted the possibly distorted account of 
the Fadhli Chief's ill-will towards, and his contempt 
of, the British. In 1856, Fadhl's brother had vainly 
attempted to blacken the Fadhli Chief's character with 
the British. (2). But General W. Coghlan, the Resident
(1) LA, Res - S of S, 18.12.1865 and to SGB
Bombay, 1859
Playfair 'Arabia Felix'/p.171* Hereafter Playfair
'Arabia *
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had then had the benefit of the Rev. G.P. Badger's 
experience, and of Hormuzd Rassam's. Merewether had 
no such experienced expatriate advisers to assess the 
reliability of the Abdali reports. It is possible 
that Merewether inserted the Fadhli's alleged views 
because they provided the only possible justification 
for British action. Bombay refused to authorise action, 
but Merewether had not awaited approval.
Bir Said was isolated from the principal Abdali 
settlements in an area of thick acacia jungle with open 
clearings. The Fadhlis encamped in a clearing; they 
were reported to be 1,000 strong; and they were so 
confident that they had no scouts posted when the British 
attacked, late in the morning of 22nd December (1). Two 
of the local fields had been harvested by the Fadhlis; 
some of the raiders were picking off the stalk, and 
packing, the looted grain. Others were cooking the 
mid-day meal. Conditions for a British surprise attack 
were ideal. The Fadhlis apparently had no reason to 
fear Abdali, or British, opposition. The Fadhlis were 
'panic stricken' ;\..the Fadhli chief shouted for a 
horse and being put on it fled at once ...' (1). Later,
(1) LA, Res - S of S, 23.12.65
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Merewether, in defence of his action, claimed that 
1••• from the roads being closed, the greatest distress 
would have been experienced by the Garrison and 
inhabitants of Aden - not a drop of water, not a blade 
of grass, nor a bit of wood would have come in so long 
as the Foodlee remained at Bheer Saied and its 
neighbourhood ...' (1).
Merewether's claim is exaggerated; he could have 
repaired the Khormaksar bridge and placed picquets 
between Khormaksar and Shaikh Othman. Water and supplies 
would have come in then in perfect security; water 
would also have continued to be available by boat from 
Hiswa across the Bay. There is no evidence that the 
Fadhlis intended to move beyond Bir Said. Merewether 
mentioned no raiding parties. If there had been any, 
he surely would have used their presence to support his 
action. It is possible that Merewether was merely 
making the best justification he could for his rather 
weak case. That is supported by the Fadhli Chief's offer 
of peace, if he was compensated for the damage inflicted 
upon him by the British (2). By tribal custom that
(1) LA, Res - S of S, 16.1.66
(2) LA, Res - S of S, 2.*+.1866
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would be an injured party1s entitlement for a 
treacherous attack in peacetime. Merewether ridiculed 
the offer (l). He did not suggest that his attack was 
considered to be in breach of a Fadhli understanding 
of British neutrality in tribal affairs (2).
Merewether's action at Bir Said was approved 
retrospectively by the Government of Bombay (3). Sir 
Bartle Frere, the Governor of Bombay, believed that 
there v/ere occasions when an officer was justified in 
acting on his ov/n initiative, in a local emergency, 
without orders (4). There had to be mutual confidence 
between superior and subordinate authorities. Once 
operations had begun, they had to be completed; so 
Merewether marched through the Fadhli area of Abyan
(1) LA, Res - S of S, 2.4.66.
(2) i.e. C.U.Aitchison 'A collection of Treaties, 
Engagements and Sanads', Calcutta 1909,Vol XIII
(Hereafter Aitchison 'Treaties'), No.XXXIII.
Fadhli chief to Resident saying that the British 
were not to interfere in any Fadhli Abdali 
hostilities, but would remain friendly to both sides.
(3) LB, Dispatch No. 7 of 28.2.66 - S of S.
(4J Philip Woodruff 'The Guardians', London, 1954, p.40, 
quoting Frere to Lawrence (hereafter Woodruff 
'Guardians') ........................................
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early in January, with Fadhl bin Mohsin and Abdali. 
supporters. Merewether claimed that his intention was 
to demonstrate the British capacity to operate outside 
Aden, along the coastal plain (1). He exerted pressure 
upon the Fadhlis; some of Ahmad bin Abdullah1 s 
followers submitted; and some of the Fadhli settlements 
in Abyan were destroyed, including the principal centre, 
Assala (2). The Fadhlis did not attempt to oppose 
Merewether. The Anglo-Indian troops' superiority in 
weapons was decisive. The Abdali auxiliaries provided 
the camelry for scouting which the British lacked.
Merewether ascribed the success of his operations in 
1866/67 *••• in great degree ... to the faithful conduct 
of the Abdali chief ... and tribe ...' (Si­
lt is probable that Merewether's ultimate aim was 
to destroy the basis of the Fadhli strength in Abyan, 
so that the Fadhlis could not again threaten Lahej.
The destruction of Assala destroyed a rival market
(1) IOL. Enclosures to Bombay Correspondence to S of S
of 28.2.66. Merewether's Report on the Abyan operations.
(2) Hunter 'Aden' p.l68
(3) AAR 1866/67, para 4-2
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centre of Lahe j; and thereby the Fadhli chief lost 
a major source of revenue. Assala was in a healthy 
position, on the edge of the malarious Abyan delta; and 
it had secure communications to the Fadhli chief at 
Shuqra. By destroying it, Fadhl bin Mohsin probably 
realised, Abyan would deteriorate into an insecure 
border area. The Fadhli client, 'Haidera Mansour1, 
tribe to the north were able to recover virtual 
independence (1). The Yafais were encouraged to 
reoccupy their old position at Jawala (1). It is possible 
that the Abdali chief hoped to replace Fadhli control in 
Abyan by his own, by intriguing with the Yafais and with 
the Haidera Mansour (2). If so, other preoccupations 
intervened.
Merewether was determined to humble the Fadhli 
Chief, to make him surrender unconditionally; he 
therefore urged continuing British pressure after the 
successful Abyan operations (3)- Simultaneously,
(1) See Map G.
(2) Cf. Belhaven 'Road1 p.151 on Abdali ambitions
70 years later.
(3) LA, Res - S of S, 2.*+.66
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Merewether used continuing Fadhli resistance as a 
continuing argument for the early recruitment of 
Irregular Cavalry, which he had requested since January, 
1865 (1)* Events in Abyssinia kept Merewether away from 
Aden from May to December 1866 (2); and shortly 
afterwards, in 1867, he left for Zoula, the Eritrean base 
for the Abyssinian campaign. The Fadhli chief sent his 
eldest son to surrender in Aden in April, I867 (3)* 
Merewether1s peace terms restricted the Fadhlis' 
freedom of action; they might not raid tribes friendly 
to the British; but Merewether did not otherwise 
interfere with their tribal society (4-). The caravan 
routes had to be protected, but that was expected before; 
robbers were to be punished, but that was necessary for 
travellers1 security. The most important condition, as 
events developed, was the requirement that a prominent 
hostage had to stay as a tribal intermediary in Aden.
The Chief's eldest son, Haidera, came; he learnt to
(1) LA, Res - S of S, 28.1.65
(2) AAR 1866/67, para. 4-0
(3) LB, GB° Despatch No. ?8 of 2^.7.67 - S of S
(4-) Aitchison 'Treaties' No. XXXIV of 27.5*67
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understand the British; he made friends with the 
Residency Interpreter and arranged for him to be the 
Fadhli Agent in Aden. As a result, Haidera bin Ahmad 
showed no pro-Ottoman feelings in 1873> during the 
Anglo-Ottoman confrontation, although his father had 
received encouragement from the Ottoman, Ahmad Pasha 
of Hodaida (1).
+ + + + +
Captain W.F. Prideaux wrote, at second-hand, a 
contemporary account of Merewether1s relations with the 
Fadhlis between 1861* and 1867; he accepted that f... it 
is ... alleged, as a reason for the Fadhli Chief1s 
misbehaviour, that our relations with the Sultan of LaheJ 
have become so intimate as to virtually exclude • all 
other Chiefs from a share of our friendship and the 
benefits that accrued therefrom ...' (2). But he blamed 
hostilities upon 1... the character of the Arabs in 
general ...', and upon the courage and stubborn fanaticism 
of Ahmad bin Abdullah in particular (2)* Prideaux
o
(1) LB, G.B Dispatch No. 1 of 12.1.67
(2) AIA, AD III A
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unsympathetically claimed that Ahmad had *... an utter 
disregard of consequences, whether personal to himself, 
or effecting the very existence of his tribe . ..*
and that Ahmad’s attitude arose from his resentment at 
the British possession of Aden. Prideaux*s account was 
the usual source used by later officials and writers (1).
No Fadhli account was available.
Prideaux*s account needs to be read with some 
scepticism; he was in Abyssinia with Rassam*s mission 
while the events were taking place. He had little 
understanding of local conditions; he blamed Ahmad bin 
Abdullah for *... being every ready to afford a safe 
refuge to the perpetrators of [anti-British] atrocities ...*, 
but the Fadhli Chief was obliged by Arab custom to provide 
asylum for fugitives (2). H.F. Jacob recognised that it 
would have been ’... a moral impossibility ...* for the 
Fadhli Chief to surrender, or to expel, such fugitives (3)*
(1) e.g. Hunter ’Aden1 p*201
(2) Cf. Colonial 123 p A 2
(3) H.F. Jacob ’Kings of Arabia*, London, 1923> P*6l.
(Hereafter Jacob ’Kings’). Jacob had then had 
about 20 years experience of S.W. Arabia.
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Prideaux was writing about a.successful action, 
vindicated officially by its results, and approved by 
the Foreign Department and by the Government of Bombay. 
Further, he was probably indebted to Merewether for his 
transfer from the Indian Army to political work (1).
He was unlikely to criticise ap. successful senior officer, 
and, by implication, the Governments which had approved 
that officer’s actions (2).
Playfair referred to the Fadhli tribe’s conversion 
’... from implacable enemies into staunch supporters and 
friends ...' before 1858, as a result of General Coghlan's 
conciliatory policy towards the Fadhli Chief (3)* Playfair 
was accepted as being very experienced in local affairs (*f); 
yet Prideaux acknowledged only a temporary Fadhli change 
of heart, due to Coghlan's operations against the Abdalis 
at Shaikh Othman in 1858, and his conciliatory policy 
towards the Fadhlis. Prideaux*s comments were consistent 
with Merewether *s account of Ahmad bin Adballuh's
(1) 10L, PD, DO Correspondence, 1862-73> Sir John Kaye to 
Brigadier W. Coghlan ± n 7 undated , 1863.
(2) Cf. Tremenheere, p . 2 . * f 7 6 . Trelow - line 10.
(3) Playfair ’Arabia1 p.36
(k) IOL L/P & S/8/10 Vol. 50. Sir J.W. Kaye - Brig.
W. Coghlan 5*12.62.
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behaviour. But there is insufficient evidence to justify 
this view.
PrideauXsuggested that the Fadhli Chief was resentful 
because he received a smaller salvage reward for a 
stranded ship in 186*+ than he had expected. By local- 
custom he would probably have been entitled to half the 
ship*s value. But Ahmad bin Abdalluh*s behaviour was 
amply explained by the predicaments which he found himself 
in. Prideaux*s views were probably different to Playfair*s. 
Playfair supported Coghlan*s policy of direct Residency 
relations with each tribe. Merewether advocated building- 
up the Abdali Chief and then dealing with the other Yemeni 
tribes through him. Prideaux admitted that, but for 
British intervention, the Fadhli Chief would probably 
have absorbed the Abdali area into the Fadhli Confederation.
+ + + + +
Merewether did not declare his intention to build 
up the Abdali chief in his correspondence; that can be 
deduced from his later management of affairs and from 
his comments after he left Aden. Merewether!s policy 
was realistic in the short term; and, if there had been
2.2k
continuity amongst the Aden Residency staff, it might 
have been an economical way of spreading British influence 
through an Anglophile Abdali Chief. It required no 
heavy expenditure of Government money outside Aden; it 
possibly required no additional staff; and there was no 
extra military requirement beyond the proposed 100-strong 
Aden Troop of Irregular Cavalry (1). Merewether argued 
that security in the coastal plain would produce a great 
increase in agriculture. Agricultural wealth would 
provide the resources to finance the Abdali Chief as 
the Paramount Chief. Merewether implied in 1870 that 
Fadhl bin Mohsin had the brains and the courage, but was. 
too lazy, to profit by his opportunities (2).
The truth is probably that a plan such as this was 
impractical; that Merewether was too quick to assume 
1 after ... fifteen years experience on the Frontier of 
Sind r ... [that] the people of the Southern Yemen 
and their habits are so exactly similar that you have 
only to change the name from Belooch to Arab and all 
differences would cease ..., (3)* On the Sind frontier,
(1) 10.19 n.3
(2) AIA 560 f b57. Merewether*s Memo of 2lt.ll.7Q to
SGH. Merewether was then Commissioner for Sind.
(3) LA, Res - S of S, 28.1.65
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John Jacob ftad worked successfully to build up the 
authority of the Khan of Kelat amongst the Beluchi tribes’ 
(1). Frere, as Commissioner of Sind, had delegated 
considerable power to Jacob and had supported his work (2), 
The Beluchis acknowledged the Khan as the leader of their 
confederation5 but the Abdali Chief had little tribal 
backing and his ancestors came from Jauf in northern 
Yemen. There was insufficient basis for a comparison 
with the Beluchis. Merewether did not understand, and 
possibly did not know much about, Yemeni tribal 
organisations*
Merewether was very friendly with Fadhl bin Mohsin; 
the latter was, in a sense, Merewether1 s prot/g/*
Merewether had intervened to support Fadhl for the Abdali 
leadership in 1863. In June, 1865> Merewether was so 
concerned for Fadhl's health, when cholera was raging 
at LaheJ, that he invited him to Aden to convalesce from 
illness (3). By contrast, the elderly Fadhli Chief 
never visited Aden. It is probable that Merewether*s
(1) Deputy Commissioner of the Frontier Districts 
and Commandant of the Sind Horse.
(2) Woodruff 1 Guardians1 p.30
(3) LA, Res - S of S, 17*6l.65
2*26
impressions of Yemen affairs and of local Yemeni leaders 
were largely influenced by Fadhl bin Mohsin. The latter 
had ambitions to regain the Aqrabi area (1); his 
brother Muhammad had ambitions to expand Abdali control 
over the Subaibi area (2); and Fadhl proposed in 1871 
to occupy the Hajariya Province of Southern Yemen. (3)»
He did expand at Haushabi expense in 1868 (*f). The 
evidence of Fadhl1s territorial ambition is clear; and 
Merewether may have believed that Fadhl was the right 
man to develop a single state in Southern Yemen* bound 
to Britain by self-interest. Merewether claimed that 
Sir James Outram had 1... at once . foreseen that no 
Resident could remain *... indifferent to what was going, 
on outside the Barrier Gate • ••* (5)* Merewether tried 
to shape* and probably altered, the course of Yemeni 
development near Aden; but his next two successors 
dissipated much of the local influence that Merewether gained.
+ + -h + +
(1) p.2.31* below
(2) 7.^-2 n.l
(3) P.2. 59 
(W p.2.27-
(5) LA, Res - S of S, 16.1.66
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The Zaida Question1, an Abdali Haushabi quarrel over 
water rights and land.
The Haushabis had long controlled the headworks 
to the traditional Abdali flood irrigation system,; but: 
they seldom exercised their power of seriously annoying 
tbeAbdalis by diverting the water into the desert (1). 
However* increased Abdali security, after the Fadhli 
defeats in 1865 an& in 1866>, gave to the Abdalis 
opportunities for expanding their agriculture. But* 
the greater the area under cultivation, the more important 
it became to the Abdalis to secure control of their 
irrigation system. The Abdali chief and his relatives 
were major landholders; they had benefitted 
disproportionately by the British destruction of Fadhli 
power. They owed their new security to the British; 
they had little need to reward tribal supporters and to 
keep them loyal by customary grants of land and 
conciliatory treatment. Furthermore, the Abdali chief' 
had received money grants from the Residency; he enjoyed 
rising revenue from the new transit tax on caravans, from 
water sales to Aden; and he imposed new monopolies on
(1) Playfair ‘Arabia,1 p*36
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the Abdali area (1). He no longer needed to spend money 
to protect his possessions from the Fadhlis; and with 
his surplus cash he could buy up local land* Fadhl bin 
Mohsin left most of his administrative work to his 
younger brother, Muhammad, who developed new ways of 
raising local revenue (1). The chiefly family were 
criticised by Residency Officers for their avarice, and 
for their selfish exploitation of land, regardless of the 
wider interests of the local community (1). Changing 
social conditions’'made this exploitation easier*. New 
agricultural land could be brought under cultivation 
cheaply by African freed slaves released destitute in 
Aden (2), and by immigrant Yemeni Zabidis, working as 
share-croppers. These circumstances combined to favour 
the rise of a relatively rich family oligarchy at Lahej, 
replacing the more traditional Yemeni tribal system*
In 1867, the Abdali Chief invited the Resident to 
send the 10th Bengal Cavalry to camp near Lahej, until 
they were required for the Abyssinian Campaign (3)*
(1) AIA 560 f W 3, Lt. G.F. Hancock^ Report on Lahej 
of March 1871
(2) IOL, P.D. Memo B85 of 12.11.69 on E. African Coast 
Slave Trade, Res - SGB, 2^.12.68
(3) AAR, 1867/68, para 18
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Fadhl hin Mohsin made himself responsible for providing 
the fodder that the Cavalry needed. Possibly this was 
profitable for him; the Cavalry had approximately 800 
horses and mules (1). There were inroads on the summer 
stock of forage for local needs and a shortage occurred 
amongst the Abdalis (2). Possibly the Abdalis then 
trespassed on grazing within Haushabi limits. In May,
1868* the Haushabis diverted Abdali irrigation water into 
the desert, in retaliation for real or imagined grievances (3)* 
Abdali Haushabi fighting began and there were casualties 
on both sides. The Abdalis occupied the strategic 
Haushabi hamlet of Zaida, which commanded the irrigation 
headworks to the Abdali cultivation, and the Haushabi 
Chief's home village of ArBaha. The Haushabis were 
worsted and accepted Abdali peace conditions.
The Haushabi Chief and his Elders surrendered the 
village of Zaida and its lands, in compensation for 
Abdali losses and expenses during the fighting (3)* The
area provided *... the chief part of the Haushabi
(1) Roberts 'India1 Note p.296
(2) AAR 1867/68, para. 18
(3) AAR 1868/69, para. 37
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revenue . ••' (1), so the Haushabi chief quickly regretted 
his loss. The Resident, Major General E.L. Russel^ tried 
to mediate. He considered the Abdali seizure of Zaida 
unjustified; he advised Fadhl bin Mohsin to return it 
to the Haushabi Chief; but he had no authority to impose 
a solution (2). He did, however, arrange a six-months 
truce; but he gave the Haushabi chief grounds for 
hoping to recover Zaida through British mediation.
Russell did not come to Aden until January 11th, 1868; 
he then went to command the British base at Zoula for 
the Abyssinian Expedition from March 11th until June 21st. 
In Aden, he lacked the benefit of Residency interpreter 
Hormuzd Rassam's experience of Yemeni affairs and his 
senior Assistant, Captain G.R. Goodfellow, was away on 
sick leave until October* 1868. Russell possibly 
overestimated the local impression of the successful 
Abyssinian Campaign and thought that British prestige was 
so high that his mediation would be accepted (3)* His 
intervention was an error of judgement; he raised
(1) AIA 560 f 723, Capt. Prideaux's Report of 19.1*72
(2) AAR 1868/69, para. 37
(3) Of. Roberts 'India1 p.298 for Merewether*s view
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All bin Manaafs hopes falsely, and he showed Fadhl bin 
Mohsin the weakness of a Resident1s position when the 
latter was not prepared, and not authorised, to apply 
pressure to back his judgement. Merewether had made 
Fadhl powerful locally. Russell showed Fadhl that he 
could disregard an indecisive Residents wishes.
The Haushabi chief then tried to obtain support 
from his tribal neighbours for combined action against 
the Abdali chief (1). The old Fadhli chief refused to 
join in; and his successor, Haidera bin Ahmad, tried 
to prevent Merqashi tribesmen assisting the Haushabis in 
1871 (2). Haidera took firm action against such Merqashi 
dissidents as disobeyed him. In January, 1871, the 
Resident reported 'slight skirmishing* on the Haushabi 
Yafai border (3)* The Yafais were possibly encouraged 
to attack by the Abdali chief as there were Abdali Yafai 
marriage ties. Fadhl bin Mohsin complained of a caravan 
being attacked withim Haushabi limits, too (*f)5 it is 
possible that the Abdali complaint was designed to prevent
(1) AAR 68/69, para. 38
(2) AIA 560, Res - SGB, 11.5.71
(3) AIA 560 f 3, Res - SGE, 7*1.71
(1+) AIA 560, Res - SGB), 27.I.7I
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any Anglo^Haushabi rapprochement. The new Resident*
General C.W. Tremenheere, wrote and warned Ali bin 
Manaa that he would *... incur the displeasure of 
Government by permitting such outrages . ..* (1), without 
obtaining the Haushabi version of the incident. The 
Haushabi reply was unconciliatory; but, by February* 
Tremenheere was complaining of Fadhl*s arrogance and 
ambition (2). It is possible that Tremenheere might have 
become more impartial. Ry April, however, Tremenheere had 
become dependent upon Fadhl to extricate him from his 
embarrassments with the nearer Subaihi tribes (3). By 
June, Tremenheere was complaining of the usually impertinent 
Haushabi replies to Residency letters (*+). He asked for, 
and in September obtained, permission to pay the Haushabi 
stipend every 2 months, instead of half-yearly. In 
November, 1871, there was a strong Fadhli raid, led by 
the chief's brother, Husain bin Ahmad, against the 
Haushabis. They seized a large quantity of sheep and
(1) AIA 560, Res - SGB, 27.1.71
(2) AIA 560, Res - SGB, 23.2.71
(3) p.2.52 note 2
(If) AIA 560, Res - SGB, 26.6.71 and G of I 1969 P of
16.9.71
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camels (1).
Tremenheere had demanded that All bin Manaa shohld 
break his tribal obligation to give asylum to fugitives (2) 
and should expel five Merqashis who had lifted 12 camels 
off a caravan in Abdali territory in June, 1871 (3)* 
Tremenheere showed no understanding of Ali bin Manaa1 s 
predicament; he described the Haushabi as 1... insolent 
and treacherous and altogether uncivilized •••* (*f)» 
Tremenheere had little local experience; the views he 
expressed were necessarily based on the information and 
the views that he received from his staff* Salih Jaffer, 
the Residency interpreter, was the Abdali Chief's Agent 
in Aden from 1866; he was the Fadhli Agent from 1867; 
and in 1873 General J.W. Schneider, then Resident* 
admitted that Ali bin Manaa considered Salih biased in 
Fadhl bin Mohsin1 s favour (5)* Captain W.F. Prideaux
Cl) AIA, Aden News 1871, No. 22 of 10-17 Nov.
(2) Cf. with Merewether p.2*21 n*3 above.
(3) AIA 560, Res - SGB, 9.6*71
(b) AIA 560, Res - SGB, 25.8.71
(5) F0 78 275*f f69, Res - SGB, 28*12*73
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described the Haushabi as having f... but little 
influence over his tribe and of a quarrelsome
and untrustworthy disposition ...'(D* Aden was visited 
by both Abdali and Fadhli leaders (2); whereas Ali bin 
Manaa. did not visit it between I87O and 1873* having 
lost confidence in the British.
Abdali Aqrabi relations 1869-1871
Across the harbour from Aden lived the Aqrabi 
tribe whose people had originally been Upper Aulaqi 
mercenaries of the Abdali chief (3)* They seized the 
newly built Abdali fort at Bir Ahmad late in the eighteenth 
century. At that period conditions in the Abdali area.
(1) AIA 560 f723> Prideauxfs Report of 18*1.72
(2) e.g. Aden News 1871, News No. 24- and No. 26.
Fadhl bin Mohsin. and Husain bin Ahmad Fadhli both 
visited within a month of the Fadhli raid on the 
Haushabis.
(3) Statement by the late Mubarak bin Salih, ,&iAulaqi, 
brother of the Upper Aulaqi Sultan^to the writer, 
at Bir Ahmad f in 1959*
+ +
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were disturbed. The Aqrabis maintained their independence 
and earned a reputation for courage (1). They were 
fortunate that the site of Bir Ahmad was not on a 
water-course and was relatively malaria-free and so more 
healthy than that of Lahej (2). The Aqrabis; strengthened 
themselves by an alliance with the Fadhlis before the 
British occupied Aden. The value of this alliance ended 
when the Fadhlis were forbidden to raid Abdali territory 
in 1867.
Evidence of revived Abdali ambitions in the Aqrabi 
area occurred after the Aqrabi sale of the Little Aden 
peninsula to Britain in 1869 (3). The transaction was 
supposed to be secret (4-). Negotiations had been begun 
through the Mansab of Adenr Seiyid Alawi bin Zaim 
AlAidroos. The Arabic document for the sale was: 
prepared by Salih Jaffer acting as Residency Interpreter. 
Shortly afterwards, Salih Jaffer was sent on duty to
C D  Hunter lAdent p. 156
(2) Sinker 1 Keith-Falconer1 pp.234- & 237 makes no mention
of malaria, at B. Ahmad in 188?. It is mentioned at 
Lahej Cp.233).
(3) IOL, AR, AAR 1868/69, para. 39 and Aitchisom 1 Treaties1 
No. XLI of 2A.69
(If) IOL, pi(, AIA 560 f 560
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Lahej. On Salih*s return, Fadhl bin Mohsin wrote from 
Lahej complaining that the area sold was Abdali, not 
Aqrabi, territory.
Brigadier W.M. Coghlan had made an agreement in 1863 
with the Aqrabi Shaikh.which provided that Little Aden 
should not be sold to foreigners (1). Coghlan, after 
8 years in Aden, had no doubt that the peninsula was an 
Aqrabi possession (2). He had long wanted to acquire it, 
and had often discussed its purchase with his Assistants, 
Captain Playfair and Mr. Rassam (2). But, having 
acquired Perim on his own initiative, Coghlan could not 
suggest a similar initiative at Little Aden until the 
criticism over his occupation of Perim had quietened 
down. He had, however, considered the status of Little 
Aden carefully (3)* His local informant was Seiyid 
Alawi bin Zain who was then the Abdali chief1s agent in 
Aden. The Seiyid was also Mr* Rassam*s intermediary
Cl) IOL, Pol. Dept. 10 DO *62-73? page 23, Kaye to 
Coghlan 18.2.63
(2) IOL, Pol. Dept. 10 DO *62-73? Coghlan to Kaye, 
13* 12.62
(3) IOL, Pol. Dept. 10 DO letters *62-73. Memo by 
Kaye of 6.10*62 quoting a letter from Mr. Rassam
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with the Yemeni tribe s. As the Man sab of Aden and a. 
religious leader, he was respected by the tribes* He 
had every opportunity of assessing correctly where the 
rights to ownership lay*
It is difficult to see how the Abdali chief could 
have had any effective claim to, or control over, Little 
Aden. It was not continguous to the Abdali area and 
the Abdalis had no coastal settlement after losing Aden.
The Abdali chief did not control the Subaihis. On the 
Hydrographic Office Chart of the Gulf of Aden, the 
'Akrabi Tribe* was marked between Bir Ahmad and the 
anchorage of -Bander F.lka.- [ilr Fuqm, Ba0 (1).
Beyond, to the west, the ‘Subeihi Tribe* was written in.
The Abdali area did not approach Little Aden.
During the Resident1^  absence on leave, the young 
and impetuous Captain Goodfellow was officiating as 
Resident; he reacted as if the Abdali claim was justified. 
He demanded that the Aqrabi Shaikh should refund the 
purchase price and he accused Seiyid Alawi of misleading 
the Residency staff (2). Plainly, Abdali influence upon
(1) Admiralty Chart based on Haines IB36 Survey and 
revised by the RN Surveys of I860 and L87I.
(2) IOL, JbSC, AIA 560, Rev. G. Badger to Resident on 
behalf of Seiyid Alawi, 2.3.71-
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Goodfellow was strong. It was possibly exercised through 
Salih Jaffer. Goodfellow was offered back the purchase 
price by the Aqrabi chief in exchange for the return of 
the Aqrabi*s signed agreement to the sale. That 
Goodfellow refused, so the Aqrabi kept the purchase money; 
but Goodfellow continued to doubt the validity of the 
Aqrabi claim* T/tfhen Hus sell returned to Aden, the Resident 
chided Seiyid Alawi for allowing the purchase to be made 
from the Aqrabi, and not from the Abdali chief. Only 
after an intervention by Mr. Rassam did Russell accept 
that the Seiyid had acted correctly* Fadhl also 
proposed action against the Aqrabis to recover Hiswa*
He asked for the assistance of the Residency steamer, 
so that he could attack the Aqrabis from Aden harbour*
His request was refused*
+  -h +  *  +
How the British acquired rights at Hiswa
Hiswa was mainly valuable for the water drawn from 
it for Aden; it provided 5*000 gallons daily (1). The
(1) L/P&S/6 Letters & Encl. from B°, Res - SGB 19.3*72,
21*9*72 forwarded to S of S 23.1.73
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area had been transferred to the Seiyid by the Aqrabis 
in 18^9* That transfer was acknowledged by the ruling 
Abdali chief, thus admitting that the area was not 
claimed by him. But, when the Seiyid made arrangements 
to sell the water, the Abdali chief claimed that any 
such right belonged to him. That claim was rejected by 
Badger, writing on Seiyid Alawi1s behalf (1). Land and 
water rights were not separate. In this case, there 
were, of course, no riparian landowners below Hiswa who 
could claim to suffer from an abnormal withdrawal of 
water above their land.
The Aqrabis disputed the Abdali claim because an 
effective occupation of Hiswa would have placed the 
Abdalis astride the caravan route from Bir Ahmad to:
Aden and would have threatened Bir Ahmad. Aqrabi Abdali 
hostilities began again; and, in 1850, involved the 
British when the Aqrabis mistook a watering party from 
the 'Auckland1 for official British naval support for the 
Abdalis (2). Later, Fadhl bin Mohsin claimed that Captain
(1) p.2.37 n*2 above
(2) Hunter 'Aden1 p.166. Hunter did not understand the 
reason given by Badger in Note 1 above
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Haines had asked the Abdalis to take action, on hehalf 
of the British, against the Aqrabis* Fadhl claimed 
that Haines had thereby recognised Abdali authority over 
the Aqrabis, and Fadhl hoped to recover Aqrabi territory.
Fadhl was prepared, as an alternative, to claim from 
the British the subsequent expense of Abdali operations 
against the Aqrabis*
In l85*+» Hiswa was recognised by Resident Sir James 
Outram as being the property of Seiyid Alawi. The claim 
was not disputed then by either the Aqrabis or Abdalis.
Outram held a meeting there with tribal leaders at which 
Badger was present as interpreter ahd!;tribal adviser to 
the Resident. The Seiyid offered the area to Outram (1).
It was not officially annexed but Outram and his 
successors did establish a Government garden there to 
grow vegetables for Aden; and a British fort was 
constructed and manned to protect the garden in 1866 (2).
The Abdali chief retaliated for the sale of Little 
Aden by threatening action in 1869 against Seiyid Alawi 
and against the Aqrabis. Goodfellow told the Seiyid that
(1) IOL, AR, AIA 560 f 551 - Badger of 19*^*71 to Tremenheere.
(2) Hunter 'Aden1 p.68
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Fadhl bin Mohsin claimed MT#90°0 in unpaid rent for the 
Seiyid's use of the Hiswa area. A case was brought 
against the Seiyid in the Aden Qadhifs Court by Fadhl 
bin Mohsin. The Qadhi and the Seiyid were on bad terms; 
and the Qadhi refused Seiyid Alawi*s request to adjourn 
the case to allow time to prepare an answer. Judgement 
was awarded in Fadhl bin Mohsin*s favour. Seiyid Alawi 
feared that he would be imprisoned for debt if he did not 
settle with the Abdali chief. He therefore paid MT#6000 
through Salih Jaffer, who had offered his services as an 
intermediary. According to the Seiyid, a receipt which 
Salih promised was never forthcoming. The background to 
this case probably contributed to Goodfellow*s original 
conviction that the Abdali chief had documentary claims 
in the area which invalidated any Aqrabi right to sell 
Little Aden.
Seiyid Alawi1 s account of the events, as set out by 
Badger, leads to suspicion of Salih Jaffer*s integrity (1).
But Badger had strong prejudices against the latter*s 
father, *... a scoundrel1, who was only sent out of Aden 
because of the insistence of Captain S.B. Haines1 assistant...1.
(1) p.2.37 n .2
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Badger also disapproved of Haines. Badger carried his 
dislike of the father into a suggestion that Salih Jaffer 
had apparently misled General Russell so that the latteir 
did Seiyid Alawi *a grave injustice1 by accepting 
Abdali claims to Hiswa. Badger was, however, supported 
by Brigadier W. Coghlan. The latter described Seiyid 
Alawi as 1... the best and truest friend Her Majesty's 
Government had ...' in Aden, and a particularly valuable 
friend during the Indian Mutiny (1).
Russell wished to avoid an Abdali-Aqrabi conflict 
over Hiswa. The Abdali chief alleged that he had 
1... listened to him j^RusselQ and felt a firm 
consideration H  that M  should obtain ... 
these Akrabees ... under [Abdalij rule ... or 
compensation for the large sum of money ... expended ...1 
at Haines1 request against the Aqrabis from 1850 (2). But 
the Resident had no authority for intervening in Aqrabi 
or Abdali affairs, or for suggesting that past Abdali 
expenses would be reimbursed. Vlhateveir settlement Russell
(1) AIA 560, Coghlan - Tremenheere, 17A.71
(2) IOL, AIA 560 f If95? Fadhl bin Mohsin -
Tremenheere, 27.6. 7 L^
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could achieve between the two tribes depended upon his 
personal powers of persuasion. Russell first persuaded 
the Aqrabi chief to surrender his claims to the Hiswa 
area to the British, arguing that that was better for 
the Aqrabi than the insecurity of feuding with the 
Abdalis. Russell then secured Abdali recognition of 
British control, although Fadhl bin Mohsin said, after 
Russels departure in December I87O, that he expected a 
large reward for his compliance (1)#
Russell had asked Bombay to approve a payment of 
MT#5000 to the Abdali chief, in settlement of the latter1s 
claims in the Aqrabi area, in the autumn of 1870* The 
Residencyfs letter was overlooked in Bombay, and, for 
nearly a year no action was taken (2). The silence was 
embarrassing to the new Resident, General C.W. Tremenheere, 
who had arrived early in December, 1870# It weakened his 
position vis-a-vis Fadhl bin Mohsin and placed Tremenheere 
on the defensive, when the unanswered Abdali claims were
Cl) AIA 560 f 518, Fadhl b. Mohsin - Tremenheere,
16.11*71
(2) AIA 560 f k79 para. 2 of G.B0,s 375^ of 15.8*71 
- For. Dept., G of I.
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again pressed in June L87I.
By June, 1871, Tremenheere had been forced 
reluctantly to depend upon Fadhl bin Mohsin in delicate 
negotiations with the Subaihis. Tremenheere1s own 
mistakes further weakened his influence as Resident over 
the Abdali chief* Fadhl bin Mohsin advised Tremenheere 
to adjudicate the Abdali Aqrabi claims personally, or 
to remain outside the quarrel and leave the two tribes 
to settle the issue finally by war (1). Fadhl. was 
confident that he could coerce the Aqrabi on his own, 
if the Resident did not wish to be troubled. Fadhl 
was however to be disappointed (2). Aqrabi independence 
was recognised by the Bombay Government and the Abdalis 
were offered an ex-gratia payment of MT#2500 in 
settlement of all their claims; in the Aqrabi area. That 
decision deprived the Abdali chief of his earlier freedom 
of action. Other factors may have influenced Fadhl bin 
Mohsin. He may have had second thoughts on the practicality 
of collecting enough money or mercenaries to overcome the
(1) AIA 560 f Fadhl b. Mohsin - Tremenheere,
rec *d 27.6*71.
(2) p*2 A 5 n.2
600-odd, tough, Aqrabis, Or, he may have been concerned 
to maintain British goodwill as the extent of Ottoman 
successes in Asir became clear, bringing the likelihood 
of Ottoman intervention in the Yemen nearer(l). Fadhl 
may even have felt that his personal relations with 
Tremenheere had deteriorated so far that it would be 
unwise to defy him over the Aqrabis, In November, 1871,
Fadhl renounced any intention of settling the dispute 
by force (2).
In the spring of 1871 there was a drought and forage 
was scarce (3). The Subaihis were, under ordinary 
conditions, poor; and, now being hungry, caravans passing 
through the MansouriC1*) section* s territory were pilfered (?)• 
Subaihi interference interrupted Adenfs supply of
(1) Cf, p.2.6l n,2
(2) IOL, AR, AIA f 518, Fadhl b. Mohsin - Tremenheere 
3rd Ramadhan, 16.11,71
(3) IOL, AR, AIA 560, Res 12V85& of 2.6.71 to SGB
(*+) See Map R
(5) IOL, AR, AIA 560, Res 66A53 of 2*f.3.71
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cheaper quality qat (1) from the Matjtari area of
Hajariya (2). This qat was popular with the poorer1
members of Adenls population. Its absence was keenly 
felt and resented. Any local impression of weakness that
resulted from a failure to restore supplies was damaging
to British prestige. The sale of qat was farmed-out as 
a monopoly to a concessionaire, who paid RSMDOO p.a. to the 
administration. The concessionaire complained to the 
Residency about his losses. On several occasions, qat 
had been looted from caravans. In selecting the best 
bundles, in the centre of the packages, the protective 
packaging had been disarranged leading to muchcf the 
load drying out and so losing its value. Tremenheere 
failed to gain the Abdali chiefs assistance to check 
this looting (3); he therefore felt obliged to intervene 
directly (3).
Tremenheere, and his Assistants, had insufficient
(1) *catha . edulis1, a shrub growing in the Yemen and 
Abyssinian hills. It's dioots and small leaves were 
chewed for relaxation. The taste is bitter. The 
local effect is to stimulate the chewer and make 
him talkative.
(2) IOL, AR, AIA 560, Res 73/521 of 7A.71 to SGB
(3) AIA 560 f 6^7> Fadhl bin Mohsin - Tremenheere, rec*d
26.3.71
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information available about the Subaihi area to judge 
whether the Aden Troop should be used there; but 
Tremenheere had no choice if he was to take action* He 
later argued that he wished to operate directly, and not 
through the Abdali chief, against the Subaihis Cl). The 
file records contradict Tremenheere * s statement. It was> 
only afterwards that he condemned his predecessors' 
excessive reliance on Fadhl; and even then, he did not 
think it politic to write that to Bombay; the criticism 
was crossed out in the draft in Tremenheere*s handwriting.
Tremenheere*s instructions to the Aden Troop's 
Commandant were vague; too much was left to Captain G*S* 
Stevens' discretion. The operation was definitely an 
offensive patrol. Stevens was to surprise the Subaihi 
Mansouri section and take *••* the principal chiefs of 
the Tribe and bring them as prisoners to Aden ...' (2)* 
That was not 'treating directly* with the Mansouris, as 
Tremenheere subsequently told Bombay his aim had been (3)*
Cl) IOL, J>af, AIA 560, Res 103-691 of ^.5.71 - SGB:
(2) AIA 560 f 617) Res. tumo. note of 5«^*71 - Stevens
(3) AIA 560, Res 79/566 of l^A.71 - SGB
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But Tremenheere was then trying to reduce official 
censure for risking the Troop beyond reach of support 
and for involving the Residency in tribal affairs.
Since Stevens had been at Aden under two years, he could 
not have 'treated directly1 with the Subaihi tribesmen 
without an interpreter. He had no previous acquaintance 
with them and inadequate Arabic.
The incident illustrates how little information the 
Aden Residency possessed about the surrounding area in 
1871 (1). Tremenheere did not know that Stevens would 
have to cover '... some seventy eight miles of bad ground 
...' in 20 hours. The Troop had covered a considerable 
mileage in the 2b hours before that. It had gone 
originally to Lahej, believing that to be the best route 
to Dar alKudaimi. They then retraced their steps to 
Bir Ahmad. There they obtained a guide# When the Troop 
met some tribesmen whom the guide identified as the 
caravan looters there was no interpreter to act as an 
intermediary and to explain to the startled tribesmen 
what was required of them (2). Stevens and his men were
(1) IOL, AIA 560, Stevens Report of 8.^.71 - Res., para. 16
(2) Cf. AIA 560 f 659, Abdali chief's letter to Tremenheere
of l1*.1*.?! expressed his view that an intermediary
was essential.
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unsupported, in unfamiliar country and facing unknown 
adversaries. There were only 13 of the latter, and 
they were heavily outnumbered by a better armed enemy, 
but the terrain was unfavourable for cavalry and familiar 
to the tribesmen* Both sides were suspicious of the 
other* It is not surprising that a' sharp 1 fight 
occurred* 8 tribesmen were killed, 3 escaped and 2 were 
captured.
Stevens reported that the Troop had entered the 
foothills of the Yemen mountains behind the coastal plain*. 
They had crossed over a low pass through the first range 
of foothills to reach their objective. Once firing began, 
neighbouring tribesmen were aroused* They were seen 
running along the hillside, between the Troop and the 
coastal plain, to secure positions overlooking the pass 
so that they could prevent the Troop retreating to safety* 
The Troop*s horses were tired after hard going over 
difficult country* Some were heavily loaded carrying 
two riders to transport the prisoners and troopers whose 
horses had been killed in the first action* The party 
retreated in haste; by ‘trotting out* the Troop reached 
the coastal plain with only stray shots at them from 
long range. But the margin of safety was narrow*
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Tremenheere had been in Aden less than four months 
and none of his staff at the Residency knew the area 
where the operation occurred. The Resident had tried 
to countermand the operation after Stevens had left 
Lahej. Tremenheere was an Engineer, not a Cavalry 
officer, but his use of the Troop might have been acceptable, 
if it had been operating on the coastal plain. There, 
the Troop would have dominated the tribesmen and the 
latter would have had no chance of escape. Tremenheere 
had believed that the tribesmen would have surrendered 
once their escape was cut off. He had rashly instructed 
Stevens to find, and bring in, the looters, without 
warning him not to operate beyond the coastal plain*
He did not send Bombay a copy of these operational 
instructions; and Bombay never asked for one.
The Government of India approved Stevens 1... commendable 
vigor H  and judgement in the difficult circumstances 
in which he found himself placed ..., (1). But the Foreign 
Department realised clearly from Stevens1 report how 
narrow the margin had been between success and an
(1) AIA 560, For. Dept. (Aitchison) letter of ^.7.71 
forwarded to Res. by SGE 10.8.71
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expensive fiasco. A retaliatory operation would then 
have been necessary to restore British prestige. Such 
an operation was beyond the capacity of Aden's existing 
garrison. A military reverse had been avoided by good 
luck and by Stevens1 leadership, but the operation was 
still a British involvement in Yemeni tribal affairs*
That was contrary to official policy; and Tremenheere 
was reprimanded (1). Once the incident had occurred, 
Tremenheere was anxious to extricate the Residency from 
Subaihi affairs without incurring further criticism.
In the absence of experienced British advisers Tremenheere 
was obliged to turn to the Abdali chief as his intermediary* 
The Abdali had told Tremenheere before the operation that 
he was unable to prevent the Subaihis raiding his own 
subjects (2). The chief's first reaction was to welcome 
Stevens* operation (3)* Later, he criticised aspects of
(1) J&L, AIA 560, For. Dept. G of I, No. 1379P of b.?.71
sent with SGK 3670 10*8*71 to Res*
(2) p»2 .^ f6 n .3
(3) IOL, bjtf, AIA 560 f 659> English translation (only) 
of Abdali letter of l^A.?! - Res*
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it; and he assured the Resident rather brazenly that, 
had he been asked, 1... he would have brought the 
offending chiefs and their followers into Aden to be 
dealt with ,,,* as the Resident thought fit (1). The 
Abdali chief conveniently forgot his earlier protestations 
of impotence. He had an interview with the Resident on 
9*5«71> after the Resident had reluctantly left to him 
all arrangements for settling the British differences: 
with the Subaihis (2), Tremenheere was reluctant to 
trust Fadhl because he believed that the Abdali chief 
encouraged the Subaihi looting of caravans (3). Fadhlr 
for his part, tried to strengthen his own position. He 
suggested that the Resident should confer with him as to 
*••• the best means of settling the country ,,,f whenever 
cases like the current Subaihi difficulty arose (2)*
Fadhl bin Mohsin had begun by warning the Resident 
in April of the need to conciliate the Atifis (*f),
(1) IOL, JSCj AIA 560, Res 103-691 of ^.5*71 - SGB
(2) IOL, AIA 560 f 685, Memo of Interview
(3) AIA 560, p.673? Tremenheere1 s IO3/69I of 5*71
- SGB, para. 11
(*f) See Map D
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Three of their tribesmen had been killed by the Aden 
Troopers. Fadhl bin Mohsin expected that the Atifis 
would seek revenge (1). But it appears that the Abdali 
chief did not then realise that he would be Tremenheere*s 
intermediary. It is possible that Salih Jaffer explained 
Tremenheere*s dilemma and led Fadhl to realise how he 
might profit as an intermediary by the Resident*s 
difficulties. Once Fadhl was appointed as the intermediary 
with the Subaihis, he disregarded his own earlier advice 
to the Resident - and the Atifi claims. Fadhl had his 
own quarrel with the Aqrabis (2). It therefore suited him 
that the Atifis should be at feud with the Aqrabis. The 
latter had provided guidance for the Troopers to Dar 
al Kudaimi.
The Atifis made clear by June that they intended to 
pursue their feud; and that they recognised no right of 
the Resident to intervene between them and the Aqrabis (3). 
They were, however, prepared to accept blood money for
(1) AIA 560 f 659> Abdali chief - Tremenheere of l^A.71
(2) See p.2*38- p.2.
(3) AIA 560, Atifi letter - Res. rec*d 20.6.71
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their men killed by the Aden Troop; and they were 
willing to accept a stipend for allowing travellers to 
pass through their territory. At the same time, they 
emphasized that they were Ottoman subjects under the 
Pasha at Hodaida. In the same month, the Atifis killed 
an Aqrabi. The Resident recognised that the murder was 
in retaliation for the Atifi deaths at Dar al Kudaimi*
But he deleted that admission in his draft from his report 
to Bombay, possibly to avoid renewed censure (1).
Fadhl. arranged in May for stipends for the Rijai, 
Mansouri and Makhdumi sections of the Subaihi, on the 
grounds that the caravan route from Mafalis crossed 
Rijai territory and the route from Madrajah passed through 
the other two sections1 territory* On the grounds that 
no caravan route passed through Atifi territory, that 
larger section were not offered a stipend* But, in fact, 
a very minor route did pass through Atifi country. It 
is possible that the Resident knew the relative strengths 
of the three favoured sections, but not the extent of their 
territories, when he accepted the Abdali chief1s proposals.
(1) AIA 560 f 7*+7, Res - SGB
2*55
A report was prepared at the Residency on the tribes 
near Aden in August (1)*
The Abdali chief proposed a stipend of MTj#fO p.m.
for the small Rijai section, with an estimated fighting
strength of 30 men, and only MTJ325 p*nu each for the
other two sections. The Makhdumis fighting strength
c
was also 30, but the Mans^iris were 300 strong. These 
3 sections were the Subaihi sections nearest to the 
Abdali chief. They were potential raiders of Abdali 
crops and livestock. They were also poor and they were 
useful mercenaries who could be hired, publicly or 
secretly, for use against Fadhl bin Mohsinfs enemies.
It appears that the Rijaiswere treated most favourably 
because they were the most accessible section; because 
they possessed the only permanent settlement; and because 
Abdali influence over the Rijais could divert the caravan 
route from Mafalis away from Aqrabi territory into 
Abdali territory. The Aqrabis would lose, and the AbdaAs 
gain, transit taxes. In addition, RiJ43- complicity would 
assist the Abdali chief to harass the Aqrabis.
The Resident spent a considerable sum of money
(1) AIA 560 f 7*+7> Prideaux*s Memo sent by Res - SGB, 25.8.71
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through the Abdali chief during the latter1s negotiations 
with these sections at Shaikh Othman. Tremenheere paid 
out MT&L800, including MT#500 representing Fadhl1s 
expenses for hospitality (1)* Since the Hijais had 
previously been accustomed to an annual present of MT#12 
p.a. from the Residency (2), they had reason to be 
impressed by the benefits of the Abdali chief acting as 
their spokesman, with Salih Jaffer as the Residency1s (3).
The Resident described the proposed stipends to
1.•• the three principal Soobahee Chiefs whereby traffic
on the roads through their country will be entirely 
exempted from all dues •••* (If). He claimed that these 
stipendiary agreements would give the British an
influence over the Soobahee tribe which has never hitherto 
been obtained and will prove an effectual check upon the 
predatory habits of the people •••' (If). It would be
(1) AIA 560 f 685, Memo of Abdali chief1 s interview of 
9.5.71, para* 5
(2) AIA 560 f 21. According to a note in the file margin.
(3) AIA 560 f 685, as proposed by the Abdali chief at
his interview toith the Res. 9*5*71
(If) AIA 560 f 691, Res - SGB
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easier to accept Tremenheere1s assessment of the situation 
as his honest opinion, if he had not disguised the causes 
of the Atifi murder of an Aqrabi in June as due to 
*... a long standing blood feud ...., (1). Tremenheere1s 
description of the three Subaihi sections was neither 
accurate nor responsible. Possibly Tremenheere was 
misled by the Abdali chief. But those sections certainly 
were not, as Tremenheere claimed, 1... the principal 
[Subaihi] sections..1 *, Indeed, by August, Tremenheere 
admitted that the Subaihi were a very fragmented tribe.
The chiefs of the Rijais and the Mansuris were described 
as *... treacherous and mean ...' (2).
The Government of India approved the agreements in 
August, 1871* but emphasised that 1... in future as few 
engagements of this kind [should] be entered into as 
possible ...*. 1... Our position at Aden by no means
entails upon us the duty of making safe for travellers 
roads and tracts over any large portion of the district 
and deserts around the Fortress ...* (3).
(1) p. 2#5*+ u.l above
(2) AIA 560 f 712, Res - SGB, 25*8.71
(3) AIA 560 f 733, For.Dept., G of I, No.l799P of
25.8.71 quoted in B° Res11 No JObk of 20.10.71
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The Atifis1 reaction showed that the new agreements 
aroused jealousy and resentment amongst tribal sections 
who received nothing (1)* whilst the sections which 
received stipends found them in time an insufficient 
inducement for giving up highway robbery (2).
Tremenheere*s account of the affair was accepted 
by later writers (3)* But Tremenheere had first 
intervened in internal Yemeni affairs when he sent the 
Troop out; and he then proceeded to make a much more 
lasting commitment to three insignificant sections 
without any authority to do so. He relied upon the 
Abdali chief, whom he did not trust, and had criticised 
at the end of February, to extricate himself from a 
situation which he did not understand. Ultimately, 
Tremenheere was considered locally as having arranged the 
tribal stipends as a form of blood-money payment, for 
the Subaihis (1). The Fadhli chief had asked Merewether
(1) AIA 5^0 f 7*+9* Shaikh Salih bin Rajih and others 
of the Atifis to the Resident, rec*d 20.6.71
(2) Ingrams 1Arabia1 p.Ill quoting the Rijai chief
(3) Hunter*Aden1 p.169
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for comparable compensation for what had seemed to the 
Fadhli to be an unjustified attack (1). Merewether had 
refused, but he did report the demand, if not the 
reasons behind it, to Bombay. Tremenheere did not.
+ + + + +
Abdali ambitions in the Yemen
The collapse of central authority within the Dhu 
Muhammad confederation and the consequent decline in 
their influence in southern Yemen in 1871 apparently 
aroused Fadhl bin Mohsin*s ambition. He informed 
Tremenheere by letter that he proposed to visit him at 
the end of January. During the interview that followed, 
Fadhl suggested that the British should intervene in 
Southern Yemen to rescue it from anarchy (2). He claimed 
to have had many requests for intervention and assurances 
of local support (3)* He was confident that the country 
would accept British ‘rule1* But his proposals,
(1) p.2*15 n .2
(2) IOL, AR, AIA 560, Res 19/1^7 of 27.1*71 - SGB
(3) AIA 560, Res if0/236 of 23.2.71, para. 6
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understandably, gave a key role to his personal position, 
and he was nominally independent.
Fadhl proposed that a force of 500 British troops, 
and a subsidy of R$300,000 would be required. In 
return, he offered the British MT#25,000 p.a., half the 
estimated annual revenue of the district. He emphasized 
that the British would then also control the coffee 
exports of Southern Yemen. The area Fadhl proposed for 
occupation included Taiz, Ibb and Jibla. It covered 
much of the Shafai tribal territory of south Yemen.
As an alternative, the Abdali chief proposed that he 
should act on his own, using tribal mercenaries and 
relying on the offers of local support that he had 
received. He had already begun collecting money for 
hiring mercenaries. He asked Tremenheere if the British 
would object to such an initiative on his part. 
Tremenheere gave him no encouragement. In the Resident1s 
view, the operation would be expensive for the Abdali 
chief, and, if successful, the benefit might ultimately 
go to some mercenary leader, beyond British influence. 
Fadhl would remain dependent upon his mercenaries. 
Tremenheere complained to Bombay that *... prosperity 
and the attentions which he received on ... his visit
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to India j[in I879I appear to have turned [[Fadhl fs) 
head.Ml)* Fadhl had been invited to Bombay to be 
present during the Duke of Edinburgh1 s visit. Fadhl 
was accompanied by Salih Jaffer, the Residency Interpreter, 
and they also visited Hydrabad.
By February, I87I, Fadhl bin Mohsin was already 
concerned about Ottoman intentions in the Yemen (2)*
He asked the Resident what the Ottoman aims were in Asir. 
From reports Fadhl had received from merchants in Mocha 
of remarks made by the Raim Makam there, Fadhl feared 
that Ottoman activities might expand southwards into 
the Yemen. He asked Tremenheere for his opinion. 
Tremenheere believed that he had reassured local opinion 
that the Ottomans would not move south towards Aden. But 
Fadhl declared that he would postpone his own action in 
Southern Yemen until Ottoman intentions there were 
clearer.
Fadhl continued his ostensible preparations for 
expanding his authority in the Yemen, undeterred by 
Tremenheere1s coolness* In March, Tremenheere reported
(1) IOL, . AIA 560, Res W 2 8 6  of 28.2.71, para. 11
(2) As note 1 above, para, b
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a rumour that Fadhl was negotiating to acquire the Taiz 
district (1). In June, the proposal was described to 
Bombay in detail (2)* The Residency information came 
from !a confidential agent* of the chief of Taiz, Hasan 
bin Naji alBahr. It appears unlikely that the information 
would have come to Tremenheere unless that suited Fadhl*s 
purposes* The Residency appeared to have had no earlier 
contact with Hasan and it was in no way involved in the 
negotiations or in financing the scheme»
Fadhl had agreed to pay Hasan MT^^jOOO for control 
of Hajariya, with monthly payments of MT#1,600 for a 
garrison of 200 soldiers who were to remain under Hasan*s 
command (3)« But the plan was never carried out. No 
explanation was given by the Resident why Fadhl did not 
go further* There were, however, formidable obstacles, 
apart from the continuing -uncertainty over future Ottoman 
plans* The Abdali area was separated from Hajariya by 
the territory of the bitterly hostile Haushabi chief
Cl) IOL, / ^  AIA 560, Res 69A 6I of 25.3.71 - SGB;
(2) AIA 560, Res 150/981 of 30.6.71 - SGB
(3) AIA 560, Res No.32 of 3*7.71 - S of S
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to the norths The main trade route between Taiz and 
Lahej passed through difficult country under Haushabi 
control. The route to the west through the Subaihi 
country was less used, no easier, and possibly no safer 
for the Abdalis. Fadhl bin Mohsinfs proposed occupation 
of Hajariya may have been a ruse to justify the collection 
of funds and mercenaries for a sudden attack on the 
Aqrabis. Fadhl reasserted his claims over the latter in 
June (1); and that month the Hajariya chiefls 'confidential 
agent1 gave the Residency details of the heavy expenditure 
to which Fadhl was committing himself. But Fadhl had no 
opportunity of using mercenaries against the Aqrabis in 
the cooler weather from October to April because the 
Government of Bombay's recognition of Aqrabi independence 
was received at Aden in September (2.).
+ + + + +
First contacts with interior tribes
During the latter part of Merewether's, and the
(1) See p.2.^4- n.l
(2) IOL, AR, AIA 560 f k99, G.B°s 375^ of 15.8.71 - 
For.Dept.
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first part of RusselL's, period as Resident contact with 
the interior increased (1). Caravans could pass through 
Fadhli country in safety and most of Aden's supplies 
during 1867/68 were brought from or through, the Fadhli 
area, instead of the Abdali area as before (2). Aden's 
population was increasing rapidly by immigration. The 
Abyssinian expedition and Aden's use as a staging post 
for troops and ships for it had impressed the Yemenis.
In 1868/69 '••• more Chiefs [had] visited Aden to pay 
their respects and to become acquainted with the British 
Government than [had] ever come in before ...' (3). 
Members of the Fadhli and Abdali ruling families made 
more frequent visits to Aden and wanted closer contacts 
with the Residency than before; and the Abdali chief 
showed his trust in the British by asking to have his 
children educated in Aden (*f). Strange visitors came from
(1) IOL, ^  AAR 1867/68, para 18. From 186?
(2) As note 1 above, para 17• It was probably still 
suffering from the after effects of the earlier 
drought and epidemics.
(3) AAR 1868/69, para 35
(^) As note 3 above, paras 38 & 36. In the Yemen children 
were usually left as hostages of necessity and not 
from choice.
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farther afieM, too, and the more important ones included 
the son and brother of the Upper Aulaqi Sultan (1), who 
were the first official tribal visitors from their area.
The Upper Aulaqi Shaikh, Farid bin Nasr, who was at feud 
with his neighbour, the Upper Aulaqi Sultan, arrived 
soon after to ask for help in his quarrel (2). He was 
told that Government policy prevented any such intervention 
in internal Yemeni affairs. These visits helped to 
strengthen the British claim to influence over a wide 
area in the interior when the Anglo-Ottoman confrontation 
occurred in 1873* At the time, these visits had little 
significance; and Lahej had long had connections with 
all these areas.
+ + + + +
Consideration of an expansion of Aden settlement from 
May 1870 to August 1871 to neutralize some effects of 
the opening of the Suez Canal
Brigadier E.L. RusseHhad recognised in the spring
( 1 )  A IA  560 f  1 7 ,  Res l f l / 2 8 7  o f  2 3 .2 .7 1
(2 )  A IA  560 f  29 , Res 9 V 6 5 5  o f  27A . 7I
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of I.869 that the new Canal would 1... make Aden an 
entrepot of European trade with the east and the chief 
coaling station ...* for shipping on that route (1). In 
his view, before the Canal was opened, the British 
position at Aden needed to be reassessed. Russell foresaw 
that the post would have a greatly increased strategic 
value and would need better defences. No attempt was 
made to suggest a new British policy towards the Yemen 
until June, I87O. It is possible that the Aden Annual 
Report for I869/I87O provided the stimulus. In July, 
the Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay, W. 
Wedderburn, submitted a Memorandum suggesting a new policy (2).
Wedderburn proposed that the whole Abdali area should 
be taken over so that 1.... foreign nations could be
prevented from taking up positions manifestly antagonistic
or injurious to British interests...1. He noted that the 
French had already acquired a foothold at Shaikh Said (3); 
and he anticipated the competition of other European 
nations, attracted into the area by the new opportunities
(1) AAR 68/69> para 68
( 2 ) AIA 560, AG SGB, Memo of 5.7*70
(3) p.3.2 n.3
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which the Suez Canal offered. He believed mistakenly 
that the Abdali area extended from 80 miles east of 
Aden up to the Straits of Bab el Mandeb - and the new 
French position at Shaikh Said. Possibly Wedderburn 
confused Playfair's description of the 'Province of Lahej' 
with the Abdali tribal area, of which Lahej was the centre (1). 
That error was corrected in a Memorandum which Sir William 
Merewether, then Commissioner of Sind, wrote on 
Wedderburn's proposals (2). The.error was recognised 
at the Aden Residency too; a faded marginal pencil 
comment reads 'erroneous*.
Merewether's corrections of Wedderburn's ideas of 
the exaggerated size of the Abdali area, may have raised 
earlier doubts at the Foreign Department on the soundness 
of Wedderburn's proposals. Merewether admitted that he 
did not himself know the Abdali boundaries accurately.
In June, 1871, C.U. Aitchison, the Foreign Secretary,: 
rejected Wedderburn's proposal (3). One reason was that 
the Abdali borders were unknown to the Foreign Department,, 
and to the Aden Residency; another was that such an
(1) Playfair 'Arabia' p.33
(2) AIA 560, Memo of 2l*.11.70
(3) AIA 560, Sec.For.Dept. - SGB, 2.6.71
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annexation might conflict with '... possible claims to 
suzerainty on the part of the Turks ...'. It was not 
even certain, Aitchison pointed out, whether the whole 
south Arabian coast from Aden to the Straits would be 
covered. If it was not, Wedderburn's original purpose 
would not be achieved.
Aitchison suggested that the Aden Garrison needed 
a reliable water supply from Shaikh Othman, freedom 
of access to all parts of the Abdali area, and the 
abolition of Abdali transit dues on local produce to 
reduce the cost of living. Tremenheere was asked for 
his opinions as Resident in July, 1871 (1)* He had 
recently been reprimanded for his rash use of the Aden 
Troop and he had had trying negotiations with the Subaihis 
through the Abdali chief (2). He was not in a strong 
position to undertake the 'judicious negotiations'^ which 
the Foreign Department suggested^to improve the British 
position. Unsure of himself, the Resident asked the 
Commandant of the Aden Troop for his comments on the 
Foreign Department's suggestions.
(1) AIA 560, SGB - Res, forwarding copy of For.Dept.
Memo, rec'd 28.7«71
(2) p. 2,56 n J
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Captain Stevens knew more about the surrounding area 
than other Residency officersr but that was not much. He 
did not favour stationing part of the Aden Garrison in 
Abdali territory: he thought, probably correctly, that
a two-year term of duty in Aden was too short a period 
for the establishment of mutual understanding between 
British or Indian troops and the local population (1). 
Stevens, mistakenly, believed that summer sandstorms 
would have made the Lahej area an unsuitable station for 
European troops in summer. Sandstorms were worse inland 
than in Aden. But summer nights were much cooler in 
the coastal plain than in Aden, where the volcanic hills 
retained the heat after sunset (2). Tremenheere accepted 
Stevens' arguments against basing some of the garrison at 
Lahej, although he wrote that he believed that the Abdali 
chief would '... gladly allow our troops to be 
stationed ...' there (3). There is no evidence in the 
current file that Tremenheere ever asked the Abdali chief 
if he would agree.
Stevens had suggested that an agreement to ban a
(1) AIA 560, Stevens Memo of 3JL*7*71
(2) Writer's personal experience
(3) AIA 560, para 3, Res - SGB, 25.8.71
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foreign occupation of Khor Umeira might be advantageous: 
he did not know who owned the anchorage, but he was 
prepared to go and find out in the cool season. 
Tremenheere in his reply omitted any mention of Khor 
Umeira. It was near Atifi territory and he had no 
intention of allowing the Aden Troop to go near it. 
Instead, Tremenheere commented that he was opposed to 
distant commitments which might require patrols through 
the country of the more distant tribes, which might 
regard them 1... as an unusual or threatening display of 
force •••-•. Tremenheere was cautious after his earlier 
experience with the Subaihis and the Aden Troop.
Tremenheere suggested that the Abdali strip of 
coast between the Khor Maksar and Hiswa might be secured 
with advantage *... to allow of access entirely through 
British territory to Little Aden The description
was not accurate. The Hiswa area did not extend up to 
Little Aden. But Tremenheere may have believed that 
British control of the Abdali shore of Aden Harbour 
would reduce the chance of Abdali Aqrabi hostilities; and 
that the Aqrabis would be willing to give up the barren 
coastline between Hiswa and Little Aden, if asked . _ .
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Tremenheere1 s most sensible comment came on 
familiar engineering ground; he proposed that Adenfs 
Executive Engineer should be provided with a Royal 
Engineer Assistant so that plans could be prepared for 
improving Aden*s water supply. Once that had been done, 
the Abdali chief could be approached for his agreement. 
Tremenheere also proposed that once the Indian Government 
had agreed to provide funds, negotiations could begin 
for commuting transit dues within Abdali territory.
Neither proposal received the attention it deserved 
because each involved capital expenditure and a probable 
recurrent demand for money, beyond Adenfs local resources.
Wedderburn1s proposal might have provided a basis 
for a constructive new policy that defined British aims 
in the Yemen more clearly. But its presentation was 
vague and factually inaccurate. Wedderburn preferred to 
get the Foreign Departments agreement to the principle 
of a new policy before asking for detailed comments from 
the Resident at Aden. That was probably a mistake. It 
was also unfortunate that the ineffective Tremenheere 
was the Resident who was asked for his observations on 
Aitchison*s compromise proposals. If action had been 
taken in 1871, or in 1872, the Anglo Ottoman, confrontation
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in the Yemen in 1873 might have been avoided.
+ + + + +
The Fadhli-Yafai dispute over irrigation water in Abyan
Crops on the Fadhlis* fertile lands in eastern 
Abyan depended upon the reliability of their water supply 
down the Naza irrigation canal from its junction with 
the Wadi Bana, well within Yafai limits (1). This channel 
left the east bank of the Wadi Bana near AlMisana and 
passed across the Abyan plain, dominated by the Yafai 
positions at AlHusn and at Khanfer (2). The Naza canal 
watered the lands of the Haidera Mansour tribe between 
that channel and the Wadi Hasan. The channel then crossed 
the Wadi Hasan to water the lands of AlKhaur and Teran, 
belonging to the Fadhli chief.
The Yafais had lost control of the hamlet of Jawala 
in 1837? recovered it briefly in 1866 during the Anglo- 
Abdali operations against the Fadhlis, and had then lost 
it again. The Yafai claim remained a source of friction
(1) See Map £
(2) Belhaven ‘Road1 p..l*+9
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into the 20th century (1)* But Tremenheere dealt solely 
with the Fadhli Yafai dispute over the Naza Canal water 
in May, 1872, when Tremenheere tried to mediate between 
the tribes (2). That was but one of many disputes. As 
Captain Playfair was an accepted authority on Yemeni 
affairs, and as the Residency probably had a copy of his 
book, 'Arabia Felix1, which mentioned Yafai claims in 
Abyan, Tremenheere might be expected to have known about 
them.
Tremenheere was misguided in mediating when he 
lacked the power to enforce his arbitration. He was also 
•unauthorized to intervene in inter-tribal disputes. Yet 
he was behaving as the representative of a paramount 
power when, without physical force in reserve, there can 
be no governing power. Still more unrealistically, 
Tremenheere believed that the small annual payment of 
MT#25 p.a. to the Lower Yafai chief from the Fadhlis would 
be more attractive because the Fadhlis agreed to abolish 
transit dues on trade, to and from Abyan, in return for 
an enhanced stipend of MT#80 p.m. to the Fadhli chief. 
Tremenheere should have realised that the Lower Yafai 
chief would receive little personal benefit from the
(1) Ingrams 'Arabia1 p.132
(2) IOL, AR, AAR 1872/73 (no para nos.)
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abolition of Fadhli transit dues, and that he would want 
more money for himself for the Naza water.
The Lower Yafai representative at the negotiations 
was the son of the chief, Ahmad bin Ali bin Ghalib (1).
There is a reference to the chief's eldest son visiting 
Aden in July, 1871* but there is no indication that he 
had the same friendly relations as the Fadhli chiefr who 
even came to borrow money from Salih Jaffer, the Fadhlis 
Aden Agent, for operations against the Yafais (2). The 
Yafai would have been at a disadvantage in Aden, in less 
familiar surroundings than the Fadhli, Haidera bin Ahmad, 
whose friend was Tremenheere1s interpreter. The Lower 
Yafai chief repudiated his son's agreement, and, within 
a year, there was fiercer border fighting than before 
between Fadhlis and Yafais (3)* Tremenheere1s intervention 
in Abyan was as inept, and as unfortunate in its results, 
as his interventions with the Subaihis and with the 
Haushabis.
+ + + + +
(1) IOL, Jkffj News Report No. 6, 20-27*7»71« Chief from 
I8*fl - Sept 1873
(2) AIA 728, Memo of conversation, Res - Fadhli Sultan, ^.11.76
(3) AIA 625, News No. 18 of 1873, 25-30 A . 73 &  No. 5
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Section 3* Anglo-Ottoman Relations in the Yemen
186? - 1873
Successive Residents, and the Bombay Government, 
regarded any foreign expansion in the Yemen with distaste. 
The Foreign Department and the India Office took a less 
possessive view of Ottoman expansion, until 1873. Ihe 
Foreign Office, preoccupied with European politics, 
showed minimal interest in Ottoman moves in the Yemen even 
in 1873* Developments are considered in three sections. 
Firstly; there were joint British and Ottoman objections 
to French interest in the Yemen coast# Secondly; there 
was Ottoman expansion in Asir in 1871, and in the Yemen 
in 1872. Thirdly; from January to December 1873? there 
was an Anglo-Ottoman confrontation in the southern Yemen,
+ + + + +
The Ottomans and the French at Shaikh Said and British 
reactions
In I869, a Frenchman, living in Aden, negotiated the 
purchase of the shallow anchorage of Shaikh Said, at the 
south-west tip of the Yemen, from the Hakimi section of
3*2
the Subaihi tribe* This was a new area of French 
challenge to Ottoman claims* France had already extended 
along the North African shore; she had shown her interest 
in the Levant in i860; and the Mediterranean seemed about 
to become a French lake (1). French activity in Egyptian 
trade and in the work of the Suez Canal had led to a 
growing French interest in the Red Sea* Obokh had been 
acquired in 1862 as a coal depot (2). The new French 
interest in Shaikh Said disturbed both the Ottoman Pasha 
at Hodeida and the Resident at Aden*
The Resident considered the sale valueless and 
illegal (3) because it did not have Ottoman approval*
The Hakimi section aekowledged Ottoman Suzerainty and 
used Mocha as their market centre (*f). But even the 
prospect of a French trading station without sovereignty 
was unwelcome to the Resident* He feared that such 
competition might attract the Hajariya coffee trade away
(1) G. Hardy, *Histoire de la Colonisation Francaise1,
Paris 5th edn I9V7 p.200 (hereafter, Hardy Colonisation1)*
(2) F0 78 3187 Earl' CowJyey, HBM Amb. Paris - F0 6*6.62 
quoted in Hertsletts F0 Memo of 20.10*73
(3) AAR 1868/69 para h2
(b) AIA 560, Res - SGB, 3*6*70* The French flag was 
hoisted at the end of May or early in June
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from Aden (1). French sovereignty was worse (2). That
was believed, mistakenly, to threaten the British occupation 
of nearby Perim Island, At that time, French warships 
were more common that British ones. Local Anglo-Ottoman 
concern led to correspondence between the Resident and the 
Pasha at Hodeida (3). The Resident also arranged for a 
British naval survey of the anchorage (if),
British enquiries about the Porte1s reactions, and 
about the French Company concerned, were made by the British 
Ambassadors in Constantinople and in Paris, at the India 
Officefs request (5). The Porte announced its intentions 
to send two or three small warships to protect Ottoman 
interests and to patrol the Yemen coast (6), British
(1) AIA 532, Res - SGB, 31.12,69
(2) AIA 560, Res - SGB, 3.6.70, The French flag was
hoisted at the end of May or early in June
(3) AIA 560, Res - SGB, 11.2,70 refers
(V) PRO Admiralty 127/11, Res - Commodore Sir Leopold Heath,
10.6.68 and Res - Capt. Colomb of H.M.S. Dryad, 21.10.68
(5) F0 7 8 5837 HBM C d'A C'ple - F0, ll.if.70
AIA 53^ For. Dept.fs 1216 P — Ag SGB fi. Res. Aden
Received at Aden late May, or early June, 1870.
(6) PRO Admiralty 127/11, Copy of Sir H. Elliot*s dispatch - 
F0 of 1J+.5.70 sent to Commodore Heath by Admiralty, 5.7.70
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maps, officials (1), and miters (2) described &11S.W. 
Arabia west of Hadhramaut as Mthe Yemen11, so the British, 
in their anxiety to see the French displaced, had 
inadvertently encouraged the Porte to increase Ottoman 
interest in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. A small 
Ottoman garrison of ^0 men was established at Shaikh 
Said early in 1871 (3).
Embassy enquiries in Paris, made unofficially, 
revealed that the French Company concerned had issued 
a fanciful, and slightly anglophobe, share prospectus 
to persuade French investors to finance the new 
settlement (*+). But the limitations of the anchorage 
were demonstrated during a storm in March, 1871. Four 
small French vessels at anchor were damaged or wrecked. 
That damage confirmed earlier British (5) and French (6)
(1) e.g. Hunter fAdenf. Sketch map facing p.86
(2) e.g. Palgrave Arabia1. Map facing p.l
(3) AIA 560, Res - SGB, 27.1*71
(If) F0 78 5387, HBMA Paris - F0, 15*3.70
(5) AAR 1868/69 para b2.
(6) AIA 560, Res - SGB, 3.6*70
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naval criticism of the anchorage. Late in 1871> the 
French traders abandoned their unproductive settlement (1). 
It had never had a staff of more than five Frenchmen, 
with Egyptian and Aden-recruited workmen (2), But 
French sources continued, throughout the century, to 
raise periodic claims to Shaikh Said (3). The Residents 
at Aden remained watchful against, and jealous of, French 
competition throughout the area, (If),
+ + + + +
The Ottoman proposal to occupy Husn AlGhorab
In 18699 the Ottomans informed the British of their 
intention to occupy this sheltered anchorage about 230 
miles east of Aden, The Resident grumbled that he had
(1) AIA 560 Aden News of 22-30.12.71
(2) AIA 560, Res - SGB, 23.2.71
(3) F0 78 5388 French newspaper ^epublique1 of 30.1*1901 
published an article claiming the territory as French,
(*0 p. 6.75 n.2
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1... no faith in Orientals but he could find no
cause for objecting to the establishment of a much- 
needed Ottoman quarantine station for pilgrims there (1)» 
The isolated site was ideal. But, when troops were sent 
to Shaikh Said, the Ottomans proposed to establish their 
quarantine station there instead. Shaikh Said proved to 
be unsuitable. But the plans for using Husn alGhorab 
were not revived. Kamaran Island was used instead.
+ + + + +
The Ottomans in Asir and the Yemen
The Ottomans on the Tihama coast had limited contacts 
with the populations of south-west Arabia through trade 
and the pilgrim traffic before 1871. Ottoman administation 
was limited to the coastal ports; the Pasha had his 
headquarters at Hodeida; and there was an Ottoman 
KaimMakam at Mocha. On the African coast of the Red Sea, 
Suakin and Massawa were transferred by the Porte to 
Egyptian administration in 1865* Egyptian influence was 
carried farther south by KhediVial warships* visiting
(1) AIA 532, Res - SGB, 19*3.70
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coastal anchorages. In 1867* Zeila, which had been 
under the Pasha at Hodeida since 18^ -9? was transferred 
to Khedivial administration. But, within two years, the 
Porte came to view the Khedive*s possible ambitions with 
some concern (1). Some Ottoman officials believed that 
the Asiri revolts of 1869 and of 1870 were encouraged by 
the Khedive*
The Ottomans wished to maintain their control of the 
Hejaz with its links with all the Muslim world. But the 
Wahhabis of Nejd had occupied Mecca previously in 1803 
and had been believed to threaten the whole Ottoman 
Empire (2). It was necessary that the Ottomans should 
have some control over the adjoining areas. That 
necessity was emphasized by the Asiri attack on Hodeida 
in I87O. The Asiris and Nejdis were customary allies (3)* 
Asir, the Yemen and Nejd were not under Ottoman control; 
nor was the Rashidi area farther north. W.G. Pal grave 
forecast in I867 that the Wahhabis might still prove ai
Cl) ’Annual Register* for 1869? P*273-278
(2) T.P. Hughes dictionary of Islam1, p.660, London
1885* (Hereafter Hughes *Islam*).
(3) Pal grave ‘Arabia* p.297
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serious threat to the Ottomans (1). These dangers' 
were the more serious because of the Ottoman weakness 
through the failings of Abdul Aziz as Sultan. Between 
I87O and 1872 the Ottomans took action in all four 
areas (2).
+ + + + +
The expansion of Ottoman authority in Asir
The Ottoman invasion of Asir in 1871 was, according 
to the Resident in Aden *... watched with much distrust 
and suspicion by all the tribes ...f of the Yemen (3).
In a widely distributed proclamation, the Ottoman 
Commander explained that the expedition was to punish 
the Asiri chief, Muhammad bin Aidh, for rebelling against
(1) Palgrave 1Arabia1 p»305
(2) Hasa and Nejd - J.B. Kelly fBritain and the Persian 
Gulf, 1795-1880f, Oxford, 1.968, p. 717-751. (Hereafter
Kelly ‘Gulf1).
Shammar - Brit^annica 1Arabia1 p.512 
Asir and the Yemen p. 3*8 - 3 « H
(3) AIA 560, Res - SGB, 27,1.71
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the Ottomans and for attacking Hodeida. Copies of this 
proclamation,dated 8th January I871>reached Aden (1).
The Resident estimated the Ottoman strength at 20,000 
troops (2); that was sufficiently imposing for the 
Asiris to offer their submission, providing that their 
territory was not invaded. Their condition was 
unacceptable to the Ottoman Commander, Redif Pasha, who 
demanded unconditional surrender. The Asiris refused.
The Ottomans had a quick and successful initial 
campaign. Four Ottoman Regiments,supported by four guns, 
captured the Asiri capital of Raida in a 17 day siege. 
Ottoman casualties were said to be less than 20 men; but 
the Asiris lost 200 killed, including their leader and 
29 lesser chiefs* Asiri prisoners were captured (3).
But a subsequent Ottoman advance southward into the 
Yemen, through rugged mountain country towards Sanaa (*f),
(1) Referred to in note 2. There are however no copies 
in the file
(2) AIA 560, Res - SGB, 27.1*71
(3) AIA 560, Res - SGB, *f.5.71. The Resident’s information 
came via an Indian merchant’s clerk at Hodeida, from 
the letters of an Ottoman officer in Asir to another
in Hodeida 
(if) AIA 560, News No k of 6-13.7*71
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Was halted by renewed Asiri resistance under the late 
chief's brothers. The Asiris made a surprise assault 
on Raida which was repulsed with the reported loss of 
IfOO Asiris (1). Two Ottoman defenders were killed and 
four were wounded. The casualty figures suggest that 
the Asiris were badly armed with smooth barrelled 
flintlocks against the Ottomans' breech-loading rifles.
It is probable that the Yemen tribes were as ill-armed (2),
+ + + + -h
The Ottoman reoccupation of the Yemen
Ahmad Mukhtar Pasha, Muhammad Redif's second-in- 
command, was appointed Commander in Chief and Governor 
of the Yemen, when Redif returned to Constantinople 
sick (3). The occupation of the Yemen was reported to 
be planned to start in October, 1871ffrom Mocha, instead 
of overland from Asir. But, by December, Ahmad Mukhtar
(1) AIA 560, News No 5? 13-20.7.71
(2) Bury »Uz' p.295-296
(3) AIA 560, Aden News Letter No 13 of 7-lI+.9*71
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was still detained at Raida (1)* Ottoman officials for 
the new administration in the Yemen had arrived at 
Hodeida from Constantinople (2). The officials were 
reported destined for Hodeida, Taiz, Sanaa, Odein, Jibleh 
and Ibb. The Ottoman advance into the interior developed 
during 1872. Sanaa was captured in April. The Resident 
reported growing anxiety amongst the Yemen tribes near 
Aden about Ottoman intentions in their areas (3).
The Resident warned of the danger to Aden's position 
of an Ottoman advance into southern Yemen and suggested 
that the Ottomans should be halted (b). The India Office 
passed Tremenheere1s letter to the Foreign Office on 
28th May, but no further action was taken. Further Indian 
Government letters were passed from the India Office to 
the Foreign Office on 13th August and on 29th October, on 
the same topic (5). Argyll saw these letters, but the
(1) AIA 560, Aden News No 17? of 6-1*+. 10*71
(2) AIA 560, Aden News No 26 of 8-15.12.71
(3) AAR 1872/73 (no para nos) quoting the 1871/72 AAR, 
of which no copy is available
(if) LA, Res - SGB, 7-5.72 (r) S of S
(5) IOL, Z/L/P & S/3/1ok/b Vol 83 (Index of letters)
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Government of India had failed to make positive proposals 
on the Residency enquiries.
Since 1839? the Government1s policy had been one of 
non-intervention in Yemen's tribal affairs. That policy 
had been re-affirmed in 1871 (1). Lord Mayo^ had been 
assassinated in February, and, until Lord Northbrook1s
/
arrival in September, Lord Napier of Ettrick, the 
Governor of Madras, was acting as Governor-General.
Even after Lord Northbrook's arrival time was needed 
before any revision of policy.
Brigadier J.W. Schneider, appointed a^ Resident 
in July, had continued to press, like his predecessor, 
for a change of policy to prevent the Ottomans reaching 
Aden's border. His letter of October 26th to Bombay was 
copied to the Secretary of State. Schneider reported 
Ottoman demands on Lahej (2). Argyll had the letter 
before him from November 22nd to 2*fth. He then passed 
it to the Foreign Office, for information on the 26th.
Lord Granville made no comment, but none had been asked 
for; and the Ottomans were still in the Yemen highlands,
(1) p.2.67 n .3
(2) LA, Res - SGB, 26.10.72, copied to S of S
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outside areas of British interest for Aden. As the 
India Office and the Government of India proposed no 
action, there was no cause for the Foreign Office to 
suggest any* In addition, Granville believed that there 
were no grounds for Anglo-Ottoman disagreement anywhere, 
but a natural tendency for Ottoman Foreign Ministers to 
'... drift to[Sir Henry Elliot, the British Ambassador^] 
for advice and support *..' (1). But the Ottoman 
intention to occupy all the Yemen was apparently 
understood* The Resident's letter was summarized as;
'Lahej: wish of Turkey to obtain allegiance of the 
Sultan [of LahejJ ' (2)*
Argyll's own view of the relationship between the 
Home Government and the Indian Government was that policy 
should be determined by requirements at Westminster, but 
that there should be no interference in details concerning 
the functioning of the Indian executive (3). Argyll, 
therefore, probably considered in 1872/73 that any change 
in policy towards the Yemen tribes was a matter for
the Government of India to raise. Certainly it did not
(1) GeJ^. Granville - Elliot, 20.9.71
(2) IOL Z/L/P & S/3/1Ob/b Vol 83, Letter No 2803
(3) BM, SPR, PD, 187^, Vol CCXVIII p.1066, Argyll on 2b.b.7b
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concern Foreign Office relations with the Porte, until 
a new Indian policy towards the Ottomans in the Yemen 
had been decided. The Foreign Department did not suggest 
any revision of the existing policy, and until the Viceroy 
did so, the Secretary of State could pay no attention 
to such requests from subordinate Governments or officials* 
Argyll and Lord Salisbury believed that the Secretary of 
State should not diminish the dignity and authority of 
the Viceroy, by interfering in the Viceroy's administration, 
particularly when the new telegraphic connections between 
India and Europe provided new temptations for such 
interference from I87O (1)« So the Resident remained 
embarrassed at the absence of an official statement of 
British policy towards the Ottoman occupation of the 
Yemen, because he could give the Abdali chief no clear 
advice*
+ + + + +
(1) BM, SPR, Vol CCXVIII I87lt, p.1082, commenting 
on action during the Bengal famine
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Sir Bartle Frere was appointed as head of the 
Commission for the suppression of the East African Slave 
trade in 1872 (1). On his journey across Europe, Frere 
had stopped in Paris. There, the Commission's Secretary, 
the Rev. G.P. Badger, had talked with Server Pasha,
Ottoman Foreign Minister in 1871> and Ottoman Ambassador 
in Paris in November, 1871. Monsieur de Remusat, the 
French Foreign Minister, was also present; he had 
talked to Badger about Ottoman claims to Arabia as they 
had been described to the French. Probably,French 
interest in Shaikh Said (2), had led to Franco-Ottoman 
discussions on Ottoman claims in Arabia. Monsieur de 
Remusat did not question the validity of Ottoman claims.
Frere took Server Pasha's claim, that the Ottoman 
Empire included all Arabia, so seriously that he asked 
Badger to record it in a Memorandum to the Foreign 
Office. In Badger's view, Ottoman authority extended 
along the Red Sea from Suez to Mocha only. But Badger 
had left Aden in 1862. Conditions had changed much 
since then. Frere had retired from India in 1867 and
(1) See R.J. Gavin nThe Bartle Frere Mission to Zanzibar,
1873% The Historical Journal, Vol 122, p . W
(2) See 3.1-5 above
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he possibly had not appreciated fully the opportunities 
that the opening of the Suez Canal had offered to 
Ottoman communications around the coasts of Arabia*
Frere had some justification for accepting Badger as 
an expert on South Arabian Coastal affairs,(1)* In 
Badger!s biased view the Ottoman claims to the whole 
coastline were preposterous1, but he believed that;
*••• there is every possibility that the Turks will lose 
no time in endeavouring to enforce them Such action
would, he believed, increase conflict and competition in 
the area to the disadvantage of local and British 
interests (2).
Badger was a missionary and a clergyman, not a. 
Secretariat Officer or a lawyer by profession,; and his 
interpretation of the nature of the Mukalla Anti-Slave 
trade treaty of 1863 was distinctly idiosyncratic (3).
He argued that such treaty arrangements virtually
(1) IOL, L/p & S/8/10 Vol JO, Sir John Kaye, Sec*,
P & SD - Brigadier Coghlan, Resident of Aden,
5*12.62, referred to Badger as an expert on Yemeni 
affairs
(2) PRO F0 78 3186 f 189-200, Badger1s Memo
(3) Aitchison treaties1 Ho. LXXIII
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recognised local chiefs' independence. But the Indian 
Government had, since 1856, carefully avoided any 
commitment to maintaining local tribal independence in 
anti-slave trade treaties*
Badger and Frere were concerned to counter any 
proposed extension of Ottoman influence in Southern Arabia 
leading to Ottoman control over ports there because they 
feared that an Ottoman presence would assist the slave 
trade from Africa. Local ships would benefit from 
Ottoman flag cover to protect them from R.N. searches.
This bias was not wholly justified. The import of 
slaves into the Empire had been banned by Imperial 
firman in 1856; and Ahmad Ayub Pasha, 'while Governor 
General of the Yemen, was to declare a penalty of five 
years in prison for convicted slave-importers (1).
Badger, however, wished Britain to declare a sphere of 
influence along the south Arabian coast to '... prevent 
further mischievous aggression on the part of the Turks 
...'* Frere was to develop Badger's theme in January, 1873> 
in correspondence with Argyll and Granville (2)*
(1) AIA 621, Aden News No 29, 10-16*7.73
(2) p. 3.22 n.l&2 below
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The Foreign Office and the Foreign Department 
received Badger*s Memorandum coolly* C.U. Aitchison,
Secretary at the Foreign Department, disagreed with 
Badger1s idea that the Porte might look to Russia as a 
new protector of Muslim interests (1)* It is possible 
that Frere*s views had influenced Badger*s Memorandum*
Frere had believed that Russia and France would seize 
any opportunity of replacing British influence in the 
Indian Ocean area (2)* Frere reacted strongly when he 
found the Resident in Aden in despair at apparent 
official indifference to the prospect of an Ottoman 
advance up to Aden (3)*
Indian policy in S*E. Arabia had required limited 
British intervention in internal affairs,whereas the 
policy in the Yemen was one of non-intervention* Frere 
had been a firm believer in active interference from 
Bahrain to Ras al Hadd, when necessary to protect maritime 
trade. *Active interference1 necessarily expanded British 
influence. But an active Ottoman naval, and possibly
(1) IOL, AM Reel 318, Aitchison*s comments of 30*12.73 to
Northbrook on the Memo forwarded on by Northbrook to Argyll
(2) IOL, Home Corr. Sec. Vol 62, Frere*s Memo of 18*7*68,
as a member of Political Committee at the India Office
(3) P.3.13 n.2
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political, presence along the south Arabian coast and 
in the Persian Gulf would reduce, and perhaps replace, 
British influence. A basis for Ottoman influence already 
existed, Frere recognised^ in local respect for the 
Sultan as Caliph and for the Porte as the major Muslim 
Power (1).
Frere arrived at Aden aboard H.M.S. fEnchantress* 
on 31st December (2). He stayed with Schneider at the 
Residency. Preparations had to be made for coal supplies 
for H.M.S. 1Enchantress1 on her return from ZanzibarT 
to take Frere to Gulf of Aden ports. Frere would also 
have wanted local news about the slave trade (3); and 
Badger probably wished to revisit local friends. Frere 
considered Schneider *excellent* (1). Schneider was 
visited on 2nd January by the agitated Abdali chief,
Fadhl bin Mohsin. The chief had received a letter from 
Ahmad Mukhtar Pasha telling him to go to Sanaa to make 
his submission. Fadhl asked, again, for British
(1) IOL, NP, Frere - Northbrook, 19*5*73
(2) PRO Admiralty 53/10638, Log of H.M.S. "Enchantress*
(3) AIA 619, Note of 16.12.72 by Schneider to give Frere 
copies of correspondence about the trade regionally
protection! for his territory. Failing such a guarantee, 
Fadhl had to decide to submit to the Ottomans or to go 
into exile. Fadhl had been chronically short of money.
He could not have expected a financially secure exile. 
Failing a definite assurance of British protection,
Fadhl had probably no alternative but submission^ and, 
after months of waiting for British action, Fadhl was 
unlikely to delay much longer. His family rival and 
elder brother, Abdullah, might possibly have been 
installed by the Ottomans if Fadhl displeased them.
Frere had no doubt that Lahej and the supplies of 
the coastal plain were strategically important for the 
British in Aden. Having passed through the new Suez 
Canal,Frere realised the increased importance of Aden 
as a port. Retaining Aden securely was f... a matter of 
prime necessity to out every interest in India, China 
and Australia ...* (1). Frere considered Aden 1... the 
most important of all our outlying Indian possessions,, 
and the key to our overland route ..♦* (1). In his 
view, danger to Aden should be viewed by a Governor of 
Bombay as only slightly less grave than danger threatening
(1) FO 78 27535 Frere - Elliot, Constantinople, 2.1.73
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Bombay itself Cl)* Frere considered that Aden, 
without its hinterland, would always be at risk. That 
was an orthodox military view. Aden*s 1... chief 
supplies of grain and vegetables, forage and firewood, 
meat and fresh water . .•* might be interrupted. Possibly 
Frere remembered Merewether’s arguments to him in 1865/
66 (2). Aden would only f... be fed badly and with 
difficulty and at vastly increased expense by importation 
from beyond the sea . ..* (1). Possibly Frere encouraged 
Schneider to give the Abdali chief unauthorised assurances 
of British support to gain time*
Frere*s subsequent actions show that he was committed 
to obtaining British Government support for keeping the 
Ottomans away from Aden’s hinterland. He did not delay 
his departure beyond Vth January (3); be left at 5 P*m. C^ +); 
but he apparently left postdated telegrams about the 
situation, for dispatch by Schneider, if no reply had
(1 )  FO 78 2753? Frere - Elliot, Constantinople, 2 .1 * 7 3
(2) p.2.15 n.l
(3 ) AIA 6 2 1 , Aden News 2 6 .1 2 .7 2 - 1 .1 .7 3  foretold his 
departure date
(k) PRO ADM 53 1 0 6 3 8 , Log of H .M .S .’Enchantress', *fr.l.73
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been received by 5th January to Schneiderfs urgent 
telegrams to the India Office of 3rd January, and to 
Bombay of 2nd January. Frere also wrote a hasty, 
alarmist, and superficially convincing1letter to Sir 
Henry Elliot, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, 
explaining why Ottoman action against the Abdali chief 
was 1... grotesquely unjustifiable, or so little 
permissible by us ...f (1). That letter was written on 
2nd January; it was copied and enclosed with covering 
letters written to Argyll (2), of the third, to 
Granville Cl), of the fourth, and to Sir Philip Wodehouse, 
the Governor of Bombay (3)* Frere enclosed a rough 
sketch map vaguely defining his idea of the northern 
limit of Aden’s required hinterland. Possibly, these 
three letters, too, were left, like the telegrams, for 
Schneider to dispatch on the 5th, if necessary.
(1) FO 78 2753? Frere - Elliot, 2.1.73? enclosed with 
Frere — Granville, ^f.1.73
(2) AM Reel 318
(3) N.P. Wodehouse - Northbrook, 2 0 .1 .7 3 ,  enclosing 
copy of Frerefs letter to Elliot
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Schneider’s unanswered telegram to Bombay on 2nd 
January (1), and to the India Office on the 3rd (2), 
was temperate and conventional; ’’The Sultan of Lahej 
has just visited me expecting a hostile movement of 
the Turks against his Country. He claims our protection.
I request instructions by telegraph to my letter 229 
of 26th October. Copy of which was forwarded to your 
Grace.”
Frere*s telegram was urgent and dramatic; ^Turkish 
movements against Tribes round Aden very serious. Mooshir 
threatens Lahedj whence Aden draws supplies. Unless this 
be promply stopped Mooshir will hold power to starve our 
garrison or quadruple our Commissariat expenses.”
Merewether had had personal correspondence with 
Indian Office officials; Schneider probably had not (3). 
Nor had Schneider any previous experience of political 
work. Frere was able to write personal letters to
(1) LI, Enclosed with G of I - S of S, 10.1.73
(2) L/P & S/3/I0lf Vol 97? U/S 10 - U/S F0, 6.1.73? 
forwarding telegram
(3) L/PS/8/10 June 6 2 - 9  July 73* PD D/0 correspondence
influential politicians and officials ■whom he knew.
to
He also possibly helped Schneider/plan a strategy for 
his subsequent use of letters and telegrams to maintain
tension in London, while the crisis lasted (1).
\
Schneider, with his future career at stake, could not 
afford mistakes in unfamiliar circumstances. Frere1s 
personal advice probably gave Schneider encouragement. 
Certainly, Frere1s telegrams and correspondence played 
a decisive part. Elliot was influenced (2); Argyll 
took immediate action (3); so did Wodehouse (*f)$ 
Northbrook was encouraged (5); and Granville was probably 
influenced in drafting his instructions to Elliot.
+ + + + +
Frerefs telegram was probably deliberately 
sensational to make sure that Argyll saw the telegram
(1) g.3.6^ n .3 for comparison
(2) p.3*^5 n.l
(3) p.3*26 n.l
(b) p.3*26 n .2
(5) NP, Northbrook - Wodehouse, 25*1*73
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personally. A more restrained message might have been 
•pigeon-holed1, as Schneider’s telegram of 3rd January 
was (1)* But no official could afford to ignore 
Frere*s telegram, in case later events justified Frere’s 
warning. The Under Secretary at the India Office, Herman 
Merivale, knew Frere: he probably knew that Frere was
given to sudden enthusiams (2); and he took Frere1s 
doom-laden warnings light-heaitedly. Merivale suggested 
to E H a m m o n d ,  the Foreign Office Permanent Under 
Secretary, that he would ’.•• know best ... the way of 
inducing the Turkish Authorities to abstain from starving 
our poor people at Aden in order to punish their own 
malcontents ...' (3)* That implied some recognition of 
Ottoman suzerainty in the Yemen. The formal India Office 
covering note to the Foreign Office moreover reflected 
Argyll1s view of the situation, wired from Scotland*
It asked for *..* representations needful to put a stop
(1) p.3-23 n *2
(2) R. Boswell Smith ’Life of Lord Lawrence1, 2 Vols.,
London, 1883, II, p.^32, for this contemporary 
assessment of Frere (hereafter Smith ’Lord Lawrence1)
(3) FO 78 2753 D/0 note, Merivale - Hammond, 6*1*73
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to proceedings so injurious to Aden • ••* (1)*
An additional advantage in sending telegrams on a 
Saturday was that they probably arrived after the India 
Office and the Bombay Secretariat had closed. Argyll 
and Wodehouse received Frere*s warning when they had 
no routine work to distract them from the Abdali crisis. 
Frere*s telegram produced immediate action. Wodehouse 
sent an 1Operational Immediate* telegram to Northbrook 
at Calcutta on the same day (2). The Chief Secretary 
at Bombay also telegraphed to the Secretary of the 
Foreign Department about Schneider*s still unanswered 
wire of 3 days before (2).
Wodehouse was not interested in the Persian Gulf 
and Arabia; and he had accepted that foreign policy 
there should be a matter for the Viceroy, and not for 
the Governor of Bombay as in the past. But Wodehouse 
did recognise/ the new strategic value of Aden as the 
British Naval Base for war-time control of the approaches 
to, or from,the Bed Sea and the Suez Canal (3)* In that
(1) IOL, Sec. Misc. Book L/P <Sr S/3/10*f, Vol 97, TPN U/Sec 
10 - U/Sec F0, 6.1.73
(2) LI Ends - G of I Despatch - S of S of 10.1*73
(3) IOL, NP, Wodehouse - Northbrook, 20.1.73
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assessment he was possibly influenced by Frere1 s letter 
to him from Aden (1). Wodehouse accepted Frerefs 
assessment of the Yemen situation. He proposed that 
he should instruct the Resident to ”... inform Musheer 
that operations against Lahej will be regarded as 
unfriendly to ourselves ...” (2).
Northbrook was responsible for any action taken;
and his orders were more cautious. The Resident was
”... to address Pasha at once calling upon him to 
suspend all demonstrations or action against Chiefs and 
Tribes around Aden with whom we have political relations, 
pending instructions from his Government •••* (3)*
Northbrook believed that his ”... message ... was as 
near a declaration of war in case Ahmad Mukhtar proceeded 
to interfere with Lahej as he felt justified in making ...” (*f). 
Northbrook copied these instructions to Argyll with a 
further five explanatory paragraphs, by cypher telegram (5).
(1) p . 3.22 n. 3
(2) LI, Enel, G of I - S of S, 10.1.73
(3 ) IOL, LI, Enel, G of I - S of S, 1 0 .1 .7 3
(*f) IOL, N, P, Northbrook - Wodehouse, 2 5 .1 .7 3
(5) IOL, LI, Viceroy1 s tel of 6.1.73 - S of S, recfd 7.1*73
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Northbrook amplified his views in a mail despatch of 
10th January, received in London on the 27th (1).
Northbrook considered that the Ottomans should not 
’••• interfere with those Chiefs with whom we have so 
long held direct relations as independent powers . ( 2). 
It is possible that Aitchison and Northbrook envisaged 
the Yemeni chiefs as a breakwater between the British 
in Aden and the Ottomans, But the Yemeni tribes, which 
Northbrook described as ’independent powers’, could not 
be compared with the strong, friendly and independent
States •••* (3) which Lord Mayo wanted as an intermediate 
zone between Russian and Indian territory, Northbrook's 
phrase ’independent powers1 sounded more respectable 
than the reality. Possibly its inappropriateness was 
clear to India Office officials with experience of Yemeni 
affairs, but Argyll had already decided to support 
Northbrook before the despatch arrived, Northbrook had 
to state what he wanted, rather than to justify his
(1) IOL, LI, Enel, G of I - S of S, 10.1.73
(2) IOL, LI, Viceroy’s tel of 6.1*73 - S of S, Rec'd 7.1.73
(3) Sir W.W. Hunter ’Earl of Mayo1, Rulers of India series,,
Oxford, 1891? p*12 (Hereafter Hunter ’Mayo1).
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requirements*
Northbrook, in his written despatch of 10th. January, 
clearly envisaged the withdrawal of Ottoman suzerainty 
over the Haushabi tribe. But the Haushabi chief had 
recognised Ottoman suzerainty by December, 1872. 
Northbrook enclosed a copy of the Resident's letter to 
Bombay of November, 1872 (1), which implied that the 
Haushabi submission was an unwilling one. It possibly 
was; but it is probable that the chief would have been 
unwilling to submit to British suzerainty. Schneider 
considered that the Haushabi1s admission of Ottoman 
suzerainty could be reversed, once Schneider received 
Northbrook's message for Ahmad Mukhtar Pasha. Schneider 
wrote tb the Haushabi chief on 8th January, remonstrating 
at the latter's visit to the Pasha* In reply, the chief 
professed a cautious willingness to be guided by the 
Resident (2).
It is probable that Northbrook was guided by
(1) IOL, LI, Enel G of I - S of S, 10.1.73 
Res of 20.11.72 - SGB
(2) IOL, LA, Res - S o f  S, e n c lo s in g  c o p ie s  o f  Res -  
H a u s h a b i, 8 .1 *7 3  and H a u sh a b i -5 R es, 1 1 *1 *7 3
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Aitchison as Secretary to the Foreign Departments He 
had a high regard for Aitchison; Aitchison was famous 
for the clearness and the directness of his notes (1). 
Possibly Northbrook decided to extend the area in dispute 
beyond the Abdali area because he accepted Aithhison's 
Minute. Aitchison had the advantage of having considered, 
and then rejected, a proposal to extend British territory 
by annexing Lahej in 1871 (2). It is possible that 
Aitchison believed in January, as he did in December, 1873? 
that British naval pressure could enforce Ottoman 
withdrawal from anywhere that Britain required in the 
neighbourhood of Aden (3)* Northbrook envisaged Anglo- 
Ottoman negotiations. It was therefore sensible to 
demand a larger sphere of British 'influence' than the 
small, and indefinite, Abdali area, to give room for 
manoeuvre in negotiations. Northbrook was aware of Aden's 
inadequate defences, because he had read a recent report
(1) Sir W. Lawrence 'The India we served', London, 1928, 
p.78 (Hereafter Lawrence 'India').
(2) p.2.67 n.3
(3) IOL, NP, Aitchison - Northbrook, 3°*12.73? copied 
to Argyll by Northbrook
3.31
on them, on his voyage to India (1).
Northbrook argued for a return to the Palmerstonian 
ban on Muhammad Ali's forces crossing the coastal range 
of hills and descending to the Gulf of Aden (2)* 
Schneider had suggested, in the previous October, that 
that policy should be applied (3). Ihe policy was 
consistent with India Office objections to a Khedivial 
occupation of the Somali Coast (b), and with the Foreign, 
Office's objections in 1871 to an Italian presence, at 
Socotra, in the Gulf of Aden (5).
Northbrook's telegram to Argyll on the Yemen 
situation was received on 7th January and passed to the 
Foreign Office on the 8th (6). By then, the Foreign 
Office had had Schneider's telegram of the 3rd and 
Frere's of the 5th for two days. Both telegrams had
(1) IOL, NP, Northbrook - Argyll, 29*7.72:
(2) LI, G of I - S of S, 10.1*73
(3) p.3.12 n *2 above
(*f) p.6*15 n*3
(5) P.5.3 - 5 A
(6) F0 78 2753, Viceroy - S of S, 6.1*73
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m e n tio n e d  o n ly  L a h e j,  a l th o u g h  S c h n e id e r1s te le g ra m  
had r e f e r r e d  t o  h i s  l e t t e r  o f  O c to b e r ,  18 72 , c o v e r in g  
a w id e r  a re a  ( 1 ) ;  b u t  th e  I n d ia  O f f ic e  had n o t  
a t ta c h e d  a cop y  o f  S c h n e id e r s  e a r l i e r  l e t t e r .  I t  i s  
t h e r e fo r e  p ro b a b le  t h a t  F o re ig n  O f f ic e  t h in k in g  was 
d o m in a te d  b y  th e  supposed need to  keep th e  O ttom ans o u t  
o f  L a h e j o n ly .  I t  was s t i l l  b e l ie v e d  i n  M arch  t h a t  t h a t  
was a l l  t h a t  was r e q u ir e d  ( 2 ) .
A vague re fe re n c e  to  o th e r  *A ra b  C h ie fs 1 was h o w e ve r 
made i n  th e  F o re ig n  O f f ic e * s  te le g ra p h e d  in s t r u c t io n s  
t o  E l l i o t  ( 3 ) .  I t  was p ro b a b ly  in s e r t e d  because  o f  
s im i la r  r e fe re n c e s  i n  N o r th b ro o k 1s te le g ra m . I t  p ro v e d  
s u f f i c i e n t  t o  m is le a d  th e  F o re ig n  D e p a rtm e n t i n t o  
assu m in g  t h a t  N o r th b ro o k 1s re q u ire m e n t  f o r  a w id e r  
O ttom an a b s te n t io n  beyond L a h e j had been a c c e p te d . The 
In d ia n  G overnm ent t h e r e fo r e  l a t e r  assumed t h a t  E l l i o t  
had asked  f o r ,  and t h a t  th e  O ttom ans had a c c e p te d , such  
an  a b s te n t io n .
+ + + + +
(1 ) p .3.12 n .2 above
( 2 ) p .3 . 53 n .5 b e lo w
(3 )  FO 78 2753, FO -  E l l i o t ,  1 1 .1 .7 3
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Lord Granville sent his first instructions on the 
Yemen by a cypher telegram to Sir Henry Elliot on 
11.1*73• It read; ‘The Sultan of Lahej has expressed 
to the Resident at Aden great apprehension of a hostile 
movement against him on the part of the Turkish forces 
in that quarter. Any such movement would be viewed in 
a serious light by Her Majesty1s Government as calculated 
to interfere with the British territory of Aden ...
You will request the Porte to send immediate orders to 
its Authorities to suspend hostile operations in that 
quarter £implying LahejJ against any of the Arab 
Chiefs which [may] disturb the position we hold
at Aden, £and] would certainly produce a bad impression 
in England no less than in India.1 (1).
Granville had discussed the situation with Gladstone; 
and neither Minister apparently saw any cause for 
extending claims to British influence beyond Lahej to 
prevent an Ottoman occupation. Gladstone modified 
Granville*s original draft to Elliot to emphasize that 
Aden was British ‘territory* and not just under British
(1) p.3.32 n.3
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Occupation1. He also substituted the request to 
1 refrain from1 hostile operations by the more conciliatory 
1 suspend1 implying a temporary action to be followed by 
negotiations (1)* Elliot's private correspondence in 
1872/73 with Hammond confirmed Ottoman goodwill toward 
Britain (2). It was therefore probable that the Ottomans 
would respect the British wishes not to advance against 
Lahej *
The Porte assured Elliot that no operations
have been or will be commenced against the Lahej without 
orders from the Porte, which will do nothing without 
communicating with Her Majesty's Government (3).
But the Porte pointed out that Lahej was '... a part of
Hausha who recognised Sultan's authority, and
his aggression ought not to pass unpunished The
Ottoman reply to Elliot raised points which suggested 
that the Ottomans anticipated diplomatic disaussions.
the Yemen •..1; that 1.•. that chief
attacked and plundered a neighbouring Chieftain,
 had
[ihe n
(1) FO 78 2753? Note by Hammond of 11.1.73 on back of f 35
(2) HP, PRO, FO 391/22
(3) FO 73 2753, Elliot's wire to FO of 13.1.73
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It was summarised at the Foreign Office as, fNo 
operations yet undertaken against Lash [sicj * (1). 
Gladstone and Granville saw Elliot's despatch and made 
no comments; nor were there any comments in the India 
Office file*
On 21st January, Granville received Sir Bartle 
Frere's alarmist letters on the possible effects of 
Ottoman expansion on the British position at Aden (2)*
These letters reinforced the arguments already expressed 
by Badger against any Ottoman expansion in South Arabia (3). 
An internal F*0* Memorandum of 21st January summarised 
the position as it appeared to have developed since the 
6th (*+)• Granville elaborated his earlier instructions 
to Elliot in a despatch of the 23rd (?)• Elliot waa to 
make clear to the Porte that Britain '*.. would view 
very seriously any proceedings calculated to disturb:
(1) FO 78 2753? Summary on despatch cover
(2) p*3.22 n. 1
(3) p.3.16 n* 2
(if) FO 78, 2753? Unsigned Memo initialled by Granville 
as 'seen*
(5) FO 78 2753 f 5k-6k, 23.1.73, FO - Elliot
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the Country near Aden ..* by Ottoman interference ••. 
with rulers friendly to Great Britain ...,* Granville 
did not specify who those rulers were. He did not 
know,, nor did the India Office,, until May, after the 
Viceroy had listed them (1)* Granville also sent Elliot 
a Memorandum (2) written in 184-3* headed 1 Yemen 
Instructions1, with more recent comments sent by the 
India Office to the Foreign Office on 26.11*72 (3)*
But the Aden News Reports for 1873 show that Ottoman 
activities did not interrupt supplies to Aden (4)*
+ + +  +  -h
Argyll*s Personal Attitude
Argyllfs personal views in 1873 prejudiced him 
against any consideration for the Ottoman Empire, against
(1) p.3.56 n*5 below
(2) p.3*35 n*5 above
(3) FO 78 2753? including copy of Res Aden - SGB,
26.10*72, copied to 10
(4) AIA 621
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a n y  e x p a n s io n  o f  O ttom an t e r r i t o r y ,  and a g a in s t  an y  
a c t io n  w h ic h  m ig h t  b e n e f i t  th e  E a s t A f r ic a n  S la ve  T ra d e . 
A r g y l l  had lo n g  h e ld  t h a t  * . . .  no E n g l is h  C a b in e t had 
th e  same d u t ie s  as th e  D iv a n  (th e  P o r te ]  i n  re s p e c t  o f  
th e  "h o n o u r and in d e p e n d e n c e " o f a Mohomedan E m p ire  . . . *  ( 1 ) .  
He was n o t  c o n c e rn e d  to  p re s e rv e  th e  i n t e g r i t y  o f th e  
O ttom an E m p ire , b u t  o n ly  t o  p re v e n t  R u s s ia  g a in in g  a t  
O ttom an e xp e n se . He had 1. . .  no sym pa thy  w i t h  th e  T u rk s  
as a p e o p le , o r  as a G overnm ent . . . f i n  1854 (2_), and he 
gave no in d i c a t io n  o f  a n y  change o f  a t t i t u d e  i n  1873* 
C e r t a in ly  he w o u ld  have w elcom ed an O ttom an c o l la p s e  i n  
Hay 1877 ( 3 ) .
He \'TQ.s a s in c e re  P r e s b y te r ia n  ( 4 ) .  He knew t h a t  
N o r th b ro o k  b e l ie v e d  t h a t  M u s lim s  i n  I n d ia  had no a f f e c t i o n
(1 )  A r g y l l  A u to b io g r a p h y  & M e m o irs 1, 2 V o ls ,  Lo nd on , 1906 , 
V o l I ,  p . 466 ( H e r e a f te r  A r g y l l 1A u to b io g ra p h y 1)
(2 )  Q p . c i t . I  p . 446
(3 )  E . O i l i e r ,  C a s s e l l1s i l l u s t r a t e d  H is t o r y  o f  th e
R u s s o -T u rk is h  W ar1, 2 V o ls ,  London 1877-79?  I?  P *1 57
(4 )  A r g y l l  A u to b io g r a p h y 1 V o l .  I I ,  p . 589
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for their Christian rulers and that British power 
depended upon British bayonets (1). Argyll regarded 
Lord Mayo’s assassination as part of a contemporary 
upsurge of religious fanaticism (2). As a Christian, 
he considered Mrs. Harriet Beecher Stowe to have been 
’••• the chosen instrument of a Divine purpose • ••* 
for the abolition of slavery (3)* In 1872, he had 
written to Northbrook; ‘... the Queen1s Government 
everywhere ought to do its best to help to suppress 
an iniquity so monstrous and so desolating • •• as the 
East African Slave Trade has been now proved to be •••' (*+).
Argyllfs position within Gladstonefs Cabinet was 
influential; he had 20 years of close political and 
social connections with Gladstone and with Granville (5)* 
Granville considered that Argyll was closer to him than 
anyone but his brother (6). These relations were
(1) AM Heel 317? Northbrook - Argyll, If*8*72
(2) IOL, NP, Argyll - Northbrook, 23.10*72
(3) Argyll Autobiography1 II, p.57 written of her in 1856 
(V) NP, Argyll - Northbrook, 12.10*72
(5) Argyll ‘Autobiography1 II, p. 315 Argyll - Gladstone 29.6*7*+
(6) Argyll ‘Autobiography1 II, p*3**-8 Granville - Argyll 5**+«80
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important when ‘the leading spirits1 in the Cabinet 
decided *... a great deal by private and personal 
understandings ...’ (1). Granville customarily discussed 
all foreign policy matters with Gladstone; and Northbrook, 
as an ex-member of the Government, knew how Argyll could 
press Granville and Gladstone* Argyll had the added 
advantage that he was prepared to press for an unpopular 
policy. Many of the ‘extreme joints* of Gladstone's 
Government were too radical for Argyll’s taste, and 
Argyll faced the prospect of leaving office without 
regret (2)* He owed his political office partly to his 
influence in Scotland, as chief of the Campbells* In 
his own view, once he had reached decided opinions where 
great issues were at stake, Argyll urged his opinions 
with *the eagerness of a strong conviction1 (3). The 
Yemen crisis was such an issue.
Argyll had never sat in the House of Commons and 
that possibly explains why he believed that in an
Empire such as ours, especially in the East, the executive
(1) Argyll ‘Autobiography’ I p.383
(2) N.P. Argyll - Northbrook, 13.2*7^
(3) Argyll ‘Autobiography1 II p.^
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power ought to have a strong weapon always in hand, 
and ought not to be hampered with the Parliamentary 
forms, which are necessary in European hostilities . ..* (1). 
He believed that War was, at times, a necessary evil (2). 
Possibly for such reasons he was prepared for the Cabinet 
to authorize force in Lahej, without reference to the 
House of Commons. Any personal views that Argyll might 
have recorded in his Journal for 1873 are unknown. The 
Journals are not now listed amongst Inverary Castle 
Muniment Room records (3)*
+ + -h + +
Argyll had received Frere1s letters on 20th January 
and had been impressed by Frere*s forceful warnings.
Frere had written; 1... I do assure Your Grace that the 
position seems so hazardous ... energetic remonstrances- 
should be ... sent to the Turks through Sir H. Elliot
(1) Argyll ‘Autobiography1 II p.65
(2) Ibid p.335 (in 1879)
(3) Writer1s correspondence to, and phone conversation of 
2*f.1+.73 with, the present Duke of Argyll and the 
Chamberlain of Argyll
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who should firmly insist on abstinence from all
interference with the low country on this coast . ..• (1)*
Frere may have been influenced by the inadequate state
of Adenfs defences, revealed in 1862, when he was
Governor of Bombay (2).
Argyll urged Granville not to be satisfied with
the bland Ottoman reassurances that 1... these Tribes
*
and Territories are already ours (part of Yemen - a 
Province of Turkey) and we are only punishing some 
depredations made by one Chief upon another*1•
•Well - but if we admit this as satisfactory we 
are giving up all that Frere and others are contending 
for.
•We must not therefore accept without protest a 
reply which asserts the very dominion we object to and 
merely assures us that they are taking no new steps . ..* (3)*
(1) AM, Reel 318, Frere to Argyll,, private 3«l*73j 
enclosing copies of letters to Elliot and to Granville, 
rec*d 20.1*73
(2) p.10.3 n.l
(3) FO 78 2753  ^ Argyll, from Inverary, to Granville,
25*1.73, rec'd 27.1.73 in FO
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Argyll was back at the India Office soon after 
January 27th when the Viceroy1 s despatch on the Yemen 
situation was received (1)* Argyll also received a 
private letter from Northbrook (2). Both the despatch 
and the letter insisted that an Ottoman advance must 
be prevented, although Northbrook accepted that Anglo- 
Ottoman negotiations were a matter of Imperial, not of 
Indian Government, policy. In Northbrook1s view, he was 
not justified in doing more than instructing that the 
Resident at Aden should warn the Ottoman Governor-General 
to halt his advance, while the two Governments arranged 
diplomatic discussions. Northbrook expressed his 
confidence to Argyll that the Ottomans would not dare 
to attack Lahej in the meantime. Northbrook did not then 
share the Resident's suspicion about Ottoman moves.
Indeed, he expressed some doubts about General Schneider's 
competence, because Schneider had requested the better 
Snider rifles for Aden's garrison, although the Indian 
troops were untrained in their use, because Ottoman troops 
had breech-loading rifles (2).
(1) LI, Despatch of 10.1.73 sent via Brindisi
(2) NP LXXXV No bl of 10.1.73
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Argyll persuaded Granville that the British position 
had not been made sufficiently clear. Another despatch 
was therefore sent to Elliot on the 3°th (1). It read; 
*... Her Majesty1 s Government wish that the independence 
of the ^undefined] native chiefs in the vicinity of 
Aden should be respected, and that any attempt to subvert 
their authority would not be viewed with indifference ...1 
It seems unlikely that the India Office and the Foreign 
Department did not realize that the Abdali Haushabi feud 
was a probable reason for the Haushabi chief accepting 
Ottoman suzerainty (2). The details were available 
explaining that feud, but the India Office did not forward 
them to the Foreign Office until January, 187^ (3)* From 
this time, throughout the crisis, the India Office was 
selective in the material it passed to the Foreign Office. 
Argyll was concerned to support, not to control, the
(1) FO 78 2753, Cypher despatch, FO - Elliot, 30.1.73, 
seen before despatch by Argyll, Gladstone & the Queen
(2) p.2.27 - 2.3lf
(3) P0 78 275&J 10 - FO, 12.1.7b, forwarding Res — S of S 
1.2.73
(1).
5
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demands of the Government of India, against the general 
moderation and caution of the rather disinterested 
Foreign Office. If the Haushabi area was accepted as 
being under the Ottomans, then the Alawi and Amiri areas 
to the north would also remain Ottoman.
The Resident1s earlier description of *... the 
Chieftains of the Principalities fsic] bordering on 
Aden ...f was misleading for officials who did not know 
the area (1). Most Yemeni chiefs were elected leaders 
liable to be deposed if they proved unacceptable to 
their tribe. Rivalry within a chiefly family was not 
uncommon. So the British objection to l... any attempt 
to subvert ...* a chief*s authority was likely to lead 
to Anglo-Ottoman friction (2). This was particularly 
so when the Abdali chiefly family were divided over the 
right of Fadhl bin Mohsin to be chief; when the Haushabi 
chief had a justified grievance against his Abdali 
neighbours; and when the Haushabi chief sympathized 
with Abdullah bin Mohsin1 s claim to the Abdali chief ship*. 
Argyll^ determination not to admit of any Ottoman right
(1) FO 78 2753 f 12lf, Res - SGB, copied to S of S, 26.10*72
(2) p*3A 3 n. 1
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to discuss the Haushabi complaint against the Abdalis 
was a barrier to Anglo-Ottoman discussions and therefore 
to mutual understanding*
+ + + - +  +
Khalil Pasha had called on Elliot on 3rd February 
to tell the Ambassador that the Council of Ministers 
1 • • • had decided that he [KhalilJ should attempt to 
obtain the acquiesence of Her Majesty's Government to 
the Chief of Lahej making a purely nominal submission 
to the Sultan without tribute or service being required 
from him (1). Elliot assured Khalil Pasha *... that
there was no possibility of the idea being entertained 
Elliot was probably influenced by Frere*s letter to him 
from Aden in rejecting these tentative Ottoman approaches 
for a negotiated settlement of differences (2). Probably 
Elliot's obdurate refusal to consider the not 
unreasonable Ottoman claims to Lahej, and the reasonable 
compromise proposed, suggested to the Porte that it would
(1) FO 78 2753, Elliot - FO, 3.2.73
(2) p^ 3.22 n. 1
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be impossible to negotiate with the British* But 
Elliot still himself accepted, in a private letter to 
Hammond on 9th February, that a diplomatic agreement 
with the Porte over the Yemenicoastal tribes was probably 
necessary and obtainable (1). Granville did not query 
Elliot’s rejection of the tentative Ottoman approach 
for a negotiated settlement* He probably assumed that 
the Lahej dispute was settled. Elliot thought so too* 
Elliot misjudged the Ottoman dilemma. He wrote;
*... it is evident • *• that the Porte is most desirous 
of avoiding all action calculated to give umbrage to Her 
Majesty* s Government, but it is embai^assed to find a 
satisfactory mode of retreating from the position 
produced ... by the threatening proceedings of the Pasha 
of Senna Jsanaaj • (2). Elliot’s mistake was in not
recognising that the Porte approved of Ahmad MukhtSr’s 
attitude towards the tribes of southern Yemen (3)*
There was no difference of opinion between the Porte and 
its Governor General. Elliot was possibly influenced by
(1) HP, Elliot - Hammond, 9*2*73
(2) FO 2753, Elliot - FO, 3*2.73
(3) FO 78 2753 f 226, Rashid Pasha - Elliot, 15.7.73
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Freie1 s charge that Ahmad Mukhtarfs call for Abdali
submission was aggressive and unacceptable (1)* Elliot
used Frerefs letter as a basis for a Memorandum on the
situation which he delivered to the Porte, after Granville
had approved its issue on 15th February (2). Elliot
even disregarded his own earlier report that 1... Lahej
... is regarded by the Porte as forming a part of the
territory of the Yemen •••*, which the Ottomans were
reoccupying (3)* The Portefs claim to Lahej was unchanged
at the year’s end. Lahej was 1... une territoire que
\
nous n favons jamais entendu abandonner ... a une 
✓
Puissance Etrangere ...* (*f). In the Ottoman view, the 
British had no claims to local suzerainty by virtue of 
their small annual payments to local chiefs (5). In 
that the Ottomans were correct; those payments were a.
(1) FO 78 2753, Frere - Elliot, 2.1.73
(2) FO 78 2753, FO - Elliot, 15.2.73
(3) FO 78 2753, Elliot - FO, 13.1.73
(if) FO 78 275^ f 38-39, Tel despatch, Ottoman Foreign
Ministry - Ottoman Ambassador, London, Dec 1873
(5) P. 3.80 n. 1
3A8
Danegeld taken over from the Abdali chief in 1839 (1)«
As Elliot, and Granville, understood the situation,
Indian concern was limited to the vague area of the 
coastal plain of which Lahej was the market centre*
Elliot had stated that an Ottoman withdrawal of 
the claim to Lahej 1 might be regarded as a recognition 
of weakness, injurious to the Sultan*s authority in the 
districts now acknowledging it . ..* (2). Schneider 
expressed similar views late in December, 1873 (3)« In 
reality, even a British administration in Lahej was less 
harmful to the Ottoman position in the Yemen that a 
continuation of Abdali independence. So long as Lahej 
and other areas were independent, they provided a refuge 
for Yemeni opponents of the Ottomans and unsupervised 
access to the sea, and to contraband trade in arms and 
other goods*
Elliot claimed, on 12th February, that the Porte*s 
dilemma had been solved by Mr. Pisani, the British Embassy
Cl) AFI, Cmdr. Haines letter - Captain Willoughby, 7*3*39
(2) FO 78 2753, Elliot -r FO, 13.1*73
(3) FO 78 2753, Res - S of S, 8.12.73, forwarded
10 - FO, 12.1.7^
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Dragoman (1), Pisani suggested, at an interview with 
Khalil Pasha, the Ottoman Foreign Minister, that it was 
Ahmad Mukhtar Pasha who had claimed Lahej as a part of 
the Yemen, and not the Porte. That explanation 
'.*. disengaged the Porte ... from the responsibility 
of the Pasha1s initiative . .*'* Khalil Pasha neither 
accepted nor rejected Pisani's formula for saving the 
Porte's face, while obtaining a repudiation of the earlier 
Ottoman claim to Lahej, which Frere and Indian officials 
wanted. According to Pisani*s report, interpreted in 
the light of later developments, Khalil Pasha courteously 
avoided committing himself. But, at the time, Pisani 
interpreted the Pasha's reply as accepting the suggestion 
that Ahmad Mukhtar had acted on his own initiative* In 
reality the Porte approved the Pasha's actions; but 
Pisani wrote; *... Khalil Pasha expressed thanks for 
^Elliot'sj ... explanations, and repeated anew that the 
question of Lahej may be considered as accepted in the 
sense wished for by Her Majesty's Government *..'•
India Office and Indian officials interpreted that
(1) FO 78 2753, Elliot - FO, 12.2*73, forwarding 
Pisani1s Report - Elliot of 11.2*73
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statement as meaning Ottoman absention from the wider
area that they had asked for: and it later became the
basis for unjustified British charges of bad faith by
the Ottomans.
The Porte tried to end discussions on the Yemen by
informing the British Embassy that; f... Vizirial
orders, founded upon an Imperial Rescript, have been
forwarded to the Governor General of Yemen to abstain
from interfering with the Ruler of Lahej, and directing
him to leave matters in their former position ...' (1)*
That repeated the Ottoman assurance of non-intervention
in Lahej affairs, which the British had originally
requested. It envisaged an impossible return to the
'status quo ante* 1873 in south Yemen, where the Ottoman
occupation had changed Yemen's politics. The Porte
possibly thought that that reply was less damaging to
Ottoman prestige than any renunciation of Ottoman claims*
Elliot's despatch was passed to Gladstone and the Queen,
Staff
and was seen by senior Foreign Office officials (2).
(1) FO 78 2753? Locock, Charge d 1Affaires Constantinople - 
FO, 11+.2.73 by cypher wire
(2) Lords Enfield, Tenterden and Granville
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A copy of the confirmatory letter was passed later to 
Argyll, who maintained his tough line. He *... hoped that 
Sir Henry Elliot may he instructed, in future discussions 
on this question with the Ottoman Ministers, firmly to 
maintain the position already taken up ...l (1).
Granville accepted Argyllfs request (2).
The British had no legal justification for 
preventing a friendly Power occupying and administering 
all the Yemen. Northbrook admitted to Frere in June 
that British agreements with the tribes did not justify* 
military action in the Yemen against the Ottomans (3)* 
Frere indeed recognised in 187*+ that comparable British 
agreements with the Somali tribes did not justify British 
opposition to a Khedivial occupation of the Somali 
Coast (h). Yet Elliot had cavalierly rejected moderate 
Ottoman proposals for Lahej in February (5)* Granville*s
(1) FO 78 2753 U/S 10 - U/S FO, 5.3*73
(2) FO 78 2753? Undated order on the 10 letter by Granville
(3) NP, Northbrook - Frere, 9*6.73
(**) p.6.17 n.3
(5) P.3.^5 n.l above
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disinterest, Argyll's partisan support of the Indian 
Government's demands, and Elliot's acceptance of Frere's 
unofficial arguments established British opposition to 
any further Ottoman advance,. But as recently as 
October 1872, the Resident had accepted the possibility 
of any of the Yemeni Chiefs transferring '♦*. their 
adherence to another Power . •.* than Britain (1)* Frere 
contributed to the creation of an ‘instant crisis1 out 
of an issue that had been raised seven months earlier. 
Subsequently, his interventions with Argyll helped to 
maintain tension. Yet the need for a negotiated settlement 
was realised by Elliot (2) and by Northbrook (3); and 
a compromise settlement was probably obtainable without 
sacrificing Indian strategic interests near Aden or 
Ottoman prestige in the Yemen. But Granville expressed 
no wish for formal negotiations, possibly because of the 
Liberal Government's weak domestic position (**•). At the 
conclave of Gladstone's leading Ministers on 17th March,
(1) p. 3.12 n. 2 above
(2) p. 3 A 6  n. 1
( 3 )  P. 3.*+2 n .  2
(1+) Gr.P,, Granville - Elliot, 20.8.73
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the Aden situation was not mentioned (1).
+ + + + +
Argyll was impressed by the Indian case for a 
wider sphere of influence than Lahej; he now received 
a Hadhrami visitor*s report of an interview with Ahmad 
Mukhtar in Sanaa and of Ottoman plans to occupy all of 
the Yemen and Hadhramaut (2); and the Indian case, that 
Ottoman assurances over Lahej were inadequate, was 
underlined in the India Office file (3). Argyll tried 
to persuade Granville by sending him the despatch (*+)• 
Hammond questioned the justification of this sweeping 
new proposal (5)« Granville shared Hammond1s doubts#
(1) BM, GP, Vol DLVI, p*76
(2) p.^.37 n.l (Res - SGB 16.1.73) enclosed with (3)
below
(3) IOL L/P & S/5 Vol l^ f, G of I - S of S, l>+.2*73, 
rec *d 11.3^73
(b) FO 78 2753, G of I - S of S, lb.2*73, rec*d and passed
by U/S 10 - U/S FO, 28.3.73
(5) FO 78 2753 U/S 10 - U/S FO, Note by Hammondof 16/3
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But Argyll was strengthened in his convictions hy 
another alarmist letter from Frere, received on 
19th March via Zanzibar (1)*
Frere urged that the matter was !... one of vital 
importance, and calling for immediate action . ..*. In 
his copy of a much longer letter to Granville, Frere 
emphasized vividly the danger to the British position in 
India of '... the re-establishment of a Khalifate over 
Arabia, even in the person of an Osmanli Sultan [which] 
would be an object of religious enthusiasm; and such be 
it remembered is the grounds of the claims which the 
Turks are putting forward to be the rightful sovereigns 
over the whole of Arabia; and if of Arabia, then of the 
entire Muslim world*..1, including India. That was a 
subject which Frere possibly knew (2) worried Argyll (3)«
(1) IOL L/P & S/3/83, Frere - Argyll, with copies of 
correspondence - Granville, of 10.1*73 written
(2) L/P & S/3/10lf, Vol 97, U/S 10 - U/S FO, 9*8*73,
Argyll on Ottomans in Nejd and Lahej and the Muslim 
disturbances in Kashgar and Yunnan. Argyll referred 
to his earlier concern
(3) P-3.38 n. 2
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In Argyll*s view, Muslim fanaticism, outside the Indian 
Army, had been aroused by the events of the Indian 
Mutiny (!)• Frere went on to warn of the impetus to 
the slave trade that might be expected from an extension 
of Ottoman flag-cover to south Arabian vessels, immune 
to R.N. searches. In addition, since the opening of the 
Suez Canal, steamers flying the Ottoman flag had appeared 
in the Gulf of Aden, and they, too, might carry slaves.
A report had been received from the Greek Consular Agent 
at Suakin that Egyptian steamers collected *... -^0 - JO 
slaves every fortnight . ..* (2). Frere was given a copy. 
Probably Frere selected those arguments which he felt 
would most impress Argyll. Argyll had a high opinion of 
Frere (3); but he also realised that Frere could, at 
times, indulge his theories too freely (*f).
(1) Argyll Autobiography II, p.91
(2) AIA 6l9> S.G. Lazary - Res, postmarked 3°.9.72
(3) Argyll Autobiography II, p.78 referred to Frere as
1... one of the most distinguished of the ...
administrators ... of the Indian Empire ...*
(*f) ChP, Argyll - Granville, 12.11.69 on a Memo of Frere* s 
of 8.11.69
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Argyll received another despatch from India, kept 
it two days himself (1), and then sent it 'for information 
and return1 to Granville on 28th March (2). Three 
letters of the Resident about affairs in Haushabi country 
were also sent in original* Granville returned the 
papers on Vth April, unconverted (3). He required 
*... some clear proofs ... before making any stronger 
remonstrations to the Porte •. • * • Argyll sent the Foreign 
Office a copy of his subsequent wire to Northbrook asking 
for a justification for a British Protectorate and for 
details of the tribes covered (^).
Northbrook replied by mail on April 11th, and his 
reply was copied to Granville on 12th May (5)* Argyll 
supported Northbrook's case. For the first time the 
tribes which the Indian Government wished to protect 
were named. They were:- 1. The Abdalee (Lahej)(6);
(1) IOL 2/1/P of S/3-A Vol 83 with Argyll 26-27.3.73
(2) FO 78 2753, U/S 10 - U/S FO of 28.3.73
(3) FO 78 2753> Note on back of correspondence
(>+) FO 78 2753, S of S - G of I, 5A.73
(5) FO 78 2753) G of I despatch of ll.*f*73» rec'd early May
(6) Received stipends or customary payments:
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2* Foodhlee (1); 3- The Akrabee (1)5 f^. The
Howshebee (1); 5* The Alowee (1); 6* The Ameer
j^AmirlTJ (1); 7« The Soobahee (2); 8. The Jaffae
jjfafaij ; 9* The Owlakee ^Aulaqi] . Northbrook
referred the India Office to the 7th Volume of Aitchison‘s 
First Edition of Treaties for details of existing 
agreements (3)*
The Abdali, Fadhli and Aqrabi tribes occupied the 
coastal areas from which Aden drew the bulk of its supplies* 
In addition, a small part of Yafai territory, in the 
Abyan delta, some Subaihi territory, west of the Abdali 
and Aqrabi territory, as well as the south eastern part 
of Haushabi territory, with the village of Haroor, were 
in the coastal plain. The bulk of the Haushabi and Yafai 
territory was not. Nor was any of the Alawi* or of the 
isolated Amiri areas. The coastal plain in the Aulaqi 
area, east of Fadhli territory, did not provide Aden with 
supplies. Most Aulaqis lived in the interior* There was
(1) Received stipends or customary payments
(2) Some sections of this divided tribe received stipends
(3) P*3.56 n. 5
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no effective British influence outside the Abdali,
Fadhli and Aqrabi areas. The Abdali chief had, however,
some influence with his nearest Subaihi neighbours,
the Rijai. The British had nominal connections, through
their agreements, with the Manscnri, Makhdumi and Rijai 
other
and some/sections of the Subaihis*
Northbrook*s despatch asserted *..* that, while 
the Chiefs have been independent of Turkey, they have 
not been so of the British Government, which, for some 
years past, has paid them stipends, and has frequently 
interfered to settle their inter-tribal quarrels 
Yet the British had proved unable to prevent inter-tribal 
feuding* Northbrook claimed that the tribes looked 
*... on the Resident of Aden as their friend and adviser 
in all their difficulties. The question is somewhat a 
domestic one . ..'* It is plain that the Indian authorities, 
echoing views which Schneider had expressed in October,
1872 (1), were giving a biased assessment* But there 
were few facts upon which the Home Government could judge; 
and some were a matter of opinion. The Viceroy claimed
(1) p*3.X2 n*2
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that the Chiefs were, and had been for a century* 
independent of Ottoman influence and control* But the 
Atifi section of the Subaihis had claimed to be under 
Ottoman control in I87I (1). The Haushabi chief had 
accepted Ottoman suzerainty by December, 1872* However, 
the Governor General and his Council had been 1 of
Haushabi under subjection was equally objectionable to 
similar action taken in regard to Lahej . * (2).
The main Indian Government argument was that the 
British already had Treaty relations with these nine 
chiefs and so could make new agreements *••• if deemed 
•expedient” . It was stressed that existing
engagements had been made without reference to
Turkey or any other Foreign Power • Rather more 
bluntly, the argument continued that, as *•••, to the 
question of the rights of the British Government as against 
the Chiefs themselves, we would observe that *•*. we
opinion that any Ottoman attempt to bring the •••
(1) p*2.53 n.3
(2) FO 78 2753, G of I despatch - S of S, 21*3.73, 
passed to FO, 26A.73
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consider ourselves free to impose any measures upon 
the Chiefs which we may deem essential for the safety 
of our Aden possession #..f (1). The Indian Government 
demanded the very right which it denied to the Porte ■ 
to protect the Ottoman position in the Yemen#
An emotional argument was that !... the proceedings 
of Turkish officials have been so prejudicial to British 
interests at Aden as to afford good grounds for such 
arrangements being concluded with the Chiefs as may be 
deemed best fitted to prevent a repetition of the 
evils • •.1» That charge was unfounded. Similar 
arguments were used again, with no more justification, 
in 1902 by the British Boundary Commissioners to justify 
demanding Ottoman territorial concessions (2). The Aden 
Weekly News Reports from January to late March, referred 
to the ‘tranquil1 condition of the districts in the 
neighbourhood of Aden (3). Apart from the imposition of 
a new !ad valorem1 duty imposed on goods going to
(1) LI, G of I despatch of ll.lf#73 - S of S, para b
(2) 9*60 n.l and 9*7° n*2
(3) AIA 621, Reports of 31.1.73 - 8.2.73 and m-#3.73 - 
27-3.73
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Aden from the Yemen interior, as against 2%fo to be 
levied on goods going to Mocha from the interior, there 
was nothing mentioned that was !prejudicial1 to British 
interests at Aden. Even that tax was light, if the 
Ottomans increased security on the caravan routes. The 
British had themselves encouraged the Abdali chief in 
1865 to institute a transit tax to pay for his expenses 
in protecting caravans from Fadhli raids.
Northbrook pointed out that the Abdali chief had 
asked for British protection. But, quite incorrectly, 
it was claimed that he was '... the chief of the largest 
and most important tribe ...'. No reference was made to 
the Indian Foreign Department's earlier objection to 
annexing Abdali territory, because that might cause a 
dispute with the Porte over Ottoman claims on the Abdalifs 
undefined borders Cl). Nor did the Indian Government 
explain how it would control the tribes if they were 
protected. It merely said that the tribes would be 
required to abstain from political intercourse with Foreign. 
Powers, without the consent of the British Government, and
(1) p.2.67 n.3
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to refer all disputes with Foreign Powers, or with each 
other, to the British Government for settlement ...l.
The British Government would then f... engage to defend 
them against unprovoked aggression by Foreign Powers . ..** 
fForeign! was not defined, but it probably applied to 
non-Arabian Powers.
When Northbrook and his Council drafted their 
Despatch, they had received a copy of Granville^ important 
policy Despatch to Elliot, No 19 of 30*1»73 (1). They 
also understood that Khalil Pasha, the Ottoman Foreign 
Minister, had reassured Elliot that the Porte would make 
no fresh advances and that the Ottoman Commander had 
been directed *... to leave matters in their former 
position (2). Those undefined assurances ‘satisfied1
Northbrook and his Council because they were believed to 
apply to all the stipendary chiefs, and not to Lahej 
alone, in answer to Indian demands. The Ottoman 
assurances therefore caused mi stand er standings in India, 
and so, later, in London. Consideration of the conflicting
(1) p.3.^3 n.l
(2) p. 3.50 n.l above
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Indian Government and Ottoman interests in the southern 
Yemen required time and a calm atmosphere. Circumstances 
dictated that both should be denied, even before the 
Indian Government proposals were sent to the Foreign Office.
■+• +  +  + +
On 5th May, the Resident telegraphed to India that 
Ottoman intervention in the Haushabi area was continuing (1). 
For his part, the Resident had warned the Haushabi chief 
to cease co-operation with the Ottomans and to secure 
the withdrawal of Ottoman troops, unless he wished to 
have his stipend cut and have other, unspecified, action 
taken against him (2). The Haushabi chief*s reply was 
rude but realistic; he suggested that Schneider ask the 
Ottomans to -withdraw their troops, instead of asking that 
of the Haushabis; he warned that the main caravan route 
would be closed if Schneider stopped paying the Haushabi 
stipend; and, in that case, the Haushabi chief invited
(1) FO 78 2753, 10 - FO, 12*5*73 passing G of I tel - 10 
of 10*5*73 quoting Resident
(2) FO 78 2753? Hes - Haushabi chief, 12.5*73 copied to 
FO by 10, 17.6*73
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Schneider to hunt him through the Haushabi hills, if he 
could (1)., Schneider complained to the Secretary of 
State that such disrespect for British prestige depended 
upon Ottoman support for the Hau^abi chief (2)* Once 
that was removed Schneider was satisfied that the ‘petty 
and contemptible1 Haushabis would be brought to their 
senses. Schneider assumed that Haushabi wishes were 
irrelevant and that the tribe was a British dependent. 
Schneiderfs reports were also sent to the Foreign 
Department through Bombay*
Frere visited Aden on 19th May; in his opinion, 
Ottoman interference with the tribes near Aden was 
increasing. He favoured assisting the local tribesmen 
to expel the Ottoman troops and reinforcing Adenfs 
garrison, if diplomatic notes failed to secure an Ottoman 
withdrawal (3)* There is no evidence that the tribesmen 
wanted to, or could have, expelled the Ottomans. Frere 
advised Northbrook on the 19th to 'stir up1 the Foreign 
Office (3)* Possibly he gave Schneider similar advice.
(1) FO 78 2753? Haushabi Chief - Res, back of f 220
(2) FO 78 2753 f 225(back), Res - S of S, 26.5.73, para 8.
(3) NP, Frere - Northbrook, 19*5*73
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From Aden, Schneider began to send frequent telegraphic 
reports of Ottoman movements, or rumoured movements,, 
southwards towards Lahej* His first report was of the 
arrival of 12 Ottoman soldiers, billeted1 - so Schneider 
telegraphed - in the Haushabi Sultan1s house at Shuqa (1). 
The Haushabi chief had asked for Ottoman support against 
Abdali pressure, so Schneider1s use of the emotive word 
billeted1 was misleading* Shuqa was a sensitive border 
area where Haushabi territory had been ceded to the 
Abaalis (2). When the message was passed to the Foreign 
Office, the word ’Lahadj* was added after ’Shuqa1 in the 
summary on the Foreign Office file cover (3). The report 
thus apparently referred to an Ottoman intrusion into 
Abdali territory* Granville accepted that interpretation; 
he also agreed with Argyll’s demand for an immediate 
Ottoman withdrawal; Elliot was instructed on the 22nd to 
press the Porte for that (*+).. This British misunderstanding
(1) L/P & S/3/10*f Vol 97, Tel* G of I - 10, 21*?*73,
repeating news from Aden
(2) p. 2.28-2.30 and 3.73
(3) FO 78 2753, 10 - FO, 22,5.73
(If) FO 78 2753, Tel. FO - MBMA C'ple, 22.5.73
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was incorporated in the official record of events (1).
It appeared that the Porte had broken the undertaking 
of mid January not to begin operations against Lahej (2).
Northbrook believed that the Ottomans were guilty 
of bad faith by sending troops into the Haushabi area, 
to Shuqa; Northbrook therefore instructed Schneider by 
telegram to protest to Ahmad Mukhtar that *... in sending 
troops to Housibee country he is acting contrary to 
assurances given by the Ottoman Porte ... and will be 
answerable for the consequences ...' (3)* The Resident 
duly wrote to the Pasha, accusing him of bad faith (b). 
Schneider and his staff were enduring the humid heat of 
an Aden summer. Now they suffered from a false sense of 
grievance against the Ottomans in the Yemen as well*
More disturbing news of Ottoman moves followed. The 
Resident telegraphed on the 27th that the Haushabi chief
(1) BM, SPR, PD IS?1** C92O published January 187^
(2) p.3*3^ n.3
(3) LI, Viceroy^ wire of 23.5*73 - S of S, reporting 
instructions sent through Bombay
ib) FO 78 2753 f 22*f, Copy of Res - Pasha c. 23.5*73
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was trying to persuade Abdali tribal leaders, including 
the Chief’s elder brother, Abdullah, to accept Ottoman 
suzerainty (1). On the 29th, Schneider reported a 
proposed Ottoman flag march from Hajariya through 
Haushabi territory and up to Qataba (2). Schneider 
described that alarmingly as *..• a reconnaissance in 
the neighbourhood of Aden • He accordingly asked
for, but was refused, authority to station troops in 
Lahej (2)* Meantime, Elliot felt that the Turks
were making fools of themselves about the Arab tribes ...! 
near Aden; but that that ’••• was not from want of 
plain speaking by him (3).
Elliot had described Foreign Minister Khalil Pasha, 
in April, as *••• an errant old woman, who cannot take 
a decision and goes on shilly-shallying ...* (W* But 
Khalil Pasha had some justification for indecision; his
(1) FO 78 2753, Kes - 10, tel, 27.5*73
(2) FO 78 2753 f 191
(3) HP, Elliot - Hammond, 30*5*73
(^) HP, Elliot - Hammond, 13.^.73
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position depended upon the whim of the Sultan; and 
neither Elliot nor the Pasha had adequate maps of the 
area. However, on 1st June, Elliot telegraphed to London 
that the Porte accepted the British demands to withdraw 
Ottoman troops from the Haushabi Sultan*s house within 
nine days (1). But the Porte required that this 
acceptance should be considered, temporarily, as private; 
and certain, unspecified, Ottoman rights were reserved.
Argyll received Frere*s alarmist letter written 
from Aden on 19th May on 2nd June (2). Frere had 
suggested military measures, if diplomacy failed to 
secure an Ottoman withdrawal from the territory of the 
stipendiary tribes. He justified military action by the 
strategic need to recognise the increasing value of Aden 
because of the growth of traffic through the Suez Canal* 
That was an indirect recognition that the British claims 
on the Porte were based on British convenience, not on 
legal right. Northbrook had already emphasized to Argyll 
in February that Indian concern was for all the stipendiary
(1) FO 78 2753
(2) AM Reel 317 with a copy of Frere - Northbrook,
19.5*73 (p.3.6^ n. 3 )
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chiefs and not with the Abdali alone (1). That was 
reinforced by the Indian Despatch passed to the Foreign 
Office on 12th May, calling for Protectorate treaties 
with all the stipendiaries, so that Britain would have a 
legal justification for defending them from the 
Ottomans (2)* Frere would have learnt on his return to 
Aden from Zanzibar, how Indian demands had escalated 
beyond Frere‘s originally more moderate aims. He would 
also have learnt from Schneider of the Ottoman's intentions 
to occupy the Haushabi area.
Frere sent Argyll a copy of his letter to Northbrook 
of 19th May; that exaggerated the dangers to the British 
position. Frere claimed that British agreements with the 
stipendiary tribes were '... not for general political 
objects, but to keep open roads and enable out* garrison 
to be fed Unjustifiably, he implied that Ottoman
control would endanger those supplies* But in his 
January letter to Elliot, copied to Argyll, he had accepted
(1) LI, Despatch No 22 of 1^*2*73? rec'd 11*3*73? para 5
(2) L/P & S/3/l0*+, U/S 10 - U/S FO forwarding Despatch
No 38 of 11^.73
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that 1 their [ottomanj authority may be an
excellent exchange for a chronic state of intertribal 
feuds, elsewhere ....1 than on the coastal plain (1)*
Now he criticised an Ottoman export duty of 2 on supplies 
going to Aden. That was a small price to pay for security 
in the interior. But Frere described "protectionist1 
Ottoman taxes as intended 1... to divert trade from Aden 
to ... Mocha and Hodeida ...* (2)*
Frere referred to the Haushabi grievance against the 
Abdalis for taldng land at Zaida and warned wildly that 
the Haushabi chief 1... is now threatening Lahej £with
taken from him by Lahej ...* Cl). That charge was never 
substantiated. The Abdali chief probably believed it; 
but the Ottomans showed no sign of provoking an Abdali- 
Haushabi clash, although the Ottomans did recognise the 
Haushabi claim against the Abdalis (3). So did Schneider (*+).
(1) p. 3.20 n. 1
(2) NP, Frere - Northbrook, 19.5-73
(3) FO 78 2753, Elliot - FO, 13.1.73
(If) FO 78 2753) Res - S of S, 3*12.73) para *+, passed
to FO 12.1.7*f
Ottoman and preparing to recover land formerly
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Frere went on to warn of the probability of fresh anti- 
British religious feeling in India, if the exiled Moplah 
leader from India, Seiyid Fadhl bin Alawi, was given a 
leading role in local affairs by Ahmad Mukhtar Pasha. 
Evidently, Schneider had told Frere about the Pasha's 
alleged plans to employ Seiyid Fadhl (1). Argyll had 
also received a copy of Schneider's letter about the 
interview from the Government of India in March. Argyll 
had had some correspondence from India warning him of 
the latent religious conflict between Christianity and 
Islam in India that could erupt (2). He suspected that 
'... Mahomedan ill-feeling ... cannot be conciliated ...' (3). 
Northbrook was more open-minded; many British officials 
assured him that Lord Mayo's assassin was regarded as 
a martyr, but he had no means of knowing whether that was 
so (*+). Argyll was possibly impressed; the India Office 
enquired whether Muslim actions in Yumax, Kashgar,Nejd, and 
Lahej were part of a common plan (5). The Foreign Office
(1) p.lf.37 n.l
(2) AM Reel 318, Sir William Muir - Argyll, 18.12.71
(3) NP, Argyll - Northbrook, 23.10.72
(if) NP, Northbrook - Argyll, 26.9-72
(5) FO 78 2753, 10 - FO, 9.8.73
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issued a circular to its Consular Officers in Muslim 
countries enquiring if they had any such evidence.
There was no aggression by the Porte on the Haushabi 
tribe; Ottoman soldiers went to Shuqa to protect 
Haushabi interests; but the India Office, on Argyll*s 
instructions, copied an Indian telegram of 23rd May to 
the Foreign Office, *... relative to the aggressions on 
the Haushabi tribe of the Turkish authorities in the 
Yemen (1) on 3rd June. Granville was asked that Elliot 
should make ‘effectual* representations to the Porte to 
stop this ‘aggression*. Elliot was so instructed (2).
But the Porte*s new Governor General had left for Hodeida 
on 5th June, with instructions *... to cause immediate
withdrawal of troops from the Haushabi Sultan*s house
and to abstain fromat arRaha, not from Shuqa (3) 
molesting any of the jB'ritish stipendiary^ tribes ...* (b).
Elliot*s telegram caused further misunderstandings, and 
later British charges of Ottoman bad faith. Elliot's ill
(1) FO 78 2753 f 201
(2) FO 78 2753, tel. FO - Elliot, 5.6*73
(3) Only subsequently apparent, and unknown to Elliot 
when he telegraphed
(b) FO 78 2753, tel. Elliot - FO, 6.6*73, rec*d 7.6.73
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health, possibly due to the strain of seeing Anglo- 
Ottoman understanding deteriorate, may have contributed 
to his failure as an intermediary. He complained of 
tiredness (1).
The Ottomans were not 'molesting* the Haushabis; 
they had not undertaken to withdraw from Shuqa; and an 
Ottoman withdrawal from arHaha, from the Sultan*s old 
home, did not imply an Ottoman evacuation of Haushabi 
territory. The Ottoman assurances to Elliot were, 
therefore, honoured. But, because the British understood 
them as referring to an evacuation of all the territory, 
including the Haushabi chief*s tower at Shuqa, on the 
sensitive Lahej border near Zaida, a continued Ottoman 
presence at Shuqa was held to be an Ottoman breach of 
faith. The confusion was caused because the British 
demand, sent to Elliot on 15th May, was virtually a new 
demand (2). It was later recognised as being the definitive 
statement of the British position (3). The British right
(1) HP, Elliot - Hammond, 27*6.73
(2) FO 78 2753, FO Despatch III - Elliot, seen by Gladstone
(3) FO 78 5098, Viceroy*s tel. of 28.12.99 - S of S
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to declare a Protectorate inland rested upon the Ottoman 
failure to reject this demand openly. In it, Granville 
extended his instructions to Elliot of 11th March (1), 
then 1... specifically applying to the Sultan of Lahej ...1, 
to such 1... native Arab tribes ... as were in friendship 
with the British Government . ( 2). This sudden 
extension of British demands, and the urgency with which 
they were repeated (3)> probably caused confusion and 
consternation at the Porte. The Foreign Office had called 
for the withdrawal of Ottoman troops; they were 
withdrawn; but the Ottoman gendarmes remained in Haushabi 
territory at Shuqa. The letter, but not the spirit, of 
the British telegraphic demand had been met*
Granvillefs new instructions accepted the Indian 
Government's case th,at all the stipendiary chiefs should 
be protected (*f). Not surprisingly, the Porte reserved 
its rights, and its comments, for a later date. But, in
(1) FO 78 2753
(2) p.3.73 n. 2
(3) p.3.65 n. b
(^) LI, Despatch No 38 of 11*^.73
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an age when great weight was attached to keeping 
promises, Ottoman behaviour now came,wrongly, to be 
portrayed as deliberately deceitful and dishonourable. 
Elliot believed that the Ottomans had agreed on a general 
withdrawal (1); so did the Foreign Office (2); so did 
Northbrook (3)* But Northbrook believed that negotiations 
would be required in London and Constantinople to arrange 
matters; and he told Elliot so (3)* In Aden, Schneider 
noted Ottoman advances in Hajariya towards the Subaihi 
tribe, whom he chose to consider as British stipendiaries, 
throughout June (*0. He was also aware that the Ottomans 
remained at Shuqa.
On 17th June the India Office sent copies of earlier 
correspondence about Ottoman advances towards Aden to 
the Foreign Office. Some of it had been sent before; 
and there was no great concern at the Foreign Office* 
Granville believed that *... the question would seem by
(1) NP, Elliot - Northbrook, 6.8.73
(2) FO 78 2753? Comment by Granville on the cover of 
f 208, U/S 10 - U/S FO, 17*6.73
(3) NP, Northbrook - Elliot, 9*6.73
(*f) AIA 621, News Reports, 5 - 1 7  June 1873
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Elliot's report |to 
Schneider had made an emotional issue out of his exchanges 
with the Haushabi chief, and out of his assurances to the 
Abdali chief, that the Ottomans would withdraw, being 
proved to be untrue (2)» f... The position of the British
Government at Aden will be unbearable if any petty and 
contemptible chief Jthe HaushabTJ ... can set its 
authority and wishes at defiance by making his submission 
to the Ottoman Porte ...* (2).
The new Foreign Minister, Rashid Pasha, tried to
reassure Elliot on 15th July of Ottoman goodwill towards
the British at Aden, while reserving Ottoman suzerainty
over *... les tribus aux environs d'Aden ....Ces peuplades
trouvent un debouche avantageux et lucratif^ de leurs
denrees sur les marches d'Aden, et notre firme intention
/
n'est point certes de troubler un etat des choses aussi 
satisfaisants . ..* (3). Rashid understandably professed 
himself at a loss to understand how the British had 
charged the Ottomans with bad faith over the still
be] settled . (!)• But
(1) p*3»75 n. 2
(2) FO 78 2753 f 22k, Res - S of S, 26.5.73
(3) FO 78 2753 f 226, Ottoman Note Verbale
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unexplained incident of the Haushabi Sultan. Rashid 
commented tartly on the surprising British preoccupations 
with the administration and troop movements within the 
Ottoman Province of Yemen. Considering the way in which 
British demands had escalated the Ottoman note was 
conciliatory. It emphasised that the Porte and its 
officers in the Yemen were following precisely the same 
policy. That statement, alone, should have, but did not, 
put an end to British theories that difficulties were due 
to Ottoman officers in the Yemen deliberately disregarding 
the Porte's instructions. Instead, some British opinion 
came to explain divergences between what the British wanted, 
and what the Ottomans did, by saying that the Porte gave 
different instructions to its officers to the assurances 
which it gave to Elliot (1). Rashid Pasha emphasised 
that traditional Ottoman policy towards Britain had not 
changed.
Schneider complained on 30th July that the Ottoman 
detachment remained at Shuqa; their number had risen to 
30, but they were described as 'Irregulars* (2). Elliot
(1) p.3.81 n.l
(2) FO 78 2753 f 259, Tel. Res - S of S
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was sent a copy of the Resident's telegram (1). But 
Schneider complained again; he had received a letter 
from the Mutasarif of Taiz complaining of Subaihi 
cattle raids against the Haushabis (2) Such Subaihi 
action might have been encouraged by the Abdali chief 
to provoke a clash, and to provoke an anti-Haushabi and 
anti-Ottoman British reaction (3)* But the Resident 
considered a warning letter from Ahmad Ayub Pasha to 
the Abdali Sultan far more serious* The Pasha warned 
the Abdali that no *... Government will relinquish the 
rights that revert to its sovereignty and that it guards 
and protects he who has already tendered his submission ...'
i.e. the Haushabi] • The Resident implied that the 
Pasha criticised the Abdali for not yet tendering his 
submission,unlike the Haushabi. There is, however, no 
Arabic copy in the India or Foreign Office file; and 
the Residency's translations were sometimes inaccurate*
(1) FO 78 2753, FO - Elliot, 8.8*73
(2) FO 78 2753 f 276, Copy Res - S of S enclosing a 
copy of Mutasarif's letter
(3) Cf. p.2.52 - 2.53
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The Resident wrote to the Pasha demanding that he should 
evacuate Haushabi country '... in conformity with the 
orders you have received . ..* from the Porte (1).
Schneider was not conciliatory; but his personal honour 
had been repeatedly involved in assurances, later 
discredited by Ottoman action, to the Abdali chief; and 
the weather was 'hot and trying' (2). He had believed 
that Ahmad Ayub had replaced Ahmad Mukhtar at Sanaa 
because the latter had disobeyed the Porte's orders not 
to interfere with the Haushabi and other British 
stipendiaries (3). At Bombay Sir Philip Wodehouse found 
*... the conduct of the Turkish officers ... certainly 
most strange Wodehouse wanted to '... show ourselves
amongst our allies in the interior ...' C^ f). Northbrook 
however refused Schneider permission to send troops to 
Lahej *
(L) FO 78 2753? Copy Res - Ahmad Ayub, 19.8.73 enclosed 
with Res - S of S, 21.8.73* passed to FO, 6.9.73
(2) AIA 621, Aden News, 18-25.6.73
(3) LI5 Despatch No 68 of 11/8, rec'd 8.9*73* Northbrook 
instructed Schneider to inform the local chiefs so.
(^ f) NP, Wodehouse - Northbrook, 1.9*73
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Ahmad Ayub had reported on British claims in the 
Yeraen to the Porte through the War Minister on 6.8*73 (1).
He recognised, correctly, that the British paid small 
stipends to various, unnamed, chiefs. He claimed that the 
Subaihis came under the Ottoman Districts of Mocha, for the 
coastal sections, and, of Hajariya for the inland ones.
Only two small nomadic sections, which had refused Ottoman 
suzerainty, were excluded (2). These two may have been the 
Makhdumi and Mansouri sections, which had British stipendiary 
agreements from 1871? and which were under Abdali influence at 
times. Frere stated that the Ottomans controlled the settled 
Rijai section to the West of Lahej (3). The Pasha 
described the Haushabis as being tranquil and well 
governed under their Ottoman Mudir, the Haushabi chief.
Ahmad Ayub blamed unrest on the Abdali Haushabi border on 
the Abdalis. He considered that the latter should obey
(1) FO 78 2753 f 333 * 336, Trans, of report of Ahmad Ayub
received confidentially by British Embassy through its
dragoman, Mr. Pisani, and enclosed with Pisanifs 
report of 29.10.73 - Elliot
(2) Cf. p. 2. ^  - 2.55
(3) NP, Frere - Northbrook, 19.5*73
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the law of the land, if they wished to work their fields 
at Zaida. The Pasha also reported the application of 
the Abdali chief1s elder brother, Abdullah, through his 
son, Fadhl, for Ottoman nationality and protection. Their 
application was submitted to the Porte and the petitioners 
were told that the Ottoman decision would be 1... in 
conformity with the Imperial Commands . ♦.* of the Sultan*
+ “I* + + *h
Ahmad Ayub replied to Schneider in a letter of 
30th September, received on 9th October, rejecting the 
Resident’s claim that the Haushabi area was not Ottoman 
territory. Schneider complained indignantly to Argyll, 
sending the Pasha’s letter in original;’... The 
impression created in my mind*, Schneider wrote, ’by 
the persistent disregard of orders by the past and present 
Moosheer is that the Ottoman Porte gives assurances to
H.M’s Govt which its subordinates are instructed to 
ignore ...’ (1). Schneider also telegraphed to the India
(1) FO 78 2753 f 359, Res 59 of 11.10.73 - S of S
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Office news of the Pasha's refusal (1). Schneider's 
telegram arrived when feelings at the India Office were 
already in favour of more resolute action. Northbrook 
had written to Sir Henry Rawlinson in a letter of 8 ..9.73 5 
the best way out ... will be to make treaties ...' 
with all the stipendiaries (2). That would make the 
British position clear by establishing a Protectorate.
The probability, confirmed by Haushabi ties with the 
Ottomans over the next ^0 years, that the Haushabi chief 
would not have made a treaty voluntarily with Britain, 
was overlooked.
Argyll had received a letter from Northbrook of 
15.9*73 which had explained that there were '... no 
signs of withdrawal of Turkish detachment from the 
Howshebee country ...* (3). Northbrook pressed Argyll 
privately, as he had publicly, to obtain Government
Cl) FO 78 2753 f 289, Res Tel. of 10.10.73 - S of S
(2) NP. Rawlinson was Chairman of the Political Committee 
at the India Office
(3) NP
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approval for Protectorate Treaties (1)* Argyll officially 
reminded the Foreign Office about the India Government's 
earlier proposal to take certain chiefs in the
vicinity of Aden under British protection when passing
on the correspondence on Yemen affairs (2). Privately, 
Argyll urged Granville; '... we must keep Aden and keep 
it in perfect security and peace (3)* Aden was as
important for the trade beyond India as for India itself. 
Argyll proposed to Granville that Protectorate treaties 
should be authorised.
Lord Tenterden had just taken over as Permanent Under 
Secretary from the elderly Mr. Hammond (*+•). Tenterden,
(1) LI, G of I Despatch No 68 of 11.8.73 realistically 
stressed the importance of Protectorate Treaties 
for the Abdali and Fadhli areas only
(2) FO 78 2753, 10 — FO, 13.10.73
(3) GP, Argyll - Granville, 13.10.73
(b) Granville's views on Hammond were given to Queen
Victoria on 7-10.73 - Letters of Queen Victoria, ed. 
G.E. Buckle, Murray, London, 19^6, Vol II, p.286;
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a more competent official, commented sharply; "This is 
a very serious matter. If we protect these tribes we must 
see to their gd. behaviour and sooner or later shall 
probably have to govern them altogether and annexe them,
I presume you will consult Mr, Gladstone before deciding.1(1)• 
Granville added a short minute to a brief summary of the 
background prepared for Gladstone*s benefit* Granville 
suggested *... another representation to the Porte, 
telling them that such a measure has been proposed, but 
before taking it into consideration we think it right 
to make another representation to them of the absolute 
necessity of their bona fide carrying out their assurance 
...* (2),. Gladstone 1 entirely concur {red]* and went on. 
to stress the necessity of avoiding an unjust war by 
such hastiness as had caused the Ashanti War (3).
Gladstone made no private comment on the Yemen to Granville 
when returning the Memorandum* Gladstone was then 
preoccupied with Home Affairs. Argyll accepted that
(1) FO 78 2753? Tenterden - Granville, back of f 298C 
dated lV.10*73
(2) FO 78 2753 f 298, undated, Granville - Gladstone
(3) FO 78 2753 f 309, Gladstone, 17.10.73 - Granville
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Protectorate treaties would limit British freedom of 
action, but saw no other way of protecting Aden (1). 
Granville informed Argyll that Gladstone agreed to a. 
final attempt to preserve the 1 status quo1 by obtaining 
an Ottoman withdrawal from the Haushabi area through 
Elliot (2). But events were moving too fast for calm 
discussions in London or Constantinople*
+ + + +■ +
The Abdali chief mistrusted the approach of his 
brothers, Abdullah and Abdul Karim, to the Ottomans (3). 
Their action threatened his own authority* As the 
Resident could not actively assist Fadhl bin Mohsin against 
his brothers, Fadhl stopped his brothers1 share of tribal 
revenue• Northbrook had refused to give Schneider 
1 discretionary power1 and had resisted pressure for troop 
movements (*f)* The Resident approved Fadhl fs action.
Cl) Gr*P. Argyll, in an undated note
(2) FO 78 2753, Granville - Argyll, 19.10*73
(3) p-3.81
(*+) NP, Northbrook - Elliot, 9.6*73
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The brothers retaliated by collecting funds directly 
from the market. Fighting followed in which Abdullah 
bin Mohsinfs side lost two men killed. Local mediation 
restored an uneasy peace in Lahej. Two of the Abdali 
chief1s dissident nephews were surrendered to him as. 
hostages (1).
Fadhl bin Mohsin appealed to Schneider for support 
and received *+001bs of gunpowder and shot of various 
calibre (2). This supply of gunpowder alarmed Abdullah 
bin Mohsin who owned a strong, fortified house in Lahej 
town, which the chief had been unable to seize (1). As 
thick mud walls could resist cannon shot, gunpowder 
was used locally to blow up such buildings. Abdullah 
then appealed to the Mutasarif in Taiz for protection, 
as an Ottoman subject. In the Civil Governor1s: absence 
from Taiz, the military commander ordered troops to go 
to Lahej from Shuqa. He did not know that Ottoman troops 
were not alloiired to enter Abdali territory. Once the 
troops were in Lahej, Schneider*s protest was referred 
from Taiz to Ahmad Ayub Pasha at Sanaa (3).
(1) FO 78 2753  ^ tel. Res - 10, 20.10.73
(2) FO 78 2753 f 368, Res - SGB (r) S of S, 20.10.73
(3) F0 78 2753 f M*2, Res - S of S, 28.10.73
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Northbrook authorised Schneider to use troops to 
protect the Abdali chief, when the Resident reported 
the Ottoman refusal to withdraw on the 22nd (1). The 
Resident despatched his Second Assistant, Captain Hunter, 
with fifty sabres of the Aden Troop, to Lahej on the 23rd, 
and an Anglo-Ottoman confrontation had begun* On the 27th, 
the Resident provocatively moved the 328 strong Aden 
garrison !Lahej Field Force1 out to Lahej (2)* Despite 
rising tension at Simla and at London deliberate calm 
still prevailed at Lahej* The Ottoman officer courteously 
visited Captain Hunter on the 25th and showed his concern 
to avoid hostilities (3)* The country remained quite 
tranquil (if). Supplies for the interior for Aden remained 
plentiful* Schneider , in telegraphing to India and to 
London about the Ottoman troops entry into Lahej, omitted 
all mention of his earlier provocative despatch of 
gunpowder (5) •
(1) FO 78 2753 f 317, Viceroy* s tel. - Argyll of 23.10*73
(2) FO 78 27 53 f 3^3, Bes tel. - S of S of 27*10*73
(3) p*3*86 n*3
(if) AIA 621, Aden News No ¥f of 2*1-31.10.73
(5) p*3.86^ h *2
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This news appeared, in London, to he another 
Ottoman provocation* The Resident had described the 
Ottomans troops1 officer asking the chief for hostages, 
and a senior Ottoman officer asking for the surrender* 
of the Abdali tower at Zaida. But the Resident did admit 
that the Ottoman detachment denied any hostile intent; 
and he had advised the Abdali chief not to attack the 
Ottomans* Typically, the India Office did not pass the 
Indian Government Desptach, which set out some of the 
background (provided earlier by the Resident (1)) to 
the squabbles between the Abdali chief and his elder 
brother, to the Foreign Office, until after the Foreign 
Office had ordered Elliot to protest to the Porte against 
the Ottoman failure to honour their assurances not to 
enter Lahej (2). Argyll considered 1 *.♦ matters ... 
getting serious In his view an Anglo-Ottoman
military clash was possible (3)* But Granville remained
(1) FO 78 2753 f 3*fl, Res 227 of 26*8*73 - SGB
(2) fo 78 2753, FO - Elliot, 25*10.73
(3) Gr.P., Argyll - Granville, 29.10.73
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calm; he believed that the Porte might procrastinate, 
but that it had no intention of opposing Britain (1).
He sent Argyll a. copy of his telegram to Elliot of 
2jth October*
Granville’s opinion was justified by Ahmad Ayub’s 
quick, conciliatory, reactions. The latter despatched 
an Officer, Izzet Mustapha Bey, to Lahej at the end of 
October* Ayub Pasha wanted to arrange an Abdali 
reconciliation and to obtain an Ottoman withdrawal with 
the minimum Ottoman loss of face* Izzet Bey reached 
Lahej on 15th November (2). But Schneider was looking 
for an end to the crisis on his own terms; he required 
the unconditional departure of the Ottoman troops* He 
wanted to injure Ottoman prestige, as he felt that 
British (and therefore his own) prestige had been injured 
recently* British prestige would then rise locally. 
Schneider, in his later written report, felt obliged to 
pay tribute to Izzet Bey*s remarkable courtesy in a 
difficult position.(2)* : However, at the time, Schneider
(1) Gr.P*, Granville - Argyll, 31.10*73
(2) FO 78 27 53, Res 71 of 2^.11*73 - S of S with a. 
report on Izzet Bey’s visit to Lahej
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telegraphed provocatively to Argyll that he saw 
*... nothing but discreditable subterfuge and evasion 
in conduct of Turkish authorities and he trusted that 
there was a limit to the forebearance of the British 
Government Cl)* Schneider also acted provocatively;
he travelled the length of Abdali territory up to the 
Haushabi border at Zaida before returning to Aden on 
30.10*73. The whole area was calm* At Lahej both the 
Ottoman Mulazim and Abdullah bin Mohsin tried to 
negotiate a settlement with the Abdali chief. But Schneider 
warned Fadhl bin Mohsin not to negotiate with either (2).
The Resident maintained tension in London and at 
Calcutta by reporting rumours of small Ottoman 
reinforcements moving to Lahej and to Shuqa (3).
Subsequent correspondence suggests that such ’reinforcements* 
were possibly only messengers. The Resident even sent 
telegraphic reminders that the Ottoman were not 
withdrawing from Lahej or from Shuqa, when he had nothing
(1.) FO 78 2753, Tel. Res - 10 of 18.11*73
(2) FO 78 2753, Res - SGB copied to S of S, 12.11*73
f 553-55^
(3) FO 78 2753 f 350, Res tel. of 3.11.73 - S of S
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more provocative to report (1)* The India Office remained 
opposed to Granville’s moderation, with a comment by 
Argyll that ’••• the position of affairs is most 
unsatisfactory and that if the Govt of the Sultan cannot 
be persuaded by diplomacy to adhere to the promises so 
frequently made ••• more active measures should be taken 
to enforce their withdrawal ...* (2).
The Resident’s telegrams to India brought Northbrook 
an offer of naval support from the British C in C,
Indian Ocean (3). Northbrook considered one ship was 
sufficient. Much was subsequently made of the stay of 
a modern Ottoman corvette, the 'Libnan*, in Aden at this 
time. The ’Libnan1 was carrying troops; and its presence 
was later alleged to have been a demonstration in
favour of the Ottoman detachment near Aden .•«’ and a 
naval threat to the British position at Aden (*f). There
(1) FO 78 2753 f 371, Res tel. of 8.11.73 - S of S
(2) FO 78 2753, U/S 10 - U/S FO on FO draft of 12.11.73
(3) NP, Northbrook to Wodehouse, 10.11.73, referred to 
the naval offer
(*f) Hunter ’Aden’ p.169
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is no evidence for either charge. Ramadhan began in 
mid-November, 1873, and that, combined with a shortage 
of Ottoman credit, was sufficient to delay the ’Libnan1 
in Aden waiting for coal. Certainly the factual 
contemporary News Report did not refer to the delay as 
a demonstration (1). Indeed, tension in Lahej was low 
and the Resident knew that. He visited Lahej from 
7th - 10th November and described the Ottoman Mulazim 
as being f... heartily tired of his position ...f (2).
There was no evidence of any tension at Lahej. But at 
the India Office, Rawlinson wrote to Northbrook;
*..♦ The Arabian affair is troubling us very much ...' (3)* 
While Northbrook wrote to Granville from Calcutta;
1... I hope he [Elliot^ will arrange the Aden affair
At the Foreign Office, Tenterden, correctly, assessed 
the local background in a Minute; 1... The Houshebee 
Sultan and the Lahejd rebel uncle |~sic elder brother.
(1) AIA 621, Aden News No k? of 15-20.11.73
(2) FO 78 2753 f 553, Res - S of S of 12.11.73
(3) NP, Rawlinson, 1*+.11.73 - Northbrook 
ib) NP, Northbrook - Granville, l1*.11.73
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have tendered their submission to the Governor General 
of Yemen to secure his assistance• The result being that
by Turkish troops . ..* (1). Tenterden went on, 
mistakenly, to blame Ahmad Ayub Pasha, 1... an ambitious 
man, urged by fanaticism (and perhaps stimulated by the 
expectation of its being well received by the Porte) to 
extend the Turkish dominions over all the Arab tribes whom 
he could reach ♦ .*** Tenterden, misinformed by Elliot* 
had not realised that the Ottoman troops were not motivated 
by different sentiments to the Porte1s (2).
Argyll received a private letter from Northbrook on 
16.11*75 complaining that f... the conduct of the Turks ■ 
has become worse and worse ... The deliberate neglect 
by the Turkish officials of the assurances given to 
Sir H. Elliott • •* seemed to me to justify so much of 
interference [as sending troops to Lahej] ...f (3)*
the chief town of the Houshebee has been occupied
(1) FO 78 2753, Tenterden on 11+*11*73 to Granville
(2) p• 3• 67 n.3- and p.3*77
(3) NP, Northbrook - Argyll, 23.10*73
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fI should have liked to go further and eject the 
Turks from Lahej ... but in the absence of orders in 
reply to our references ... I did not think that we were 
justified in doing more without instructions*. I hope 
we may soon receive power to act vigorously or our 
position at Aden may become severely compromised • ••*.
Northbrook*s last remark justified Gladstone*s and 
Granville*s reluctance to have Protectorate treaties* Had 
Northbrook been permitted to make one with Lahej he would, 
he implied, have used force against the Ottomans. But 
even Argyll, while pressing the Indian Governments case 
in London, did not encourage Northbrook to provoke a 
clash with Ottoman troops. In replying to Northbrook, 
Argyll made no mention of Aden affairs (1). He wrote 
about the succession in Afghanistan. However, Argyll 
then knew that Elliot had received assurances from the 
Porte on 15.11 for *... the immediate evacuation of 
Houshebee country and that] they engage that these 
orders shall'be executed ...* (2). But Elliot*s next
(1) NP, Argyll - Northbrook, 19.11.73
(2) FO 78 2753, Elliot*s tel. of 15.11.73 - FO, rec*d
16.11.73
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telegram introduced an element of doubt Cl)• It confirmed 
the despatch of orders 1... to withdraw :troops from 
Howshabee and any other part of Lahej to which they may 
have been sent •..1. The Haushabi area was not a part of 
the Abdali territory of Lahej. Clearly there was some 
Ottoman confusion, but the Porte had no direct telegraphic 
communication with Sanaa. The Grand Vizier had, earlier, 
instructed Ahmad Ayub to withdraw troops, as Elliot 
understood, from both Abdali and Haushabi territory (2).
But Elliot was mistaken; the Grand Vizier only referred 
to withdrawing troops from any part of Lahej, and not 
from the Haushabi area.
Elliotfs wire relieved the tension in London for ten 
days while the India Office waited for Ottoman orders to 
be received at Lahej and Shuqa. It was then the Porte’s 
turn to express anxiety at the British occupation of 
Lahej (3). The Porte admitted that a junior Ottoman
(1) FO 78 27535 Elliot’s tel. of 16.11.73 - FO, rec’d
17.11.73
(2) FO 78 2753, Elliot’s letter No b26 of 18-11.73 enclosed 
a copy of Grand Vizier’s telegram of 3/15 November 1973
(3) FO 78 2753* Ottoman telegraphic despatch presented by 
Musurus Pasha - Granville on 26.11.73
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commander had made a mistake; but it urged that there 
was no need for a British presence at Lahej* Granville 
was inclined to agree, subject to Argyll*s assent (1).
But Argyll withheld that. He could * ..* not undertake 
to issue any instructions which tend to embarrass the 
Political Resident at Aden or the Government of India in 
the exercise of their discretion as to the best means of 
maintaining the influence of the British Government with 
the Chiefs in the neighbourhood of Aden ...* (2)* The 
Foreign Office too had second thoughts and queried (3) 
whether the Ottoman telegraphic despatch given to 
Granville on 26.11^73 (**■) guaranteed an Ottoman withdrawal 
from all the nine tribes. Elliot gave Rashid Pasha*s 
confirmation on 1.12.73 that it did, thereby conceding 
for the first time what Northbrook had wanted since 
January (5).
(1) FO 78 27^3? Granville - Argyll, 27.11.73
(2) FO 78 2753, Confidential D/0 Kaye - Tenterden, 28.11.73
(3) FO 78 2753, FO tel. of 28.11*73 - Elliot
W  P*3-95 n. 3
(5) FO 78 2753, Elliot tel. of 1.12.73 - FO
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On 2nd December, Schneider revived tension in 
London by reporting that the Ottomans had not withdrawn 
from either Lahej or Shuqa, and that the Haushabi chief 
was cultivating Abdali lands under Ottoman protection (1).
The Resident reported (1) rumoured (2) Ottoman troop 
movements south from Taiz with light pack artillery*
He suggested that reinforcements should be kept ready 
for Aden* Granville was satisfied with Elliot1a reassurances(3) 
but India Office officials were more impressed by the 
Resident1s rumours* Argyll described the Yemen situation 
as f.*. intolerable . ..* (if). fThe Turks j~werej playing 
with us and our Forces would be said to be afraid of them 
if we stood still* The Resident should be authorised to 
repel the Turks by force and Argyll expected to hear that *. • 
Northbrook had taken that course*.,,(5) * That alarmed
(1) FO 78 2753 f ^56, Res tel. of 2.12.73 - S of S
(2) Possibly the Abdali Chief was providing Schneider with 
rumours to maintain tension so that the Haushabi, and 
the Ottomans at Shuqa, were forced to withdraw
(3) FO 78 2753, Elliot - FO, 2.12.73 wired further 
reassurances
(k) FO 78 2753, U/S 10 - U/S FO,2.12.73 expressed Argyll1s view
(5) NP, In Northbrook*s letter to Argyll, 23.10.73, rec*d 16.11, 
Northbrook wrote that he would have liked to eject the 
Ottomans
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Granville, who wrote to Argyll on the Vth (1), after 
consulting Gladstone (2), that if Argyll thought that 
Northbrook would order force, they wished Argyll to 
instruct the Resident not to do so *... without the 
consent of the Home Govt . ..*. Granville correctly 
believed that sufficient time must be allowed for the 
Governor General of Yemen to receive, and to act on, 
the Porte*s orders. The Porte had no telegraphic link 
with Sanaa (3)*
Granville was unmoved (*+) by a private Memorandum 
to him from Frere ( 5 )5 advocating naval pressure against 
the Ottomans at Hodeida if British demands were not met. 
Frere*s intervention is an interesting illustration of 
the combined efforts of Frere and Kaye, and also Rawlinson,
(1) Gr.P.
(2) Gr.P., Granville - Gladstone, 3*12*73
(3) FO 78 2753, Elliot tel. - Granville of 5-12.73 
pointed that out
(V) FO 78 2753, Undated Minute by Granville 
(5 )  FO 78 2753 f if8 6 -Li-89) Memo by Frere
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to apply pressure wherever they thought it might he 
effective. Frere wrote on Athenaeum Club paper, of which 
he and Kaye were both members. Possibly the two men may 
have discussed the Resident*s telegram of 2.12*73 and the 
Yemen situation there* They were certainly exerting as 
much pressure for action on Argyll, and on India Office 
policy, as they could, just as serving officers had 
pressed Northbrook in India to authorize force (1)* 
Rawlinson, writing to Northbrook on 5th December, doubted 
if the Turkish troops would be *... withdrawn within the 
limits that we have prescribed unless we show our teeth 
in earnest ...* (2)* But Rawlinson did give qualified 
credit to Argyll*s feood and strong* letter on the Yemen 
to Granville of 2,12*73 (3). He however regretted that 
Argyll only felt that the time had *almostf come to use 
force* In Rawlinson*s opinion that time had arrived 
earlier*
(1) NP, Northbrook - Sir Henry Rawlinson, 8.9.73 referred 
to pressure for a military solution
(2) NP, Rawlinson - Northbrook. Central Asian affairs were 
mentioned in Rawlinson*s correspondence with Northbrook 
more than the Yemen
(3) L/P & S/3/lOlf, U/S 10 - U/S FO, 2.12*73
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On December 6th, the Ottomans withdrew from Lahej, 
and from Shuqa (1). Their withdrawal marked the beginning 
of a new phase of Abdali and British expansion at Haushabi 
and Ottoman expense. Schneider was not authorised to 
campaign within Haushabi territory, but he marched the 
Lahej Field Force up to the border. When the Haushabi 
chief failed to make his expected submission to Schneider 
after evacuating Shuqa, the Resident allowed the Abdali 
chief to occupy further Haushabi territory up to A1 Afiad. 
Once the Haushabi elders made peace with the Abdali chief, 
Schneider withdrew the Lahej Field Force; its support 
was no longer necessary for the Abdalis. But Schneider 
left the Aden Troop to patrol in the previously disputed 
area. Complacently, Schneider remarked that ‘heavy 
punishment* had ‘overtaken1 the Haushabi chief, who was 
a refugee living in the hills (2)*
In Lahej, Abdullah bin Mohsin and his principal 
supporters had been taken into Aden as ‘state prisoners1.
(1) F0 78 2753, U/S 10 forwarded Res tel.s of 6*12
and 7*12 - FO on 9*12.
(2) FO 78 2753 f 600, Res tel. of 20.12.73 - S of S
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Abdullah*s fortified house was blown up. These were 
calculated moves by Schneider to hurt local Ottoman 
prestige* Elliot reported the Ottoman Minister of War's 
annoyance at these encroachments upon the Ottoman
possessions (1)* A later official protest followed
early in 187*+ (2) 5 Le Resident Anglais se trouve
avoir fait acte d'autorite sur une territoire que nous 
n'avons jamais entendu abandonner a une Puissance
V
Etrangere In Ottoman opinion, the agreement between
the two Governments to maintain the 'status quo' had been 
broken. So Elliot's assurance to the Porte,that Britain
1... n'entendait en aucune facon elever des pretentions 
de possession sur Lehadj, mais qu'il avait simplement en 
vue de sauvegarder ses Conventions avec certains Cheikhs . •. * 
had proved false. Elliot admitted that '... even those 
who are friendly to us have been a little startled at
hearing that the Housebee sic Abdalij Sultan's brother
had been taken as a prisoner to Aden and his fortress 
blown up ..*' (3). Elliot wrongly explained the troubles
(1) FO 78 2753, Elliot's letter ^61 of 15.12.73 - FO
(2) FO 78 275^ f 38-39) Ottoman telegraphic dispatch
(3) NP, Elliot - Northbrook, 17.12.73
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as being due to an expansionist policy pursued by the 
Ministers of War and Marine, in opposition to the Grand 
Vizier and the Foreign Minister who had worked for 
reconciliation with Britain.
Northbrook recognised the outcome as a 'diplomatic 
success1 for Britain (1). He was now prepared to be 
conciliatory, although he still wanted Protectorate 
agreements with the tribes to prevent future misunderstandings 
v/ith the Porte. The Resident was ordered to endeavour 
to effect a reconciliation between the Abdali chief and 
his brothers to reduce tension, and possibly because the 
Indian Government also did not want the Abdali dissidents 
as political prisoners in India (2)*
The events in 1873 in southern Yemen were of interest 
to very few Britons, other than officials of the India 
Office or of the Indian Government. The subject was not 
an issue of inter-party controversy, because Lord Salisbury 
continued Argyll's support of Northbrook on Yemen affairs. 
There were no Parliamentary questions on the events of the
(1) NP, Northbrook - Rawlinson, 25.12.73
(2) AIA 64-3, Tel. SGB - Res, 27.12.73
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Yemen (1). Such information as did appear was largely 
inaccurate (2). *The Times* reported on 8th December that
Elliot wrote complacently on 6th January that l... that 
Lahej business is at an end . .** (V). Elliot considered 
that nothing could have been more satisfactory than the 
Sultan*s language* Abdul Aziz was concerned only to 
protect Mecca and Medina; he did not want a crisis over 
the Yemen (?)• But the importance of Sultan Abdul Aziz*s 
expression of irritation at Ottoman commitments and 
expenses in the Yemen was marginal* Elliot had
(1) BM, SPR, PP 1873-71*
(2) BM, Newspaper Room* *The Times* of 26*-10*73 reported 
1,000 Turks threatening to occupy Lahej
(3) BM, Newspaper Room. The Times quoting their Calcutta 
correspondent
(V) GiP, Elliot - Granville
(5) FO 78 275V, Cypher Tel. V.1.71* - FO from Elliot
reporting an interview with the Sultan on 3rd January
the Turks had evacuated Lahej * *..• The country
clear of Turks between Lahej and Suez f (3).
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recognised (1) that discontent against the Sultan in 
Constantinople and in the Provinces was weakening the 
Ottoman Empire. Elliot was mistaken in believing that 
Anglo Ottoman differences in the Yemen were at an end.
They were to continue until the Ottomans left. But no 
study was ever made into the causes of the conflict and 
so into ways of preventing its recurrence. No explanation 
was considered necessary. Elliot’s view and Schneider1s 
reports were accepted because the outcome was ’satisfactory1. 
The official, published narrative record of the 
confrontation retained the bias and the inaccuracies of 
the original reports from Aden and India (2). For the 
British, the events of 1873 were transferred into myths 
very early.
(1) Gr.P., Elliot - Granville, 28.11.72
(2) BM, SPR, PP 187V, Vol LXXVT, p.VOj, C 920
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Section b. The Aden Residency and Coastal Hadhramaut
1865 - 1888
Hadhramaut was divided into Inner ( 
and Coastal (^1^1— (^), Hadhramaut (1); many independent 
tribes lived there, with no central authority and no 
recognised suzerain* The Porte clamed suzerainty over 
all Arabia, and the Sultan, as Caliph, was prayed for in 
Shihr's main mosque on Fridays (2)* Two principal tribal 
groups were in conflict; the Kathir, in central Inner 
Hadhramaut, and the Yafai, principally settled around 
alQatn, in the west of the Wadi Hadhramaut, and at 
Mukalla. The Yafais were descended from Yemeni mercenaries, 
whom the Kathir had employed whilst ruling Hadhramaut 
intermittently between the 16th and 18th centuries.
The Kathir had themselves emigrated to Hadhramaut 
from Dhufar during the 15th century (3)* Some Kathir 
had remained in, and were the principal tribe of,
Dhufar. In Hadhramaut, the Kathir described their
(1) Map A
(2) Colonial 123' p#28, note 2
(3) * Colonial 123', p.27-28
confederation as the Shenafir Confederation, from the 
name of the leading Kathir section in Dhufar. The 
Kathir, Awamir, Jabir and Bajir tribes were the members 
of that Confederation; their territory stretched south 
from the borders of the Rub al^Khali desert to a point 
about 60 miles north of the Indian Ocean; and from near 
Shibam in the west to near Tarim in the east.
The Yafai had seized control of every major centre 
In Inner Hadhramaut, except Shibam, by the mid-19th century. 
Shibam was built on a strong defensive position, a rock 
outcrop, near the middle of the Wadi* It was in the 
main area of Kathiri settlement, and an important market 
centre for the surrounding bedouin tribes and settled 
cultivators. !... He who holds Shibam in fact holds the 
country ...' (1). However Shibam1s revenue was 
apparently inadequate for its rulerfs requirements; the 
Kathiri chief sold half of his town to the Yafais of 
alQatu (2). In I83O, the Kathiri chief tired of sharing 
Shibam and killed all the Yafais there when the majority
(1) Ingrams 1Arabia1 p.188-189
(2) 'Colonial 123'p*29* Ho date is given
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were away visiting relatives at alQatn (1). In the
fighting which followed the more numerous Kathir had
the advantage over the Yafai of alQatn, who appealed
✓ d
to one of their emigres in Hyderabad Deccan, Umar bin 
Awadh alQuaiti.
Awadh had joined the Nizam1s Arab Irregulars; he 
married, settled in Hyderabad, and finally acquired 
considerable wealth and influence as Commander of the 
Irregulars. The British Residency in Hyderabad 
credited him with an ambitious scheme to dethrone the 
Nizam and to reign himself (2). The scheme was 
frustrated by the jealousy of the other Arab Jemadars 
of the Irregulars who refused their co-operation.
Umar sent men, money and three of his sons to assist his 
fellow tribesmen against the Kathir (J). The date of 
this involvement is not stated. It appears to have been 
about 1850) but local accounts were written from partisan
(1) Colonial 123 p.29-30
(2) AIA 789, First Asst Res, Hyderabad - SGB,
6.9.77
standpoints, supporting either the Kathir or the Quaiti, 
and they are in conflict (1). It is clear, however, 
they there was a broad alliance between the Kathir and 
the Seiyids of Hadhramaut, and their emigre's in the 
Hejaz, against the Yafai. Possibly it was represented 
to the Residency in Aden for factional advantage, as 
a struggle between a religious, pro-Ottoman, Kathiri 
faction, and a more secular, more tolerant, even pro- 
British Yafai group. The Quaiti leaders of the latter 
group were identified as supporters of the Nizam*s pro- 
British Minister, Sir Salar Jung. During the Indian 
Mutiny, the loyalty of these Quaiti-led Arab Irregulars 
to Sir Salar was considered to have been decisive in 
keeping Hyderabad loyal to the British alliance (2).
Power in Hyderabad was in Sir Salar*s hands; the Nizam's 
Minister was *a delegate of power - not an adviser* (3).
+ + + + *("
(1) e.g. Note 1 Colonial 123 p*30
(2) G.B. Malleson 'History of the Indian Mutiny* Vol III
■ ■ ■ ■  '        .  . ■  , i w i  ^ , ! ’r  -  J . . i i -
p.120, London 1880
(3) IOL, D 107, Note by Sir B.C. Bayley, page 6
*+.5
Many South Arabians served as Irregular soldiers 
with the Nizam; some served other Indian rulers. .The 
company commanders of these troops held the rank of 
'Jemadar1. The Jemadars recruited the Irregulars to 
fill their Companies and were paid according to the 
nominal strengths of the contingents which they were 
required to provide for service when necessary. In 
practice, about a quarter of the contingent was normally 
available for duty (1). The remainder were either working 
elsewhere, and receiving a retaining fee, or were still 
to be enlisted from amongst the Arabs and half-Arabs 
living in the area* The Jemadars, and even the Commander 
of the Arab Irregulars, were also allowed private 
business interests* In the view of British officials at 
the Hyderabad Residency, the Irregulars did *.♦. no real 
service but ^cost a J very large proportion of the 
revenues of the state, while they £were^j a permanent 
bar to the satisfactory settlement of the country . ( 2 ) .  
Whether they were in Hyderabad, or abroad on their private:
(1) AIA 726 Ag Res - SGB, 11.6*76
(2) AIA 789 First Asst Res, Hyderabad - SGB., 6*9*77
^ .6 ,
affairs, Jemadars in the Arab Irregulars might remain 
on the pay-roll. At least one Jemadar was usually in 
attendance on the Nizam*s Minister, even when the latter 
travelled outside the state. Periodically, all the 
Jemadars in Hyderabad went into camp with the Nizam’s 
Minister en.
+ + + ■+■ +
The Kathiri leadership was divided between two 
groups; these were the A1 Isa bin Badr Kathir in the 
Shibam area, whose chief was at feud with the Quaiti 
of alQatn; and the A1 Abdullah bin Badr Kathir in the 
Tariba area. The more vigorous and lasting leadership 
developed in the latter group. One of their number, 
Ghalib bin Mohsin, emigrated and enlisted in the Nizam1s 
Irregulars. He became a Jemadar and acquired wealth.
He sent money home to his brother, Abdullah bin Mohsin. 
Abdullah used the money to buy two positions commanding 
the important, Yafai-occupied, town of Tarim (2). The
(1) AIA 726 Sir Salar Jung - Res, Hyderabad, 28.9*75
(2) ’Colonial 123*p.29
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village of Ghuraf commanded the eastern trade route 
from Shihr where it entered the Wadi Hadhramaut, The 
fortress of Heid Qassim dominated the western approach 
to Tarim.
Abdullah enlisted a large number of Aulaqi 
mercenaries a). With his mercenaries and his partial 
command of Tarim*s approaches, Abdullah put pressure 
on the Yafai ruler of Tarim,bin Gherama, to sell him 
half the town. Subsequently, further fighting occunsd*
The local, Tamim,tribe supported bin Gherama and more 
Aulaqi mercenaries were brought in to strengthen 
Abdullah. In I8V7? the Kathir overcame bin Gherama and 
occupied all his territory up to, and including, Saiun*
Bin Gherama fled to Kukalla* There he was refused help 
by Naqib Salih bin Muhammad*
Abdullah, following his reoccupation of the country 
from Tarim to Saiun, made an alliance with the Seiyids 
of Hadhramaut in l8*+7, to restore peace to the country (2). 
Such an alliance was a threat to the Yafai in Hadhramaut.
(1) 'Colonial 123'p.29 says 2,000* The figure is possibly
exaggerated
(2) 'Colonial 123*p.30? Note 1
^•8
In 1850, in support of the Kathir, Seiyid Ishaq bin Aqil 
bin lahya led an expedition from Mecca, supplied by the 
Grand Sharif, to Burum, about 20 miles west of Mukalla (1)* 
The expedition was intended to capture Shihr, but it 
came too late in the season for calm weather; and 
the Kasadi Naqib of Mukalla joined the Bureiki Naqib of 
Shihr in attacking the force after it disembarked in the 
shelter of Burum Bay, The invaders were defeated* In 
later British records the attack was inaccurately 
described as an Ottoman one.
In 18?8, the Quaiti recovered half of Shibam by a 
negotiated agreement with its Kathiri chief, Mansour, 
Shortly afterwards, the Quaiti leader, Awadh bin Umar, 
invited the Kathiri leader to his house and murdered 
him* The Quaiti then killed all the A1 Isa bin Badr 
Kathir whom they could find and assumed control of all 
Shibam.(2). Thenceforward, the Quaitis were opposed 
by the A1 Abdullah bin Badr Kathir, led by Ghalib bin 
Mohsin in Hyderabad and by his brother, Abdullah, in.
(1) ‘Colonial 123' p,30, Note 1
(2) ‘Colonial 123'p»30
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Hadhramaut. Both sides depended upon Hyderabad for the 
money to finance their operations and to maintain their 
strength.
In 1866y a Kathiri force, said to have numbered 
600 men, and to have been led by Ubud bin Salim, a 
relative of the Kathiri chief, besieged and captured 
the port of Shihr (1)* The dispossessed ruler, Naqib 
Ali bin Naji alBureiki, was irresolute, elderly, and 
impecunious; possibly a shortage of money had earlier 
obliged him to sell his village of Hazm to Mohsin bin 
Abdullah al Aulaqi about 1861. He died in poverty as 
a refugee in Lahej in 1875 (2). It is possible that 
the Bureiki Naqib*s faithful observance of his anti­
slave trade agreement with the British of 1863 (3) 
contributed to his downfall. The loss of trade would 
have reduced his revenue from customs duty, alienated 
Shihri merchants and their customers involved in the
(1) ;M;:(L/P & S/9 Vol V3) Res 23 of 2*,11 *66 - SGB(r) S of S 
The Resident*s information was not first hand. The 
numbers may be taken as an estimate
(2) FO 78 3615, Res - SGB, para 9? 3*6*799 passed by 
10 - FO, 10.9.81
(3) Note with Note 1, pA*10
If.10
trade, and reduced opportunities for employment in 
Shihr. The port depended upon its trade and the local 
fishing industry for its livelihood* Shihr*s loss had 
been Mukalla*s gain, for the Kasadi Naqib observed his 
own anti-slave trade agreement (1) only in the breach (2). 
Locally, it was believed that a change of ruler ended 
Shihr*s obligation to eschew the slave trade (2). That 
belief may have been an incentive to support a Kathiri 
occupation* The Kathiri attack was possibly suggested 
to the Kathiri leader by Seiyid Aqil bin Abdullah bin 
Yahya, who led the abortive raid on Burum in 18^0 (3)«
It may also have been encouraged by Ghalib bin Mohsin*s 
fellow Jemadar, Mohsin bin Abdullah al^ulaqi. The period 
was an unsettled one, and conditions in the Hadhramaut 
possibly resembled those in the Yemen between I861f-1866. 
There, drought, cholera, cattle plague and locust sx^ arms' 
provoked such suffering and scarcity that inter-tribal.
(1) Aitchison1Treaties'(1933 Sdn) No LXVII
(2) LB, Res - SGB, 7*12.72, forwarded to S of S by B° 
Despatch No 8 of 1873> received 26*2*73
(3) p*4.8 n*l
*f.ll
fighting resulted* There is no official account of 
conditions because no Residency officials visited 
Hadhramaut between 1861+ and 1872 (1).
Shihr lacked the strong natural defences of Mukalla 
and its ruler lacked tribal support. His ancestor had 
come from Hureidha in Wadi Amd, in western Hadhramaut, 
at the invitation of the Shihris, guided by Seiyids of 
the alAttas family, in 1752 (2), Since the Attas Seiyids 
themselves lived in Hureidha (3)> their support for 
Shihr1s new ruler was possibly based on enlightened 
self-interest. The Hadhramaut was then very disturbed*
But once the Kathir and the Seiyids had agreed to work 
together against the Yafais in 18*4-7, it is probable that 
the position of Naqib Ali in Shihr became more precarious* 
He was not a Yafai (If), but the Kathir and their Seiyid
(1) AIA 579 Report of Capt. W.F. Prideaux - Res, 2.12*72
(2) v Colonial' 123'p*3C Note 1
(3) 'Colonial 123'p*38
The family belonged to the bin Bureik Mushaikh of 
the desert area near Shabwa, between Hadhramaut and 
the Yemen
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allies required control of Shihr for operations against 
the Kasadi Naqib in Mukalla and the alQuaiti Yafai in 
Inner Hadhramaut.
The Aden Residency was ill-informed about Hadhramaut; 
in 1871> the Resident!s Second Assistant, Captain 
W.F. Prideaux, described the Upper Yafai tribes as 
bordering 1... upon the Province of Hadhramaut and .... 
often engaged in war with the Kaiti \_slo Kathiri] 
tribe ...* (1). In fact, the distance between the 
western limits of Hadhramaut and the eastern border of 
Upper Yafai was over 200 miles* But the immigrant Upper 
Yafai tribesmen in Hadhramaut were at feud -with the 
Kathir* The Residency had little contact with the 
Hadhramaut coast and none with the interior. The 
Resident had neither the staff, the means of communication, 
nor the authority for the regular contact necessary to 
maintain accurate information. Instead, the Residency 
depended upon Hadhramis established in Aden, and upon 
Hadhrami visitors, for local news* That method of 
securing information gave a bias towards the rulers of
(1) AIA 560 f 726 Report of August I 87I  -  Res
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Mukalla and Shihr, whose dhows visited Aden* By contrast,, 
the Kathir had no coastal shipping and no regular Aden 
contact* It was probable, therefore, that distorted 
reports of the occupation of Shihr reached the Residency* 
Possibly the Kathir helped themselves to such food stocks 
as they found in Shihr, even as the Fadhli tribesmen 
looted vessels visiting the port of Shuqra in 1865* out 
of necessity and hunger (1). Since the Kasadi Naqib 
claimed that the Kathir attempted, but failed, to seize 
Mukalla in 1866, his reason for blackening the Kathir 
was plain. Another British informant was the refugee 
Bureiki Naqib who came to Aden via Mukalla, seeking 
British help*
The new Kathiri ruler of Shihr wrote a friendly 
letter to the Resident in November, 1866 (2)* The 
Resident, Major W. Merewether, had not yet returned from 
leave and duty in Britain, so the Kathiri letter was: 
received by Captain G.R. Goodfellow, officiating as 
Resident* Goodfellow did not acknowledge the letter*
(1) Cf. p.2*10 n.1
(2) LA (L/P & S/9 Vol i+3). OffS Res - SGB, copied to 
S of S, of 12.66
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He was excitable and impulsive, and, at the time, rather 
overworked. It is possible that Merewether, on his 
return, never saw Ghalib bin Mohsin1s letter, before 
receiving from Sir Bartle Frere, the Governor of Bombay, 
a letter introducing Awadh bin Umar alQuaiti, the 
Kathir1s opponent* Awadh sailed from Bombay early in 
I867 to eject the Kathir from Shihr. On his arrival at 
Aden he was apparently given considerable material 
assistance by the Resident for his expedition against 
the Kathir.
It is possible that Frere and Merewether linked 
the Kathiri occupation of Shihr with the prospect of 
xenophic, religious support for the Kathir from Mecca. 
There were various Muslim religious leaders living in 
exile from India (l)^and from elsewhere under European 
control^in Mecca. Frere was strongly opposed to Ottoman 
control of the south Arabian coast; possibly he feared 
that a Kathir occupation would lead to that. But the 
Kathiri leader1s letter to the Resident was conciliatory, 
hoping for Anglo-Kathiri friendship-.
(1) E.g. Seiyid Fadhl bin Alawi, the Moplah, from
the Malabar Coast. See p.5.14 n.l
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Successive Residents at Aden were generally ready 
to suspect, and to resent, Ottoman ambitions in any 
change in the ‘status quo1 in south Arabia, The Kathiri 
occupation of Shihr was such a change. The Residency's 
suspicion of Ottoman aims was probably increased by an 
alleged attempt by an Ottoman naval commander to obtain 
local admissions of the Porte's suzerainty at Shihr and 
at Mukalla in 1867 (1)* In view of Awadh bin Umar's 
proven ability to manipulate situations to his own 
advantage, and of his understanding of British Indian 
officials, it is possible that the report was an attempt 
by Awadh, by then ruling Shihr, to obtain more British 
support from Aden for his expedition inland against the 
Kathir. It is difficult to see why the Porte did not 
persevere later if the Ottomans were refused, and (lid 
wish to obtain, local recognition of their suzerainty*
The British had accepted the prospect of an Ottoman 
occupation of Husn Ghorab, about 60 miles west of Mukalla* 
in I87O (2). The Porte expected the British to accept an
(1) 'Colonial 123'p.31
(2) p.3.6 n. l
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Ottoman occupation of all the Yemen up to Aden in 
1873 (l). There was no reason before 1873 why the Porte 
should have expected British opposition to any Ottoman 
naval demonstration on the Hadhramaut coast. But none 
was reported, although Ottoman naval activity round the 
coast increased. Possibly the Ottomans considered that 
their suzerainty was acknowledged. Server Pasha claimed 
in 1872 that Mukalla was an Ottoman base (2).
+ + + + +
Awadh bin Umar left Hyderabad v/ith an introduction 
to Sir Bartle Prere from the Nizam* s Minister, Sir Salar 
Jung (3)* Sir Salar had influential Muslim friends 
and connections in Bombay (4). Prere*s own experiences
(1) p.3.13 n.2
(2) p.3.16 n.2
(3) AIA 726, Capt.Hunter*s report of Oct. 1876 to 
Ag Res, Aden.
(4) Lawrence * India*, p.16, referring to Sir Salar's 
secretary in 1879.
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in Sind during the Mutiny gave him good cause for 
respecting Sir Salar, and his loyalty to the British 
alliance, and every reason for helping him and his 
friends where possible. In 1873, Frere quoted Sir Salar 
as a reliable Indian source who could confirm the 
danger to British interests in India of allowing an 
anglophobe local administration to be extablished in 
the Hadhramaut (l). Frere then had in mind Seiyid Fadhl 
bin Alawi the Iloplah (2).
Frere believed that British influence on the south­
east coast of Arabia, and in the Persian Gulf, should 
expand to counter increasing international interest in 
the area (3). The Viceroy, Sir John Lawrence, was 
opposed to such a British expansion. Frere and Lawrence 
respected each other, but their official contacts during 
Lawrence's Viceroyalty were not always smooth (4). 
Lawrence told Frere, in April, 1866, that '...we should
(l) NP Sir Bartle Frere - Lord Northbrook 19.5.1873
(2j See p.4.37 below.
(3) Kelly 'Gulf' p. 652-654.
(4) Smith 'Lord Lawrence1 Vol II, p.427.
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interfere as little as may be practical in the affairs 
of the Arab tribes on the sea-board ...! in Oman (1). 
Lawrence was unlikely to have approved any British involve­
ment, in support of the Quaiti, on the coast of 
Hadhramaut. So Frere could not instruct Merewether 
publicly to assist Awadh bin Umar. Frere however 
possibly wrote privately to Merewether. Captain Hunter 
stated in I876 that Frere wrote to Merewether and 
approved the latter issuing supplies to Awadh bin Umar (2). 
The Bombay Secretariat denied that such instructions 
had been issued. But, by then, Frere and Merewether had 
left India. The subject was not reopened. But Awadh bin 
Umar did embark at Bombay with a mixed force of about 
200 armed Arabs and Kohillas, in a chartered steamer?on 
what was, effectively, a filibustering expedition (3) 
with Frere1 s knowledge (>+)•
Merewether issued a large quantity of ammunition
(1) Kelly 1 Gulf1 p.653
(2) AIA 726, Hunter's Report - Res of Oct I876
(3) AIA 579? Prideaux1s Report of 2.12.72, paras 11 & 15 
(>+) LB, BO Despatch 23 of l8.if.67 - S of S
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for rnuskets and cannon, and some tents, from the Aden 
arsenal to Awadh (1). Yet the Aden Annual Report for 
1866/67 made no mention even of Awadh1s visit, still 
less of the issue of stores. It is possible that 
Merewether acted on his own judgement. But it seems 
unlikely that both Captain Hunter, and Major Goodfellow, 
would have been misinformed about the authority behind 
Merewetherfs action in issuing the supplies* It is 
possible that Merewether interpreted Frere*s instructions 
too liberally; Merewether possibly relied on Frere1s 
retrospective support, Merewether had, indeed, received 
Frere*s retrospective approval in 1866, for his 
unauthorised action against the Fadhli chief, contrary 
to official policy (2). Possibly Merewether arranged 
for the stores to be *written off1, as issued for use 
to his Abdali allies against the Fadhli tribe, with 
whem peace had not then been made. Another possibility 
is that the powder issued was old, or obsolete^stock
(1) AIA 5795 Prideaux*s report of 2.12*72, paras 11 & 15
(2) p. 2,l6n*3
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which had been ‘condemned1 and had to be disposed of.
By-1866, the garrison“of~Aden-'were-’~ne-'4re>ng^ p-“a-rmed—wi4;h
Merewether*s assistance was intervention in internal 
tribal affairs, but it may have been less formidable 
than the first impression suggests*
Merewether (l),and Frere^may have considered that 
British prestige could be increased locally, and the 
slave-trade reduced, by intervening discreetly to instal 
a grateful ruler in Shihr. Frere had worked to reduce 
the slave-trade. He had asked in I86if that *.. • suitable 
representations may be made to the Turkish Government ...* 
on the slave trade in the Ottoman Red Sea ports (2).
Other reports had been written in 1865 (3)* Possibly,
Frere and Merewether believed that a Kathiri occupation 
of Shihr would lead to an effective Ottoman presence 
there, or that even an independent Kathiri rule would 
encourage the slave-trade, and Frere was concerned about
(1) Roberts 1 India* p..298
(2) LB, Despatch - S of S of 28.10*6*1 enclosing a report 
by the Captain of H.M.S. 1 Pantaloon*
(3) LB, Despatch No 6 of 28.2*65 & No 2 of 13*5.65 - S of S
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modest but increasing Ottoman naval strength in the 
Persian Gulf (1).
Merewether returned to Aden on l*+th December from 
England* He had been held for consultations on future 
policy towards the Emper/or Theodore of Abyssinia after 
his leave expired* Merewether was accepted at the 
India Office as the expert on Gulf of Aden and Abyssinian 
affairs. He had been in personal touch with senior 
officials (2), and had been able to judge how his 
unauthorised initiative against the Fadhli chief had 
been received. He was, therefore, well-qualified to 
judge what discreet action he could take to assist Awadh 
bin Umar. Possibly, Merewether risked a reprimand if 
his peccadillo was disclosed prematurely. But Merewether 
believed by March, 1867? that military operations would 
be necessary in Abyssinia (3). He was likely to be needed 
in the area in 1867 and the unauthorised issue of some
(1) LB Despatch Ho 3 of 12.1.67
(2) IOL, Pol. Dept., DO Corr. 1862-73, Sir John Kaye, 
(Sec., Secret & Pol. Dept.) - Merewether on 19*6.66 
and on 21.8.66
(3) AAR 1866/67 (no paras)
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gunpowder would not change that.
+  +  +  +  *t“
Awadh bin Umar made an alliance on 7*2,1867 with 
the Kasadi Naqib for joint operations against the 
Kathir (1)*, By the terms of the agreement each ally 
was to provide for a joint war chest, Awadh
was to obtain sole possession of Shihr and its 
dependencies after their capture. But, in the event of 
a long drawn out struggle, each of the allies was liable 
to pay a further MT#5°j000, if necessary. The allies 
were to '... be as brothers and friends and their 
countries will be one and the same . ,. and their enemy 
is one and their friend is one . ••* (2), The agreement 
was signed by Naqib Salih bin Muhammad, It was not 
witnessed by his son and heir, Umar.
The alliance of the Kasadi Naqib of Mukalla with
(1) FO 78 3615, Printed papers on the Hadhramaut struggle 
passed by 10 - FO on 10.9.81, based on suspect Quaiti 
sources
(2) From the agreement quoted in (1)
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Awadh bin Umar ensured some capacity to blockade Shihr 
by Kasadi war-dhows. In the circumstances, it is not 
surprising that, after an inconclusive engagement outside 
Shihr on 29th April, the Kathiri garrison evacuated 
Shihr at night on 30th April (!)• Low Kathiri morale* 
poor supplies, and the beginning of the summer humidity 
of an unfamiliar coastal climate, probably provide the 
main reasons for the Kathiri collapse. In addition, it 
is possible that some of the Kathir had returned home for 
the Id alFitr celebrations, on 17th February I867*and 
had not returned to Shihr by April (2). Others might 
have left for home for the Id alHajj which was on 
27th April. The Kathir tribesmen were unpaid volunteers 
and, as such, at liberty to come and go as they pleased.
The Yafai allies agreed later to attack the Kathir 
in Inner Hadhramaut* The joint forces would be under the 
Naqib1s command, but the Naqib would be accompanied by
(1) LB Despatch No 77 of 2i+*,8,67 with copy of Res letter
- SGB of 7*5.67? reporting QuaitI capture of Shihr
(2) The Muslim and Christian Calendars G.S.?», Freeman-
Grenville, London, 1962. (Hereafter Grenville
 -----------
‘Calendars1).
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Awadh bin Umar, or by one of the latter*s brothers*
The resulting joint conquests would be divided equally 
between the allies. This later agreement was witnessed 
by Umar bin Salih, as well as being signed by his father, 
Naqib Salih. It also made clear that the anchorage of 
Ras Sharma (1), 20 miles each of Shihr was a dependency 
of Shihr. It seems improbable that Shihr*s previous 
ruler had had any title to the capg, . or to the anchorage. 
It was, however, valuable to Shihr as the nearest 
sheltered anchorage for local craft. Being without any 
settlement, possession of Sharma yielded no taxable 
revenue.
In preparation for joint operations in Inner 
Hadhramaut, each of the allies agreed, in September, 1867? 
to contribute a further MT#60,000. The Kasadi Naqib was 
allowed to pay MT#2,000 p.a. instead of making one 
immediate payment. In October, the allies* expedition 
moved north against the Kathir in Tarim. It was not a. 
success. No accounts, however, were ever produced (2)t
(1) In Arabic, i r \/
(2) FO 78 361?, para 1^ , Res - SGB of 3.6.79, passed
by 10 to FO, 10.9.81
to show details of the expenses which Awadh bin Umar 
claimed from Naqib Umar bin Salih in 1873.
It is difficult to see what direct benefit the 
Kasadi Naqib expected to obtain from any joint 
acquisitions of territory in Inner Hadhramaut. The 
nearest Kathiri territory was about 60 miles inland from 
Shihr. The Quaiti family already controlled some 
western parts of the Uadi Hadhramaut. They would 
therefore have benefited from an expansion of their 
territory eastwards. The Kasadi Naqib could not benefit 
similarly; his inland territories were some 13 villages 
in Wadi Duan, south of the western end of the Uadi 
Hadhramaut, and far from the Kathiri-controlled areas (1).
It is possible that the Kasadi Naqib hoped to obtain 
Awadh bin Umar*s friendship and subsequent support for 
his son and successor, Umar bin Salih. The Naqib may 
have also believed - or have been persuaded by Awadh 
bin Umar - that Shihr and Mukalla would be insecure 
until Kathiri power in Hadhramaut had been completely
(1) FO 78 3615? para 2k, Res letter - SGB of 3»6*79?
quoting from Naqib Umar bin Salih - Res
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broken^  (1). It is also possible that the Yafai intention 
was to forestall a possible tribal alliance between the 
Kathir and the Saiban Confederations against the Quaiti 
and the Kasadi, by destroying the Kathir* The Quaiti 
brothers were ambitious and intriguing men* Awadh bin 
Umar was persuasive and calculating. So long as the old 
Kasadi Naqib lived, Awadh made no known claims for payment 
of the Kasadi share of the joint war chest. It is possible 
that no basis for the claims existed. Naqib Umar bin Salih 
could produce no correspondence of the period. Awadh*s 
records were unique.
By 1869, the Naqib had no illusions about Awadh 
bin Umar's intentions towards Kukalla; the Naqib visited 
Major General G.L. Russell at Aden and explained the 
importance of stopping aid from Hyderabad to Awadh (2)* 
According to Umar bin Salih, his father obtained a verbal 
promise 1... that he should not fear from anyone as the 
English Government would protect him from all things ...,. 
Such an assurance was unauthorised, unrecorded, and of no 
practical value* Yet, bearing in mind Russell's over-
Cl) Cf. p. 4.7 n. 2
(2) AIA 726 f 72-82, Nacjib Umar - Res
b.2 7
optimistic forecasts to the Haushabi (1)) and to the 
Abdali (2), chiefs, this irresponsible promise rings 
true. Some Resident had the Naqib1s letter marked with 
a slip ’NPKIB* (3), in red ink (*0 , showing that he 
accepted the substance of the letter as important.
Russell did try, ineffectually, to obtain guarantees 
through Bombay that the Hyderabad authorities would end 
assistance to Awadh bin Abdullah at Shihr.
In I87O5 Russell commented on a Kathiri proposal
to the Resident that the British should provide them with 
two steamers for operations off Shihr, on deferred 
terms (5). Russell wrote;1... There is no doubt fthat] 
the Ketheree will endeavour to obtain the assistance of 
the Turks, as this power has for some time been watching 
events in that quarter ...I - Russell was correct: the
Kathir did appeal to the Ottomans in 1872. Russell argued
(1) p.2.30 n. 2
(2) p.2,^3 n.l and 2.1+2 n.2
(3) ’Note Please Keep in Book1
(*+) Only the Resident could use red ink in a file
(5) NO 78 3186, Res - SGB, 31.3*70 f 1 $ +
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that, because of the number of Indian traders in 
Mukalla, 1... I cannot think it desirable to permit it 
to fall into the hands of either the Katheree or the 
Turks ...-*. Russell’s stated belief goes far towards 
confirming the likelihood of his having reassured the 
Kasadi Naqib in 1869 with a promise of British protection. 
But Russell’s judgement was at fault. The Foreign 
Department objected strongly to the implication behind 
Russell* s argument that 3ritish political interference 
and the flag should follow British-Indian traders.(1) 
Hadhramaut was, officially, independent and not of 
strategic importance to Britain. But, unofficially, 
Residents at Aden would continue to view the Hadhramaut 
coast, like all other places on the Gulf of Aden, with 
semi-proprietary interest. Foreign interest was 
unwelcome.
Awadh bin Umar may have chosen to bide his time, 
appreciating that both the Kathiri and Kasadi leaders 
would not live much longer. The Kathiri leader died in
(1) FO 78 3186 f 156, For. Dept. G of I - SGB, I7.7.7O
1870* In 18715 Awadh arranged a Quaiti Kathiri truce 
and returned to Hyderabad* It is probable that Awadh 
had judged that the weak Umar bin Salih would be easier 
to overcome than his father (1)* When Awadh heard of 
the old Naqib1s death, he hurried back to Hadhramaut, 
proceeding straight to Kukalla to condole on Naqib Salih1 
death (2). Umar bin Salih claimed that Awadh began 
intrigues against him, at once, in Mukalla, and in Duan 
amongst the Saiban (3)* It is possible that family 
rivalries within the Kasadi family gave Awadh bin Umar 
opportunities for intrigue. The late Naqib*s father had 
seized Mukalla from his cousin, Abd arRub, in l8*+2 ( b ) , 
The coup was not bloodless, and the new ruler's murders 
extended beyond his family rivals to their suspected
(1) AIA 6M+, Hunter's report - Res of 29.3*7^
(2) AIA 6M+, Translation of Gujerati letter from Naqib 
Umar - Res, dated 23*2.7^
(3) K0 78 3615, para 2b, Res - SGB, 3*6.79? quoting the 
Naqib, passed by 10 - FO, 10.9*81
(b) 'Colonial 123'p.31» Naqib Muhammad alKasadi starved 
his Seiyid Minister to death on suspicion of 
treachery
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supporters. Some members of the senior branch of the 
Kasadi family escaped to India. There is, however, no 
indication whether Awadh bin Umar used these refugees, or 
their claims, for his own purposes in Mukalla.
The Naqib claimed that Awadh engineered the 
hostilities which broke out with the Saiban tribesmen. 
Awadh stayed for eight days in Mukalla and then went 
on to Shihr. Soon after, Awadh sent his brother-in- 
law, Umar bin Awadh, accompanied by three Seiyids, 
to the Naqib with a letter, offering his assistance 
in settling the dispute. By then, Kasadi forces under 
the Naqib's uncle were in Duan, opposing the tribesmen 
there. The Naqib accepted Awadh1s offer to bring the 
Amudi Shaikh and other Saiban leaders to Mukalla, and 
to make them accept the Naqib's terms (l). The Naqib 
claimed that he accepted the offer, naively, at its face 
value.
Awadh bin Umar wasted no time on receiving Umar bin 
Salih's reply; he set off without warning with 300 
followers in attendance and a further 400 behind in 
reserve. He sent a messenger to announce his imminent
(l)"Colonial 123*p.110-114 has some detail on the Saiban 
and the Amudi Shaikh, at a later period
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arrival from Baqarain, less than 5 miles from Mukalla, 
Baqarain was also the source of the town’s main water 
supply. The Naqib had barely time to receive his visitors 
at the gate of Mukalla. It is possible that Awadh hoped 
to take his host by surprise and so seize the town#
Awadh may have intended to forestall any plans that the 
Naqib might make to quarter the Quaiti supporters outside 
the town walls. Awadh and his large escort entered Mukalla* 
His hOO-strong reserve followed and occupied the Kasadi 
fort at Harshiyat, commanding the road to Duan and to 
the Kasadi expeditionary force. Awadh had arranged that 
some of his additional men from Harshiyat should 
infiltrate into Mukalla unobtrusively, in parties of five 
and ten men at a time, nominally visiting the Quaiti 
supporters within Mukalla. Awadh thus increased his 
superiority in men within Mukalla.
Umar bin Salih had a bodyguard of 100 armed slaves 
and a tom garrison of 200 Yafai mercenaries. The Yafai 
mercenaries had been bribed by Awadh bin Umar not to 
support their employer in the discussions that followed.
The Kasadi slaves remained loyal. But Awadh1s men 
controlled the approaches to Mukalla. Awadh then asked
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Umar to repay the old Naqib *s ^ebt1 of MT#l60,000 
for the Kasadi share of expenses against the Kathir in 
1867/68 (1).
Umar was almost a prisoner in his own town; he 
had no money to repay the 'debt1; and his Yafai 
mercenaries urged a settlement* He accepted Awadh1s 
proposal that the Quaiti family should take a half-share 
in the Kasadi possessions, for a payment of MT/2h0,000 (2). 
Awadh arranged payment of the balance of MT/80,000 to 
the Naqib and left for Shihr (3)« Mukalla continued to 
be dominated by the Quaiti followers, but the Naqib 
retained sole possession of the town citadel, in a 
strong position beside the landing place* The Naqib 
was able to send messages out of Mukalla by sea.
Brigadier J.U. Schneider was concerned throughout 
1873 with the attempted Ottoman expansion south through 
the Yemen (*f). He sent Captain VJ.F. Prideaux to
(1) See p.*+.22 -
(2) Aitchison1Treaties'(1933 edition) Supplementary 
Agreement II, page vi
(3) Detail from Naqib1s Gujerati letter - Res, p. n.
(if) See p.3.10 - 3.10^
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Mukalla to try and arrange a peaceful settlement.
An unsettled local quarrel provided an opening for 
Ottoman intervention* Prideaux called Awadh from Shihr 
for discussions. Agreement was, however, not reached 
between the Quaiti and Kasadi leaders; and Prideaux 
returned to Aden without a settlement, leaving Awadh 
in Mukalla. In the meantime, Umar bin Salih had recalled 
his forces from Duan. Awadh was, possibly, over-confident, 
or he failed to appreciate the significance of control of 
the narrow passes leading to Mukalla, of the plateau 
overlooking it, and of the town!s water supply at 
Baqarain. He only controlled the access into Mukalla 
through the town gates.
The unexpected return of the Kasadi forces from 
Duan, and their occupation of the strategic sites which 
the Quaiti had neglected, caught Awadh and his men in a 
trap. Deprived of food and water from outside the town, 
Awadh was obliged to capitulate (1). There was little 
fighting. Only three Kasadis were reported to have been
(1) AIA 6M+, Petition of Awadh bin Umar - SGB. through 
his agent in Bombay dated 11.6.7*+
killed. Umar bin Salih allowed Awadh to return to Shihr, 
leaving behind his payment of MT#80,000. By December,
18739 Umar bin Salih was in alliance with the Kathir 
against Awadh* By January, 187^9 there were no Quaiti 
left in Mukalla (1).
The role of Mohsin bin Abdullah bin Ali alAulaqi 
in arranging the alliance between Umar bin Salih and the 
Kathir was not described in the British records. The 
old Naqib had, however, been on friendly terms, before 
his death, with Mohsin bin Abdullah and had asked the 
latter to be the guardian for his son. Possibly Mohsin 
looked for local allies to protect his village of alHazm 
from Awadh bin Umar, Mohsin joined with the Kathir, the 
Saiban Ba Umar of the rich agricultural area around 
Ghail ba Uazir, and the Kasadi Naqib. The Kathir, who 
raised a voluntary tribal levy, received some pay from 
the Naqib. The allies declared intention was to drive 
Awadh from Shihr.. The Residents sympathy was with the 
Naqib and his allies; he considered that 1... the Kayatee 
Jemadar obtained possession £of ShihrJ some years ago
(1) AIA 658, Aden News No b of 23-29.1.7*f
b.35
in a very questionable manner from the Katheerees •..'(l). 
After the Resident received the detailed report of the 
Naqib on Awadh1 s behaviour in Mukalla, Schneider 
might have assumed that Awadh*s methods were normally 
* questionable* (2)*
In December, 1873? Awadh*s fortunes were at their 
lowest ebb# Shihr was blockaded by land and the Kathir 
had occupied the hamlet of Dufaigha, 5 miles east of 
Shihr (3)* Awadh*s prestige and his pocket had suffered 
from his intrigues. But his enemies had their own 
problems. Apparently the Kathir suffered, or faced,, a 
food shortager Mohsin bin Abdullah alAulaqi wrote to 
Seiyid Turki of Muscat from Hyderabad, asking him to 
freight a vessel with dates for the forces besieging 
Shihr C^ f)* Mohsin also asked for Omani naval support to 
blockade Shihr* He tried to make his requests more
(1) AIA 658, Aden News No 5? 30*l#7l+-5.2.71+
(2) AIA 6*4f, Naqib - Res of 23 • 2.7*+
(3) AIA 6Mf, Quaiti petition - SGB of 11*6.7*+
(>+) FO 78 2755 f 188, Res Pers. Gulf*s letter of
29*3*7b - 8GB forwarded a copy of Mohsin*s letter
of l b . 1 . 7 b
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attractive by claiming that Shihr had been subordinate 
to Oman, and that the Seiyid Turki*s ancestors had been 
traditional arbitrators in local disputes. By contrast, 
the Quaiti family were nouveaux riches whose wealth had 
gained them control of Shihr. Mohsin did not however 
suggest that Shihr should revert to Omani rule after its 
recapture. But he did promise vaguely that ’...whatever 
expenses may be incurred are on all of us...1. Turki, 
however, had enough problems of his own. He was incapable 
of controlling his own rebellious country and had no 
money and resources to spare for external adventures (l). 
It is probable that he never replied (2). The Kathir 
apparently got no dates; instead, the 3,000 tribesmen 
evacuated Dufaigha and retired to the agricultural area 
of G-hail ba 7/azir, about 15 miles north-west of Shihr, 
early in 1874 (3). The land blockade of Shihr was lifted.
+ + + + +
(1) Kelly ’Gulf1 p.775-776
(2) p. 4.35 n.4, Ag.Pol. Agent Muscat believed that Turki
would not reply.
(3) AIA 644, Numbers from Hunter’s report of 29.3.74 - Bes
^ .3 7
The Ottoman reoccupation of the Yemen began, in 
1872; it changed the ‘status quo* in south-west Arabia 
and offered the attractive possibility of Ottoman 
assistance for any underdog in major local quarrels#
In 1872, the Kathir applied for assistance. They were 
invited to send a representative to Sanaa by Mushir 
Ahmad Mukhtar Pasha. The Kathiri Regent, Ubud bin Salim, 
went himself, without disclosing his rank. The Pasha1s 
information was not reassuring.. He told Ubud that the 
Porte proposed to make over the Province of Hadhramaut 
to Seiyid Fadhl bin Alawi the Moplah 1•.♦ to bring [it] 
into order ...f once the Yemen, including the Abdali 
area, was under Ottoman administration. Ubud brought 
this disturbing news to Aden when he called on the 
Resident (1)#
Ubud bin Salim may have been trying to play off 
the Ottomans against the British to obtain British naval 
assistance against Shihr (2). It is possible that Ubud
(1) LI, Res - SGB of 16.1.73) forwarded by Viceroy to 
S of S, lk.2*73) reporting Ubud!s interview
(2) p. 4Y2'7n. 5
knew o f  th e  R e s id e n t 's  c u r r e n t  c o n c e rn  a t  p o s s ib le  
O ttom an a c t io n  a g a in s t  L a h e j ( 1 ) .  He m e n tio n e d  th e  
P a s h a 's  i n t e n t io n  o f  b r in g in g  a l l  th e  Yemen u n d e r  
O ttom an a d m in is t r a t io n *  U b u d 's  news was ta k e n  s e r io u s ly  
b y  th e  R e s id e n t,  and b y  th e  F o re ig n  D e p a rtm e n t who 
q u ic k ly  c o p ie d  th e  R e s id e n t 's  l e t t e r  t o  th e  S e c re ta r y  
o f  S ta te *  The R e s id e n t c o u ld  n o t  ta k e  s id e s  i n  a 
H adhram i q u a r r e l ,  and he had no re a s o n  to  do so* N o r 
had th e  F o re ig n  D e p a rtm e n t, o r  th e  I n d ia  O f f i c e ,  cause 
f o r  in t e r v e n t io n ,  Ubud was g iv e n  no hope o f  B r i t i s h  
a s s is ta n c e .  B u t U b u d 's  v i s i t  p o s s ib ly  caused th e  R e s id e n t  
t o  send P r id e a u x  to  M u k a lla  and to  S h ih r  i n  th e  au tum n o f  
1873? to  t r y  and m e d ia te *  A s e t t le m e n t  o f  t h a t  q u a r r e l  
w o u ld  rem ove a cause f o r  O ttom an in t e r v e n t io n .  F re re  
a d v o c a te d  s t a t io n in g  ' • • * a s m a ll H n g l is h  £~nava lj v e s s e l 
o f f  M u k a lla  t o  w a tch  and t o  p re v e n t  a n y  'c o u p  de m a in ' ( 2 ) .
The F o re ig n  D e p a r tm e n t 's  a t t i t u d e  to w a rd s  H adhram aut 
had changed i n  1873 fro m  in d i f f e r e n c e  to  a r e c o g n i t io n  o f  
th e  s t r a t e g ic  im p o r ta n c e  to  I n d ia ,  and p o s s ib ly  to
(1) p.3.1 9 —  3.23
( 2 )  FO 78 2753, Memo F re re  -  L o rd  G r a n v i l l e ,  3 *1 2 *7 3
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Britain, of the Hadhramaut Coast. There was still no 
wish for any Indian involvement in the area* But the 
Foreign Department had begun to share the Aden Residency's 
distaste for any other foreign presence in the Gulf of 
Aden. Officials of the Government of Bombay had acquired 
that concern earlier. In 1870, the Political Department 
had shared Russell’s concern for the security of British- 
Indian trading interests in Mukalla (1). But the Naqib1s 
request for British protection had been refused* A Quaiti 
request for British protection for Shihr in 1872 was 
ignored (2)f as apparently an earlier approach by Awadh 
bin Umar to Sir Seymour Fitzgerald had been. Fitzgerald*s 
relations with Lord Mayo were, however, poor (3)* He 
was therefore unlikely to put forward a proposal for 
discussion that Lord Mayo would reject. In general,
Lord Mayo followed Lawrence's policy of not extending 
British commitments beyond India's existing borders.
(1) p.4.27 note 5
(2) FO 78 3186, Letter from Quaiti Agent, Bombay to SGB 
forwarded by SGB - For Dept, 11*11*72 and copied to 10. 
Forwarded by 10 - FO
(3) IOL, Argyll microfilms Heel 317? Northbrook - Argyll* 
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But the Political Department was concerned about the 
political and strategic implications of the alleged 
Ottoman naval pressure to make the Shihr administration 
fly the Ottoman flag. The Bombay correspondence on the 
Quaiti request for British protection was therefore 
copied to the India Office (1). The India Office passed 
it to the Foreign Office for information without comment. 
In 187*+ the Quaiti family appealed for help to the Ottoman 
Governor-General at Sanaa, allegedly giving a present 
of KT02O,OOO (2). The Quaiti emissary received cold 
comfort.- He was promised that the Quaiti appeal would 
be forwarded to the Porte. Probably the Pasha was 
unwilling to enter into any commitments in Hadhramaut 
after his experience of the Ottoman debacle in Lahej 
in December, 1873 (3).
The Government of India could have interfered 
decisively by sea*but it did not wish to do so. The 
Secretary to the Foreign Department wrote; *... the
(1) p .^ .39 n #2
(2) AIA 6V+, Res - SGB, 2.3.7^, reported to For Dept 
by SGB, 21+*3*7l+
(3) p.3.101 n.l and n.2
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dispute between the Jemadar (Awadh bin Umar/ and the 
Naqib of Mukalla is a matter with which the British 
Government does not desire to interfere ... * a).
Aden officials had personal experience of, and contact with, 
the contestants; and they found it impossible to keep 
away. Brigadier Schneider tried to maintain friendly 
relations with both sides, and so retain Residency 
influence throughout the area. That was a very personal 
interpretation of the way in which the official policy 
of non-intervention in tribal affairs should be carried 
out. It required considerable skill to visit bitter 
enemies only VO miles apart, to deny each what they 
wanted, and yet to leave them broadly convinced that, 
although they were independent, their contact with the 
British was more valuable than any foreign alliance or 
suzerainty could be.
In March, 187^? Captain Hunter was sent to visit 
Hadhramaut with the Residency Interpreter, Salih Jaffer. 
Hunter was instructed to offer the Resident's 'good 
offices', again, in the hope of arranging a settlement.
(1) AIA 6M+, C.U. Aitchison, Sec. For. Dept. - SGB, 13.2.7^
b.h2
But he had to make clear that 1... the British Government 
does not desire to interfere ...' (1). This last 
instruction seems to have ruined any likelihood of 
Hunter arranging a Quaiti-Kasadi settlement of their 
differences. Since Naqib Umar's prospects were 
encouraging he had no cause for stopping operations.
Awadh had good reason for wanting to preserve what he 
still retained, but he had nothing to offer the Kasadis 
in return.
The Naqib wanted the British to intervene in the 
fighting on his behalf, because he claimed (2) that 
Sir Bartle Frere had promised Mukalla British protection 
from foreign attacks in return for the signature of a 
new treaty, banning the slave trade (3)« The Residency 
interpreted Sir Bartle Frere's letter differently.
Hunter was required to inform the Naqib that Frere1s 
promise applied only to foreign, and not to local, attacks.
(1) AIA 6Mf, Res instructions - Hunter, 2^.3.7^
(2) AIA 726, Res - SGB, 12.9.76, quoting Naqib
(3) Aitchison 'Treaties' No LXXIV of 7.*f.73
■+.■+3
It was arguable that Awadh*s attack was a foreign* one. 
Awadh had been born in Hyderabad and was half Indian.
His mercenaries, brought from India, and his operations 
in Hadhramaut^were financed from Hyderabad, although 
the sources were private Quaiti family funds. The 
Naqib was apparently not very disturbed at the British 
refusal to intervene. He possibly considered that the 
lack of positive British support would delay, but not 
damage, his prospects of victory.
By June, Abdullah and Awadh bin Umar were 
sufficiently worried to ask for British mediation (1).
They asked that a British officer should enquire into, 
and settle, the Quaiti-Kasadi dispute. No mention was, 
however, made of the Kathir, of the Ba Umar of Ghail ba 
Wazir, or of Mohsin bin Abdullah alAulaqi, who were 
allied with the Naqib. Awadh was certainly unlikely 
to consider that the Kathiri claim to Shihr was better 
than his own. Possibly the Quaiti intention was to 
divide the Kasadis from the Kathir, by making a settlement
(1) AIA 6M+, Petition by Quaiti agent in Bombay - SGB 
of 11.6.7^
w i th  th e  N a q ib , and so s e c u r in g  th e  r e le a s e  o f  tw o s h ip s  
t h a t  th e  Q u a i t is  had b o u g h t i n  I n d ia .
The B r i t i s h  had im pounded tw o Q u a it i-o w n e d  s h ip s  
because  th e y  w ere B r i t i s h - r e g i s t e r e d  v e s s e ls .  They 
t h e r e fo r e  c o u ld  n o t  be em p lo yed , u n d e r th e  F o re ig n  
B n l is tm e n t  A c t of 1870 , i n  f o r e ig n  w a rs . S c h n e id e r  
had d e ta in e d  th e  Q u a i t i ’ s S.S. •P e lw a n * ' i n  A p r i l ,  when 
she c a l le d  a t  Aden to  c o a l .  He s u s p e c te d  t h a t  she
w o u ld  be used  f o r  w a r l ik e  o p e r a t io n s  ( 1 ) .  S c h n e id e r
te le g ra p h e d  Bombay f o r  i n s t r u c t i o n s .  The d e c is io n  was 
t h a t  th e  ’ P e lw a n 1, and a s a i l i n g  s h ip ,  th e  • S u lta n  P a sh a 1, 
w o u ld  be re le a s e d  f o r  le g i t im a t e  t r a d e ,  b u t  t h a t  th e y  m ust 
n o t  c a r r y  w a r - s u p p l ie s  o r  s o ld ie r s ,  because of t h e i r  
B r i t i s h  r e g i s t r a t i o n .  T h is  r u le  was a ls o  a p p l ie d  to  th e  
S .S . •O ra n * , b o u g h t j o i n t l y  b y  th e  N a q ib  and M o h s in  
a lA u la q i  ( 1 ) .  B u t th e  G overnm ent o f  Bombay d id  a c c e p t 
th e  r i g h t  o f  th e  tw o  r i v a l  and in d e p e n d e n t p a r t ie s  t o  
c a p tu re  each o t h e r ’ s v e s s e ls  a t  sea o r  i n  h a rb o u r *  o r  
to  b lo c k a d e  each o t h e r ’ s p o r t s  ( 2) .  T h a t was j u s t
(1) AIA 6LhLh, Res tel. of 10A . 7^ - SGB
(2) AIA 6M+, Res -  SGB, 6.5*7^ and G ovt o f  B° R e s o lu t io n
303^  o f  1 . 6 .7 ^
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recognising that 'a state of war* existed between the
Quaiti and the Kasadi and their allies*
The British considered that the Ottomans might 
intervene in the fighting, so the British Ambassador 
to the Porte was required *... to take a favourable 
opportunity of using •.. legitimate influence to prevent 
the Turks from interfering ...* (1). Elliot spoke to 
the Grand Vizier and was assured that the Governor General 
of the Yemen had made no mention of events on the coast 
of Hadhramaut; that the Forte had no wish to intervene 
there (2). The Pasha at Sanaa knew the Porte1s views.
The Grand Vizier considered that fresh instructions were 
unnecessary. But, from subsequent Ottoman claims, it is 
probable that he wished to avoid committing himself to 
any additional correspondence with Elliot which could 
cause misunderstandings with Britain (3)*
The Quaiti remained on the defensive throughout 187*+* 
with Kathiri pressure against them by land and Kasadi 
pressure by sea. The Kathir ambushed a column of 800
(1) FO 78 2755, FO - Sir Henry Elliot, 18.7-71*-
(2) FO 78 2755, Elliot - FO, 20*8,7^
(3) But Cf. p.^.79 n.l
Quaiti followers coming from Hadhramaut, killing 30 
and capturing quantities of stores* Kasadi war-dhows 
successfully attacked Quaiti dhows supplying Awadh 
tin Unarms forces at Shiheir. Money^ supplies^and 
mercenaries were sent to Shihr from India, But not all 
the mercenaries and stores arrived; some were detained 
at Aden, en route for Shihr (1).
Throughout the year, the Naqib kept up a partially- 
effective sea-blockade of Shihr and Shiheir (2)* This 
was a setback which Awadh might have avoided had he had 
the use of his steamer, the 1 Pelwan1, and the sailing 
ship, 1 Sultan Pasha*, between Bombay and Shihr. The 
Quaiti tried to circumvent the Foreign Enlistment Act 
by buying another steamer, the 1 Phlox1, in Bombay and 
planning to re-register her in Portuguese Goa. But the 
plan was discovered by the Naqib, who warned the 
Resident (3). The Governor-General of Portuguese India
(1) AIA Petition of Ghulam Khan - Res, 18*8*7^
(2) AIA 6M+, Naqib - Res, received 20.12.7*+? reporting the 
seizure of arms, ammunition and stores bound for Shihr
(3) AIA 6M+, Naqib - Res, 27.10.7k
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agreed, at the Governor of Bombay*s request, to frustrate 
the Quaiti plan by refusing registration.
The Kasadi blockade was hurting; the Quaitis 
protested about it to the Resident in September (1).
In answer to further protests the Resident replied in 
December that; *... the seizing of vessels attempting 
to break the blockade of Shuhur imposed by the Nukeeb 
of Maculla, is according to usage ...* (2). The Kasadis 
enjoyed the advantage of good anchorages to the east 
of Shihr at Qarn and Sharma, and to the west at Kukalla 
and Burum. Awadh*s ships had no protected anchorage 
west of Mukalla where they could shelter and reprovision, 
except in neutral Aden. In addition, Shihr was dangerous 
for dhows during the south-west monsoon. It was an open 
roadstead with anchorages in depths of from 7 to 12 
fathoms (3).
In November, conditions appeared so favourable to 
the Naqib that he again rejected peace proposals agreeable
(1) AIA 6Mf f 395? Abdullah bin Omer - Res, rec*d ^.9»7^
(2) AIA 6¥+, Res - Awadh bin Omer, Dec 187^
(3) 1 Colonial 123'p*69
t o  Awadh ( 1 ) ,  p ro p o s e d  b y  C o lo n e l F . S c h n e id e r  ( 2 ) ,  
th e  A c t in g  R e s id e n t ,  d u r in g  a v i s i t  to  M u k a lla  and S h ih r ,  
Awadh had w arned th e  A c t in g  R e s id e n t  t h a t ,  f a i l i n g  
B r i t i s h  in t e r v e n t io n ,  he w o u ld  ha ve  to  make an O ttom an 
a l l i a n c e  to  m a in ta in  h i s  p o s i t io n  a t  S h ih r  ( 3 ) *  C o lo n e l 
S c h n e id e r  d is b e l ie v e d  Awadh; and th e  G overnm ent o f  
Bombay a c c e p te d  C o lo n e l S c h n e id e r*  s v ie w  (*+ ). B u t,  i n  
1882, i t  was d is c o v e re d  t h a t  A b d A lla h  b in  Umar p ro b a b ly  
had a ske d  f o r  O ttom an a s s is ta n c e  fro m  th e  Pasha a t
Sanaa i n  187*+ o r  1875 ( ? ) •  P o s s ib ly  t h i s  Q u a i t i  a p p e a l
r e s u l t e d  i n  an O ttom an re q u e s t  t o  th e  B r i t i s h  Am bassador 
a t  C o n s ta n t in o p le  i n  M ay, 1875  t o  * . . .  ta k e  . . .  c o e r c iv e  
m e a su re s  a g a in s t  a l l  a c t io n  b y  sea on th e  p a r t  o f  G h a lib  
K i s s i r i  (6 ) o r  h is  a d h e re n ts  w i t h  a v ie w  to
(1 )  A IA  6*+*+, R e p o r t o f  AS Res -  SGB, 11.11*7*+
( 2) A b r o th e r  o f  G e n e ra l J .W . S c h n e id e r
(3) AIA 6VV, As Res - SGB, i3.ll.7V
(V) AIA 6VV, B° R e s o lu t io n  7516 of 12.12.7V
( 5 )  IOL, BSC 85/88, F.M. Hunter's Memo of 3.V.82
( 6) G h a lib  K a t h i r i ,  c h ie f  o f  th e  K a t h i r ,  had d ie d  i n  I 87O
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maintaining the tranquility of the coast ...! (1).
In 1875) Awadh and his brother Salih bought a large 
war dhow for #MT18,000 and proclaimed a Quaiti counter­
blockade of Mukalla in March (2). A steamer was also 
purchased in Italy and registered under Ottoman colours 
to avoid the provisions of the British Foreign Enlistment 
Act* The omer of the 8.S. 'Jawed* was described as 
Said Ali, fTurkish merchant1 and a brother of *... Mr 
Hady Ali, merchant, Turkish subject, domiciled at 
Hadhramaut • ••' (3). Said Ali was also Awadh*s Agent 
in Shihr* The 'Jawad's1 crew were enlisted before the 
Ottoman Consul at Genoa* It may therefore have been 
AbdAllah bin Umar's intention, x-/hen seeking help from 
the Pasha at Sanaa (V), to claim to be under the Ottomans 
so that a vessel could be registered for the Quaiti under 
Ottoman colours* If Ottoman warships had intervened,
(1) FO 78 2756, Sir Henry Elliot - FO, 15*5.75
(2) BSC, P & S 75, Memo of 17.^.75 Capt Prideaux - Res
(3) BSC, PS 75 f 1+1+5-1+51, Res - SGB, :
(k) See p.-4*48:;n,5 . Either late in 187^ or early in
1875, before the registration of the 'Jawad' as an
Ottoman vessel
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the British would have reacted forcefully (1), and the 
Ottomans would then have been humiliated as they had been 
at Lahej in 1873*
The 1Jawad1s1 Captain was under orders from her 
new owner not to put in to Aden, in case the vessel was 
arrested* However, the crew of the 1Jawad1 were so 
dissatisfied with the poor mechanical state of the engine, 
the absence of necessary stores, and with their bad 
rations, that they sailed the 1Jawad1 to Aden, to complain 
to the Italian Consul on 18th xiugust, 1875 (2)* The ship 
was released by the Resident on condition that she 
traded peaceably between the Persian Gulf, India, Aden 
and the Red Sea. She was not allowed to trade to Shihr.
The 1Jawad1 should, therefore, have been of no help in 
Awadh1s campaign against Mukalla or in breaking the 
Kasadi blockade of Shihr. But she did occasionally call 
at Shihr, to the Naqib1s indignation, while on passage (3)*
(1) AIA 6Mt, AS Res - SGB, 13.11*71+? had suggested that 
British action should be taken if the Ottomans 
intervened. Bombay agreed.
(2) BSC PS/75, as note 3, p A . ^9, ' '
(3) AIA 726, Naqib - Res, 10.1.76 & I7.I.76
There were always plausible Quaiti excuses for the 
visits, such as a need for fresh water. The vessel was 
wrecked on a reef off Hodeida in 1876, while carrying 
Persian pilgrims (1).
The disadvantages to local trade of the Kasadi 
blockade were becoming apparent to Aden traders when 
the north-east monsoon shipping season opened in the 
autumn of 187*+- Coastal shipping from the Persian Gulf 
and from India, to Gulf of Aden ports, and Zanzibar 
customarily called in at Hadhrami ports for water, 
shelter, repairs or trade. By the Declaration of Paris 
in 1856 international maritime lawyers had agreed that 
blockades must be enforced by sufficient ships to be 
effective. ’Paper* blockades were unlawful, but they 
were not unknown (2). Quaiti war dhows probably tried 
to intercept shipping off their home port of Shihr, but 
well out to sea, because they had no base west of 
Mukalla. There was therefore no evidence, before a
(1) BSC, P & S 75 f 285, Aden News Report No 8 of I876
(2) The Federal States declared a blockade of 3,00*0 miles 
of Confederate coastline with b2 ships
vessel was stopped, that it was bound for* Mukalla,
Country craft habitually used coastal waters for most 
journeys. The Resident therefore proposed that 1 ... the 
Government of India should not allow the Nakeeb of 
Maculla and the Jemadar of Shihr to maintain hostile 
fleets at Aden . ,.f (1). The reference to keeping 
'hostile fleets at Aden1 appears to refer to the south 
Arabian coast between Aden and Ras Sharma. The blockades 
had degenerated into something near piracy; and the 
Resident decided that actions, such as the Quaiti seizure 
of dhows 12-1J miles off Shihr, *... by petty Arab chiefs 
ignorant of civilized usages could not be allowed by 
the Government of India...1 (2).
In the Gulf of Oman the policy had been recently 
established that local maritime warfare interfered with 
legitimate trade and would be prevented there by the 
Royal Navy, as it was in the Persian Gulf*(3). But
(1) LA, Res copied - S of S,
(2) LA, Instructions by the Res to his Assistant, Captain
Prideaux, before the latter proceeded to Mukalla and
Shihr, copied - S of S with Res letter of 3OA.75
(3) Kelly 'Gulf' p.699-701♦ Policy laid down in I87O
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naval operations by either side against the other were 
allowed. In 1875 the system was extended to the Gulf of 
Aden. But that was partly a declaration of intent for 
British convenience. The ban was not enforced by an 
increased British naval presence; and no notice was 
taken when Seiyid Fadhl bin Alawi1s embryonic 
administration asked for British action to prevent 
piracy on the coast of Dhufar (1).
July, the Foreign Department supported Schneider*s 
concern for legitimate trading vessels. British policy 
would remain one of non-interference by land, but the 
Resident was required to *... call the rival parties 
strictly to account for any acts prejudicial to the 
interests of British subjects ... in consequence of the 
so-called blockade of Maculla ...*. The Foreign Office 
informed Sir Henry Elliot at Constantinople of the official 
Indian view (2). In July, the Foreign Department endorsed 
Schneider*s policy, which Prideaux had enforced on the
(1 )  FO 78 3615
(2) FO 78 2755, FO Despatch - Elliot of 30.8.75 
following the 10 passing correspondence to the 
FO on 21.8.75
Quaitis in April by the threat of HMS ’Vulture’s* 
guns (1). Prideaux informed both Shihr and Mukalla 
that their blockades were no longer recognised, that 
they were illegal, and that the Royal Navy would ensure 
the security of trading vessels off the south Arabian 
coast. Awadh was required to pay Rs6o!f2 compensation 
to the owners and shippers of goods on the three vessels 
that he had detained and to release the two vessels he 
still held. The third vessel had escaped from Shihr, 
by cutting her cable, and had fled to Aden with news 
of the ’piracy1. Awadh tried to justify his actions as 
retaliation for the Naqib1s actions against vessels 
carrying goods for Shihr, but gave in within hours of 
the deadline of a bombardment by HMS Vulture (1).
The ban on naval blockades worked, in the long term, 
against the Kasadis, since the Naqib1s war-dhows were 
more effective than Awadh*s. Relieved of the Kasadi 
blockade, Awadh was able to bring in supplies to Shihr 
unhindered. There is no evidence that there was ever' 
any Royal Navy supervision of the cargoes that the Quaiti-
(1) BSC P & S 75 f 265, Res - SGB, 30.*f.75
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owned ships carried, even when they broke the British 
ban not to call at Shihr (1), This ban expired on 
9th May, 1875? after only six months (2). Schneider 
thought that it was still in force in January, 1876 (3)«
But, possibly to prevent R.IT. searches, the Quaiti 
sailing vessel, 1 Sultan Pasha1, was sold to, and 
re-registered in Basra, under the name of, IJasr Abdul 
Habib alQuaiti (*+). Thereafter, she could call at Shihr 
with cargo without risk of British seizure, because she 
was under Ottoman colours. She was also armed with two 
guns which would have been illegal if she had remained 
under British colours and had been used on warlike operations. 
With supplies coming in freely to Shihr in 1876, the Quaitis 
began to gain ground.
Schneider probably realised that the British ban on
(1) P. 4.50 n.3
(2) AIA .726, Bombay Resolution 67^ of 8.2,76
(3) AIA 726, Res - SGB, 17 and 20.1.76
(if) AIA 726, Naqib - Res, Jan. 1876 (no date). The
Naqib*s information was usually accurate on Quaiti 
affairs.
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blockades would benefit Awadh, Schneider wrote; !,,. Me 
may expect in time to see a powerful Mahomedan Chief 
established there £in MukallaJ allied with the Nizam: 
a state of things by no means desirable when considered 
in connection with the .ambitious designs of the Khedive (1) 
on the African Coast outside the Straits of Bab al 
llandab . ..* (2), Awadh*s family financial resources now 
began to influence Hadhramaut affairs decisively. In 
Hay, 1876, Awadh was reported to have cabled to Hyderabad 
for MT#3°,000. He had already received, according to the 
Naqib, Rsl0,000 brought by an Austrian-Lloyd steamer on 
the regular Bombay-Europe service (3)- Owing (*f) to a 
smallpox epidemic at Aden (5)? the steamer called at 
Shihr instead of Aden.
The Acting Resident, Major G.R. Goodfellow, wrote to
(1) p.6.11 - 6.23
(2) LA, Res - SGB, copied S of S, 27A . 75- A •
(3) AIA 726, Naqib - Res, 1.5*76
(*+) Marginal note by Capt. Hunter in the file explaining
the reason for the visit
(5) Hunter 1 Aden1 p.177 noted an epidemic for one month
in 1876
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Bombay complaining about *... the unsatisfactory 
relations still existing with the contending Arab tribes 
at Makulla and Shehr and the Hydrabad State . ..* (l). 
Goodfellow was strongly prejudiced against the continuing 
Quaiti occupation of Shihr, Pie noted marginally in a 
Residency file that !... The Jemadar of Shihr has no 
more right to Shehr than I have . ..* (2). Goodfellow*s 
complaint was therefore designed to assist the Naqib, 
who had no resources in Hyderabad. Mukalla was mentioned 
with Shihr to avoid any outward appearance of bias by 
Goodfellow. His protest, however, was no more effective 
than earlier protests had been.
Between 1869 and 1876, Sir Salar Jung was often 
requested by British Residents in Hyderabad to prevent 
intervention by Arabs in the Nizam1s employment, in the 
affairs of Hadhramaut. The British Resident there,
C.B. Saunders, was not a strong personality. Northbrook 
criticised him(3). Sir Salar, however, liked Saunders,
(1) AIA 726, Ag Res - SGB, 23.5*76
(2) AIA 726 f l85j Undated pencilled note
(3) IOL, Argyll microfilms Reel 317? Northbrook - Argyll, 
8.7.72
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so the Viceroy did not transfer him elsewhere. Prom 
1872-1875, Sir Salarfs relations with the British were 
strained by claims which he made on behalf of Hyderabad, 
and about which he felt deeply (l). Neither the liberal 
nor the Conservative Governments during this period were 
willing to restore territory to Hyderabad. The foreign 
Department were therefore reluctant to press Sir Salar 
on other matters, such as Awadh's support from Hyderabad 
Arabs (2). V/hen Colonel P.S.Lumsden was acting Resident 
in Hyderabad during Saunders' absence on leave in 1872/73 
Northbrook anticipated a more forceful representation of 
British views. But hostilities in coastal Hadhramaut 
did not develop until 1874. Lumsden therefore had no 
cause to raise British objections to intervention in 
Arabia from Hyderabad. Between July 30th, 1874 and
(1) Por details of Sir Salar*s feelings about the recovery 
of the Assigned Districts of Berar, see 101, MSS EUR 
P86/107 (pages not numbered).
(2) Argyll microfilms Reel 317, Northbrook - Argyll, 
17.11.72 and AIA 726, Offg Sec. Por. Dept, quoting 
Gov. Gen. in Council's views to Offg Res, Hyderabad, 
10.2.76.
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July 29th, 1875? Sir Salar received at least nine letters 
on the matter from the Resident at Hyderabad (1), Most 
went unanswered! The British wanted 1... effectual 
measures ... to prevent the transmission from Hyderabad 
of the funds necessary for the prosecution of the war .
Sir Salar took no such measures.
The Resident at Aden was ill-informed about 
developments in Hadhramaut5 and the Resident at Hyderabad 
was worse informed. Hadhramaut was ’independent1, and 
the Foreign Departments policy was to maintain a * status 
quo' there which had already been unbalanced. Saunders 
and later Residents at Hyderabad relied for much of 
their information on what they were told by Sir Salar, or 
by such of the Arab Jemadars as Sir Salar sent to them.
The ’... complete and precise information ^required^ on 
the subject of aid and assistance rendered by certain 
Arabs in Hyderabad in the contentions prevailing in 
Arabia ... ' (2) possibly was not available* Certainly 
Sir Salar Jung gave very little information; and what he
(1) AIA 726 f 73-81
(2) AIA 726, Res, Ilydesz&ad - Sir Salar, 2.10*7^
^ .6 0
gave was heavily biased. Sir Salar was proud of 
Hyderabad’s local autonomy and he resented any apparent 
British interference in Hyderabad's internal affairs.
The Foreign Department belatedly claimed that 
any interference by Hyderabad government servants in 
the affairs of foreign states was a breach of Article 15 
of Hyderabad's Treaty of 1800 with the British* The 
Department chose to blame Sir Salar's 'misunderstanding' 
of an earlier request to stop aid going to Hadhramaut 
upon Colonel C.B. Saunders. Sir Salar had chosen to 
understand the request as an invitation to him to mediate 
between the two parties in Hadhramaut. But it was not 
only Saunders who failed to get official policy enforced; 
nor only Sir Salar who knew how to manage British officials 
in Hyderabad.. In June, 1875) the officiating Resident in 
Hyderabad, Sir R.J. Meade, was cleverly influenced by 
Salih bin Umar al Quaiti. On the Foreign Department's 
orders (1), Meade had instructed the Nizam's Minister 
to prevent the despatch of money to the warring parties 
in Hadhramaut. Salih called on Meade. The Resident was
(1) AIA 726, Off^ Sec. For.Dept. - Off® Res, Hyderabad, 
10.2.76
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flattered by Salih's behaviour; *... nothing could be
Salih persuaded the susceptible Meade that the British 
ban on money transfers to Hadhramaut would leave his 
brothers^and their women, children, and dependents 
there destitute, Salih had supported his interview with 
a convincing written petition. Meade forwarded the 
petition to the Foreign Department for reconsideration 
of its orders with the comment that 1... the strict 
enforcement of the orders ... will unavoidably press 
most harshly on him £salih bin UmarJ ...' (l).
The Naqib reported in July, 1876, that Quaiti money 
had turned the whole country against him and that his 
tribal allies had deserted him(2).By the end of August, 
the Kathir had evacuated the main centre of Ghail ba 
Wazir, which they had garrisoned for the Naqib (3). The 
Aulaqi forces had lost the outpost of Mayan alMasjid (3)
more respectful than Barak Jung's Umar1s
Hyderabad titleJ language and demeanour ... • a)
(1) AIA 726, Off® Res, Hyderabad - For Dept
(2) AIA 726, Naqib - Res, 28.7.76
(3) AIA 726, Awadh bin Omer - Res, received 10.9.76
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and were besieged in adLHazm (1). Sir Salar1 s 
partisanship, and Quaiti family funds from Hyderabad, 
had enabled Awadh to recover from his precarious position 
in 187*+* it was too late for the Viceroy1 s reliance 
*... upon Nizam*s Government to stop . ..* money transfers 
altering the situation (2).
+ + + + • +
The intervention of the Sharif of Mecca and the Residency 
attitude towards that intervention.
In March, 1876, Sharif AbdAllah bin Aun of Mecca 
offered his mediation, provided that both belligerents 
agreed in advance to accept his judgement. In the event 
of a subsequent rejection, or a breach of the peace, by 
one side, the defaulter*s property (3) would be taken 
over by *... those appointed by the High Government ...* (^ -).
(1) AIA 726, Naqib - Res, rec*d 10.9.76
(2) AIA 726, For.Sec. - Res, Hyderabad, 10.7*76
(3) The implication was that it was not sovereign territory
(*+) AIA 726, Res - Naqib, rec*d 5.Lf.76 enclosing the
Sharif*s letter
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The Acting Resident understood that phrase to mean the 
Porte, which was usually referred to as ‘the highest 
Government* (1)* However, there is no Arabic copy of 
the Sharif1s letter, which was returned to the Naqib, 
so the accuracy of the translation cannot be checked.
The Resident may not have been justified in seeing the 
letter as a veiled method of asserting Ottoman supremacy 
in Hadhramaut. Indeed, the Sharif was later reported to 
be opposed to more Ottoman intervention in south Arabia 
because a stronger Ottoman presence in Arabia would have 
reduced his own power (2). The Sharif specifically 
wrote that the Porte did not know of the dispute.
The Sharif was so influential in Jeddah and Mecca 
that 1... the power of the Turkish authorities seemed 
to be entirely nominal ...* (3)* ^he Ottomans were 
concerned for the security of their European frontiers 
and fighting had occurred between Ottoman forces and 
Zaidi tribesmen in the Yemen (*+) • The Porte was in no
(1) k J  Lj | c^ 0 or H/JU/I
(2) FO 78 3615, H.M. Amb. C'ple - FO, 9,lf„80
(3) BSC P & S 76, Report of Capt. Wodehouse R.N. of
H.M.S. Teazer of 5.7*76
(*+) Servia and Montenegro declared war in July 1876 and the 
Bulgarian Atrocities had occurred in May. An attack 
.......by Russia was-likely....................................
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position to provide troops for new commitments in 
Hadhramaut,so it appears unlikely that the Sharif1s 
initiative was Ottoman inspired. But Aden Residency 
officials had suspected Ottoman influence in developments 
in Hadhramaut and in Bhufar since 1850* Goodfellow" was 
convinced that 1... ere long the attention of the Turkish 
Government wall be draw/n to the ports of Makulla and Sheher
(1). Schneider, departing on leave, had advised 
the Naqib to reject the Sharif1s offer; f... those 
at Mecca have no concern whatever with the affairs of 
your country ..., (2). Schneider feared lest Ottoman 
influence might replace British influence on the Hadhramaut 
coast, if the Sharif intervened* Schneider wanted to 
preserve the Hadhrami 'status quo1, already affected 
by the opening of the Suez Canal, unbalanced by Quaiti 
remittances from Hyderabad, and possibly influenced by 
Seiyid Fadhl bin Alawi's arrival in Dhufar (3)*- Despite 
sympathy for the Naqib, Schneider was prepared to
(1) AIA 726, AS Res - SGB, 23.5.76
(2) AIA 726, Res - SGB, 8A .76
(3) p.5.1^ - 5.15
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sacrifice Kasadi interests if he could thus exclude the 
Sharif1s influence.* The British refused to accept the 
Naqibls claim to British protection by virtue of Frerels 
undertaking to his father (1).
In Nay, 1876, the Secretary of State agreed that 
there might be ’no serious objection1 (2) to mediation 
between the two sides *... if both belligerents should 
apply with apparent sincerity for the friendly offices 
of the Resident . ..* (3)* The Officiating Resident,
G.R. Goodfellow, commented marginally in the Aden file
that Awadh was unlikely to seek British intervention,
because 1... the Resident knows too much of his affairs *..!('h-).
In Goodfellow1 s view, the Residency should reject Awadh1s
claim to #11121+0,000 against the Naqib, In addition,
Awadh should be warned that Shihr would not be protected
(1) AIA 726, Res - SGB, 12.10*76 forwarding a translation 
of Frere’s Arabic agreement with the late Naqib,
but without a file copy
(2) Underlined four times in the file, in apparent 
irritation
(3) AIA 726, S of S - Gov.Gen., 18.5*76, forwarded by 
U/S For.Dept. - SGB, ^*8*76
(*+) AIA 726, Comment dated 18.9*76
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against a foreign attack, in the hope that Awadh would 
then accept British mediation; but there was no British 
undertaking to protect Shihr from foreign attack* 
Furthermore, the Hyderabad Resident had been informed 
that *... the dispute /^between Awadh and the Naqi bj is 
not one in which the Government of India has any intention 
of interfering . ..* (1) It is probable, allowing for 
conditions in Hyderabad, that Salih bin Umar and his 
brothers had. been told of this official view.
In September, 1876, the Naqib had f... no defence 
but God and the Unglish Government ...! (2); he 
appealed to the Resident to arrange a two months1 truce; 
Awadh had an estimated 5>0G0 nien under arms; the Naqib 
had 800 (3). The Naqib1s ally, Mohsin alAulaqi, was 
In extremis1, besieged by Awadh. The main Aulaqi fort 
was badly damaged and Awadh expected its surrender within
(1) AIA 726 f 91? U/S For.Dept. - Res, Hyderabad
(2) AIA 726, Naqib - Res, recfd 10.9*76
(3) AIA 726 f 21+l-2^ -8, Residency interpreters report 
of his visit to the Naqib and to Awadh bin Umar 
on 26-27 September 1876
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a fev/ days when Salih Jaffer insisted on visiting him 
at his camp outside alHazm. Awadh refused to agree 
to a truce that would save alHazm, but he reluctantly 
offered one for six months to the Naqib. The latter 
would not desert his embattled Aulaqi ally and rejected 
Awadh1s offer.
After Awadh had captured alHazm, he possibly planned 
to complete his operations by a seaborne landing at 
Mukalla. A threatened feint in November did not develop 
into an attack (l). The approach to Mukalla was made 
dangerous by a reef offshore and the landing place was 
covered by the town citadel. The Quaiti seaborne moves 
were possibly directed partly against the morale of the 
Kasadi forces, with a view to wearing down their will to 
resist, and partly as a threat to induce the Naqib to 
tie down more of his forces in Mukalla and so to prevent 
their use in defending other Kasadi villages of* in 
offensive operations against Quaiti positions.
(l) AIA 726; Naqib - Res, 22.11.76.
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The Resident returned from leave in November and 
decided to try and intervene* He visited the two ports 
in the I.G.S. 'Dagmar', escorted by H.M.S. festal1 (1). 
Schneider needed all the pressure that he could apply, 
unofficially, to reinforce his arguments for a negotiated 
settlement. Awadh knew that time was on his side. The 
Foreign Department had made official policy clear.
'... So long as either belligerent continues obstinate, 
it is clear that the British Government cannot interpose 
effectually between the parties without adopting more 
active measures than [/the Govt* of IndiaJ is prepared 
to adopt, or than Her Majesty1s Government has 
authorised ...f (2).
Schneider*s local prestige was high, and Awadh bin 
Umar was too dependent upon sea communications to be able 
to risk misjudging the official British attitude. Awadh 
agreed to a two years* truce with the Naqib (3)» He
(1) Since the *Dagmar* only carried a 2-pounder for saluting 
purposes, H.M.S. 'Vestal*s presence was more imposing
(2) AIA 726, U/S For.Dept. - SGB, 25.11.76
(3) AIA 726, Res tel. - SGB, 25.12.76
could not have refused without offending the Resident, 
after offering a truce in the previous September through 
the Residency Interpreter. But Awadh could, and did, 
avoid committing himself to a negotiated settlement 
which would have lost him the chance of capturing Mukalla* 
Awadh claimed that he, personally, agreed; but, that 
as his brothers, AbdAllah in Shibam, and Salih in Hyderabad, 
had joined with him in the 1873 agreement to purchase half 
the Kasadi possessions, he must consult them before 
replying*. That bought time; the Resident could not 
wait at Shihr for an answer* Awadh also claimed that 
his elder brother, AbdAllah, was the ruler of all Quaiti 
territory on the coast, as well as inland. That provided 
an excuse for Awadh later refusing the Resident1s 
intervention, without offending Schneider. But even 
the agreement to a 2 years1 truce was an expensive 
concession* While hostilities continued, Awadh had to 
pay Indian and Arab mercenaries.
Awadh now had his hands tied on the coast until 
Schneider left Aden in May, 1877? hut Awadh was free to 
strengthen his position in the interior* By returning
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the Quaiti-held portion of Tarim to the Kathir (1), 
the Quaitis obtained a ten year truce with the Kathir (2). 
In September, 1877> Awadh refused to submit the Quaiti- 
Kasadi dispute to the new Resident*s arbitration and 
recommenced hostilities. Awadh*s excuse was that the 
Quaitis had rejected other off&F s of mediation by the 
Ottomans, and by Seiyid Fadhl bin Alawi, in Dhufar. At 
the India Office, the view was that Britain was 1... well
out of it . ..f (3). Meantime, Awadh seized Dis, Sharma
and alQarn, east of Shihr. The Naqib complained about 
the Quaiti seizures. He was informed by the Resident 
that British interests were limited to a * ... settlement 
of the money matters which have been the cause of 
disturbances affecting the interests of peaceably disposed 
inhabitants and merchants , ( * + ) .  The Resident lacked 
the authority, and the resources, to prevent Quaiti
(1) ’Colonial 123'p.33
(2) AIA, Aden Hews Report Ho 15 of May 1877
(3) IOL, P & S Vol 5 1877 f 1335 Minute of the Pol. Dep.
on Res letter - S of S of 25.9*77. of 2^.10*77
(h) AIA 7895 Res - Naqib, 31«1*>78
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aggrandisement. But the change of Resident produced 
no official change of heart towards Awadh. When a 
quarrel occurred between the Naqib and his younger 
brother, Muhammad, Salih Jaffer was sent to reconcile 
the two Kasadi factions (1). The Residency had no 
obligation to intervene, but the dispute benefited 
Awadh and disturbed Mukalla* It was claimed that the 
dispute between the Naqib and. his brother in 1879 was 
provoked by Seiyid Fadhl bin Alawi, then a refugee from 
Dhufar. (2). It is p ossible that that dispute arose out 
of the Seiyid!s advice to seek Ottoman help against the 
Quaiti, when the Naqib placed his reliance on the British* 
If that was so, Salih Jaffer1s intervention is readily 
understandable. It was designed to eliminate an excuse 
for Ottoman intervention*
The Resident tried to prevent Awadh visiting 
Hyderabad in 1878; he believed that Awadh would f... take 
advantage of the opportunity to strengthen his position
(1) 'Colonial 123'p«-33» The date of this Kasadi family
quarrel is given as being after 1877* Tt appears to
have been in 1879 (see note 2)
(2) FO 78 361?, Res - SGB, *+.2.79
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in Arabia by ... the transmission of money if not of 
warlike stores and men to Shihr in view to an attack being 
made on the Nakeeb • •* in October next . *.*jwhen the 
truce expired (1)* The Bombay Government accepted that 
Awadh*s visit was on personal business, for medical 
treatment in India, to bring his family to Hadhramaut 
and to *... close finally all relations between him and 
IT• H • (the Nizam] 's Government ... 1 (2). Permission was 
granted (2)*. In April Awadh visited Hyderabad (3)*
The Naqib had no doubt that Awadh intended to resume 
hostilities; the Naqib desperately wanted a settlement 
or another truce (*+). Loch asked Awadh to renew the 
truce. He also wrote to the Naqib to let him know what 
was being done. The Arabic translation (5) of Loch*s 
draft to the Naqib was more reassuring than the English
(1) AIA 7S95 Bes - SGB, Jan 1878 (date partly termite-eaten)
(2) AIA 789 5 Bombay he solution lOO1* of 28.2*1878
(3) AIA 789, Res - SGB, 30^.78
(k) AIA 789, Naqib - Res, 29*7*78
(?) AIA 789, Res - Naqib, 26.8*78
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original (1), It is possible that Salih Jaffer was 
concerned to reassure the Naqib and to retain the 
Naqib1s trust, rather than to translate Loch!s letter 
accurately* The Naqib knew that his position was 
desperate* He applied to Seiyid Turki of Oman to mediates 
but, as the Seiyid had already quarrelled with Awadh over 
the latter1s treatment of Suri vessels bound for Mukalla (2), 
Awadh was not likely to, and did not, accept the Seiyid1s 
mediation (3).
Awadh disregarded the ban on hostilities by sea 
and moved some men by an armed boat flying the Ottoman 
flag (if); he seized Bur urn from the small Kasadi garrison 
by a seaborne landing (5)* British naval forces removed 
the Quaiti vessesl from the area oo, but Awadh•s men
(1) AIA 789 f 23
(2) Sur was an Omani port whose sailors traded to 
Aden, Africa and the Persian Gulf
(3) BSC Vol III 1878 f i+85, Res - SGB, 22.12.78
(if) PRO Admlty 53/11328 Log of H.U.3. Vulture,
(5) AAR, AIA 853, 1880/81 para 25
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remained in possession of the village 6 miles west of 
Kukalla across the bay, Salih Jaffer was sent to Mukalla 
in December, l880jf... to ascertain personally the present 
state of affairs £andJ to temporize with the Chiefs 
to prevent hostilities taking place ,,, ' a), until 
definite instructions were received from the Foreign 
Department (2), The chiefs and the local population 
would also probably express themselves more freely to 
the Resident's Native Assistant than they would to a 
European (3)« Salih Jaffer still retained some influence 
over the Naqib; and Loch's aim was to ensure that the 
Naqib did not, in despair, hand over his territory to 
the Ottomans, or to the Kathir.
Salih Jaffer was convinced that the Naqib would not 
hand over his territory to Awadh .. But Salih believed 
that the Naqib would repay the #NT 80,000, which Awadh
(1) AIA 827, Res - SGB, 29.11.80
( 2 )  p . 4 . 8 2  n. 2 came.
(3) Gf. I0L, File 758/1908, 0ffg Res - SGB on the role
of the Native Assistant as he saw it on 10,5.1903
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had paid him in 1873? by instalments (1), The Naqib 
wrote to the Resident that he would hand over authority 
to any Power, or tribe, that could protect his territory 
from Awadh (2). The strengthened natural defences to 
Kukalla prevented Awadh1s forces occupying it by land in 
1880 (3). The presence of H.l-I.S. Seagull1 from 1881 
prevented a seaborne assault, or blockade. Official 
policy firmly supported a bean on maritime warfare, which 
was enforced by the Royal Navy in 1881 (*+). It is possible 
that the purpose of the ban was to reduce excuses for
foreign intervention in an area where the Foreign
Department wanted no land commitments*. The Ottomans
in effect claimed all Arabian ports bar Aden by levying
double port dues on vessels arriving at Basra from 
'Ottoman1 ports in Arabia which had not already paid port 
dues on departure (5).
(1) See p*4#34above
(2) AIA 827, Naqib - Res, 1^.12.80
(3) AIA 726 f Ij-19 is a sketch by Salih Jaffer of the N.W.
approaches to Kukalla showing the guns and posts on 
hills overlooking the approaches
(*0 AIA 827, SGB - Res, tel. of 8.12*80
(5) Kelly 'Gulf* p*808
k.76
The presence of an R.N. vessel was a deterrent to 
any foreign naval negotiations with the Naqib, as well 
as being some reassurance to him. Loch had managed to 
secure an R.N. vessel off Kukalla by stressing the 
danger of the Ottomans securing a foothold at Kukalla 
through the Naqib accepting Ottoman suzerainty (1).
Loch, wrongly, imagined that, once established at Kukalla^ 
the Ottomans could move northwards where they would 
meet *... the ^OttomanJ expeditions which are slowly 
but surely sweeping from Yemen eastwards towards Oman ...' (1). 
In Loch*s truthful view the British had, secretly, thrown 
the Naqib over1 - which justified the Naqib seeking 
another protector (1). Salih Jaffer succeeded in preventing 
the Naqib turning to the Porte for help until too late.
Loch was no longer concerned to preserve the Naqib; he 
was concerned that no harm should come to the 50-odd 
British Indians at Kukalla. Loch did not want the tom 
stormed and looted (2); he wanted a peaceable transfer 
of power. The Naqib, however, refused a truce, which
(1) AIA 827, Res - SGB, 29.11*80
(2) Note by Loch on Naqib*s letter received 1.12.80 
AIA 827 f 68
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Awadh was willing to agree to at Salih Jaffer*s request 
in December, 1880. The Kathir were then coming to the 
Naqib*s help; and, in the event of a truce, the Naqib 
would either have to entertain and provision' the Kathir, 
or pay them for their trouble in making a diversion in
his favour* He could afford neither provisions nor
payment a).
Loch was reluctant to leave events to take their 
course; but he had little room for manoeuvre. The R.N. 
vessels off Mukalla were not under his command; and he 
was not allowed to use troops ashore. Pie had little
left to use but bluff and the skill of Salih Jaffer in
managing the Naqib. Loch wished to prevent the Naqib 
handing Kukalla to the Kathir; he believed that that 
would perpetuate the insecurity on the coast. He did 
not believe that the Kathir could maintain themselves 
at Mukalla, so far from their tribal area, with Awadh*s 
forces threatening their communications. The Kathir 
would then be obliged to call on the Ottomans for 
assistance, and to acknowledge Ottoman suzerainty.
(1) AIA 827, Salih Jaffer* s Report - Pies of Dec 1880 
f 16?
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The Bombay Secretariat optimistically believed 
that 1... some equitable settlement of the points in 
dispute ...! might still be possible in August, 1881 (1). 
Loch therefore brought the Naqib to Aden for discussions 
and tried to arrange a settlement. Loch could not 
occupy Mukalla as the Naqib wanted; the Naqib could 
not refund. Awadh MT#80,000 and would not agree to sell 
a part of his territory for #i-!T220,000, or all of it for 
£iiT300,000. The Naqib returned to Kukalla and the 
situation remained unchanged. Even the British Indians 
refused to co-operate and be evacuated to safety in Aden, 
leaving their business interests behind. Nor did the 
Kathiri diversion materially aid the Naqib. The Kathir 
were *... badly armed with old matchlocks and without 
cannon of any kind ...f (2). Each man brought 1... his 
own arms, ammunition and food such as it ...* was (2).
Naqib Umar bin Salih appealed as an Ottoman subject 
to the Ottoman authorities in the Hejaz for assistance 
some time during the summer of 1881; he complained of
(1) AIA 853, B° Res 3696 of 8.8.81, copied - Res
(2) AIA 827, Res - SGB, 16.12.80
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British measures designed to coerce him into accepting 
a settlement (i). The Porte enquired if the facts were 
true and asked, if they were, that the British Government 
would instruct the Resident to cease his interference in 
Hadhrami affairs. The Foreign Office sought the India 
Office1s advice. After 9 years of incidents on the 
'independent1 coast of Hadhramaut, it might have been 
expected that the Foreign Office would have been better 
informed than they were by the India Office, considering 
the Ottoman interest in all Arabia. Lord Granville had 
no intention of discussing Ottoman claims in Arabia in 
an exchange of diplomatic notes. He instructed that 
Husurus Pasha, the Ottoman Ambassador, should, be given 
a verbal reply (2). The India Office had replied f... that 
these people have been fighting, that the Aden Authorities 
arbitrated, that the Mukulla Chief accepted the Aden 
decision, and then backed out of it, and that it is 
intended at a convenient season to enforce that decision
(1) FO 78 3615, Note of protest presented by Ottoman 
Ambassador - FO 25.8.81
(2) FO 78 3615? Undated note on the file
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Britain 1... did not recognize the suzerainty of the 
Porte over Makulla ...' (1).
The India Office synopsis did not coincide very 
accurately with the facts. The Foreign Department had 
insisted that arbitration would have to be accepted 
voluntarily by both parties to the dispute. Indeed, Loch 
was criticised by the Foreign Department, within a few 
weeks, because force was used to impose a solution. It 
is possible that the close naval boat blockade of Mukalla (2), 
after the Naqib*s return from Aden in 1881, was enforced 
because of apprehension in the Aden Residency that the 
Naqib would transfer Mukalla to the Porte, rather than 
hand it over to Awadh bin Umar. Such apprehension appears 
to have been fully justified.
Major Hunter returned to Mukalla with the Naqib 
and Salih Jaffer after fruitless discussions in Aden.
Awadh had secured Mukalla*s virtual isolation by bribing 
the Akabirah (3) and Bani Hassan (*+) tribes in 1880 (5).
(1) FO 78 3615, U/S 10 - U/S FO, 10.9*81
(2) PRO Admity 53 121 52, Log of HMS Arab 20.10-5.11.81
(3) Belonging to the Nuwa Confederation stretching 
westwards from Mukalla to W. Hajr
(*+) Belonging to the Seiban Confederation 
(5) AIA 827, Naqib - Res, 28.8.80
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Mukalla could not hold out indefinitely, without access 
to local supplies by land. Supplies would continue to 
come in by sea, and the population was largely dependent 
upon fish and imported dates, but the main agricultural 
areas were outside the Naqib1s control, north and east 
of his outpost at Harshiyat. Loch did not give Hunter 
'precise* instructions before sending him to Mukalla (1). 
But he had not been to Mukalla himself. He had exhausted 
all possibilities of a negotiated settlement and he was 
only concerned for the security of the British Indians. 
Some of these claimed that the IJaqib would not allow 
them to leave Mukalla once Hunter had left. The Naqib 
only needed to forbid local shipping to take them as 
passengers, and they had to remain as the Naqib*s hostages 
against a Quaiti assault.
Hunter's instructions from Loch were apparently not 
specific (2); but the senior naval officer, Commander 
Hulton, R.N., had been asked by Loch to assist Hunter. 
Hunter's solution, vdLth Hulton* s co-operation, was to 
seize Mukalla more by the threat of force than its actual
(1) AIA 881, Ag SGB - Res, 2.1*82, criticising Loch
(2) There is no copy in the Aden file
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use. Little was needed. Altogether four British sailors 
were hilled in operations at Mukalla and Burum in 
1881 (1), Local casualties were not detarMLed. But 
sufficient force was used to show the Naqib that 
resistance was hopeless. He handed over his forts and 
the town to H.M.S. 'Dragon1 and sailed into exile in 
Zanzibar with some of his followers* Mukalla was then 
handed over peaceably to Awadh. The Foreign Department 
noted that the unauthorised, and unorthodox, solution 
had resulted in a 'speedy and complete* settlement (2).
It was therefore politic to turn a blind eye to the 
Residency's disregard of official policy and unnecessary
to take any further notice of this matter In the
absence of any copy of Loch's orders to Hunter it is 
impossible to assess the extent to which Hunter and 
Cmdr. Hulton disregarded the Resident's instructions.
The action probably increased British prestige in the 
area.
(1) AIA 9I+9 f 23, Report by Cndr Hulton, R.N., 
October 1881 
(2.) AIA 881, Sec For.Dept. - SGB, 11.7.82
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Awadh b in  U m ar*s  c o n t r o l  o f  b o th  S h ih r  and M u k a l la  
o f f e r e d  h im  th e  o p p o r t u n i t y  o f  a p p ly in g  p r e s s u r e  t o  th e  
more h e a v i l y  p o p u la te d  p a r t s  o f  I n n e r  H a dh ram au t. S h ih r  
and M u k a l la  d o m in a te d  H a dh ram a u t'sove rse as  t r a d e ,  and 
in f l u e n c e d  H a d h ra m is 1 l i v e s .  Awadh c o u ld  make th e  sea­
b o rn e  sh ip m e n t o f  f o r e i g n  arms t o  h o s t i l e  f a c t i o n s  v e r y  
d i f f i c u l t  and e x p e n s iv e ,  i f  n o t  im p o s s ib le .  He c o u ld  
th u s  e s t a b l i s h  a n e a r -m o n o p o ly  i n  th e  use o f  th e  more 
m odern weapons. I n  a d d i t i o n ,  he s e c u re d  c o n t r o l  o v e r  a 
m a jo r  l o c a l  e x p o r t ,  H adhram i e m ig r a n ts ,  and o v e r  a w e a l th y  
im p o r t ,  s u c c e s s fu l  H adhram is  r e t u r n i n g  home. H a d h ra m is 1 
w e a l th  a b ro a d  f in a n c e d  much o f  H a d h ra m a u t 's  fo o d  im p o r t s ,  
on w h ic h  some o f  th e  p o p u la t i o n  l i v e d  d u r in g  p a r t  o f  th e  
y e a r .  Those im p o r t s  y ie ld e d  re v e n u e  th ro u g h  im p o r t  t a x e s :  
.and th e  p o p u la t i o n * s  p a r t i a l  dependence on im p o r te d  
f o o d s t u f f s  gave Awadh a u s e f u l  p o l i t i c a l  b a r g a in in g  c o u n te r  
w i t h  th e  t r i b a l  c o n f e d e r a t io n s .  Awadh c o n t r o l l e d  th e  
c o a s t a l  tow ns w i t h  t h e i r  s to c k s  o f  im p o r te d  g r a i n  and t h e i r  
a c c e s s  t o  o v e rs e a s  s o u rc e s .  He d id  n o t  c o n t r o l  th e  t r i b a l  
a re a s  o u t s id e  th e  tow ns  and v i l l a g e s .
The G overnm ent o f  Bomb-y a p p ro v e d  a d r a f t  t r e a t y  
t o  b in d  Awadh b in  Umar c lo s e r  t o  B r i t a i n  i n  March?
1882 ( 1 ) .  The t r e a t y  re d u c e d  Awadh*s room f o r  in d e p e n d e n t  
m anoeuvre j u s t  when S u l t a n  A b d u l Hamid was r e s e n t f u l  o f  
t h e  B r i t i s h  e x e r c is e  o f  i n f l u e n c e  a t  M u k a l la  ( 2 ) .
Awadh showed no e n th u s ia s m  a t  th e  p r o s p e c t  o f  c l o s e r  
l i n k s  w i t h  B r i t a i n  and th e  Aden R e s id e n c y  ( 3 ) .  He d i d  
n o t  send an A g e n t t o  c o l l e c t  th e  d r a f t .  I n  A u g u s t ,  S a l i h  
J a f f e r  s u g g e s te d ,  i n  r e p l y  to  a q u e ry  b y  H u n te r ,  t h a t  
an o f f i c e r  f ro m  th e  R e s id e n c y  s h o u ld  d e l i v e r  th e  d r a f t  ( V ) .  
Awadh b i n  Umar was a p p a r e n t l y  more i n t e r e s t e d  to  h e a r  
news o f  th e  E g y p t ia n  U r a b i  P asha*s  f i g h t  a g a in s t  th e  
B r i t i s h  ( 5 ) *  I t  i s  p ro b a b le  t h a t  Awadh s t i l l  f e l t  i n s e c u r e .  
He had n o t  d is p o s e d  o f  t h e  K a t h i r .  The l a t t e r  c o m p la in e d  
t o  th e  R e s id e n t  by  l e t t e r  t h a t  ro a d s  i n  th e  i n t e r i o r  were 
b lo c k e d .  B u t  as H u n te r  n o te d  t o  th e  R e s id e n t ,  on th e  
K a t h i r i  l e t t e r  o f  c o m p la in t ,  Awadh had no c o n t r o l  o v e r
(1 )  A IA  881 , Ag SGB -  Res, 15 .-3 .82
(2 )  FO 78 5387, L o rd  D u f f e r i n  HBM Arnb G *p le  -  FO l b - . 3 .8 2
(3 )  A i t c h i s o n ' T r e a t i e s *No LXX
(bO A IA  881 , S a l i h  J a f f e r  -  H u n te r  i n  r e p l y  to  H u n te r *  s 
n o te  o f  2b-.8 .8 2
(5 )  A IA  881 , H u n te r  -  B l a i r ,  no d a te .  P ro b a b ly  Aug *82
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th e  t r i b a l  c o n f e d e r a t io n s  be tw een  th e  i n t e r i o r  and th e  
c o a s t .  By d is b a n d in g  many o f  h i s  t r i b a l  m e rc e n a r ie s  
awadh had p r o b a b ly  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  th e  i n s e c u r i t y  ( 1 ) .
The new R e s id e n t ,  G e n e ra l James B l a i r ,  V . C . ,  m in u te d  
* . . .  r e q u e s t  £AwadhJ to  be c i v i l  t o  th e  K a th e e r i  and 
t o  open a l l  ro a d s  • . . 1. B l a i r  had  o n ly  a r r i v e d  i n  M arch 
and had no p r e v io u s  e x p e r ie n c e  o f  th e  a re a .  He s e n t  a 
new and in e x p e r ie n c e d  A s s i s t a n t ,  M r.  L .P .  W a lsh , w i t h  
S a l i h  J a f f e r ?to  v i s i t  S h ih r  i n  th e  autum n ( 1 ) .
C o n d i t io n s  in la n d  re m a in e d  u n s e t t l e d ,  p r o b a b ly  
because th e  t r i b a l  p o p u la t i o n  needed t im e  t o  r e a d j u s t  
t h e i r  p a t t e r n  o f  l i f e  t o  th e  changed c i r c u m s ta n c e s .  The 
K a t h i r  re m a in e d  d is c o n te n t e d .  The Hamurn, l i v i n g  n o r t h  
and e a s t  o f  S h ih r^ w e re  r e s t i v e .  T h e i r  c a ra v a n  t r a f f i c  
t o  th e  K a t h i r i  e a s te r n  s e c t io n  o f  th e  Wadi H adhram aut 
had p o s s ib l y  n o t  r e c o v e re d  and Q u a i t i  s u b s id ie s  t o  
m e r c e n a r ie s  had ce a se d . I n  O c to b e r ,  1882 , A b d u l la h  b i n  
Umar ( 2 )  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  *b e d u in *  i n  th e  Q u s e ia r  a re a  w o u ld  
* . . .  have t o  s u f f e r  f o r  t h e i r  w ro n g d o in g s  . . . * .  Q u s e ia r
(1 )  A IA  881 f  197? R e p o r t  o f  M r ,  W alsh  and S a l i h  J a f f e r  
on Hadhram aut
( 2 )  Pie was th e  n o m in a l  r u l e r  and Awadh* s e l d e s t  b r o t h e r
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was w i t h i n  th e  Harnumi a r e a .  A b d u l la h  c o m p la in e d  t h a t  
f i s h i n g  canoes had been b u r n t  and * . . .  t h e  p o o r  and 
h e lp le s s  p lu n d e re d  . . . ’ . I t  i s  p o s s ib le  t h a t  th e  Q u a i t i s  
w e re  e x p a n d in g  w h e re v e r  t h e y  c o u ld  o b t a in  c o n t r o l  o f  
new t a x - s o u r c e s .  F is h e rm e n  on th e  H adhram aut c o a s t  
were n o t  t r ib e s m e n .  C u s to m a r i ly ,  t h e y  p a id  a t i t h e  o f  
t h e i r  c a tc h  t o  th e  l o c a l  t r ib e s m e n .  The Q u s e ia r  a re a  
has r i c h ,  s e a s o n a l ,  s a r d in e  and k i n g - f i s h  c a tc h e s  w h ic h  
s t a r t  a t  th e  b e g in n in g  o f  th e  n o r t h - e a s t  monsoon. I t  
i s  p o s s ib le  t h a t  th e  Hamum re s e n te d  t h e  new Q u a i t i  
p re s e n c e  i n  th e  a re a  and b u r n t  th e  unarm ed f i s h e r m e n ’ s 
b o a ts  i n  a c u s to m a ry  g e s tu r e  o f  d e f ia n c e ,  t o  show t h a t  
th e  Q u a i t i  c o u ld  n o t  p r o t e c t  them as a t r i b a l  s u z e r a in  
s h o u ld .  I t  w.’.s a s l i g h t  on Awadh b in  A b d A l la h ,  and a 
c o n v in c in g  re a s o n  f o r  th e  f is h e rm e n  to  sc ra p e  t o g e t h e r  
a second c u s to m a ry  t i t h e  t o  th e  b e d o u in .
A b d A l la h  b i n  S a l i h ,  t h e  E a t h i r i  l e a d e r ,  v i s i t e d  Aden 
j.n December, 1883? t o  t r y  t o  pe rsu a d e  th e  R e s id e n t  t o  
re m a in  n e u t r a l  w h i le  th e  K a t h i r  r e c o v e re d  S h ih r  and 
K u k a l l a  ( 1 ) .  The R e s id e n t ’ s r e p l y  was e q u iv o c a l .  The
(1 )  A IA  9b-9, Res -  SGB, 3 1 .1 2 .8 3
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B r i t i s h  w o u ld  n o t  f o r b i d  h im  to  ta k e  a c t i o n  1. . .  n o r  do 
we p ro m is e  t o  a s s i s t  you . . .  n o r  t o  a b s t a in  o u r s e lv e s  
f ro m  a s s i s t i n g  th e  Jemadar i f  n e c e s s a ry  . . . *  ( 1 ) *  B l a i r  
was a t  a l o s s  t o  know w hat t o  do . He knew l i t t l e  a b o u t  
th e  K a t h i r  and t h e i r  t e r r i t o r y  ( 2 ) .  The R e s id e n t  was n o t  
a l lo w e d  t o  c a l l  upon R.N. v e s s e ls  f o r  n a v a l  a s s is ta n c e  
w i t h o u t  Bombay1s p e r m is s io n .  The K a t h i r i  l e a d e r r s v i s i t  
had n o t  been a n t i c i p a t e d .  B l a i r  was p o s s ib l y  im p re s s e d  
by  S a l i h  J a f f e r ! s e s t im a te  o f  7?BOO f i g h t i n g  men am ongst 
th e  K a t h i r ,  and he had no means o f  r e s t r a i n i n g  t h e i r  
a c t i o n s  i n l a n d .  B l a i r ,  i n  h i s  d i le m m a , asked  t h a t  he 
* . . .  s h o u ld  be e a r l y  p u t  i n  p o s s e s s io n  o f  th e  v ie w s  o f  
G overnm ent so t h a t  th e  p o l i c y  t o  be o b s e rv e d  may be 
d e f i n i t e  . . . '  ( 3 ) *  M e a n t im e , A b d u l la h  b i n  S a l i h  d e p a r te d  
by  th e  m a i l  s tea m er f o r  Z a n z ib a r  t o  t r y  and o b t a in  
f i n a n c i a l  s u p p o r t  f ro m  th e  K a s a d i Naqib.
The F o r e ig n  D e p a r tm e n t were no l e s s  u n c e r t a in  w h a t
(1 ) AIA 91+9, Res - SGB, 3 1 .1 2 *8 3
(2) A IA  9*+9 T 53? S a l i h  J a f f e r  w ro te  a r a t h e r  in a c c u r a t e  
r e p o r t  on th e  K a t h i r  a p p a r e n t l y  based on i n f o r m a t i o n  
c o l l e c t e d  i n  Aden
( 3 ) A IA  9 ^ 9 ,  Res -  SGB, 3 1 .1 2 .8 3
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t o  d o : i t  i s  p o s s ib le  t h a t  t h e y  may have  c o n s id e re d  th e
e v e n ts  o f  O c to b e r ,  1 8 8 1 , i n  M u k a l la ,  and d e c id e d  t h a t  
th e y  p r e f e r r e d  t o  w a i t  u n t i l  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  d e v e lo p e d  
f u r t h e r .  B r i t i s h  i n t e r e s t s  w ere  b e s t  s e rv e d  b y  peace and 
th e  e v e r  e l u s i v e  s t a b i l i t y ,  so a te le g r a m  was s e n t  t o  th e  
R e s id e n t  i n  F e b ru a r y ,  b e fo r e  th e  K a t h i r i  l e a d e r  r e t u r n e d  
f ro m  Z a n z ib a r ,  t e l l i n g  B l a i r  t o  w a rn  th e  K a t h i r  t h a t  an 
a t t a c k  on th e  Q u a i t i  1. . .  w o u ld  be v ie w e d  w i t h  g ra v e  
d i s p le a s u r e  . . .  I f  n e c e s s a ry  a g u n b o a t  may be s e n t
B u t t h e  F o r e ig n  D e p a r tm e n t d i d  n o t  make c l e a r  t h a t  B l a i r
was n o t  h i m s e l f  t o  d e c id e  when t o  send a w a rs h ip  to  
S h ih r  ( 1 ) .  A b d u l la h  was w arned on h i s  em p ty -h a n d e d  r e t u r n  
f ro m  Z a n z ib a r  t h a t  th e  B r i t i s h  w a n te d  no re s u m p t io n  o f  
h o s t i l i t i e s  and m ig h t  i n t e r v e n e  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  th e
e s t a b l i s h e d  a u t h o r i t y  o f  Awadh b i n  Umar ( 2 ) .  The F o r e ig n
D e p a rtm e n t e x p re s s e d  t h e i r  d o u b ts  r e a l i s t i c a l l y  and 
p o in te d  o u t  t h a t  t h e i r  p o l i c y  m ig h t  be changed i f  Awadh 
d id  n o t  a c c e p t  th e  R e s id e n t * s  a d v ic e .  They w ere  * . . .  m ost 
r e l u c t a n t  t o  i n t e r f e r e  i n  q u a r r e l s  . . .  be tw een  th e  A ra b
(1 )  A IA  9*+9, Sec F o r .D e p t .  -  SGB, 2 8 .2 .8 V
(2 )  A IA  9^9 f  71? Res -  SGB, 8 .3 .8 V
t r i b e s  b u t  . . *  h a v in g  re g a rd  t o  th e  p e c u l i a r  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  
o f  S h ih r  and M a k u l la  . . .  t h i n k  i t  d e s i r a b le  i n  th e  p r e s e n t  
in s ta n c e  t o  s u p p o r t  th e  K a i t i  c h i e f  a g a in s t  u n p ro v o k e d  
a g r e s s io n  so lo n g  as he co n fo rm s  t o  th e  a d v ic e  g iv e n  . . . 1 
t o  h im  ( 1 ) „  T h e i r  l e t t e r  was c a u t io u s  and f u l l  o f  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s *  I t  gave l i t t l e  g u id a n c e  t o  B l a i r  and 
showed no u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  p o l i t i c s  i n  H adh ram au t. The 
F o r e ig n  D e p a r tm e n t  was i n ' u n f a m i l i a r  w a te rs  and th e  
R e s id e n t* G e n e ra l  B l a i r ,  was an in a d e q u a te  p i l o t *
Rumours f ro m  H adhram aut s u g g e s te d  t h a t  t h e  K a t h i r  
m ig h t  a t t a c k  S h ih r .  I n  May, 188*+, B l a i r  asked th e  S e n io r  
N a v a l O f f i c e r ,  Red Sea A re a ,  t o  make a v e s s e l  a v a i l a b l e  
t o  ta k e  h i s  A s s i s t a n t ,  C a p ta in  K in g ,  t o  S h ih r *  K in g  
s a i l e d  I n  H .M .S . •W o o d la rk 1, on w h a t was to  be a f o r m a l  
d e m o n s t r a t io n  o f  B r i t i s h  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  Q u a i t i s .  A 
n o t i c e  was re a d  o u t ,  and p in n e d  u p ,  i n  t h e  c e n t r e  o f  S h ih r ,  
i n  K in g ’ s p re s e n c e ,  a n n o u n c in g  th e  B r i t i s h  i n t e n t i o n  t o  
p r o t e c t  M u k a l la  and S h ih r ,  and th e  1d e p e n d e n c ie s 1 o f  th e s e  
tw o p o r t s  ( 2 ) *  B r i t i s h  r e c o r d s  g iv e  no i n d i c a t i o n  o f  th e
( 1 )  A IA  9^-9, Sec F o r .D e p t .  -  SGB, 2 8 . 2 . 8 ^
(2 )  A IA  9 ^ 9 ,  C a p ta in  K in g ’ s R e p o r t  -  Res, May 188V
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l o c a l  r e a c t i o n .  I t  i s  p o s s ib le  t h a t  some H adhram is  
b e l i e v e d  t h a t  B r i t i s h  f o r c e s  m ig h t  be la n d e d .  The 
H adh ram is  w ere  n o t  t o  know t h a t  th e  F o r e ig n  D e p a r tm e n t 
w o u ld  n o t  have  a l lo w e d  th a t . .  I t  i s  p o s s ib le  t h a t  th e  
K a t h i r  were d e t e r r e d :  t h e y  made no a t t a c k .  P o p u la r
f e e l i n g ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  M u k a l la ,  was u n fa v o u r a b le  t o  Awadh.
The Q u a i t i  G o ve rn o r  t h e r e  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  f . . .  t h e  p o p u la t i o n  
. . .  a re  f o r  th e  m ost p a r t  i n  f a v o u r  o f  th e  K a t h i r i s ;  and 
i f  t h e  l a t t e r  a t t a c k e d  th e  tow n  w i t h  any p r o s p e c t  o f  
success  th e  i n h a b i t a n t s  w o u ld  p r o b a b ly  a s s i s t  th e  
in v a d e r s  S in ce  th e  Q u a i t i  c h i e f s  soon came t o
f . . .  c o n s id e r  t h e i r  H adhram aut p o s s e s s io n s  as a p r i v a t e  
e s t a te  . . . ! , l o c a l  o p p o s i t i o n  was u n d e rs ta n d a b le  ( 1 ) .
B l a i r * s  a c t i o n ,  h o w e ve r,  was c o n s id e re d  t o  have been 
u n a u t h o r i s e d ;  i n  th e  F o r e ig n  D e p a r tm e n t s  v ie w  he s h o u ld  
n o t  have asked  d i r e c t l y  f o r  H .K .S .  U io o d la r k 1*. I n s t e a d ,
* . . .  a f r e s h  and fo r m a l  r e q u i s i t i o n  f ro m  th e  V ic e r o y  . . . ’ 
s h o u ld  have been made to  th e  n a v a l  Commander i n  I n d ia n  
w a te r s  ( 2 ) .  B u t  q u ic k  a c t i o n  seemed n e c e s s a ry *  B l a i r
(1 )  *C o lo n ia l  1 2 3 ' p . 82
(2 )  A IA  9I+9 , Ag SGB -  Res, 1 1 .1 0 .8 ^
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and h is  s t a f f  b e l i e v e d  i n  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  an O ttom an 
i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  Hadhram aut d u r in g  1884 ( l ) .  The O ttoman 
a u t h o r i t i e s  a t  t h e  P o r te  and i n  Sanaa d id  c o n s id e r  
i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  b u t  i t  n e v e r  m a t e r i a l i s e d  ( 2 ) .  The 
O ttom an N avy was n o t  used t o  e s t a b l i s h  a perm anent 
O ttom an base i n  t h e  a re a .  P o s s ib l y  t h a t  was p a r t l y  
because t h e  c o n t in u in g  J a i d i  o p p o s i t i o n  i n  th e  Yemen 
p re v e n te d  an O ttom an e x p a n s io n  e a s tw a rd s ,  o v e r la n d .  The 
O ttoman a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  t h e  Yemen, h o w e ve r ,  c o n t in e d  to  
c la im  t h a t  th e  p o p u la t io n s  o f  S h ih r  and o f  L Iu k a l la  were 
O ttoman s u b je c t s  ( 3 ; .  B u t t h e  P o r te  d is c o u ra g e d  a 
H adhram i a p p l i c a n t  v i s i t i n g  C o n s ta n t in o p le  f ro m  h o p in g  
f o r  an O ttom an p r o t e c t o r a t e  i n  1886. He was o n ly  d e s c r ib e d  
as 1. . . a  S h e ik h  named Abu B a k r  f r o m  L I u k a l l a . . . 1. B a r in g ,  
i n  C a i r o ,  a d v is e d  Abu B a k r  t o  a p p ly  f o r  B r i t i s h  p r o t e c t i o n  
w h i le  p a s s in g  th r o u g h  Aden ( 4 ) .  T he re  i s  no e v id e n c e  
t h a t  h i s  a d v ic e  was f o l l o w e d .  The V ic e r o y ,  L o rd  D u f f e r i n ,
( 1 )  BSC 8 1 /8 4  f  1117, O f fg  Res o f  6 .8 .8 4  -  S o f  S
( 2 )  A IA  972 Copy o f  C o rre sp o n d e n ce  f ro m  G-rand V i z i e r  t o  
G-ov. Gen. o f  t h e  Yemen o f  J u l y  1884. ( A ls o  B . S . C .  
1881/84 f  1117 p a ra .  6, O f f i c i a t i n g  R e s id e n t ,  Aden 
t o  S o f  S 6 .8 .8 4 , )
( 3 )  PRO PO 1 9 5 /2 4 5 6 /8 4 ,  10 Uemo -  PO, P5Q94A o f  2 9 .1 2 .1 3
(4 )  PO 78 4077 , T e l .  C o n s u l-G e n e ra l  C a i r o  -  V ic e r o y  o f  
8 . 7 . 8 6 ,  r e p o r t e d  t o  PO, and l e t t e r  C o n s u l-G e n e ra l  -  
PO, 1 1 .7 .8 6 .
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h o w e v e r ,  p ro p o s e d  t h a t  1m o d e ra te  s u b s id ie s *  and 
1 a g re e m e n ts 1 s h o u ld  be a r ra n g e d  f o r  th e  c o a s t a l  t r i b e s  
be tw ee n  B r i t a i n ’ s Yemeni s t i p e n d i a r i e s  and M u s c a t ,  such 
as th e  Q u a i t i  a l r e a d y  had.. The I n d i a  O f f i c e  a g re e d  t h a t  
such a move w o u ld  be 1 e x p e d ie n t *  t o  p r e v e n t  th e  * v e r y  
i n c o n v e n ie n t f i n t r u s i o n  o f  any  F o r e ig n  Powers ( 1 ) .  B u t  
H u n te r  p ro p o se d  t h a t  th e s e  t r e a t i e s  s h o u ld  g iv e  B r i t a i n  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  i n t e r v e n i n g , i f  r e q u i r e d ,  b u t  w o u ld  n o t  
im pose any such o b l i g a t i o n s .  * . . .  A ra b  C h ie f t a i n s  a re  
r a t h e r  g iv e n  t o  d i v e s t i n g  th e m s e lv e s  o f  t h e i r  a l l e g ia n c e s  
as r e a d i l y  as o f  t h e i r  p o s s e s s io n s  f o r  a c o n s id e r a t i o n  . . . * .  
B e r t i e  su g g e s te d  t h a t  t h e r e  s h o u ld  be a b in d in g  
o b l i g a t i o n ,  * . . .  so lo n g  as th e  t r e a t y  c h i e f s  . . .  t o o k  
B r i t i s h  a d v ic e ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  d e t e r  F o r e ig n  Powers f ro m  
b r i b i n g  th e  C h ie fs  . . . *  ( 1 ) .
+ + + + H~
(1) FO 78 397*+} FO Memo b y  F . L .  B e r t i e , r e f e r r i n g  to  
letter 10 -  FO, 15.9,86
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Awadh b i n  U m a rsa ssu m p tio n  o f  so le  pow er
The Q u a i t i  f a m i l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  
s e c u r e ly  be tw een  188H- and Awadh b i n  U m ar’ s d e a th  i n  1 9 ^9 • 
I t  i s  p r o b a b le  t h a t  th e  l o c a l  c o n v i c t i o n  t h a t  he had 
B r i t i s h  s u p p o r t ,  r e g a r d le s s  o f  w h e th e r  he was a t  f a u l t ,  
h e lp e d  t o  s t r e n g th e n  Awadh1s p o s i t i o n  ( 1 ) .  B r i t a i n  
e n te re d  i n t o  P r o t e c t o r a t e  T r e a t i e s  w i t h  th e  c o a s t a l  
t r i b e s  f ro m  th e  l i m i t s  o f  P.as B a i r  i n  Oman, e a s tw a rd s ,  
be tw een 1887 &ud I 89O. The p u rp o se  was t o  p r e v e n t  th e  
e s ta b l i s h m e n t  o f  any f o r e i g n  base on th e  c o a s t ,  w i t h o u t  
B r i t i s h  p e r m is s io n  ( 2 ) .  A f u r t h e r  A n g lo - Q u a i t i  
Agreem ent was c o n c lu d e d  on 1 s t  May 1888 and r a t i f i e d  
on 2 6 th  F e b ru a ry ,  I 89O ( 3 ) *  L ik e  o th e r  such ag re e m e n ts  
i t  f o r b a d  th e  t r a n s f e r  o f  s o v e r e ig n t y  o v e r  any  Q u a i t i  
t e r r i t o r y  t o  a f o r e i g n  pow er w i t h o u t  B r i t i s h  a g re e m e n t.
(1 ) The Q u a i t i  N a ib  o f  M u k a l la ,  Ahmad ba S u r r a ,  g ra n d s o n  
o f  th e  l a t e  19t h  c e n t u r y  S a ib a n  t r i b a l  l e a d e r ,  and 
Q u a i t i  enemy, o f  Duan, i n  J a n u a ry  1 9 5 8 , t o  th e  w r i t e r
(2 )  FO 78 397 l h, FO Memo o f  2 .1 0 .8 6
(3 )  A i t c h i s o n * T r e a t i e s ' (1933 edn) LXXI
The d r a f t  ag ree m en t was s ig n e d  b y  A b d u l la h  b i n  Umar, 
Awadh1s c o - r u l e r  f ro m  S h ib a in *  I t  i s  r e c o rd e d  as b e in g  
s ig n e d  a t  K u k a l l a ,  b u t  th e  s h i p ! s l o g  shows t h a t  t h e  
R e s id e n t  p a id  o n ly  a h u r r i e d  v i s i t  t o  S h ih r ,  a r r i v i n g  a t  
*+•30 p *n u  on 1 s t  K a y . K u k a l l a  was v i s i t e d  a g a in  b r i e f l y  
on L t h  K ay  ( 1 ) .
A b d u l la h  d ie d  i n  1 8 8 8 , and th e  R e s id e n t  r e c o g n is e d  
h i s  son , H u s s a in ,  as G o v e rn o r  o f  S h ib a in  ( 2 ) .  T h a t 
r e c o g n i t i o n  was n o t  t o  Awadh b in  U m ar*s t a s t e .  He had  
no w is h  t o  sh a re  power w i t h  any  o f  h i s  nephew s. T h e re  
was no lo n g e r  any  p o l i t i c a l  b e n e f i t  f o r  Awadh i n  h a v in g  
a c o - r u l e r  i n  S h ib a in ,  and in a c c e s s ib le  t o  th e  B r i t i s h ,  
as  t h e r e  had been be tw ee n  1867 and 1881* From 1 8 82 ,
Awadh was bound b y  t r e a t y  t o  th e  B r i t i s h .  T h e n c e fo rw a rd ,  
h i s  p o s i t i o n  as a t r e a t y  c h i e f  made B r i t a i n  s u p p o r t  h im .  
H u s s a in  was n o t  a t r e a t y  c h i e f .  B r i t a i n  had t h e r e f o r e  a 
v e s te d  i n t e r e s t  i n  m a in t a in in g  Awadh i n  s o le  p o w e r.  
H u s /a in  b i n  A b d u l la h  was d i s i n h e r i t e d  and so w ere  Awadh*s 
o t h e r  nephew s. B u t  th e  B r i t i s h  d e c l in e d  t o  g u a ra n te e  th e  
s u c c e s s io n  t o  Awadh1s son , G h a l ib .  B r i t i s h  i n t e r e s t  was
( 1 )  Adm 53 13 019 , Log o f  H . l i .S .  O s p r e y 1
(2 )  A IA  1 0 5 2 , AAR 1 8 8 9 /9 0  p .  12
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r e s t r i c t e d  t o  k e e p in g  o u t  o t h e r  p o w e rs  f ro m  H a d h ra m a u t,  
n o t  t o  u n d e r w r i t i n g  th e  s u c c e s s io n  o f  p o s s ib l y  u n s u i t a b l e  
i n d i v i d u a l s .
t
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Section 5* Aden Residency Relations with Socotra
and Dhofar 
1865 -  1886
Socotra lies just under 600 miles E.S.E. of Aden,
220 miles S.S.E. from the Arabian coast at Has Fartak, 
and under 150 miles east of Cape Guardafui on the 
Somali Coast. Geographically, the island may be 
considered as an extension of the Horn of Africa; 
linguistically, the Socotri language is related to Mahri; 
and politically, the islanders had been dominated by the 
Mahri chief of Qishn and Seihut by force since the late 
17th century. The island is 75 miles long and less than 
50 broad at its widest point. A mountain range rises to 
30001 inland. The island appeared, on a map, to be a 
desirable strategic base*
There were only two poor anchorages; one provided 
some shelter from the N.E., and the other from the S.W., 
monsoon. In practice, from May to September, the island 
was inaccessible to local shipping and dangerous even for 
steamers because of high winds and high seas. It was 
also fever-ridden. It is probable that dhows passing.
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be tw een  th e  P e r s ia n  G u l f  and th e  E a s t  A f r i c a n  C o as t 
c a r r i e d  th e  m a l a r i a l  m o s q u i to  v e c t o r s  i n  t h e i r  w a te r  
s u p p l ie s  and b i l g e s .  These w ere  some o f  th e  re a s o n s  why 
th e  B r i t i s h  and o th e r  f o r e i g n  pow ers  had  made no use o f  
th e  i s l a n d  a f t e r  th e  B r i t i s h  l e f t  i n  1&35 ( I - ) *
S o c o t ra  was o c c a s io n a l l y  v i s i t e d  b y  B r i t i s h  o r  
F o r e ig n  n a v a l  v e s s e ls  b e fo r e  th e  Suez C a n a l was o p e n e d . 
L ie u te n a n t  C .J .  C ru t te n d e n ,  I . N . ,  C a p t .  S .B .  H a in e s *  
A s s i s t a n t  a t  A d e n ^ v is i t e d  i t  s e v e r a l  t im e s .  I n  J a n u a ry ,  
1857? th e  A u s t r i a n  Government was r e p o r t e d  t o  be i n t e r e s t e d  
i n  o c c u p y in g  th e  i s l a n d  ( 2 ) .  B u t * d e s p i t e  th e  p re s e n c e  o f  
an A u s t r i a n  c o r v e t t e  i n  th e  a r e a , t h e  i s l a n d  was n o t  
an ne xed . N e x t came r e p o r t s  o f  F re n c h  c o m m e rc ia l i n t e r e s t  
f ro m  th e  B r i t i s h  Am bassador a t  C o n s ta n t in o p le  ( 3 ) .  He 
r e p o r t e d  t h a t  S o c o t ra  b e lo n g e d  t o  an A rab  c h i e f .  The 
F o r e ig n  O f f i c e  e i t h e r  th e n  a c c e p te d  O ttom an s u z e r a in t y  
o v e r  a l l  A r a b ia ,  and so o v e r  S o c o t r a 1s c h i e f ,  o r  b e l i e v e d  
t h a t  th e  i s l a n d  was O ttom an t e r r i t o r y .  A c y p h e r  w i r e  w en t
(1 ) W a t e r f i e l d  1A d e n * p .21-23
(2) AF 193 Fes - SGB, 20.1.57
( 3 )  F0 78 3186 , S i r  H e n ry  B u lw e r  t e l  -  F0 , 1 1 .5 * 5 9
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t o  B u iw er b y  r e t u r n ;  -  'Make th e  Porte r e f u s e  th e  i s l a n d *  (1).
The O ttom an F o r e ig n  M i n i s t e r ,  Fuad Pasha, was w i l l i n g  t o  
o b l i g e  B r i t a i n ,  i f  th e  P o r te  1 t u r n e d  o u t1 t o  have 
j u r i s d i c t i o n ,  b u t  Fuad Pasha d o u b te d  t h a t  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  
b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  th e  i s l a n d  b e lo n g e d  t o  th e  Imam o f  M u s c a t .
T h a t  s ta te m e n t  was im p o r t a n t  because  no O ttom an c la im s  to  
S . B .  A r a b ia ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  t o  M u s c a t ,  were made. More 
a c c u r a te  i n f o r m a t i o n  was fo r t h c o m in g  f ro m  M u s c a t ;  th e  
i s l a n d  b e lo n g e d  t o  ! . . .  th e  S u l ta n  o f  K is s e e n  fQ is h n J  
. . . *  ( 2) .  The I n d i a  O f f i c e  a r ra n g e d  t h a t  th e  Aden 
P ie s id e n t  s h o u ld  ta k e  s te p s  * . . .  t o  p r e v e n t  th e  p r o p r i e t o r  
f ro m  s e l l i n g  i t  t o  th e  F re n c h  . . . *  ( 3 ) .
I n  1871> th e  I t a l i a n  Am bassador i n  London in fo r m e d  
th e  F o r e ig n  O f f i c e  o f  I t a l i a n  i n t e r e s t  i n  a c q u i r i n g  
S o c o t ra  as a p e n a l  s t a t i o n ,  p r o v id in g  B r i t a i n  had  no 
o b je c t i o n .  The F o r e ig n  O f f i c e  e x p re s s e d  v e r y  s t r o n g  
o b je c t i o n s  w i t h  u n c o n c e a le d  p e tu la n c e .  The I t a l i a n  
Governm ent c o n s id e r a t e l y  s h e lv e d  th e  p r o j e c t  w i t h o u t
(1) FO 78 3186, FO Cypher of 12.5.59 - Bulwer
(2) FO 78 3186, FO Cypher of 9 .7 * 5 9  -  Bulwer
(3) FO 78 3186, FO Cypher of 12.7.59 - Bulwer
f u r t h e r  comment. The R e s id e n t  a t  Aden , an E n g in e e r  
O f f i c e r  ( 1 ) ,  commented t h a t  th e  i s l a n d  was d e s t i t u t e  o f  
any  n a t u r a l  h a r b o u r ,  b u t  t h a t  th e  I t a l i a n s  m ig h t  be a b le  
t o  b u i l d  an a r t i f i c i a l  h a r b o u r  w i t h  c o n v i c t  l a b o u r .  In 
h i s  v ie w ,  some such f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  r e l i a b l e  se a -  
c o m m u n ic a t io n s  w o u ld  be m a n d a to ry ,  an d , once b u i l t ,  w o u ld  
p r o v id e  a 1re n d e z -v o u s *  f o r  a n a v a l  squa,dron a t  th e  
e n t ra n c e  t o  th e  G u l f  o f  Aden and a s t r i d e  B r i t i s h  
c o m m u n ic a t io n s  t o  I n d i a .  I l i s  o p in io n  t h a t  an I t a l i a n  
o c c u p a t io n  was * u n a d v is a b le 1 p r o b a b ly  r e f l e c t e d  
c o n te m p o ra ry  o f f i c i a l  I n d ia n  o p in io n .  S i r  B a r t l e  F r e r e  
a d m i t t e d  t h a t  B r i t a i n  had no j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  o b je c t i n g  
t o  an I t a l i a n  o c c u p a t io n  ( 2 ) .
The o p e n in g  o f  th e  Suez C a na l g r e a t l y  in c r e a s e d  th e
s h ip p in g  p a s s in g  th ro u g h  th e  G u l f  o f  Aden, b r i n g in g  added
chances o f  w re c k s  i n  S o c o t ra n  w a te r s ,  and more o c c a s io n s  
f o r  f o r e i g n  i n t e r v e n t i o n  t o  p r o t e c t  s h ip w re c k e d  c re w s ,  
p a s s e n g e rs  and c a rg o e s  (3). In 1872, H.M.S. 'Briton*
Cl) AIA 560, Res - SGB, 26.10.71
(2) AIA 6M+ f82, 10 Memo of 187^ forwarded to Aden 16.11.7^
(3) AIA 575 f221, S ta te m e n t  of Master of s . s. *Isa*
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re s c u e d  th e  c rew s  o f  two B r i t i s h  w re c k s  i n  S o c o t ra n  
w a te r s .  I t  was becom ing i n c r e a s i n g l y  p l a i n  t h a t  some 
d i r e c t  f o r e i g n  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  S o c o t ra  was i n e v i t a b l e *
But the Foreign Department had recently opposed an 
extension of British influence in the Yemen (1).
A new p o l i c y  o f  l i m i t e d  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  th e  Yemen. 
was a p p l ie d  b y  th e  F o r e ig n  D e p a r tm e n t w i t h  B r i t i s h  
G overnm ent s u p p o r t  i n  1873 ( 2) .  I n  1873? th e  Aden R e s id e n t  
was c o n c e rn e d  t h a t  th e  O ttom ans m ig h t  i n t e r v e n e  i n  t h e  
f i g h t i n g  i n  th e  H adhram aut ( 3 ) *  The in c r e a s in g  E g y p t ia n  
i n t e r e s t  on th e  S o m a li C o a s t s in c e  I 869 was a f u r t h e r  
cause  f o r  Aden R e s id e n c y  s u s p ic io n  o f  a l l  O ttom an a c t i v i t i e s  
i n  th e  G u l f  o f  Aden (4-) • B r i g a d i e r  J.W. S c h n e id e r  v ie w e d  
th e  v i s i t  o f  an O ttom an n a v a l  t r a i n i n g  s h ip  t o  S o c o t ra  i n  
1874- w i t h  a c u te  s u s p ic io n *  He s u g g e s te d  t h a t  f u t u r e  
f o r e i g n  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  th e  i s l a n d  s h o u ld  be p re v e n te d  
b y  p u rc h a s in g  a s u i t a b l e  a g re e m e n t by  a r ra n g e m e n t w i t h
C l)  p .2.67 n*3
( 2) p *3.73 n *2
(3) p . U 32 - U 3 3
(*0 p.6.8 - 6.17
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t h e  i s l a n d 1 s c h i e f  (1 ) . ,  An a t t e m p t  t o  v i s i t  th e  i s l a n d e r s
i n  Decem ber, I 871*, was f o i l e d  b y  ro u g h  w e a th e r ;  and th e
d e s p a tc h  o f  an i n v i t a t i o n  t o  th e  S o c o t ra n  c h i e f ,  i n  a
b o t t l e ,  t o  v i s i t  Aden was u n p r o d u c t i v e *  The i s l a n d e r s
d e n ie d  t h a t  th e  b o t t l e  and i t s  message re a c h e d  them  ( 2 ) .
l in e n  a n o th e r  i n v i t a t i o n  was d e l i v e r e d ,  th e  r e p l y  was
p o l i t e  b u t  e v a s iv e .  S o c o t ra  had no c o n n e c t io n  w i t h  t h e
Resident; but f... the Sultan of Room was p ra y e d  f o r
every F r id a y  . . . *  i n  the T am arida  m osque. T h e i r  r e p l y
read that f... meeting and conversation f i n  AdenJ w i l l
ta k e  p la c e  when God [ w i l l j  be p le a s e d  . . . f t o  a p p ro v e
sltl
that ( 3 ) »  P l a i n l y ,  i f  the B r i t i s h  r e q u i r e d ^ a g r e e m e n t ,  th e
Resident would have t o  f e t c h  i t *
S c h n e id e r  had p ro p o se d  t h a t  th e  c h i e f  s h o u ld  a g re e  
1 . . .  n e v e r  t o  cede , s e l l ,  m o r tg a g e ,  o r  g iv e  f o r  o c c u p a t io n  
. . .  S o c o t ra  o r  any  o f  i t s  i s l a n d  d e p e n d e n c ie s  . . . * .  T h a t
was amended a t  th e  I n d i a  O f f i c e  b y  th e  a d d i t i o n  o f
* . . .  w i t h o u t  th e  p e r m is s io n  o f  th e  B r i t i s h  G overnm ent . . . 1(b ) .
( 1 )  IOL P&S 1875 f637, Res -  SGB, 25.11*75
(2) P & s 1875, Res -  s ™ ,  25.11.75 r e f e r s
( 3 )  P & 8 18 75 , S u l t a n  i n  r e p l y  t o  Res -  S u l t a n  o f  8 . 8 * 7 5
(V ) IOL P & S 1875 f 6 59, n o te  b y  U n d e r Sec.  10 .
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The amendment e n su re d  t h a t  B r i t a i n  a lo n e  d e c id e d  w h e th e r  
B r i t a i n ,  o r  an y  o t h e r  c o u n t r y ,  m ig h t  a c q u i r e  t e r r i t o r y .
A p e c u l i a r i t y  o f  th e  engagement was t h a t  th e  C h i e f 1s 
m a in la n d ,  Mahra C o a s t ,  t e r r i t o r y  was n o t  c o v e re d  b y  th e  
a g ree m en t ( 1 ) .  The I n d i a  O f f i c e  w ere  r e l u c t a n t  * . . .  t o  
a c q u i r e  a b s o lu te  p o s s e s s io n  o f  th e  i s l a n d  . . .  ' ( 2 ) ;  and 
th e  G overnm ent o f  Bombay was even opposed t o  th e  l i m i t e d  
in v o lv e m e n t  o f  th e  new T r e a t y .  The C h i e f * s  m a in la n d  
t e r r i t o r y  was n o t  even m e n t io n e d  i n  w r i t i n g  i n  th e  
A g reem ent o f  1886 ( 3 ) .
The Bombay G o v e rn m e n ts  c a u t io n  i n  1875  was r e a l i s t i c :  
S c h n e id e r  knew l i t t l e  a b o u t  S o c o t r a ,  o r  i t s  M a h r i  o v e r l o r d .  
S c h n e id e r * s  su cce ss  i n  t h w a r t i n g  O ttom an a m b i t io n s  n e a r  
Aden i n  1873 bad encou rag ed  h im  t o  p ro p o se  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
in .  th e  Hadhram aut f o r  th e  same re a s o n .  H is  a g re e m e n t f o r  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  S o c o t ra  was s i m i l a r l y  n e g a t i v e .  B r i t a i n  
had no p o s i t i v e  use f o r  S o c o t r a .  B u t  th e  I n d i a  O f f i c e  was 
im p re s s e d  b y  S c h n e id e r * s  a rg u m e n ts .  The S e c r e ta r y  o f  S ta te
(1 )  A i t c h i s o n  1 T r e a t ie s *  No LXXIII o f  2 3 .1 * 7 6
(2 )  P & S 1875 f 6 1+ l ,  Sec.F o r .Dept. - SGB q u o t in g  f ro m  
th e  S o f  S o f  2 3 . ^ . 7 5  -  G o f  I
( 3 ) -  A i t c h i s o n  * T r e a t i e s *  No' LXXIV
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wired to the Viceroy on 10th January, 1 8 7 6 .‘Letter 
from Aden Resident to Bombay No. 190 of 1875* Lose no 
time in concluding negotiations about Socotra (1)...'Three 
days later the Resident received orders to act without 
delay; he sailed from Aden for Socotra on 17th January 
aboard H.ll.S. ‘Briton1* He arrived off Tamarida on the 
21st, found that he could obtain nothing at Socotra, and 
weighed anchor for Qishn. He arrived there on the 23rd 
and obtained an agreement on the same day from Ali bin. 
Abdullah bin Salim bin Afreer.
The official account suggests a possible reluctance 
by the Mahri leaders for any negotiations. The chief1s 
nephew at Tamarida *... manifested great alarm at the 
arrival of H.H.S. Briton and he declined to come on 
board at once . ..*. He came later with the Residency 
Interpreter, ’... after some trouble and delay . ..1 (2). 
Schneider assured Socotra's chief at Qishn that the 
British f... mission was to prevent the country ... being 
taken from him Ali bin AbdullahJ or from passing into 
the hands of any foreign power, save Great Britain . ..* (2)*
(1) FO 78 3189? correspondence passed by 10 - FO, 1.3*76
(2) LA . Res - Sec.For.Dept., 1.2*76
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I t  was a l s o  t o  make a r ra n g e m e n ts  f o r  d e a l in g  w i t h  f u t u r e  
w re cks  i n  S o c o t ra n  w a te r s .  S c h n e id e r  a s s u re d  A l i  b in .  
A b d u l la h  t h a t  h i s  own p o s i t i o n  w o u ld  be s t re n g th e n e d  
a g a in s t  f o r e i g n  i n t e r v e n t i o n  b y  th e  p ro p o s e d  t r e a t y .  
S c h n e id e r  gave no d e f i n i t i o n  o f  w h a t i n t e r v e n t i o n  was 
f f o r e i g n ! . I t  a p p e a rs  t h a t  he gave t h a t  a s s u ra n c e  t o  
se cu re  th e  a g re e m e n t,  as S i r  B a r t l e  F r e r e  had p o s s i b l y  
made a s i m i l a r  lo o s e  and u n a u th o r i s e d  a s s u ra n c e  t o  th e  
K a s a d i N a q ib  i n  1873 t o  o b t a in  a new a n t i - s l a v e  t r a d e  
t r  e a ty ,  and so t o  keep Oatoman i n f l u e n c e  o u t  ( 1 ) .  The 
C a p ta in  o f  H .H .S .  T r i t o n *  c o n f i r m s  t h a t  th e  M a h r i  c h i e f  
and h i s  r e l a t i v e s  d e c la r e d  t h a t  th e y  w o u ld  n o t  s e l l
o r  p a r t  w i t h  an y  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e i r  la n d  . . . *  ( 2 ) .  C l e a r l y  
th e  M ahra d id  n o t  c o n s id e r  t h a t  t h e y  were g i v i n g  th e  
B r i t i s h  an y  r i g h t s  on S o c o t ra  ( 3 ) *  B u t  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  
t h a t  th e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w ere  n o t  e a s y ,  even w i t h  th e  im p o s in g
(1 ) p*^+ .^f-2 n .3
(2 )  PRO FO 78 3189 f 5 3 ,  Report o f  Capt., H .H .S .  B r i t o n  
of 2 .2 .7 6  -  C in C, E Indies, forwarded b y  Admiralty 
to FO
( 3 )  L / P iS / 9 / 5 3  ^ 3 - ^ 5 ,  The treaty agreement
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p re s e n c e  o f  H .M .S . B r i t o n ,  and t h a t  th e  c h i e f  n e g o t i a t o r ,  
S a l i h  J a f f e r ,  needed to  use  a c a r e f u l  m ix t u r e  o f  t h r e a t s  
and b la n d is h m e n ts *  S c h n e id e r  r e f e r r e d  t o  S a l i h , s 
1. . .  g r e a t  t a c t  and a b i l i t y  i n  c a r r y i n g  o u t  th e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
j s i c j  . ♦.  1 . C e r t a i n l y ,  th e  e x p e n d i tu r e  o f  MT# ^01.0 i n  cash  
and p r e s e n ts  h e lp e d  to  s e c u re  th e  f v e r y  s a t i s f a c t o r y 1 
c o n c lu s io n  t o  th e  v i s i t  ( 1 ) .  The a n n u a l s t ip e n d  was f i x e d  
a t  LIT# 360.
Once th e  l im i t e d .  B r i t i s h  o b j e c t i v e  i n  S o c o t ra  h kd  
been se cu re d  t h e r e  was l i t t l e  f u r t h e r  o f f i c i a l  i n t e r e s t  in .  
th e  i s l a n d .  I t  was v i s i t e d  a g a in  i n  A p r i l  I 876, when 
T am arida  was p r o v id e d  w i t h  a f l a g - s t a f f  and a U n io n  J a c k  
t o  em phas ize  t o  f o r e i g n  v e s s e l s  t h a t  th e  i s l a n d  was u n d e r  
B r i t i s h  p r o t e c t io n * .  A n o th e r  v i s i t  was p a id  i n  1877 • I n  
I 878, t h e  new R e s id e n t ,  M a jo r  G e n e ra l F .A .B .  L o c h ,  p r o v id e d  
two b a r r e l s  o f  gunpowder as an a d d i t i o n a l  p r e s e n t  w i t h  
th e  a n n u a l s t ip e n d  ( 2) .  The 1879 s t ip e n d  was d e la y e d  u n t i l  
1880 when th e  C a p ta in  o f  H .M .S . • S e a g u l l1 t o o k  i t  ( 3 ) *  The 
i s l a n d  was th e n  v i s i t e d  b y  th e  b o t a n i s t ,  P r o fe s s o r  B a l f o u r
( 1 )  L /P & S /9/ 5 3 5 Minute of Under Sec. of 1 .3 ♦ 7 6  on 
Schneider1s Report
(2 )  A IA  83 1 , Res -  SGB, 2 ^ . 7 8
( 3 )  A IA  831 f l 8 3
15 . i i
o f  G lasgow  U n i v e r s i t y .
I n  M a rch , 1 8 86 , as p a r t  o f  th e  new B r i t i s h  p o l i c y  
o f  s e c u r in g  th e  c o a s t  o f  t h e  G u l f  o f  Aden f ro m  o th e r-  
f o r e i g n  i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  th e  R e s id e n t  was i n s t r u c t e d  t o  
a r ra n g e  t h a t  th e  S u l t a n  o f  S o c o t ra  p la c e d  h i m s e l f  and h i s  
s u c c e s s o rs  u n d e r  B r i t i s h  p r o t e c t i o n  as th e  S o m a li  c o a s t a l  
t r i b e s ,  e x c lu d in g  th e  M i j j e r t a i n ,  had done ( 1 ) .  The new 
P r o t e c t o r a t e  T r e a t y  was c o n c lu d e d  on 2 3 rd  M arch 1886 ( 2 ) .
The M a h r i  S u l t a n  r e q u i r e d  a s s u ra n c e ,  f i r s t ,  t h a t  th e  
B r i t i s h  w ou ld  n o t  a c t u a l l y  ta k e  p o s s e s s io n  o f  S o co tra ,  
o r  o f  an y  o f  i t s  i s l a n d  d e p e n d e n c ie s .  A v e r b a l ,  b u t  n o t  
a w r i t t e n ,  a s s u ra n c e  was g iv e n  ( 3 ) .  T h e r e a f t e r  no f u r t h e r  
i n t e r e s t  was ta k e n  i n  i t s  a f f a i r s .  The M a h r i  c h i e f  had  
been r e l u c t a n t  t o  a g re e  t o  a P r o t e c t o r a t e  T r e a t y  f o r  
S o c o t ra  w i t h o u t  e q u i v a le n t  g u a ra n te e  f o r  h i s  m a in la n d  
t e r r i t o r y .  T h a t ,  th e  R e s id e n t ! s second A s s i s t a n t ,
( 1 )  BSC 8 5 /8 8 ,  T e l .  f ro m  SGB -  Res ,  3 1 * 3 .8 6 ,  as r e q u i r e d  
by  S o f  S
(2 )  A i t c h i s o n  f T r e a t i e s f No, LXXIV
(3 )  FO 78 397V, R e p o r t  o f  C a p t .  S e a le y ,  2 8 . ^ . 8 6 ,  passed  
b y  10 -  FO, 2 1 .5 .8 6
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C a p t .  C .W .H . S e a le y ,  was n o t  a u t h o r i s e d  t o  g i v e *
C o n s id e r a t io n  o f  th e  C h i e f1 s r e q u e s t  was p ro m is e d ,  b u t  he 
r e c e iv e d  no g u a ra n te e  ( 1 ) *  Such a g u a ra n te e  m ig h t  have  
l e d  t o  B r i t i s h  i n t e r v e n t i o n  a g a in s t  th e  Omanis o r . . a g a in s t  
t h e  Q u a i t i s .  German i n t e r e s t s  had been k e p t  o u t ;  and 
S o c o t ra  was 1. . .  a b s o rb e d  s i l e n t l y  i n t o  th e  B r i t i s h  
B m p ire  • . • ' ,  s in c e ,  as  an i s l a n d  n o t  p a r t  o f  A f r i c a ,
B r i t a i n  was n o t  o b l i g e d  t o  in f o r m  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  ( 2) .
P ro b a b ly  p re s s u re  was a p p l ie d  to  g e t  t h i s  ag ree m en t
fro m  th e  S u l t a n *  C a p ta in  S e a le y 1s r e p o r t  a d m its  t h a t
th e  S u l t a n 's  A g en t a t  S o c o t ra  was r e l u c t a n t  t o  make an y  
new com m itm ent and u n w i l l i n g  t o  p ro c e e d  a t  once t o  Q is h n .
The r e p o r t  a l s o  s u g g e s ts  t h a t  th e  M a h r i  S u l ta n  d i d  n o t  
w is h  t o  s ig n  a new t r e a t y .  I t  i s  p o s s ib le  t h a t  h i s  e a r l i e r  
i n s i s t e n c e  on B r i t i s h  p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  h i s  m a in la n d  t e r r i t o r i e s ,  
as  a q u id  p ro  quo f o r  an  a g ree m en t on S o c o t r a ,  was b e l i e v e d  
t o  be a p o l i t e  way o f  r e f u s in g  th e  B r i t i s h  demands. The 
B r i t i s h  b e h a v io u r  a t  S o c o t ra  was n o t  c o n c i l i a t o r y .  H .M .S .  
D ragon e x e r c is e d  th e  s h i p ' s  company i n  g u n d r i l l ,  f i r i n g
(1 )  L I ,  F o r  .D e p t .D e s p a tc h  136- -  S o f  S o f  6 . 8 .8 6
(2 )  FO 78 3975+j c o r re s p o n d e n c e  P erm anent U /S  FO and
F o r .S e c .  L o rd  R o s e b e r /y  c.25.*+ [sic 66
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over forty rounds, and in musketry, the morning she 
arrived. $00 rounds were fired from the Gatling Gun and 
b20 rounds of pistol practice was fired (X). Similar 
drill was carried out at Qishn on arrival, with the 
addition of exploding an underwater 'observation mine1 (2). 
Since practice drills were unusual more than once a 
quarter, this was calculated sabre-rattling. When the 
Resident later visited Qishn no salute was even fired (3).
+ -h + +  +
DHOFAR
Dhofar is bounded by the People's Democratic 
Republic of Yemen on the west, and by Oman on the east.
A range of mountains, twenty to forty miles deep and 
3000 feet high, run for 200 miles along the coast. These 
mountains cause heavy rainfull during the S.W. monsoon,
(1) Adm.53/12366, Log of H.M.S. 'Dragon', 19-21.^.86
(2) Adm. 53/12366, Log of H.M.S. 'Dragon', 22^.86
(3) Adm. 53/13022, Log of Ii.M.S. 'Osprey', 2.5.88 b p.m.
5 .1 ^
giving the coastal area plentiful water and vegetation* 
North of the mountains is steppe country, stretching up 
to the Hub al Khali desert. The coastal inhabitants are 
the Kathir on the plain and the Qara in the mountains with 
the Rashid in the steppe and desert to the north* Mahri 
tribesmen, who live in both the People1s Democratic 
Republic of Yemen and in Dhofar, spread far into Dhofar 
from the coast to the desert. Mahri is widely spoken 
by the Kathir as well as the Mahra. The Qara have their 
own language. Arabic is widely understood too.
+ + + + +
The Aden Residency and Dhofar 1875-1886-
The Indian authorities on the Malabar Coast had 
outlawed a certain Seiyid Fadhl bin Alawi in 18-52 for 
creating disturbances amongst the Muslims of the area (1). 
The Seiyid had settled in Mecca. In 1873 Re travelled 
from Jeddah to Hodeida aboard an Ottoman warship, to visit 
Ahmad Mukhtar Pasha, the new Ottoman Governor of the
(1) Kelly ‘Gulf1 p.773
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Yemen. Cl). The Pasha had already told a Kathiri emissary 
that he intended to place Seiyid FacLhl in charge of 
Hadhramaut and of Dhofar (2)* In 1875* the Seiyid moved 
to Dhofar at the invitation of a delegation of Dhofaris, 
who hoped that he would reconcile Dhofar1s internal 
divisions. The Seiyid1s arrival made Seiyid Turki, the 
uncertain ruler of neighbouring, anarchical,Oman, 
apprehensive that a more effective, expanding, Ottoman 
presence might follow C3)* Seiyid Turki therefore 
claimed to the British Agent in Muscat that Oman had 
prior rights to Dhofar* Seiyid Turki wished to eject 
Seiyid Fadhl. The Omani claim was slight. It rested on 
an alleged, brief, occupation of the principal port of 
Salala during a troubled period in Dhofarfs history in 
1829*
Lt. Col. S.B. Miles, the Consul at Muscat, and the 
Officiating Resident in the Gulf, Lt. Col. W.F. Prideaux,
(1) NP, Frere - Northbrook from Aden, 19*5*73
(2) p A . 3 7  n.l
(3) FO 78 3615j Seiyid Turki — Lt. Col. Miles,forwarded 
by Offg.Res.Pers.Gulf - Offg.Sec.For.Dept., dated 
15 * 6.76
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initially supported the Omani claim, out of distaste for 
Seiyid Fadhl and the prospect of increased Ottoman interest 
in the area* l... The extension of the influence of this 
dangerous fanatic ... whose aims and views are • •• those 
of an irreconcilable to Christianity and British rule 
cannot but prove prejudicial to British interests in 
South Arabia . *.f Cl)* Prideaux*s comment may have been 
influenced by his service in Aden from 1863-725 when 
successive Residents had an almost obsessive mistrust of 
Ottoman intentions in South Arabia* But within a year, 
Prideaux suggested that support for Omani claims on Dhofar 
should be dropped (2). They !... were not of a very 
definite character and did not deserve support . *.*.
It is possible that Prideaux had not changed his views 
on Seiyid Fadhl and his Administration1, but rather that 
he was opposed to any additional British commitment on 
behalf of the ineffective Seiyid Turki*
The Resident at Aden had been concerned (3)5 in
(1) FO 78 3615, Offg.Res.Pers.Gulf to Offg.Sec.For.
Dept., 5*7.76
(2) FO 78 3615, Offg.Pol.Res.Pers.Gulf - Offg.Sec.For. 
Dept., 18.5.77
(3) FO 78 3615, Res.Aden - SGB, 7.2.76 forwarded by 
G of I - S of S, 2k.3.76
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February, 1876, to hear of Seiyid Fadhl1s establishment 
at Dhofar; and his successor remained as concerned 
about possible developments (1). In February, 1877> 
Schneider had quoted a local report 1... that the people 
of the country would like to come under the dominion of 
the Turks, and that he £ FadhlJ had asked the Porte to 
send two steamers there with 500 troops ...* (2). In 
November, Brigadier F.A.E. Loch, who had succeeded 
Schneider in May 1&77* feared f... the formation of a 
hot bed of religious fanaticism - strongly imbued with 
intensely Inimical feelings towards the British 
Government in India ...l. Loch had similar flights of 
fancy about Ottoman moves through the desert from/the 
Yemen to Hadhramaut (3). But, by January, I878, Loch 
had a more realistic view o f  Seiyid Fadhl*s precarious 
position in Dhofar, supported only by a local fear that 
rebellion would result in Ottoman troops arriving to
(1) FO 78 3615, Res - SGB, 20.11.77, copied to S of S
(2) FO 78 3615, Res.Aden - SGB, 7 .2.76, forwarded by 
G of I - S of S, 2b.3.76
(3) p .^ .76 n.l
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support the Seiyid*
The Foreign Department was concerned to prevent any 
possible Ottoman competition with Britain1 s casual 
surveillance of the Hadhramaut coast. *... We consider 
it undesirable that such claims £as Seiyid Fadhl*sj as 
may be put forward by the Porte or its Agents to dominion 
over any part of the Hadhramant [sloj coast of Arabia 
should be recognised . ..* (1). Dhofar was not considered 
locally to be a part of Hadhramaut, but there were 
historic and tribal connections through the Kathir tribe (2). 
The critical position of Umar bin Salih alKasadi at 
Mukalla in 1876 gave the Foreign Department some reason 
to fear that Ottoman intervention in Dhofar could result 
in a ICasadi invitation to intervene at Mukalla too* But 
Ottoman problems in Europe in 1876 made the possibility 
of intervention appear, in retrospect, to have been 
unlikely. However, the Foreign Department was also 
concerned about Muslim attitudes in general, and, in
(1) FO 78 3615, Gov of I despatch of ^.9*76 - S of S.
10 passed the correspondence to FO on. 11+*10»76
(2) pA.l n.3
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particular, the capacity of Seiyid Fadhl, outlawed from 
India, to harm British interests. The Foreign Office 
labelled their new file Cl) on the subject; fSayyid 
Fadhl (or Fazl) bin Alawi the outlawed Mopiah priest in 
the Hadhramant fsicj Coast of Arabia (Dhafur, ShahY,
Makulla and Zaffer)!(2).
Lord Salisbury at the India Office felt that,
*... without assuming that Sayyid Fadhl has acted with 
the knowledge and consent of the Turkish Government, or 
asserting in any way the claim of Muscat to suzerainty 
over Dhofar, it is desirable, as suggested by the 
Government of India, to obtain, from the Porte a repudiation 
of the Sayyid*s proceedings (3). Salisbury*s aim
appears to have been the customary British wish to 
maintain the 1 status quo* along the souther Arabian coast 
by excluding any foreign influence, which might, subsequently, 
be in conflict with British interests. It is possible
(1) FO 78 3615
(2) Possibly Yafai
(3) FO 78 3615, U/S 10 Louis Malet - U/S FO, quoting 
Lord Salisbury
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that Seiyid Turki1s weakness in Oman was a sufficient, 
argument against Britain supporting Omani claims in 
Dhofar (1). Any British support might have entailed more 
British liabilities in support of Seiyid Turki*s claims,.
The Foreign Office accepted Lord Salisbury1s request and 
asked Sir Henry Elliot to take action (2), But, despite 
several reminders, the Porte avoided giving the assurances 
which Salisbury sought, and which Indian officials at 
the Foreign Department and in Aden wanted (3)* But Seiyid 
Fadhl1s harshness alienated his subjects, who tolerated 
his presence only from fear that he enjoyed Ottoman 
support o o .
Seiyid Fadhl was driven out of Dhofar in January,
1879 (5)? after vainly appealing (6) for Ottoman assistance
(1) Kelly »Gulff p.780-783
(2) FO 78. 3615? BO - Elliot, 2i.lO.76, with copies of the
correspondence from Aden and India on Seiyid Fadhl
(3) FO 78 3615? Elliot - FO, 29.ll.76, 10 - FO enquiring
10.8*77 FO - Sir Henry Layard, who had replaced Elliot
l k . 8 . 7 7
(*0 IOL P&S, Res - SGB, 15.1.78
(5) FO 78 3615, Res - SGB, *+.2.79, sen, to S of S by 
G of I despatch of 1.5*79
(6) FO 78 3615, Res Aden - SGB, 3.1.79
5.21.
from the Yemen. According to secret reports from the 
Yemen, obtained by the British Ambassador (1), to the 
Porte, the Governor General gave only a non-committal 
verbal reply to the Seiyid*s Agent. The Pasha knew that 
the Resident at Aden was concerned that Ottoman influence 
should not spread into Hadhramaut. In deference to that 
concern, and. possibly because of his own commitments 
against the Zaidis, he offered no assistance.. The 
Kathiri Shaikh, Awadh bin Abdullah bin Said bin Mubarak 
AshShanfari, wrote to the Residency Interpreter on 13th 
January, 1879? to report the welcome news of Seiyid 
Fadhl*s expulsion for ‘tyranny* (2).
Seiyid Fadhl had been ousted, but he tried to 
recover his position in Dhofar by manoeuvres in 
Constantinople, where he was welcomed by the Sultan*s 
A.D.C. on his arrival (3)* Seiyid Fadhl had a reputation
(1) FO 78 3615, Sir Henry Layard - FO, 18.8.79?= 
enclosing undated confidential correspondence from 
Gov •*. Gen. of Yemen to the Porte
(2) FO 78 3615? encl. dated 18 Moharram 1296 with 
Kes — SGB, H-.2.79
(3) Kelly *Gulf* p.775
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as a religious savant; and Sultan Abdul Hamid added the 
Seiyid to his coterie of such men at Constantinople* But 
the Seiyid thought it prudent to cultivate the acquaintance 
of the British Ambassador, possibly because he failed to 
receive hoped-for material assistance from the Sultan (1). 
On 30th January, 1880, the Seiyid sent an amiable letter, 
in French, by the hand of his son, to Sir Henry Layard (2)* 
Sir Henry was impressed by Seiyid Fadhl1s strikingly 
handsome son. Seiyid Fadhl visited the Ambassador shortly 
afterwards. The Seiyid. admitted that the Sultan had 
refused him military assistance, but he still hoped for 
a loan of £15*000. The Seiyid maintained that he was 
still the ruler of Dhofar*
Seiyid Fadhl professed to believe that the position 
of the Ottoman Empire was very precarious; he therefore 
wished for British friendship, and for British protection 
for Dhofar if the Ottoman Empire collapsed* Seiyid Fadhl 
referred to the Sultan as the Caliph., and to the Sultan1 s
(1) FO 78 3615} Layard - FO, 12.2.80, reporting on an 
interview with Seiyid Fadhl
(2) FO 78 3615, Layard - FO, 6.2.80
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Caliphial duties to carry out all the precepts of the 
Koran* In that, Seiyid Fadhl was echoing the frequently 
heard local opinion of the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph as the 
suzerain of all Muslims within the area. Seiyid Fadhl 
claimed, flatteringly, that the Sultan 1.•. had frequently 
spoken to him j~of Layard J as his true friend, and of 
England as his best ally ...f (1). There is no evidence 
that Layard doubted the sincerity of Seiyid Fadhl*s 
assessment, but Layard enquired of the Foreign Office 
whether he should take steps to prevent the Sultan, or 
the Porte, encouraging Seiyid Fadhl*s return to Dhofar (2).
The India Office had no doubt that Seiyid Fadhl*s 
return would be unwelcome to the Indian Government. Layard 
was informed accordingly* But he was unable to prevent 
the Seiyid1s return (3)* According to Layard, the Sultan*s 
Ministers did not want the Seiyid to return, but the Sultan 
refused to prevent it* Ottoman opinion was apparently
(1) FO 78 3615, Layard - FO, 12.2.80
(2) FO 78. 3615, FO * 10, 3.3.80 and 10 - FO, 12.3.80
(3) FO 78 3615? Layard - FO, 7.V.8O
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divided. One school held that Ottoman prestige would 
suffer if Omani influence was allowed to expand into 
Dhofar. Opponents of that view held that greater 
damage to Ottoman prestige could occur if the Sultan 
assisted Seiyid Fadhl and the British then intervened 
more effectively on behalf of Oman (1.) •
Seiyid Fadhl made his own preparations for his 
return to Dhofar, despite the conflict of opinions at 
Constantinople. He informed Seiyid Turki in May, 1880, 
that he would shortly be leaving for Dhofar l... with 
the orders of the Sublime Porte . ..* (2). He planned 
to travel via the He3az but he does not appear to have 
left until late in 1880 (3). In the Hejaz, too, local 
opinion was divided about the merits and demerits of the 
Seiyid1s attempted return. Those who were opposed to any 
increase of Ottoman influence in Arabia believed that a
(1) FO 78 3615, Bayard - FO, 15.5.80
(2) FO 78 3615, Seiyid Fadhl1s letter was forwarded in
translation by British Agent, Persian Gulf to S of S,
19.7.80
(3) FO 78 3615, Sir H Layard - FO, 15.5.80
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renewed attempt on Dhofar would lead to greater Ottoman 
intervention in Arabia (1), and to a consequent decrease 
in local leaders1 influence* Even personal jealousy 
altered individual attitudes. Grand Sharif Abu Mutalib 
of Mecca allegedly changed his support of Seiyid Fadhl. 
into opposition when the Sultan made Seiyid Fadhl a 
Mushir, a senior Ottoman military rank to the Grand 
Shar i f1 s own ran k (2). In October, 1880, the Grand 
Sharif had been reported as favouring the Seiyid*s plans 
to recover Dhofar ( 3 ) .
There was apparent confusion amongst British 
diplomats as well as amongst Ottoman officials; the 
new British Ambassador, Mr. G.J. Goschen, apologised to 
the Foreign Office for giving Seiyid Fadhl. formal letters 
of introduction to the British Consul at Jeddah and to 
the Resident at Aden (*+)• Mr Goschen 1... was not aware 
that he £ the SeiyidJ was an outlaw ...*. The Foreign
(1) FO 78 3615, Layard - FO, 9A . 8O
(2) FO 78 3615, Brit .Ambassador C*ple - FO, 8.2.81
(3) FO 78 3615, Brit.Consul Jeddah - FO, 23.10.80
(b) FO 78 3615, Goschen - FO, 22.9.80
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Office had 110 such doubts. Mr. Goschen was instructed 
that he should *... clearly intimate to the Porte that 
any active assistance on the part of the Sultan to the 
Syud,, who is an outlaw from British India, would be 
regarded with great disfavour ... * a). But the British 
Bmbassy remained ill-informed. Lord Dufferin, the new 
Ambassador, asked in August 1881 about *... the nature 
of the delinquencies of ... Seiyid Fadhl in India . ..l (2). 
Lord Dufferin1s enquiry went unanswered. The Foreign 
Office1s concern was to remove Indian anxieties about the 
possible future use of the Seiyid by the Ottomans.
British attitudes towards the Seiyid were so controversial 
that they possibly contributed to Ottoman mistrust of, and 
resentment at, British behaviour, in South Arabia.
In September, 1885, Seiyid Fadhl and his son,
Muhammad, arrived at Jeddah from Constantinople. The 
following January, Muhammad bin Fadhl. sailed for Dhofar 
with 100 ex-Sharifian soldiers and some cases of arms 
aboard a British pilgrim ship bound for India, via
Cl) F0 78 3615, F0 - Mr. Goschen, 2>+.9.80
(2) F0 78 3615, Dufferin - F0, 23.8.81
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Dhofar (1). Omani rule in Dhofar was insecure; there 
was an uprising in 188.1; and other revolts followed in 
1888 and 1895 (2). The Resident detailed the s.s. 
Mlatapedia* in Aden harbour, on the pretext that the 
ship had no qualified doctor, as required for pilgrim 
ships, while asking for orders from Bombay* Instructions 
were received to search the ship. A quantity of arms 
were found and removed. Seiyid Muhammad bin Fadhl then 
claimed to be an Ottoman officer sent to rule Dhofar 
under the Porte. He declined to land in Dhofar without 
his arms and disembarked at Aden (3)« The precarious 
Omani presence in Dhofar (*+), instituted after Seiyid 
Fadhl*s departure in 1879 5 not subsequently 
challenged by the Seiyid; and the Aden Residency, no 
longer fearing foreign occupation of the area, showed 
little interest in Dhofar, which was, henceforward,
(1) BSC 85/86 HBM Consul Jeddah - Res, 7.1.86, sent 
under flying seal with the Captain of the S.S. 
'Matapedia1.
(2) Aitchison treaties8 (1933 Edn.) p.277 & 280
(3) BSC 85/88 Res (r) S of S, 20.1.86
(*+) B»Thomas 1 Arabia1 ffaljLx1 . Readers Union edn. , London,
1938, p.11.
considered to be the concern of the British Agent in 
Muscat, and not of the Resident at Aden.
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Section 6* The Aden Residency and the African
Coast of the Gulf of Aden, 1865 - 18.98
Somali territory stretched from the coastal inlet 
of Ghubat Kharab, on the Gulf of Tajoura, eastwards to 
Cape Guardafui and then continued southwards for some 
800 miles* The narrow coastal plain facing the Gulf of 
Aden was backed by a coastal range of hills, with an 
open plateau behind the hills stretching up to the 
Abyssinian foothills in the west. The coastal plain 
provided winter grazing; and the annual fair, at the 
anchorage of Berbera, attracted tribesmen with trade 
goods from the whole area. During the hot weather, from 
April to October, the tribesmen migrated inland*
The Somali tribes were divided into two main 
divisions; the northern group stretched from roughly 
Las Khoreh on the Gulf of Aden to Dankali territory 
bordering Ghubat Kharab. Aden*s Somali residents and 
visitors came mainly from this northern group Cl). The 
Somalis were nomadic pastoralists. Competition over
(1) Hunter rAden! pAl-Af2
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grazing and water rights was natural. Apart from a few 
small coastal settlements, the Somalis had no permanent 
villages, and no agriculture. Date palms were not 
cultivated. In 187^> *••• from the Straits of Bab elMandeb 
to Has Hafoon ... these people acknowledge-jjd] no one man 
as better than another ..., (1). That judgement was 
possibly inaccurate; it represented experience of the 
small coastal anchorages and of Anglo-Somali misunderstandings, 
when the Somalis had an interest in exaggerating the anarchy. 
Inter-tribal, and internal tribal, raiding was common.
Between Assab on the Eritrean, Dankali, coast and 
Gape Guardafui there were few good anchorages. Assab 
was an excellent anchorage, but there was no permanent 
population there, and water was scarce. The Dankali 
village of Tajoura was a port for the shipment of Galla 
slaves to Arabia. Zeila was a mainly Arab trading torn, 
on the Somali Issa tribe1s coast, with a shallow anchorage 
offshore. Bulhar was another shallow anchorage, unsafe 
during the summer monsoon, and without a permanent 
population. Berbera was the main Somali anchorage.
Other small anchorages existed in the east. But the area
(1) AIA 6*+*+, Memo by Captain F.M. Hunter, 16.12.7*+, para 2
around Gape Guardafui was treacherous waters during the 
summer monsoon. The whole coastline of the Gulf of Aden 
had no permanent rivers. There appeared to be little 
benefit to any Power in occupying the Somali littoral. 
Officials at Aden were, however, always concerned at 
that prospect; but the Government of India would not 
sanction any British commitment, even at Berbera, that 
might forestall foreign intervention.
+ + + + +
Aden and the Somali Coast 1839-1865
South Arabia had traditional trading links with 
the Somali Coast; there were 65 Somalis in Aden when 
the British occupied it in 1839? and other Somali 
residents were away at the Berbera fair (IK Aden*s 
total population was then 1,297* Somali livestock and 
other supplies were particularly valuable to the Aden 
garrison when they faced early Yemeni blockades. Aden
(1) AFII Details from census returns in the file
became a stable, expanding, market for Somali produce 
and the main supplier of Somali imports. The Somali 
population of Aden increased, and there were 5,3^6 fAfricans 
- of whom most were Somalis - out of a population of 
19,820 at the 1872 census (1).
In l8*+0, Indian officials were concerned at French 
moves to develop trade with Abyssinia (2); and Indian 
naval officers were sent to obtain islands along the 
African coast which could be used to counter French 
commercial or political moves. Agreements were made 
with the local governors of Tajoura (3) and of Zeila (*+), 
which assigned to the British the uninhabited Moussa 
Islands and Eibat Island respectively. These agreements 
were of doubtful validity. Tajoura was probably partially 
dependent on Zeila; and Zeila was a Yemeni dependency (5)» 
But these agreements established a basis for later British 
claims.
Cl) Hunter ^ d e n1 p.159
(2) F0 78 3186, Hertslet^rs Memo of 5*3*7^
(3) Aitchison treaties1 LXXXV 
(*+) Aitchison treaties1 LXXXVI
(5) AF l*+7, Res - SGB, 8.11.55. Brig. W. Coghlan thought 
the Governorates were Yemeni dependencies
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Once Ottoman suzerainty was exercised on the Yemen 
coast from 18^8, Yemeni affairs became, through the Porte, 
a matter for European, rather than for Indian, diplomatic 
interest. So too did the affairs of Zeila and Tajoura, 
and the Somali ports. Even before, British concern with 
the slave trade had led Palmerston, as Foreign Secretary, 
to authorise the stationing of a warship at Berbera during 
the l8^ +l/^ f2 trading season, to prevent the export of 
slaves (1). As early as l8*+7, the Egyptian Governor of 
Massawa had ineffectively claimed all the Somali coast in 
the Khedive’s name (2)* Later, Egyptian visits to the 
Somali Coast increased British interest in Somali affairs.
The Aden Residency had the most direct British 
contact with Somali coast affairs; and the Political 
Agent was able to use Indian Navy vessels to establish 
British influence unobtrusively along the Somali coast 
while protecting tradef and merchant shipping and 
harassing the slave trade. It became customary, from 
the 18*+1A2 Berbera fair, for an Indian naval vessel
(1) AF 26, FO - Sec. India Board, 7*8.*fl
(2) AF 66, PA Aden - CG Alexandria, 2b*10*b7
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with Commander Haines1 Assistant, Lieutenant C.J. 
Cruttenden, I.N., to visit that port during the trading 
season. On occasions, officials from Aden intervened 
to settle Somali inter-trihal disputes. Such interventions 
occurred at Berbera in 184-2, and again in 1847*
During the 1851/52 fair at Berbera, Captain Haines 
intervened, unofficially, to prevent the local Dankali, 
Ottoman-controlled, Governor of Zeila, AbuBakr Shermaki, 
extending his authority to Berbera Cl)* AbuBakr was 
a notorious slave trader* Haines had no authority for 
intervention* But he had two of AbuBakr*s armed dhows^ 
seized at Berbera by an Indian Navy vessel. Later, the 
vessels were released; but, by their detention, Haines 
had damaged Shermaki*s prestige and made clear to the 
Somalis that AbuBakr did not have British support. The 
latter never gained control of Berbera,
Haines* successor, Brigadier W* Coghlan, was opposed 
to any foreign occupation of the Somali coast, and 
particularly of its main anchorage, Berbera (2); but
(1) AF 102, PA - SGB, 24*12.51. AF 108, PA - SGB, 11*4*52
(2) AF 147, Bes - SGB, 8.11.55
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Coghlan recognised that the Government of India could 
not accept any commitment to defend the Habr Awal tribe, 
the owners of Berbera. Coghlan feared that a foreign 
occupation would benefit the slave-trade, by giving 
foreign flag-cover; that it would divert local trade 
away from Aden; and that it would create other 
1 troublesome entanglements1. He wanted to include 
recognition of their independence in the Habr Awal treaty 
of 18^6 (1), as a deterrent to any 1... unscrupulous 
state ... bent upon aggrandizing itself at the expense 
of a rude people ...* (2). But the Bombay Government 
wished to avoid any commitment to the Somalis, and a 
recognition of Habr Awal independence could have been 
misunderstood as a guarantee of independence which the 
Government of India was not committed to preserving (3)? 
so the reference was deleted (1). But it was still 
possible for the Indian Government to challenge any foreign 
occupation of Berbera (3).
+ + + + +
(1) Aitchison treaties1 LXXXVI
(2) p.6.9 n.l
(3) AF 175, SGB - Res, 10.6.56
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Aden and the Egyptians on the Somali Coast 1866-188^
In 1866, Major W, Merewether protested against the 
Ottoman-appointed Governor of Zeila taxing Somali boats, 
sailing from other ports than Zeila to Aden (1).
Merewether wanted the Porte warned that Britain rejected 
the Ottoman claim to the whole Dankali and Somali coast.
The Foreign Office considered such a protest unnecessary, 
but the British Ambassador did ask that the Porte should 
l... give ••• such directions to its Authorities Jon the 
African Coast] as will secure Native Boats trading between 
the African Coast and Aden from further molestation .,.*(2).
In 1867, the Aden Residency first reported visits 
by an Egyptian warship to the Somali coast (3). The 
vessel visited Rohaita and Berbera, The Egyptian 
commander, Jaffer Pasha, attempted to induce the coastal 
populations to recognise Egyptian suzerainty, but his 
attempts were believed to be unsuccessful. The prospect
(1) FO 78 3186, Merewether*s Memo of February, 1866
(2) FO 78 3186, Lord Lyons - Aali Pasha, 25*8.66, copied 
to FO
(3) AIA Lj-56, Off® Res - SGB., 2l+,8.67
of an Egyptian presence in the Gulf of Aden represented 
a challenge to the local British hegemony and disturbed 
General E.L. Russell, Adenfs new Resident (1). Russell 
had commanded the British base for the Abyssinian campaign 
at Zoula in 1868. He had unsuccessfully recommended a 
British occupation of the fine natural harbour of Assab. 
Russell realised that the opening of the Suez Canal and the 
new strategic and commercial value that that would give 
to the Red Sea made a foreign occupation of Assab likely*(1). 
The Abyssinian campaign had shorn that well-equipped 
troops could eliminate local opposition. The Foreign 
Department hoped that, if Britain retired from the area, 
other Powers would take no new initiatives and competition 
would be avoided (2).
In 1869, the Bombay Government recognised the need 
for a more active British presence on the Somali coast, 
but official opinion was divided over the choice of a 
British Consular Agent. Colonel Merewether, then Chief 
Commissioner in Sind, favoured the appointment of a
(1) AIA lf89, Hes - SGB, 11.11.68
(2) AIA 6Mf, G of I of 5*2.69 - SGB quoted in Hunter* s 
Summary of 17*12*7^
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European (1). The Government of Bombay supported 
Merewether1s preference (2), whereas General Russel! 
preferred a native Agent (3)* Russell argued that a 
native Agent would be in less danger than a European.
C.U. Aitchison, as officiating Secretary to the Foreign 
Department, saw no need for early action and postponed 
a decision for another year (*+). Probably the Foreign 
Department was too ill-informed and too little-interested 
to decide on a new policy. It is also possible that 
Aitchison believed that British naval pressure could be 
used later against the Egyptians to obtain any concessions 
that might be desirable (5)* The usual problem of cost 
was also a factor; the appointment.of the Swiss, 
Munzinger, was possibly not made because there was no 
post on the Aden establishment for an extra Assistant to
(1) FO 78 3186, Merewether1s Memo of June 1869? prepared
for SGB
(2) FO 78 3186, SGB - Sec. For. Dept., 29.7.69
(3) FO 78 3186, Res, 16.12.69 - SGB, giving his views
at For. Dept.*s request
(If) FO 78 3186, OffS. Sec. For. Dept. - SGB, 22.2.70 
(5) Cf. p.3.30 n#3
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to work on the Somali coast# A local non-European 
Agent would have cost less than a European.
But the Residency remained concerned about existing 
foreign interest on the Somali coast. French interest 
at Kaija/am and at Ainterad had been reported in April,
1869 (1).
+ + + + +
The Bombay Government shared Russell1 s view that 
an Egyptian occupation of Berbera would be undesirable(2). 
The Egyptian flag was hoisted over the Berbera ffort* 
in April, 1870, although no Egyptian troops landed from 
the modern Egyptian warship, •Khartoum1, which was anchored 
in the harbour (3)* - Russell first sent a Somali
interpreter on the Residency staff to Berbera, aboard 
the Indian Government steamer at Aden, to try to influence 
his compatriots against the Egyptians. Then Russell
(1) AAR 1869/70
(2) AIA 8^9 G.BP Resolution of *+.2.70 and Res letter of 
2^*12.69 - SGB
(3) AIA Aden Secret^, I87O, Report of Commander EMS ‘Teazer* 
- Res, k-«b.70
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persuaded Commander Bloomfield, R.N., of H.M.S. fTeazerf 
to visit Berbera, in the hope that the presence of a 
British warship would deter the Somalis and make them 
consider before they sell their country to the 
Turks • *.' (1). Russell wrote to Muh&mmad Jamali Pasha, 
aboard the 'Khartoum1, explaining that Somali meat supplies 
for, and Somali trade with, Aden were important British 
interests (2). Russell asked the Pasha not to '••* take 
any action at Berbera and Bulhar until an understanding 
is arrived at between the Government of the Sultan 
and the British (3). The Pasha denied that he had
any authority to acquire or to purchase Berbera; but the 
Egyptian Government claimed by June that Egypt represented 
Ottoman authority on the Somali coast (3). Commander 
Bloomfield had reported in April that the Somalis 
' ••* looked upon the Sultan of Turkey as the head of 
their religion and not the Viceroy of Egypt (^ f)*
(1) PRO Admlty 127/11, Russell (No No*) - Cmdr. Bloomfield,
28*3«70, copied to Commodore i/c, E* Indies Station
(2) FO 7& 3186 f 102, Res - Muhammad Pasha, 19**f*70
(3) FO 78 3186, CG Cairo - FO (No 60) of 3.6.70 with
French copies of Anglo-Rgyptian exchanges of correspondence
(if) p*6.11 n.3
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The Indian Government decided that the Egyptian 
claim was the concern of the Government in London• The 
Resident was forbidden to correspond further with Egyptian 
or Ottoman officials about Berbera and Bulhar, until 
H.M.G.!s views were known (1). The new Resident (2) however 
tried, ineffectually, to strengthen Somali unity and 
to arrange a settlement of local, tribal, differences at 
Berbera through a Somali employee of the Residency (3).
In London, Lord Granville at the Foreign Office required 
'... some distinct evidence to show that H.M.s Gov^ are 
entitled to protest, as suggested by Sir E. Russell, 
against the Viceroy £of EgyptJ taking Berbera ... and 
for |BritainJ insisting on the independence of the 
tribes . .. * (*+). The India Office could not provide 
the proof that Granville required. There was none*
Interest in the Somali coast f... was allowed to
(1) AIA Aden Secret file for 1870? For. Dept. G of I
No 9*fl P of 8.6.70. AIA 560. The ban was reviewed 
by For. Dept. G of Ifs letter - SGB of 1.3.71
(2) Major Gen. C.W. Tremenheere arrived on 17.12.70
(3) AIA 560, Res 3.37 - SGB, 7.1*71 and 2.2.71 
(if) FO 78/3186, FO draft - 10 of 8.8.70
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drop • ••, outside Aden (1). There, shipping casualties 
forced the Residents attention to the Somali coast* 
Following the killing of a shipwrecked British sailor, 
the Mijjertain coast was blockaded in 1871 (2). Argyll, 
as Secretary of State, approved f..* the utmost exertion 
to secure • ••* those guilty (3). But. the Government of 
Bombay and the Foreign Department were opposed to any new, 
and direct, intervention on land. Approval was refused 
for the despatch of a British political officer to the 
Mijjertain coast during the blockade, because the Somalis 
retired inland when threatened from the sea. The Bombay 
Government feared involvements ashore, beyond reach of 
naval support, if a political officer was appointed.
The Egyptians claimed that Mu^zinger Pasha^s 
appointment as Governor of Massawa covered not only 
territory as far south as Edd, but extended beyond, so 
that he 1... exercise.Jd] general supervision over ...
(1) FO 78 3L87? Comment in Hertslett*s FO Memo of 20.10.73 
on Egyptian claims to the Somali coast.
(2) AAR 1870/71
(3) L/P & S/6/28*+, S of S - G of I, No k2 of 23.3.7I
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the Somali country ...' (1). But the Aden Residency still 
had to take action to rescue survivors, and to arrange 
the salvage, of cargoes, of steamers wrecked on the 
treacherous and, to Europeans, unfamiliar waters around 
Cape Guardafui, during 1872-187^ (2). Meantime, the 
Egyptians continued to strengthen their connections with 
Berbera. Egyptian naval vessels left the area during 
the summer monsoon but returned every autumn. By 
November, 1873* the Egyptian occupation of Berbera was 
a 'fait accompli*.
+ + + + +
The India Office's successful pressure on the 
Foreign Office,against the Ottomans in the southern Yemen 
encouraged renewed pressure by Argyll and the India 
Office for an Egyptian withdrawal from the Somali 
coast (3). Sir Bartle Frere complained in 1873 that an 
Egyptian presence on the Somali coast would assist the
(1) AIA 560, Aden News No 13 of 15.9.71
(2) AARs 1872/73 (no paras) and para 97, 1873/7^
(3) FO 78 3187? 10 note - FO, quoting Argyll, 1^.1.7^
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slave trade (1). But Argyll could not convince Gladstone 
and Granville that an Egyptian presence was contrary to 
British interests at Aden; and Granville retained 
strong doubts about the validity of Indian claims at 
Berbera (2)* In the realistic Foreign Office view,.
Aden's interest in supplies from Berbera and Bulhar could 
be preserved by agreements with Egypt to preserve the 
trade between those anchorages and Aden. The India 
Office argument was weak, because it rested upon the 
exaggerated danger of a foreign power being able '••• to 
stop the export ... of the meat, upon which our possession 
of Aden almost entirely depends (3)« In reality,
Aden's security depended upon British naval control of 
the Gulf of Aden, where necessary, and not on the Somali 
meat rations of a garrison of about 1^00 men.
Granville's customary reluctance to commit himself 
to a definite policy showed; he procrastinated* In his 
view '... no action is at present called for and [the
(1) AM, Frere - Argyll, Oct 1873
(2) FO 78 3187? Granville's comments on FO Memo of 
19.1.7*+- on 10 note of l*f.l*7^
(3) FO 78. 3186, Memo of 29.1*7^
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matterJ had better be left alone . ..* (1)* With the 
Liberal Government nearing the end of its period in 
office, the moment was inopportune for a change in policy; 
and developments on the Somali coast never became matters 
of party controversy. The change in Government in 
February, 187**-j led to no change in policy at the India 
Office, or in the Foreign Office. Lord Salisbury 
supported the Government of India1s views on the Yemen 
and on Somali affairs as staunchly as the Duke of Argyll 
had done; and Lord Derby remained as critical of those 
views as Lord Granville had been. It is probablf that 
the permanent officials influenced their political 
masters on these issues (2).
Frere was conspicuous because he was converted 
from opposition to, to support for, Egyptian rule on 
the Somali Coast (3)* He had had the advantage of 
visiting Aden in 1873 and in talking to officials with
(1) FO 78 3187? Note by Granville on Minute by Lord 
Tenterden of 21.1.7**-
(2) e.g. FO 78 3187, Lord Tenterden* s comprehensive Memo 
of 31*1»71*‘ on the background, as known to the FO, of 
British relations with the Somalis
(3) FO 78 31875 Undated Memo by Frere passed by 10 - FO on
7*8.7**-
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some experience of the Somali Coast. Possibly,; Frere*s 
views changed because he learnt that the slave trade was 
prohibited in Egypt and that the Khedive was prepared to 
forbid the export of slaves from Egyptian territory (1). 
Also, the new Egyptian Governor of Massawa, the Swiss, 
Munzinger Pasha, took vigorous action against slaving 
dhows (2).. Frere* s realistic re-appraisal was provoked 
by reading a Memorandum by Sir William Merewether, 
arguing for an Egyptian expulsion on the grounds of 
expediency, not on any legal grounds (3).
Frere recognised that circumstances had changed 
and that there had to be a new policy, because the Suez 
Canal had turned the Bed Sea and the Gulf of Aden from 
a backwater into a major international trade route. 
Foreign intervention was inevitable; but, if the new 
Power was the Ottomans or the Egyptians, local British 
military security need not suffer (*+). British influence
Cl) FO 78 3187 f 21, Hertslett1s FO Memo of 20.10.73 
quoting CG, Alexandria
(2) A IA  658, Aden News No 10 of 6-12.3.7**-
(3) HO 78 3187* Merewether*s Memo of 13.7*7**- passed
by 10 - FO, 7.8.7**-
(*+) Cf. with Frere*s opposition in 1873 in the Yemen, 
n. 3.
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in the area rested largely upon the prestige of the 
Resident with the coastal Somali tribes, not upon legal 
Agreements with the tribes. So long as Britain1s 
standing locally remained higher than that of any other 
Power, British influence would not be reduced by an 
Egyptian presence at Berbera; and provided that suitable 
commercial agreements secured Aden*s Somali supplies, an 
Egyptian occupation might even increase trade by increasing 
security.
Frere knew that the Aden authorities now recognised 
that Aden*s trade with shipping in transit through the 
Canal was potentially more important than trade with the 
Somali Coast. Previously, Aden authorities had been 
concerned about losing African trade to foreign competitors* 
In Frere*s opinion, Aden*s best assets were fits excellent 
geographical position1 and its fine port* Frere correctly 
believed that the slave trade in Abyssinia was 1 an 
immense stimulus to intertribal warfare, jjtending to keep| 
the country depopulated, barbarous and unsafe ...f (1).
In Frere1s view, if Egypt followed a l... policy of real
(1) AIA 6*4f, 3rd head, Frerefs Memo undated, 187^, on
African coast treaties
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true trade ... and above all ... discourage(dj slavers 
... we might welcome ...' the Egyptians on the Somali 
Coast. The only sufferers might be Indian traders who 
would face new competition.
The nomadic Somali coastal tribes lived along a 
major sea route once the Suez Canal was opened, but their 
tribal leaders had slight authority, except amongst the 
Mijjertarri tribe,(1). Some authority had to supervise 
contact between the Somalis and European shipping, to 
protect wrecks and stranded sea-farers and to arrange 
rescue and salvage operations. But the Somali coast 
was not highly productive and it had a small population* 
India could not pay the price of administering that 
coast; and, although Aden was now recognised to be an 
Imperial base and not an Indian outpost (2), the 
Government of India did not want the British Government 
to take over financial responsibility for, and political 
control of, Aden (3)*
+  +  *h -h
(1) Hunter 'Aden1 p.l?8
(2) LI, S of S - Viceroy, No 227 of 7*8*71t
(3) JAP,Minto.'827 p.37, For. Dept. Summary 1899-1905. 
Reference to Indian Govt's objections in 1890.
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Egyptian and British claims in Somaliland
The Egyptians wanted to have their claim to all the 
African coast along the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden 
including the British-claimed Moussa and Eibat islands, 
recognised by Britain (1). Without such recognition, 
the French were unlikely to give up Obokh, purchased in 
1862. The Egyptians were concerned about French arms 
exports into Abyssinia so long as Gbokh was outside 
Egyptian control. Both the British Consul General at 
Alexandria and the Ambassador at Constantinople suggested 
that the British-claimed islands '... might be given up 
to the Viceroy £of Egypt^J without inconvenience ...* (2). 
Lord Northbrook disagreed. Salisbury supported the Viceroy 
in deprecating the cession of the islands and also 
considered an Egyptian occupation of Berbera and Bulhar 
undesirable (3)*
By November, 187^, a naval report confirmed the *de
(1) p*6.^f n*3 and b
(2) FO 78 3187, Sir Henry Elliot - FO, No of 3.11.73
(3) L/P & S/3/10*f, Vol 97, Comments of 10 - FO on G of I
Despatch No 78 of 1*5*7^-
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facto1 Egyptian occupation of Berbera (1). The Consul 
General at Alexandria continued to press for British 
recognition of the Egyptian occupation, subject to 
adequate safeguards for Aden's free trade (2). In 
December, Lord Tenterden minuted to Lord Derby $
The India Office have allowed this question to drift 
on, by their impractical position on it, until the 
Egyptians are firmly established ...' (3). But, by 
then, the Government of India had accepted the need for 
an amicable settlement which would preserve British 
'... commercial and other advantages at Berbera and 
elsewhere ...' C^)* That more realistic Indian attitude 
possibly reflected Northbrook's later, personal, view 
that Britain had the best position in the Gulf of Aden, 
at Aden, and therefore had no cause for jealousy of other 
Powers interest in the area (5). But the private
(1) FO 78 3168, Report by Cmdr. A. Brooke, R.N.
H.M.S. Vulture, 20.11.7^
(2) FO 78 3168, CG Alexandria - FO, 15.9.7k
(3) FO 78 3168, Minute Tenterden - Derby, 29,12»71t-
(k) LI, 0 of I, 9.10.7^ - S of S
(5) p. 6.42 n.l
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correspondence of Argyll and of Northbrook show no 
expressed personal interest in Somali Coast affairs 
by either man, in contrast to their strongly-expressed 
objections to an Ottoman presence in southern Yemen.
+ + + + •+*
The Residency and Egyptian control of Berbera
The Egyptian occupation of Berbera was initially 
welcomed by the local Ayal Yunis section of the Habr 
Awal, who thought that they would benefit from the 
newcomers* Redhwan Bey, the first Egyptian Governor, 
closed the rival anchorage of Bulhar, belonging to the 
Ayal Yunis1 rivals, the Ayal Ahmad section of the Habr 
Awal. Redhwan hoped to make Egyptian control easier 
by concentrating trade at Berbera. But inter-tribal 
feuds made it impossible to direct all Bulhar*s trade to 
Berbera. Exports of ghee and livestock from the Somali 
Coast to Aden declined during the 187^-75 trading season; 
and General Schneider tried to browbeat Redhwan, ini direct 
negotiations, into reopening Bulhar*
Schneider*-s tactics resembled Northbrook* s initiative
6.2b
in I873* when Northbrook ordered that Schneider should 
warn Ahmad Mukhtar Pasha that the latter1s actions in 
the Yemen were unfriendly to the British (1)* The dispute 
was placed on a personal level* Schneider sent 
Captain F.M, Hunter with a mild official letter of 
protest, asking that Redhwan '••* at once remove the
Bulhar . ( 2 ) .  The Arabic translation of Schneider's 
English draft was less preremptory, it 'begged of* 
Redhwan the raising of Bulhar's blockade (3)« But 
Hunter's instructions required him to use much stiffer 
language to Redhwan; '... Observe to the Pasha that the 
Resident is of opinion that the British Government will 
not tolerate the closing of any ports on the Somali 
Coast ...* (*+) • In issuing this order Schneider was 
acting without the authority of the Foreign Department* 
Schneider was probably influenced by his recent
(1) p.3*27 n.3
(2) AIA 6Mf, Res - Redhwan Bey, Nov 187^* f 32 English, 
f 29 Arabic
(3) u-jJLt = request, u-aJJ? = beg of,
KWehr:!-s Dictionary, p*5&3
restrictions imposed on from
(b) AIA 6^ ,  Res instructions - Hunter, 13*11*7^*
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success in securing an Ottoman withdrawal in the Yemen; 
his stock with his superiors, and his local prestige, was 
high. Schneider moreover wrongly believed that the 
Ottoman officers in the Yemen acted against their official 
instructions (1). He possibly believed that Redhwan1s. 
action was also unauthorised* But Hunter was a moderate, 
tactful man. When Redhwan explained that he was simply 
carrying out orders, Hunter only protested that the closing 
of Bulhar, despite the Resident*s remonstrances, was 
unfriendly (2)* Bulhar remained closed until after the 
1875/76 season (3)* By Article II of the Alexandria 
agreement, recognising Egyptian sovereignty, Bulhar was 
to be, like Berbera, a free port. . But neither Bulhar 
nor Berbera remained free ports: the Egyptians had
promised to give away more than they could afford by their 
agreement of 1877* In 1881, the Resident even agreed to
(1) p. 3*66 n.*+
(2) AIA 6M+, Hunter* s Report - Res of 21.11.7^
(3) LA, Res 18.373 of 16.3*76 - SGB, copied to S of S
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the closure of Bulhar without complaints by the Aden 
merchants (1).
+ + + + +*
The minor role of Berbera in Egyptian colonial plans
By 1875> the Khedive was not interested in Berbera 
and the Somali Coast for its relatively meagre commercial 
possibilities. He wanted an East African outlet (2) at 
Brava or Kjrsimayu, as a terminus for the produce of the 
Central African Lakes District (3). Baker and Gordon 
had been appointed to expand Egyptian control in 
Equatoria from I869 to 1877* But the Nile passage proved 
too difficult and dangerous a route for Equatorial exports 
to Egypt. Unfortunately for the Khedive, the ports he 
wanted were northern possessions of the Sultan of
(1) BSC 8l/8*f, Res - CG Alexandria, 5.9-81
(2) FO 78 3189? Memo by CG Vivian, on leave in England, 
dated 2^*8.76 and Memo of 19.8.76 by Mr Wylde to 
Lord Derby
(3) Suggested by Gordon. Lord Elton 1 General Gordon1, 
London, 195*+* P• 1 9 ^ - 1 9 (Hereafter Elton Gordon1).
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Zanzibar, However, McKillop Pasha occupied both ports 
in 1875 (1)« By that time the Khedive*s forces could 
control, or threaten, all the Dan kali and Somali coasts, 
except for French-claimed Qbokh, thereby controlling 
almost all access to Abyssinia and being able to restrict 
arms supplies to the interior. That made the possibility 
of Egyptian domination over the Emperor John of Abyssinia, 
over Menelik of Shoa, and over the Galla and Somali 
tribes seem more likely.
However, in November 1875? the Empej^or John 
decisively defeated some *+000 Egyptian troops at Gundet 
in Eritrea (2). A second Egyptian force, instead of 
avenging the defeat, was beaten in March, I876. While 
the Danakil overran another small Egyptian force in 
November, 1875* Munzinger Pasha and 310 soldiers were 
killed (3). These military misfortunes led the Resident 
at Aden to moralise that naval power could control any 
portion of the African Coast, but that the difficulties
(1) AAR 1875/76
(2) AAR 1875/76, para 16
(3) AAR 1875/76, para 15
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began in the interior, beyond naval support (1). 
Unfortunately for the Khedive, British naval power far 
exceeded his own; and the Egyptian forces were obliged 
to evacuate Brava and Kisimayu, after British 
remonstrances in support of the Sultan of Zanzibar, 
early in 1876. The Sultan of Zanzibar had ensured British 
support by abolishing slavery in his Egyptian-occupied 
northern territories (2). General Gordon blamed Nubar 
Pasha for British opposition; Gordon said that he had 
warned Nubar in 1875 that the latter should secure 
British agreement before despatching an Egyptian expedition 
to the East African Coast (3)* Nubar believed that he 
had already secured British approval through Sir Bartle 
Frere.
The Resident believed that the Khedive had occupied 
Zeila and Berbera as a springboard for the occupation of 
Harrar ). Egyptian officers had visited Harrar and
(1) AAR 1875/76, para 17
(2) LA Aden News, Report No 51 of 23-29.12.75
(3) Lord Elton ‘General Gordon1 p. 195? London, 195*+
(tf) AAR 1875/76, para 12
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proceeded beyond into Galla territory on reconnaissance 
in 187*+ (1). Harrar was occupied in 1875* The Harraris 
welcomed the Egyptians, at first, as fellow-Muslims who 
would help them against their pagan Galla neighbours (2). 
A small Egyptian force of 500 men, from Zeila, was 
therefore adequate for the initial occupation (3)- It 
is possible that the Egyptians were considering an 
alliance with Menelik of Shoa against the Emperor John. 
The Egyptians in Harrar established communications with 
Menelik in 1876 ; but, by I878, Egyptian relations
with Menelik were bad (5)* Egyptian relations with the 
Harraris and the neighbouring Galla, and Issa Somali, 
tribes also deteriorated drastically. Major F.M. Hunter 
ascribed that deterioration, in 188*+, to bad Egyptian 
administration and to blatant extortion (2)
(1) AIA 6M+, Res - SGE, 20.3.7^
(2) FO 78 3725, F.M. Hunter's Report of 7.lf.8!+ - Baring
(3) p.6.28 n.
(»0 Aden News No 9 of 1876
(5) LI P & S Vol 5 f 887, Menelik's letter of 
- Queen Victoria via the Resident at Aden
21.2.78
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In August, I876, the British Consul General at 
Alexandria, then on home leave, minuted that the Khedive 
f... w^ not be the least obliged to us for acks his 
sovereignty over a long range of barren and unsettled 
territory where he neither have the wish nor the 
power to abolish the slave trade . ..* (1). The Khedive 
still hoped to gain control of Somali territory down 
to the Juba River (2). Berbera on its own was an 
expensive Egyptian commitment. In June, I876, the Acting 
Resident urged that the Khedive should abandon it as an 
economy measure (3)*- At last, in 1877> the British 
Government gave qualified recognition to the Egyptian 
occupation of the Somali Coast (if)* The slave trade was 
to be banned; Egypt had to agree not to cede any of the 
territory to foreign Powers; Berbera and Bulhar were to 
remain free ports; and British recognition was subject
(1) F0 78 3189, Minute of 2^8.76
(2) F0 78 3189? E0 Memo by Mr Wylde of 19.8.76, quoting
the Consul General, Alexandria
(3) LI (P &  S 76) Ag, Res - S of S, 3*6.76
(if) F0 78 3189 f 282, Memo of May 1877 on draft agreement
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to the Sultan1s ratification of the Agreement. The 
penultimate condition was unrealistic because Egypt 
needed the customs revenus to pay for Egyptian 
administration* The Sultan never ratified the Agreement.
British recognition of Egyptian claims on the Somali 
Coast did not make Egyptian influence any more effective 
there* The most dangerous coastal stretch around Cape 
Guardafui belonged to the Mijjertain tribe; and they 
had no agreements with the Egyptians (1)* Ships 
continued to be wrecked there. Early in 1879> the new 
2800 ton iron steamer, S.S. !Vortigern^ was stranded, 
carrying a politically sensitive cargo of American rifles, 
gunpowder and other cargo, near Ras Hafun (2). The 
Somalis treated the British sailors well; and the 
Resident*s First Assistant, Major G.R. Goodfellow, made 
an agreement with the Mijjertaim for the protection of 
shipping and seafarers despite Egyptfs nominal sovereignty.
(1) AIA 575 Pt II. See Report of Mate of I.M.S. Kwangtung, 
Mr. Elton of 20*7*72 to Res on treacherous conditions 
around C. Guardafui
(2) P & S Vol 5, Res 8/356 of 28.2*79, copied to S of S
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The Resident asked for the agreement to be ratified, 
and for Egyptian consent to be obtained (1). As the 
Resident pointed out, the Mijjertain Somalis denied 
Egyptian suzerainty; and the Egyptians **.. are 
perfectly ignorant of that portion of the African 
coast (2)* Nor was that a purely Residency bias*
The Captain of H.M.S. 'Seagull1 commented on *.** the 
£well knownj hatred of the Somali tribes for the 
Egyptians • ••; were their Jsomalis^J power equal to 
their desires not an Egyptian would be left on the 
Somali littoral ...l (3).
+ + + +
Cl) P &  S Vol 5, Res - S of S 15/625 of (undated)
April 1879
(2) Res instructions to Major Goodfellow before the 
latter went to R. Hafun, 2^^3-795 PS 5 ^ 803
(3) P & S Vol 5 f l*f65, Report of Capt. Heron of H.M.S. 
Seagull of 5*6.80 - Res and to Admlty
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Berbera and Urabi Pasha1s revolt
Urabi Pasha1s nationalist movement was welcomed 
by the Egyptian troops at Harrar and on the African 
Coast, although Farhat Bey, in command at Berbera, 
declared for the Khedive, after a period of fence-sitting(l)» 
The Egyptian troops had grievances: they were isolated,
amongst a largely hostile population, and the Berbera 
troops resented having to do navvying work (2). The 
Resident at Aden was concerned that support for Urabi 
might lead to a ban on livestock shipments to Aden, 
because the British were supporting the Khedive (3)* In 
return, the Egyptian garrison were apprehensive of a 
British attack on the Somali Coast (^0* Egyptian tension 
relaxed when the Acting Consul, Captain C.W. Sealey, 
informed the Bey that there was no British intention of
(1) AIA 891, Res - SGB, 18*7*82. Nadi Pasha at Harrar
was related to Urabi and had served in the same
Regiment with him
(2) AIA 891 f 107? Report of Acting British Agent, Berbera, 
Mohamed Abdar Rahman Hindi
(3) AIA 891, Res. tel. - SGB, 12.7.82
C1*-) AIA 89I, Br. Agent Berbera - Br. Consul Somali Coast,
20.7*82
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t
Interfering on the Somali Coastal)* General Loch did 
not, however, trust Farhat Beyfs professions of goodwill 
to the British and the Khedive in October, 1882 (2).
*f + *+■ + +
Hunter*s role as the first British Consul to the Somali 
Coast
Major F.M. Hunter was hastily appointed British
Consul to the Somali Coast in March, 1881, so that he
could take up his duties before a French or Italian Consul .
F. A. £
arrived (3). In General $.H. Loch*s view, Hunter's 
seniority over his fellow consuls would help *... to 
keep up the prestige of Great Britain in these 1waters* 
and in the Bed Sea . ..* (if). As Consul, Hunter came
A writ
(1) AIA 891, Br. Berbera to Ag. Br. C.S.C., 29*7.82
(2) AIA 891, Farhat - Res, 26.10.82
(3) LI, G of I - Res, 25*3►81, Res - G of I, acknowledging 
receipt of Hunter's Exequatur’, 6.if.81. The initiative 
came from the Indian authorities, but the appointment 
was ky the F0
(^ -) LI, Res - SGB, 8.2.81
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under the British Consul-General in Egypt, who was 
under the British Ambassador to the Porte. The Resident 
at Aden was too senior to hold a Consul1s post. Loch’s 
choice of his First Assistant for the Consular post was 
realistic. Hunter had 10 years experience in Aden and 
had had frequent contact with Somalis there and in Africa. 
Hunter had recently been appointed First Assistant to the 
Resideni and could be expected to remain some years at 
Aden, It was important that continuity in the post 
should be ensured. The Consul's effectiveness depended 
largely upon good personal relations with the proud and 
sensitive Somalis (1). Hunter understood them better 
than any other European; and the Somalis respected 
Hunter (2).
Hunter's dual roles, as First Assistant to the 
Resident and as Consul, gave him unique opportunities 
for assessing the weakness, and therefore the transitory., 
nature, of the Egyptian position on the Coast; and he
(1) Cf, D, Jardine 'The Mad Mullah of Somaliland', London,
1923, p.28, (hereafter Jardine 'Mullah'), on the 
qualities required of a British administrator with 
the Somalis,
(2) Times of India, Obituary of Col. F.M. Hunter, I898
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had opportunities as First Assistant at Aden for making 
some preparations for preserving British interests after 
the Egyptians1 departure. His preparations included 
unofficial, but effective, special training in musketry, 
for forty picked men of Adenls police force (1)* Most 
of these policemen were Somalis; others belonged to various 
Asian races; but all were recruited in Aden. From 
Hunterfs point of view, as an Indian political, rather 
than as a military, officer, this detachment had the 
advantage that it was directly under his command, subject 
only to the Residents approval. Military permission 
was not required to use the detachment, and there was 
no military supervision over its use once on the Somali 
Coast.
When a British presence was established on the Somali 
Coast these police were transferred to the new establishment 
and formed the trained nucleus around which a local 
administration was built. As a mainly Somali civilian 
force they could be used unobtrusively,, without arousing 
local resentment, or attracting the critical attention
(1) L.P. Walsh fUnder the Flag and Somali Coast Stories1,
London, 1-932, hereafter Walsh 1 Somali Coast1, p.200
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of rival European Powers. They did not represent a 
military occupation, as Indian Army detachments would 
have done* Their use did not therefore suggest new 
Indian military commitments in the area. Their pay and 
conditions of service were deliberately kept the same as 
in the Aden Police service so that men from the two services 
were interchangeable at the discretion of the First 
Assistant Resident (1)*
4* + + + +
Sir Evelyn Baring, who had been Lord Northbrook1s 
private secretary when the latter was Viceroy, was 
appointed British Agent and Consul General in Egypt in 
September, 1883* Baring wished to reduce Egyptian 
expenditure; one of his economy measures, made mandatory 
by the Mahdifs success in the Sudan, was the withdrawal 
of the Egyptian garrisons scattered about the provinces 
of the Sudan. Garrisons on the Emperor Johnfs border 
were evacuated through Abyssinia by arrangements made with
Cl) BSC 81/8^, Offg Res (Hunter) - S of S, August 188“+ 
f 1121
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the Emperor. Those negotiations were conducted by 
Rear Admiral Sir William Hewitt, C. in C*, E. Indies (1). 
Another isolated garrison was that of Harrar, over 
100 miles inland from Zeila, cut off by hostile Galla 
and Somali tribes, and unconnected to Abyssinian or 
Shoan territory.
The Egyptians lacked the troops, or the finances, 
to prepare a relief expedition; the Harrar garrison1s 
lines of communication were insecure and Baring needed 
reliable local information before evacuation plans could 
be made. Issa caravans travelled between Zeila and 
Harrar. Major F.M. Hunter was a natural intermediary 
with the Issa, and a source of information and assistance 
for Baring. At Baring1s request he visited Harrar in 
March; in April,, Hunter submitted his report, on the 
measures required for an evacuation, direct to Baring 
without sending the Resident at Aden a copy (2). Hunter 
explained that the views expressed were his own, and 
that Baring should refer to the Resident, General Blair,
(1) Details in PRO, F0 1.31
(2) F0 78 3725, C.S.C. — Baring, fA.Sh
6.39
for the latter1 s views. Hunter1 s excuse was that, as 
Baring required the report urgently, he had no time to 
obtain Blair's approval; and, as the Consul, Hunter 
could communicate with Baring without reference to the 
Resident.
Hunter's proposal, however, involved the temporary 
British occupation of Zeila and of Berbera, which would 
require some force from Aden. Hunter possibly knew that 
General Blair was applying for a short leave of 3 months, 
when Hunter was likely to be officiating as Resident.
Blair was in no position to comment on Hunter's proposals, 
but he would have been expected to do so if Hunter had 
copied them to him. Walsh implied that Hunter anticipated 
British intervention on the Somali Coast in February,
h188*+ (1); and that Hunter corresponded private^with 
Sir James Fergusson, the Governor of Bombay, in May,about 
Foreign Office proposals for an occupation of Berbera, 
using police, not troops, from Aden (2).
The India Office knew nothing, officially, about a.
(1) Walsh 'Somali Coast' p.201
(2) Walsh 'Somali Coast' p.98-99* There is no evidence 
of this elsewhere
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possible Egyptian evacuation until early May (1)*
Lord Kimberley favoured closer treaties with the Somali 
chiefs, comparable to the Anglo-Mahri agreement for 
Socotra (2), a temporary British occupation of Berbera 
to forestall other Powers, and, possibly, British 
recognition of Ottoman claims to Zeila and Tajoura. The 
Viceroy proposed new agreements with the Somali tribes; 
he recognised the importance of Zeila and of Berbera to 
Aden, but hoped to avoid a military occupation (3).
There was no mention of any police action; and no 
indication that Hunter's long-term preparations were 
known to the Foreign Department, or to the India Office, 
or to Baring (V) •
Hunter felt that the British Government would not 
want Berbera and Zeila placed under the control of the 
Aden authorities (5)* He favoured *... occasional visits
(1) FO 7H 3725, U/S 10 - U/S F0, 8.5.8V
(2) Aitchison' Treaties'No LXIII
(3) FO 78 3725, Tel. Viceroy - 10, 10.5.8V 
(V) p. 6.36n.l
(5) FO 78 3725, Hunter - Baring, 7.V.8V
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by a political officer and the placing of the whole
province £i*e. Harrar and the Somali and Dankali Coasts
up to TajouraJ within the political jurisdiction of the
Residency ...f to keep British prestige high amongst
the Somalis and Galla * Hunter offered his observations 
€
to Baring ' i . . .  with all respect and diffidence • • •*.
He outlined the British role as solely that of peacemakers 
and patrons1. After visiting Harrar he realised that no 
trace of Egyptian influence could be maintained (1).
British officials were divided about the attitude 
Britain should adopt towards French claims in the area 
to some 70 miles of Dankali coast reaching down to near 
Tajoura. The French pressed their claims forcefully upon 
the Egyptians (2). Lord Northbrook, at the Admiralty, 
deplored British !jealousy! of the French or Italian 
positions. He had come to oppose the f... traditional 
policy of trying to prevent the establishment of any 
other power . ..* in the southern Red Sea and the Gulf of 
Aden (3). The British, in his view, should be satisfied
(1) FO 78 3725, Hunter1 s Memo on Harrar, 5*l+.8lf - Baring
(2) FO 78 3725, Baring - FO, 3.3.8*f and earlier in Oct 83
(3) FO 78 3725? Northbrook - Granville, 12.^.8^
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with the possession of the best positions in the area* 
Northbrook was also confident of the Royal Navy's ability 
to dominate the area in wartime (1). But Aden Residency 
correspondence in 1883 had emphasized the potential 
danger of French arms imports into the area (2). Reports 
from Cairo had mentioned a French proposal for a railway 
from the Bay of Tajoura to Shoa (3). French commercial 
interest in the area, and particularly in Harrar, was 
plain*
The India Office suggested in March, 188*+, that the 
Egyptians should recognise the existing French settlement; 
but, unrealistically, it suggested that 1.*• some practical 
steps should, without delay, be taken ••• to anticipate 
any possible (^ further] French occupation ..** south- 
westwards (*+). In February, an Admiralty Memorandum had
(1) Cr.P. Vol *+, Northbrook - Baring, 8*2.8^
(2) FO 78 372^) 10 - FO, forwarding correspondence
from Res of March 1883
(3) FO 78 3725, CG, Cairo - FO, 11+*I+*83J quoting 1 Phare 
d'Alexandria1 of 11*^ *83
(If) FO 78 3725) 10 - FO, 5.3.8*f
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emphasized the value of Somali produce for British force s: 
in the Red Sea (1). Late in June 188!+, a Foreign Office 
minute noted complacently that it was unthinkable that 
the Egyptians should evacuate any major positions ini the 
Gulf of Aden without giving the British sufficient time 
to prepare their own arrangements for such places (2).
But, no plans had been prepared, except by Hunter. The 
French had unexpectedly occupied Sagallo on the withdrawal 
of local Egyptian forces (3). Naval sources reported on
12th May that the French intention was to encircle
Tajoura on the landward side and divert its caravan trade 
to Obokh* Later in May, the British Ambassador in Paris 
reported rumours of the coming despatch of a French
Resident with a military guard to Obokh (*+). On 29th May,
Lord Dufferin, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, 
was given private advance warning of the forthcoming
(1) FO 78 372?, Admiralty Memo of 9*2.8*+ on Egyptian
Coast territory south of the Red Sea
(2) FO 78 3726, Minute U/S Pauncefoot - Granville, 28*6.8!+
(3) FO 78 3725, Egerton, Ag.C.G., Cairo - FO, 18*5.8^
(1+) FO 78 3725, HM Ambi Paris - FO, 2*+.5.8^
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Egyptian evacuation of the Somali Coast, and of British 
intentions to safeguard British interests there without 
reference to the Porte (1).
Baring accepted Hunter1s advice that Harrar should 
be evacuated; Baring recognised that Hunter's local 
knowledge of, and influence with, the Somalis were 
necessary to secure a peaceful Egyptian evacuation (2).
But Baring never knew the local circumstances well enough 
to give Hunter any positive instructions (3)* Baring 
declined the sole responsibility for sending Hunter on 
the dangerous mission to Harrar; that was the British 
Government's responsibility. '••• The question ... appears 
... to be very similar to ... the [decision toj despatch 
General Gordon to Khartoum . •*' (2)* There were other 
factors involved* Hunter had laid down certain conditions 
for securing Somali co-operation and his own participation 
in the rescue of the Harrar garrison by political 
negotiations (*+)• Berbera was to be occupied temporarily,
(1) FO 78 372?, FO - Dufferin, 29*5*8^
(2) FO 78 372?, Baring - FO,
(3) Ci;P. Vol ?, Private Baring - Hunter, 9*6*8?
(1+) FO 78 3725y p*6A l  n.l above
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on behalf of the •independent1 Somalis, and the Egyptian 
officers were to be under Hunter*s orders* Certain 
Egyptian officers were to be replaced. These requirements 
of Hunterfs were not passed to the India Office until 
July (1)* They were only proposals for Baring to consider 
and then to pass to the Foreign Office for approval#
The Foreign Office was responsible for Egyptian 
affairs, and if Hunter was employed to evacuate Harrar, as 
Gordon was being employed to evacuate the Sudan, both 
men should receive their orders from the Foreign Office#
The India Office and the War Office were not initially 
involved in either operation. The Government of India 
had not proposed any occupation of Somali Coast territory# 
It was in favour of independence for the Somalis* The 
temporary administration of the coastal ports of Berbera 
and of Zeila was designed to help the Egyptian evacuation* 
Baring did not propose, and Hunter had not then suggested, 
the use of Indian troops.. The India Office and the Foreign 
Office exchanged views, and agreed, in principle, oil
(1) BSC, Offs Pol Res - S of S, 5.7.8^
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Hunterfs employment on the Somali Coast (1). But 
Egyptian agreement to the evacuation still had not been 
obtained late in June (l). The issue was a delicate one 
for Nubar Pasha, who had formed a new Ministry in 
January, 188*+* Nubar needed to know how Harrar was to 
be evacuated, before he could accept an evacuation on 
the coast. It would be politically damaging for Nubar 
to evacuate Berbera and Zeila, leaving the Egyptian 
garrison at Harrar isolated; and it was questionnable 
whether Zeila could be evacuated without Ottoman agreement, 
as it was leased from the Porte.
Decisions were taken quickly early in July: this
action was partly due to Baringfs submission ofa 
Memorandum to the Foreign Office (2). Baring was then 
in England; and he wanted to obtain a British decision 
on the future of the Egyptian Gulf of Aden ports. The 
Egyptian ministers considered that action depended upon 
a British solution to the problem of Harrar. Baring made
(1) FO 78 3726, 10 - FO, 8.5*8*+ and U/S FO Memo of 
28.6.8^
(2) FO 78 3726, Baring*s Memo, 5*7*8If
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the following points:-
1*. The Foreign Office should inform the India Office 
that Hunter needed no authority west of Zeila*
[Baring may not have realised that such an arbitrary 
division of Issa territory into two would encourage 
later Anglo-French differences when officials of each 
nation claimed to have made agreements with the Issa 
tribe^j
2*. Lord Dufferin should ask the Porte to take early 
action to resume control over the Egyptian ports that 
were going to be evacuated. Failing an Ottoman reply 
within 1*+ days, the Porte should be warned that, if no 
immediate action was taken, independent arrangements 
would be made for Zeila and Tajoura. Baring advised that 
Tajoura should be left to the French and that Zeila should 
be temporarily occupied by the British*
3* Baring 1... expected Hunter was right to propose 
a temporary occupation of Berbera Baring wanted
a small force with naval support. The actual method of 
occupation should be arranged with the India Office, but 
Berbera should be defended against any Power. 
b* Hunter should co-operate over the evacuation of 
Harrar.
6 M
5* The Egyptian authorities should be asked to arrange 
that their officers co-operated with Hunter and the 
Egyptians should explain their evacuation plans.,
Baring*s Memorandum relieved him of any direct 
responsibility for the forthcoming operation. That was 
placed upon the Egyptians and the India Office. Yet 
Baring claimed that the Egyptians wanted the British to 
decide on the evacuation plans* Plainly the Egyptians 
did: they lacked the military strength to evacuate
Harrar by force, and, like Baring, they therefore had to 
rely on Hunter*s local political skill with the Issa tribe. 
But Baring required the Indian authorities to plan operations 
on the Somali Coast for Hunter to implement. Yet Hunter 
had emphasized in April that a successful evacuation 
depended upon Egyptian co-operation with him (1). Baring 
alone could co-ordinate this Anglo-Egyptian operation..
Because of his ora ignorance of local conditions and his 
apprehension about the outcome, Baring tried to divert 
the responsibility elsewhere.
The Foreign Office had been concerned in June that
(1) p. 6.*+l n. 1 and 2
6.1+9
Hunter*s duties should be defined by the Indian 
authorities and then explained to the Egyptian Government (1)* 
The Viceroy arranged, through the Bombay Government, for 
Hunter to negotiate with the Somali tribes east of Zeila; 
he questioned whether Hunter would need similar authority 
west of Zeila (2). Kimberley believed that the latter 
authority was not required (2)* Granville made no 
comment. On 28th June, Kimberley agreed, at Hunter1 s 
request, that the local announcement of the Egyptian 
evacuation should be left to Hunter*s discretion (3)*
As a possible encouragement to secure this discretion,
Hunter had suggested that troops would probably not be 
required on the Somali Coast*
Kimberley was sent Baring*s Memorandum of 5th July 
for comment, without any extra information from Egypt (V)»
He discussed the Memorandum with General Blair, who knew
(1) FO 78 3726, 10 - FO, 12.6.8V, and FO Summary commenting 
on 10 correspondence
(2) FO 78 3726, Tel, Viceroy - S of S, 21*6.8V, sent to 
FO, 2V*6.
(3) FO 78 3726, Viceroy* s tel* of 28.6*8*4- - 10 and 
10 - FO, 28.6.8V
(V) FO 78 3726, sent in a special dispatch box
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little about Somali affairs (1)* Blair believed that 
troops should be sent to Berbera; and that Hunter might 
be able to arrange the evacuation from Harrar. Kimberley1 s 
concerns were that Tajoura should not be left to the 
French (2) and that the Government of India should agree 
to pay any garrison expenses at Berbera. Granville then 
accepted Baring's proposals in the Memorandum, other than 
that of leaving Tajoura to the French (3)* It was assumed 
that Lord Ripon and the Foreign Department would arrange 
Hunterfs orders and the supervision of his actions*
The Viceroy, however, instructed the Governor of 
Bombay that Hunter should *... refer direct [to the 
India OfficeJ for instructions ...f {b). Sir James
(1) FO 78 3725j Hunter - Baring, 7A.8Lh, '... matters
which he has not hitherto been called on to consider ...*
(2) BSC 8l/8*t, Vol V, Hunter, 0ffg Res - S of S, 5*6.81+,
advocated handing Tajoura and Zeila to Meneli'k of Shoa,
to prevent French occupation. Letter was a detailed 
survey of the need for British action at Berbera & Zeila
(3) FO 78 3726, Note in File
(*+) FO 78 3726, tel. Gov.B0 - .10, 5*7*8I+
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Fergusson noted that Hunter proposed *... to take 
MD armed constables as escort [to Berbera] instead of 
troops . ..* Cl); he recommended *... considerable 
latitude to Hunter . ..*. Plainly the Governor was 
sympathetic to Hunter*s aims (2), and he warned Kimberley 
that Hunter believed that the Somalis expected a British 
administration in Berbera for a considerable time.
Hunter had made his attitude clear to the India Office 
in June (3)> in answer to the Secretary of State*s Secret 
No 2 of 23 May, 188V.
Hunter opposed any foreign occupation; fIf the 
Turks go back to Zeila, they will eventually go on to 
Harrar ... It is not possible to measure the evils which 
will result to general commerce ...* then. A French or 
Italian occupation of coastal ports would also make 
difficulties, if it did not prevent, the Egyptian 
evacuation of Harrar, because of the Somalis1 hostile 
reaction. In Hunter*s view; *The only safe way of
Cl) p.6.50 n A
(2) Cf. p. 6.39 n. 2
(3) BSC 8l/8*f, Vol V, OffS Res - S of S, 5.6.8^
6 .52
arranging for the autonomy of the Somal will be by a. 
temporary British occupation, in the manner suggested by 
Lord Kimberley • ••' (1). The task of educating the Somal 
in self-government may {then] not prove impossible ...’ (2).
The Foreign and India Offices accepted the Indian 
Government's rejection of responsibility for supervising 
Hunter’s actions without remonstrance (3)* Ihe Acting 
Consul-General (*f) was asked for details of the Egyptian 
plans for evacuation (5); and Hunter was warned that he 
should take no action to remove the Egyptian garrison 
without fresh instructions. The wheel had spun full 
clvc/de back to Baring and Hunter, under the Foreign Office 
umbrella, although Kimberley had accepted a temporary 
occupation of Berbera for an indefinite period until self-
(1) Based on Hunter’s proposals to Baring, p*6.Ifl n.l 
Kimberley however advocated an Ottoman return to 
Zeila and Tajoura
(2) p.6.51 n.3
(3) FO 78 3726, FO - 10 on 10 draft tel. - Hunter, 12*7.8^
(*+) Mr. Edwin, later Sir Edwin, Egerton, ’locum tenens*
in Baring’s absence
(5) FO 78 3726, FO - Egerton, tel. of I7.7.81!-
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government, and a possible occupation of Zeila if the 
Porte took no action there. Since Baring later admitted 
privately his dependence on Hunter (1), Gladstonefs 
Government was drawn into an unintentional., permanent 
occupation of the Somali Coast by a course of action 
unobtrusively dictated by Hunter. He laid down requirements 
for arranging the evacuation of Harrar, and for lack of 
any alternatives his requirements were accepted. Only 
Egerton questioned the soundness of the policy (2). He 
1... venture to suggest that our own exaggerated
nervousness respecting the designs of foreign nations 
constitutes the gravest danger that threatens our country1s 
interests . ..* (2.) •
Hunter now dealt directly with the India Office on 
customary long term Indian interests, such as agreements 
with the Somali tribes, and with Baring for the immediate 
Egyptian requirements. In his dual roles as Officiating 
Resident and Consul on the Somali Coast he disposed of 
Aden*s local resources to consolidate a 1 temporary* British
(1) p ^ . 1^  n .3
• • . “ ■ * •
(2) FO 78 3726, Egerton - FO, 7.7.8H-
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position- on the Somali Coast under the Foreign Office*
That position was adopted in conformity with official 
Indian wishes to see the Somali coast 'independent1*
Only Egerton had possibly realised that the Somalis, 
could not be independent and doubted whether it was in 
the British interest to underwrite that independence (1)* 
Ripon and the Foreign Department may have feared that 
the Mahdis* success would encourage anti-foreign revolts 
elsewhere around the Red Sea* Sultan Abdul Hamid feared 
that (2)* Gordon had forecast it (3). Since Gordon 
had served briefly as Ripon1s Private Secretary, his 
predicament in, and his views on, the Sudan were unlikely 
to pass unnoticed in India* Ripon*s rejection of 
responsibility for Somali Coast policy was possibly 
cautious foresight. The Mahdis* agents did try to make 
trouble there (b)»
(1) p.6.53 n.2L
(2) CsP, Vol *+, Northbrook - Granville, 28.12.83* describing
Sultan's view
(3) Alan Moorehead 'The White Nile1, London, I960, p*217 
quoting Pall Mall Gazette article and Times letter of 
Gordon1 s of l^+.L.S^
(b) Walsh 'Somali Coast1 p.297 and p.212;BSC 85/88,
... Res .SGB, .16*3.85...................................
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Hunter undertook not to fbuyr an Egyptian evacuation 
of Harrar, nor the administration of Berbera; 1... as 
to money presents, the very sight of a dollar seems to 
upset the balance of the not naturally stable Somali 
mind - and I shall avoid the use . ..* of cash presents (1). 
Hunter planned to hold Zeila securely by evacuating the 
Egyptian garrison and by keeping 100 Native Infantry 
aboard the I.G.S. ,Amberwitchl lying offshore supported 
by the guns of H.I'l.S. !Arabf and H.M.S. ‘Ranger* (1)#
Berbera was secured by a new Agreement with the Habr
Awal (2)* The Agreement was reluctantly accepted in
London *... if absaloutely necessary ...* (3)» Hunter 
explained that the new Agreement, which forbad the Habr 
Awal to dispose of their territory except to the British, 
had been necessary because news of British plans on the
(1) BSC 81/8^, 0ffg Res - S of S, 5.7.8^
(2) Aitchison ‘Treaties1 No LXXXIX
(3) FO 78 3826, tel. Hunter - S of S, 12.7.8^, and reply
by tel. to Hunter, approved by FO* Note by Pauncefo^te 
to Granville
6.56
Somali Coast had appeared in the Indian papers (1)*
The Egyptian commander had approved Hunter*s action.
Telegraphing news of the Habr Awal agreement, Hunter 
asked for authority for a British presence. *... No 
necessity for troops at Berbera. Proposed police sufficient.
I await further instructions ...* (2). But there was no 
need for British intervention at Berbera, unless as part 
of the evacuation of Harrar. It was not then British 
policy to guarantee Berbera*s independence nor to occupy 
the area. Hunter received no orders. Everything depended 
upon whether the Porte took over control on the African 
Coast..
On 15th July, the Foreign Office informed the India 
Office that, if the Porte failed to take action at Zeila, 
Hunter should be authorised to take action there as well as at 
Berbera (3). H.M.S. *Arab* had been off the Somali Coast 
throughout July (*+). She fired a Resident* s salute of
(1) BSC 81/8b) Offg Res - S of S, 15.7.8^ and tel. of 12.7.81*
(2) FO 78 3726, tel Offg Res - S of S, 15.7.8^
(3) FO 78 3726, FO - 10, 1 5 . 7 . 8 ^
(*+) PRO Admiralty 53 12169? kog of H.M.S. *Arab*
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13 guns when Hunter landed at Berbera. off I.G.S. 
'Tenasserim' on lVth July, to arrange the new Habr Awal 
agreement. Since Berbera.was still under Egyptian 
administeration, the salute was unorthodox, but it 
emphasized to the Somalis Hunters new importance in 
Berbera.. It is probable that Hunter arranged for the 
salute; he arrived at 2.10 a.m. and the salute was fired 
at 6 a.m. when he landed. Hunter had worked closely with 
H.M.S. 'Arab1 off Mukalla in 1881 (1); and the ship had 
been detailed for duty with him on the Somali Coast 
at Baringfs request. On 2hth July, H.M.S. 'Arab1 carried 
out a practice drill at Berbera for a shore party of 
sailors and marines (2). H.M.S. 'Hanger' also stayed 
at Berbera from J+th July to 6th October. During that 
period she did four practice gun and musketry drills to 
impress the Somalis (3).
+ + "K +- +■-
(1) ADM 53 12153, Log of H.M.S. 'Arab1, 15.2.81 - July 1882
(2) ADM. 53 12169, Log of H.M.S. 'Arab1
(3) ADM 53 15250, Log ^.7.188^ - 6.10.188^
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Occupation of Zeila
Hunter was authorized, on 1st August, to reinforce 
the Zeila garrison and to *... occupy it without 
reference home if you consider step cannot safely be 
deferred . ..* to keep it out of French hands (1).
Instead of occupying Zeila, Hunter occupied Berbera, 
the Egyptian headquarters. Zeila was a subordinate 
station. Hunter could argue that his action was intended 
to be more effective than occupying Zeila itself. In his 
opinion, Zeila was less important to Aden and to the 
Somalis than Berbera (2). The action was nonetheless 
unauthorised (3)* Hunter risked at least an official 
reprimand and possibly an early retirement or dismissal. 
He used the special Aden police detachment that he had 
begun to train in 1882 (^). His action was taken so 
hastily that Mr. L.P. Walshfs official orders as British
(1) FO 78 3726, Tel. Kimberley - Hunter, 1.8.8*f
(2) p.6.51 n.3 above. He was prepared for Menelik to 
occupy Zeila
(3) Walsh ‘Somali Coast* p.100 
(*0 p.6.36 n.l above
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Agent and Vice-Consul at Berbera were not issued until 
27th August (1). It is possible that Hunter took action 
because he feared that a German detachment, or a French 
one (2), might be landed at Berbera as plans for the 
Egyptian withdrawal were known (3).
Walsh's instructions from Hunter noted that it
has primarily to be borne in mind that both [Berbera and 
BulharJ are independent and owned by the Somalis, Your 
functions are those of an administrator in a native 
state .... [There was,'however, no native state, no 
paramount chief, and a largely nomadic population] You 
will arrange for the collection, of the Customs (at Aden 
and on the spot): you will keep the peace of the ports,
exercising the powers of a first class magistrate.
you have no civil jurisdiction except over British
subjects.! ■ *
You must avail yourself sparingly of authority 
to punish by fine and imprisonment: whipping should not.
(1) BSC 81/81+, CSC Instructions - L.P. Walsh, 27.9.81+, 
after General Blair's return from leave
(2) Walsh 'Somali Coast' p.100-101
(3) p.6.56 n.l above
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be resorted to. L1* was an unpopular Egyptian 
punishment/] Your sentences should be regulated by 
your means of enforcing them and special heed must be 
had to the avoidance of exciting any undue irritation (1). 
In fact you must not punish unless compelled to do so,1
Hunter concluded; l... It is impossible to give 
instructions to meet each particular point but your own 
good sense and judgement should supplement the foregoing 
remarks ... [for the) difficult and trying duties of 
British Agent and Vice-Consul at Berbera and Bulhar1 (2).
The Habr Awal were required by treaty to assist
all British officers in such duties as may be assigned 
to them and ... to act upon their advice [aboui] 
justice, the development of the resources of the country, 
the interests of commerce, or in any other matter in 
relation to peace, order and good Government and the 
general progress of civilisation (3)* Hunter had
chosen his phrases to suit the situation in July, 188*+.
The treaty scarcely followed the pattern of the Socotra
(1) Cf. Walsh 'Somali Coast1 p.281/2, p.25*+-26^
(2) p.6,59 n.l
(3) Aitchison 'Treaties' No LXXXIX
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treaty, except in so far as both excluded foreign 
Powers (1).. Hunter had claimed that the latter treaty 
would be his model (2). He knew that f... so long as 
the Somal have not got firearms they are easily 
dominated ...' (3). His intention was to rely upon 
Somali co-operation and the self-interest of the coastal 
tribesmen, not upon force, to hold Berbera and later 
Bulhar (4). The policy was effective so long as the 
coastal tribes feared inland tribes or foreign enemies 
and needed protection. Admiral Hewett, C. in C.,
E. Indies, who had recently been in command of a small 
force at Suakin after General Baker's disaster, 
considered Walsh's escort at Berbera completely 
inadequate (5)«
4- + + -h -h
( 1 ) Aitchison 'Treaties' No LXXIII
(2) FO 78 3726, Offs Res - S of S, tel. 12*7*84
(3) BSC 85/88, CSC - CG, Cairo, 14.12*85
ih) Walsh 'Somali Coast* p.235-236
(5) Walsh 'Somali Coast* p.221
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Hunter painted an alarming picture, on 3°th July,
of increasing Issa antagonism to the Egyptians, and in
particular, to the elderly Governor of Harrar, Ali
Pasha (1)* Hunter warned that the Pasha opposed an
Egyptian evacuation as being against the Khedive*s
interests.. Hunter asked for his removal and for clear
instructions to other officers to co-operate in the
<
evacuation, with the warning that they would beepersonally 
held responsible for disasters Trought about by their own 
disregard of the policy adopted Cairo ... 1(1).
Hunter*s intention was probably to maintain pressure and 
a sense of possible crisis at the India Office in 
Kimberley*s mind (2). Hunter had secured the Habr Awal 
treaty of 15th July, but he had not been authorised to 
establish any British presence on the coast. Without 
an evacuation, the official justification for occupying 
the coastal ports would disappear.
In Egypt, Nubar Pasha procrastinated over the 
evacuation of Harrar, claiming that the garrison was
(1) BSC 81/8b f 1110, 0ffg Res - S of S (£) of 30.7.8^
(2) Cf. p.3 .97 n.l
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self-sufficient, that their position was defensible, 
and that the Egyptians lacked the resources to arrange 
a mass evacuation through desert country (1). Evacuation 
would depend upon an unfavourable balance in the Egyptian 
accounts of expenditure and revenue from Zeila and 
Harrar. Nubar undertook to produce the accounts.
Hunter wrote a letter 5 days later to Kimberley 
urging the advantages of Zeila passing under British 
control (2). In Hunter1s short-term view a temporary 
British occupation was necessary for the evacuation of 
Harrar. Kimberley had already approved that; and Hunter 
was arranging the administrative details with Egerton in 
Cairo (3). Hunter proposed delaying the despatch of 
a British administrator until the Egyptian authorities 
had warned their Governor there, AbuBakr Shermaki Pasha, 
to take orders from Hunter to ensure a peaceful 
evacuation of Harrar. The India Office and the Foreign
(1) FO 78 3726, tel. Egerton Ag. CG - FO, 21.7.81*
(2) BSC 8l/8lf, Offg Res 3/2 - S of S, k.8.8*f
(3) FO 78 3726, tel. CSC - CG Cairo, 2.8.8^: copy 
passed by FO - 10, 2.8.8^ 'for information'
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Office made no comment on Hunter1s proposals. Kimberley 
had just approved in principle a British presence at 
Zeila (1). On 2*+th August, British *... Forces landed 
Zailah. Somalees impressed. Governor obliging ...* (2).
The Porte was warned by Lord Dufferin, on Foreign 
Office instructions, that the British expedition had left 
Aden for Zeila. Unless the Porte took action, Britain 
*... will find it necessary to take steps for the 
protection of ... []the Pashalik of ZeilaTj upon its 
evacuation by Egyptian troops ...f (3)* Musurus Pasha, 
the Ottoman Ambassador in London, had protested in July 
at an apparent British disregard for Ottoman suzerainty 
on the Somali Coast (*+) • The Egyptian flag continued to 
fly over Zeila, until 1888, and a token Egyptian force of 
30 men remained on Baring*s orders (5).
(1) p.6.58 n.l above
(2) FO 78 3726, tel. Offg Res - S of S (R) CG, Egypt,
21*. 8.81*
(3) FO 78 3727, Tel. FO - Dufferin, 22.8.8^
(If) FO 78 3726, Musurus Pasha - FO, 23.7.8b
(5) BSC 85/88, CSC 18.7.85 - S of S
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But by February, 1888, Lord Salisbury considered 
that the times were ’inopportune1 for Anglo-Ottoman 
discussions on the resumption of Ottoman control over 
Zeila. Lord Salisbury suggested that the Porte should, 
instead, assert its 'more definite and valid title* to 
French- and Italian-occupied areas on the African 
Coast (1). The Government's legal advisers recognised 
that the Porte had claims to Zeila, but that it was not 
'... judged ... advisableK;to differentiate between 
British claims to Zeila and to other parts of the 
coast (2).
The Egyptian authorities were alleged in 1&96 to 
have notified the Porte on 19th November, 188*+, of the 
Egyptian evacuation of the coast from Massawa southwards (3)* 
British doubts about possible residuary Ottoman rights 
in Zeila still existed in I896, but the customary 
Egyptian rent to the Porte was no longer paid (3). The
Cl) FO 78 ¥+10, Salisbury - Sir W. White, HBMA Constantinople, 
27*2*88
(2) FO 78 ¥+10, Letter - FO from Royal Courts of Justice,
13.5.89
(3) IOL, Memo-B7*+, para 5 by W. Lee-Warner 10, 25.11.96
British administration of Berbera began on the 3rd (1) 
October after the Egyptian forces had left (2). The 
evacuation of the Harrar garrison was completed in 
November, 188*+ (3)* 2018 men, women and children were
evacuated; other Egyptians remained in the new Amir's 
service (*+). Lord Cromer alleged later that 8359 persons 
were evacuated from Harrar (5)•
British activity at Berbera and at Zeila provoked 
French irritation at Obokh, as French expansion to Sagallo, 
and later to Tajoura, provoked British irritation* A 
French Resident was appointed at Obokh at August (6).
Obokh was opened as a new coaling depot, in competition
(1) AAR 8*+/85, para 22
(2) A Times report of 9.10.8*+, published 16.10*8*+,
suggests a departure date a few days later
(3) BSC 81/8*+, CSC - Baring, *+.11.8*+ and 17.11.8*+
(*0 FO 78 *f077, Hunter's Memo of 121.87 on Harrar - Baring
forwarded to FO by Baring. The new Amir was related 
to the one executed by the Egyptians after their 
. ^occupation
(5) Earl of Cromer 'Modern Egypt1 2 vols., London, 1908, 
(Hereafter Cromer 'Egypt') Vol 2 p.52
(6) BSC 81/8*+, OffS Res - SGB, 11*8.8*+
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with Perim and Aden (1), and Issa coal coolies were 
recruited in Aden to work at Obokh. Coaling gangs in 
Aden harbour were recruited tribally and consisted of 
Arabs and Somalis. It may have been an accident that 
the French recuited Somalis from the nearest tribe,, 
although the Issa had traditional enmity to the Danakil.
It resulted in increasingly close French contacts with 
the Issa; and, since Somali marriage is exogamous, the 
French-Issa connection opened the neighbouring Gadabursi 
and Habr Awal tribes to French influence. Hunter sought, 
and obtained, permission from Baring in December to sign 
an agreement with the Issa (2), similar to his Habr Awal 
Agreement of July. British participation in the Egyptian 
evacuation of the Somali Coast was reported in !The Times1 
on 16th October (3). At the same time the paper reported 
French difficulties at Obokh, due to the heat and the
(1) BSC 81/8*+, Tel. Hunter - Baring, 23.12*8^
(2) IOL, BSC 81/8^, Tels. CSC - Baring, 23.12.8^ and 
25.12.8*+ and Baring - CSC, 27.12.8*+-, approved by 
FO, 26.12.8^ (FO 78 3728 FO - Baring)
(3) ’Times1 p.5
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lack of local labour*
The new French Consul at Aden told Hunter on 
28th October that France had annexed Dankali territory 
south of Obokh to the Issa border (1). A month later, 
the French Consul objected to Hunter that the chief of 
Tajoura had levied taxes on local trade. The Consul 
remarked that at Tajoura, where *... flotte le pavilion
T-. . . ^  . AFrancais et ou comme vous l favez reconnu vous-meme vous 
trouvenant en presence d*un fait accompli, vous ne pouvez, 
desormais, installer une douane anglaise ou egyptienne . ..* (2). 
The pace of Anglo-French rivalry quickened. Zeila was 
placed under British control in October (3)J Captain 
J.S. King was posted there from Aden on 2Vth October.
British claims over the Moussa Islands and the island of 
Eibat (V) were lunostentatiouslyl asserted by raising the
(1) BSC 81/8V, tel. CSC, 28.10.8V - Baring
(2) BSC 81/8V, Fr. Consul - Hunter and Hunter - French 
Consul, 28.11.8V* The chief was levying personal 
tribute. He hoped to play off the French against 
the British
(3) BSC 81/8V f 1275, CSC - Res, 19.10.8V 
(V) p.6.V n.3 and V
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Union Jack, in December, 188*+. The French occupied 
Tajoura in November (2); an English eye-witness implied 
that the local Dankali chief; *.•• conveyed under an 
armed escort to the fort . ..^was coerced into 
agreement (3).
The Foreign Office moved a step further and rejected 
the charade of British officials temporarily administering 
‘independent* Somali territory in November, 188*+ (*+), 
when approving Baring *s approval of Hunter*s instructions 
to Walsh of September (5). *••• Bulhar and Berbera are 
under British protection independent] and ... it
is important that this protectorate should be distinctly 
asserted ...*. Granville wanted foreign Powers to 
appreciate the position correctly (6). Baring informed
(1) BSC 81/8*+, CSC Instructions - Captain King, 13.12.8*+
(2) FO 78 3728, CSC - Baring, 20.11.81+
(3) FO 78 3728, CSC - Baring, 13.12.8*+
(*+) FO 78 3728, FO - Baring, 2*+.11.8*+
(5) P.6.59 n.l
(6) LA, M, PG, 1875-1896, No 9, 2*+.12.8*+, U/S H. Walpole 
- Res
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Hunter on December 6th (1).
Baring disliked 1... the mingled control over these 
^Somali Coast) questions ... of the Indian Government 
and of ^Granville^J through myself . ..* (2). Baring 
wanted Indian control over everything bar correspondence 
on Egyptian interests. Pauncefo0t£(3) supported Baring. 
Granville sent a copy to Kimberley, but no change was 
made. On 27th October, Baring wrote and telegraphed 
again, asking for a reply (*f). Hunter was referring to 
Baring frequently on matters which Baring considered to 
be of Indian concern, unconnected with Egypt. Still no 
change was made. Baring returned to the question 
following Hunter1s request for further instructions, after 
being notified that a British Protectorate had been 
accepted (5). In Baring!s view, future policy was an
(1) BSC 8l/8*f, Baring - Hunter, 6.12.8*+, copied by CSC - 
Res, 17.12*8*4- and - S of S
(2) FO 78 3727, Baring - FO, 16.10.8*4-
(3) FO Under Secretary
(*+) FO 78 3727? Baring - FO, letter & tel. of 27*10.8*+
(5) FO 78 3728, Baring - FO, 17.12*8*+
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Indian concern. In India, Lord Ripon disagreed Cl).
The India Office did inform Hunter that no further action 
was required (2), hut subsequent orders, such as approval 
for the new Issa treaty, continued to come from the 
Foreign Office through Baring. After Lord Dufferin. 
replaced Lord Ripon as Viceroy, Indian control over 
Somali Coast affairs replaced the Foreign Officefs 
late in January, 1885*
The India Office proposed that the Viceroy should 
control Somali Coast affairs and that the Foreign Office 
should continue control over Zeila affairs (3)« Lord 
Ripon1s rejection was a personal decision, not put to 
his Council. Its members were on tour (*+). But Lord 
Dufferin, with the agreement of the Viceroy*s Council, 
favoured Indian political control over the Somali Coast 
and Zeila, provided that the British Treasury underwrote 
any adverse balance of expenditure over revenue (*f). It
(1) LI, tel. Viceroy - S of S, 8.11.8*+
(2) FO 78 3728, tel. 10 - Hunter, 22.12.8^
(3) LI, S of S - Viceroy, 7»H*8*+
(A) LI, tel. Viceroy - S of S, 1*+.1.85 in answer to 
S of S tel. of 25.12.8^
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appears that the general objection was a financial one5 
that was maintained; the Somali Coast administration 
under India was always required to finance local 
expenditure (1).
■+■ + + +
In August, 1885> the French Vice-Consul at Zeila,
Monsieur J. Henri, informed his British counterpart 
there that a French Protectorate had been declared over 
the coast from Obokh, round the Bay of Tajoura, to 
*Ras Jiberte1 ^Djibouti] (2). It included the 
Gadabursi tribal area inland. The French claim was 
based on a t r e a t y 1, made on 11th March, 1882, by the 
French Consular Agent at Zeila, with nineteen Somali 
signatories, asking for French protection for their area 
against England. The British Vice-Consul replied that
(1) AIA 1086, B° Resolution 5656 of 10.9*90 signed by
Lee Warner, commenting on the I889/9O Somali Coast 
Administration Report
(2) BSC 85/88, Br. Vice Consul Zeila - Ag Res and CSC, 
21+.8.85j enclosing Fr. Vice-Consul1 s letter of 21.8.85
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Monsieur Henri was claiming for France 1... large 
portions of territory at present under the direct 
protection and administration of the British Agent at 
Zaila ...' (1 ). The British Agent, Captain Mein, 
asked the French that no action should be taken locally 
until the British and French Governments had discussed 
the situation (1 ). On 29th August, an Assistant Resident, 
Captain King, visited Obokh aboard H.M.S. •Sphinx1, but 
he failed to reconcile the conflicting Anglo-French 
claims on the Somali Coast. King took over Mein*s duties 
at Zeila.
King was concerned at the harmful effect on Zeilafs 
trade, if the French established a new trading post,
9 miles west of R. Djibouti, at Khor Ambadu, which French 
warships had visited in June (2). The trade from Harrar 
and Abyssinia could be diverted to the new port. Late in 
September AbuBakr asked for French protection at Zeila (3); 
he was still, nominally, the Egyptian governor of Zeila,
(1) BSC, BA - Fr V-Consul, 2V.8.85
(2) BSC 85/88, Zeila News Report of 5-9.85
(3) BSC 85/88, CSC 208 of 30.9-85 - CG Cairo. No written 
request was made
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but his home village was in the new French Protectorate 
on the Bay of Tajoura. The French gunboat, !Meteoref, 
stationed at Obokh, called at Zeila to give fmoral 
support* and to land locally-recruited Dankali gendarmes 
as a guard for the French Vice-Consultate. Feeling at 
the time was running high in Zeila between the pro-French 
and pro-British Issa factions. The French Vice-Consul 
was asked by the British Agent to withdraw the gendarmes. 
They returned to Obokh aboard the •Meteore*.
The French Consul asked Hunter on 29th September
*... whether Zaila was really under British protection,
or not1, a somewhat difficult question to answer offhand*
The Resident finally informed the French Consul that, if
he chose to address the Resident in writing ... he would
/ \ *reply in writing ... (1). Relations were tad between 
France and Britain and the prospect of Anglo-French 
hostilities was mentioned (2)* Hunter strongly opposed 
any cession of Issa territory. Relations between the 
British and French Vice-Consuls in Zeila deteriorated 
steadily throughout the year.
(1) p.6*73 n*3
(2) BSC 85/88, CSC - CG Egypt, 1^.12.85
6-75
General Hogg (1) disliked the French officials 
along the Dankali Coast and the policy that they pursued.
*... They are so full of bounce and so aggressive that 
protest is useless Hogg wrote to Colonel Sir Owen
Burne at the India Office, on 23rd February, 1887 (2).
In Hogg’s view, the French wanted Zeila badly, because 
it was the terminus for trade passing from,and through,.
Harrar, and the French could not open an alternative 
route to Obokh because of Dankali opposition and the harshness 
of Dankali country* The French therefore had to have 
access to Harrar through Somali territory. On 
31st January, 1887, the French flag was hoisted at 
Dongarita, south of Zeila, in Issa territory, by a party 
from the French gunboat ’Meteore1 (3)* That re-emphasized 
the French intention to develop trade with Abyssinia, 
and certainly with the Harrar area. The French claim, 
based on support from some Issa tribesmen, was rejected 
locally by British officials and the dispute was referred
(1) Resident, Aden 1885-1890
(2) BSC 85/88, Vol VI, D/0 letter, Hogg - Burne, 23*2.87
(3) BSC 85/88, Res - S of S, 5.2.87
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to the British and French Governments for settlement 
in London and Paris. In the India Office view, the 
British Protectorate was considered as covering 
Dongarita, and the coast up to Zeila, from 31st December, 
188b (1).
In the summer of 1886 sailors from a French warship,, 
together with the son of the French Vice-Consul at Zeila, 
were ambushed by Issa tribesmen, when they landed on the 
Issa coast of Tajoura Bay, at Ambadu (2). Some French 
retaliation was inevitable. In December, 1887? the 
French used that incident to establish a new post at 
Djibouti, a better anchorage than Obokh (3)* The site 
was west of Zeila, uninhabited, and not on any existing 
trade route, but French intentions were plain. They 
declared that a free port would be established. That 
was intended to compete for Zeila!s existing trade and 
to develop as a new entrepot for Abyssinian trade. French
(1) Note by Lord Sandwich in BSC file. An ‘English1 
flagf had not been sent to Dongarita till 26.12*86
(2) The French had visited the site earlier
(3) BSC 85/88, Tel. Ag CSC - Baring, 1.-12.87
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intentions to establish a new caravan route from Ambadu 
had been reported as long before as September, 1885 (1)* 
and the prospect had disturbed the British Agent at Zeila* 
French intentions were then linked with arms supplies 
delivered to Menelik through French-occupied Tajoura 
for the Shoan occupation of Harrar (2).
In Hunter's view, in June, 1887* there was no need 
for concern about French domination of the Abyssinian 
trade through Harrar (3). Hunter, in Aden, could assess 
developments more dispassionately than British officials 
living in relative isolation at Zeila, Bulhar, or Berbera, 
and identifying British interests with local feelings* 
Hunter was even prepared to accept that a French 
occupation of Harrar might not adversely affect British 
interests, on the Somali Coast. Hunter did not *... believe 
that a free port under French auspices •.. can compete 
successfully with one under British administration ,.- 
jon the Somali Coast] where moderate dues are levied 
• *.f (3)* Zeila was not important to Britain for its
(1) BSC 85/88, Zeila News Report of 5*9.85
(2) BSC 85/88, Zeila News Report of 16-25.9.85
(3) BSC 85/88, Memo of Hunter's of 2.6.87
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trading revenue, which was all spent locally, but 
*... to neutralise French influence and prevent its 
becoming too potent a factor in Somali politics . ..* (1), 
For that reason, Hunter had been prepared to hand over 
Zeila to Menelik in 188^ as an Abyssinian port (2)*
British interests, in Hunter*s view, were concentrated 
on retaining control of Berbera, for its good anchorage, 
and of access to Somali livestock exports.
Hunter*s domination of Somali Coast affairs ended 
with his transfer to India in 1888, arranged by Hogg as 
a possibly jealous Resident, anxious to be rid of 
Hunter, the Gulf of Aden expert (3)*
Hunter*s successor, Lt. Col. E.V. Stace, did not 
share Hunter’s indifference to French expansion into 
Issa territory, or to Zeila*s loss of the Harrar trade*
Stace considered (*+) that any British acceptance of French
authority within Issa limits broke the letter and the
(1) p*6*77 n*3
(2) BSC 81/8^ f 987, OffS Res - S of S, 188k
(3) P*19i43 n* 2.
(If) BSC 85/88, CSC - Res Aden, 25.3.88
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spirit of the Issa Agreement of 188^ (1). By that 
Agreement the Issa agreed not to cede any of their 
territory to any foreign power har Britain, Stace 
considered that the French were masking their intention 
of developing a branch route, off the Zeila - Gildessa - 
Harrar caravan route, to Djibouti, Such a route, with 
adequate water supplies, through the coastal range ‘ 
existed (2), The French claimed to be ignorant of it,.
Stace was supported by the Resident, General Hogg, 
Hogg had been opposed to any French expansion into the 
Somali area in February, 1887 > believing that, without 
a wider local base, the French would evacuate the area as 
a profitless one (3)* However, in February, 1888, the 
French Foreign Minister, Monsieur Waddington, agreed 
with Lord Salisbury to a demarcation of the Anglo-French 
boundary (*+) • That confirmed British authority (5) at 
Dongarita and French authority at Djibouti, It also
(1) Aitchison 1 Treaties1 XCIV
(2) BSC 85/88, CSC - CG Cairo, 2.1.88
(3) p.6.75 n.2
(b) FO 78 M+10, Letter of 2.2.88 
(5) p.6.76 n,l
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laid down that neither Power would attempt to obtain 
control over Harrar, unless a third Power intervened 
in that area, when either France or Britain would be 
free to take whatever measures each decided upon.
The French policy was to extend trade to Abyssinia 
through Harrar, from Obokh and Djibouti. Official 
British policy was little concerned to develop trade 
links with Menelik of Shoa; but it was concerned to 
reduce arms trafficking in the Gulf of Aden, and on the 
Somali Coast (1). French traders and an Abyssinian 
were allowed to ship, in transit through Aden, 28*+7 
rifles, muskets and 223*f shotguns, with correspondingly
large quantities of cartridges and percussion caps (2).
Other French arms supplies were shipped direct to Obokh
from Europe. The Resident asked the Secretary of State
to enlist French and Italian Government support !... for 
the restriction of the trade in arms on the Red Sea 
and on the Somali Coast ...f (3) and to reconsider
(1) Regulated by the Indian Arms Act No XI of 1878
(2) BSC 85/88, Res - S of S, 22.2.86
(3) BSC 85/88, Res - S of S, 23.2.86
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whether arms should be allowed to be transhipped in 
Aden. French arms imports to Obokh were sold to Shoa, 
for ivory and other local produce. The Resident was 
concerned that some arms would reach the Dankalis and 
the Somalis (1). In general Menelik of Shoa, and his 
nephew, Ras Makonen, at Harrar, were not allowed to 
import arms through Aden and Zeila, but exceptions were 
occasionally made, because of the unrestricted French 
trade in arms to Shoa (2).
French officials were concerned that Italy should 
be a party to any agreement banning arms-trafficking (3)* 
The reason was obvious. The French were concerned that 
their influence with Menelik, as his arms suppliersy 
should not pass to the Italian colonies in Eritrea. In
(1) p.6.80 n.2
(2) BSC 89/96, Res - SGB, 3«1*93, reported a permit 
for Ras Mekonan of 200 riles and 20,000 cartridges
(3) F0 78 *+260, Lord Lytton, H.M. Amb. Paris - F0, 
2.2.89, quoted in F0 - Dufferin, 9«3*89
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principle, the Italian Government was in favour of such 
a tripartite agreement (1). But, in practice, the 
Italians later came to ask for exceptions to the ban.
The demand for arms existed and Menelik1s domination 
over, and expansion farther into, Galla territory 
depended upon his maintaining his superiority in 
weapons. Neither the French nor the Italians nor the 
British could exercise any effective control over local 
craft along the coasts of their Protectorates.
Smuggling arms into the Yemen, for the Zaidis fighting 
the Ottomans, and into Africa, for Menelik (2), was 
profitable and it flourished widely. British officials 
claimed that Obokh was, later, the centre for arms 
smuggling in the area. It is possible that the French 
never stopped the trade; and that the British, who had 
an interest in preventing it in the Yemen which the 
French lacked, never appreciated the practical difficulty 
of preventing, as opposed to controlling, arms shipments 
from other foreign countries.
(1) FO 78 *+260, Italian Amb London - Sir Julian Pauncefote, 
U/Sec, FO
(2) Walsh Somali Coast* p.259-260
6.83
The French construction of the Djibouti-Harrar 
railway confirmed Djiboutis position as Abyssinia’s 
export port and made it impossible for France to ban 
arms imports to Menelik without offending him. Since 
further French agreements were made with Menelik France 
had an interest in securing his position by continued 
arms supplies. The French concession for a railway was 
secured from Menelik in 189^ (1). In reporting the 
concession the Resident at Aden noted that the French 
intention was to divert Abyssinian trade to Djibouti 
from the Nile route (2). But the construction of the 
railway was not without problems for the French.
The Issa, through whose territory the line lay 
to Gildessa, objected to alternative transport to their 
camel caravans. Benefits from the line would benefit 
their Shoan enemies, to their own loss. But the French 
overrode Issa objections by a combination of bribery 
and threats, and work on the line continued (3). By
(1) FO l/kl (Abyssinian Railway, 1896-1902) H.M. Amb. 
Paris - FO, 22.7.975 forwarded a copy
(2) BSC 89/96, Vol VI, SC Memo of 28.8.9^ forwarded to 
S of S by Res, 28.8.9^
(3) BSC 97/99, Res & CSC of 16.8.97
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1897? 2 locomotives and VO wagons were working on the
line. In I898, the Under Secretary at the India -Office
minuted on a further report on French progress by the
Resident (1); *No doubt the French have scored ... I
expect that the Jj3omali| coast will cost more to the
Foreign Office than its worth*(2). It Is probable that
British feeling was influenced by the prevailing
Francophobia (3). Indeed Lord Salisbury considered (V)
a proposal (5), originating from Aden, that Treasury
Funds should be used to buy out the railway company.
But the time was not propitious; money was wanted for 
*
the Shire railway and for Uganda; and Lord Salisbury did 
not wish to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer until 
the prospect was more favourable.
+■ + + +  +
(1) BSC 97/99, Res & CSC - S of S, V.6.98
(2) Responsibility was transferred to the Foreign Office in 
1898
(3) Differences over Egypt, Fashoda, & British sympathy
for Dreyfus
(V) FO 1/Vl, Memo of 8.10.,99 in red ink
(5) FO 1/Vi, Memo by Lt. J.L. Harrington after a mission
to Menelik
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Section 7. Aden Residency Relations with the Abdali
and some nearer Yemeni Tribal Chiefs
187V - 1901
The relationship of the Abdali Chiefs and the Residents
The Abdali chief was a British client, with 
considerable independence of action. The relationship 
was preserved because the alternative, Ottoman suzerainty, 
was unacceptable to the Abdali chief. That was also 
distasteful to the British. Sometimes the chief resented 
British demands; occasionally, he was coerced into action 
which he disliked; and, on occasions, he successfully 
evaded the Resident*s demands. Throughout, the initiative 
for British action came from the Resident, not from the 
Foreign Department. Indian Government policy aimed at 
avoiding any increased commitments in the Yemen, but 
Residents generally wished to exert British influence.
Successive Abdali chiefs were able to use their 
connection with the Residency to increase their local 
influence. They were also customary Intermediaries between 
the Ottoman-claimed Yemeni tribes and the British. In
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their own area, Abdali chiefs developed increasingly 
despotic tendencies; they were able to increase their 
incomes by the introduction of profitable local monopolies 
and by the exploitation of their territory1 s agricultural 
resources (1). They were suzerains, not tribal leaders, 
protected from outside interference, or from internal 
revolts,by B r i t i s h  self-interest, as that was understood 
by the Aden Residency.
+ ’+• + + +
How F a d h l b in  A l i  became the A b d a l i  c h ie f
Fadhl bin Ali succeeded to the Abdali chiefship 
on 6th July, 187^, by virtue of the support of his uncle, 
Muhammad bin Kohsin, and of the Resident1s recognition (2). 
Muhammed waived his own strong claims, and secured the 
quick approval of the members of the ruling family present 
in Lahej, to Fadhl!s accession (3)* The pro-Ottoman
(1 ) Cf Belhaven ^oad1 p . 116
( 2) See p . 7 .1 5  n.1
(3) A IA  6V3 f *+69, Fadhl b in  A l i  - Schneider, rec*d 20*7.7^
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members of the family were in voluntary exile in Aden.
They were not informed of Fadhl bin Mohsin1s death at 
midnight on *fth July until after his successors election 
on the 6th, in which they had not played their traditional 
parti Amongst the exiles was Abdullah bin Mohsin, who, 
as the eldest male member of the family, had a traditional 
claim to consideration for the chiefship. Fadhl bin Ali1s 
appointment was recognised by the Resident on the same day (1). 
That recognition carried great weight locally (2).
Fadhl bin Ali was fully aware of the pressure that 
the Resident could apply* 'Major W. Merewether had assisted 
in the settlement of 1863 by which Fadhl bin Ali was 
replaced by his uncle, Fadhl bin Mohsin. The new chief 
was apprehensive about his own safety and about his 
relatives1 ability to excite tribal opposition to his 
succession. After one unannounced, and frightening, 
family visit, Fadhl bin Ali ashed Schneider to forbid the 
Abdali exiles in Aden to visit Lahej without prior warning (3).
(1) AIA 6V3 f *+15? Res - Private Secretary to Gov B°
6.7.7^
(2) See p. 7*15 n.l
(3) AIA 6*+3 f *+69? Fadhl bin Ali - Schneider, rec'd 20.7*7^
7.h
Schneider obliged; and the exiles were warned that 1... if 
they ever create a disturbance in Lahej, they will be 
severely punished ...' (1)* That was reassuring for 
Fadhl, but contrary to the Indian Government1s policy 
of non-intervention. Schneider's warning was, however, 
unlikely to become officially known, or to need to be 
implemented. The warning was probably conveyed by word 
of mouth, and not by letter, so that the Ottoman 
authorities would be unable to provide confirmation of 
British intervention. The Ottomans did complain (2); 
but their complaint was ignored by the Foreign Office.
So long as the Abdali chief feared assassination, or a 
'coup d'etat* by his relatives, he remained a client of 
the Residency. Only after the death of his two rival 
uncles in 1881 could Fadhl disagree with the British with 
some safety.
+ ■+■ + + +
(1) AIA 64-3 f 4-74-, Res - Fadhl bin Ali dated 22.7.74- 
C2) PRO FO 78 2755 f 27^-275, Elliot's despatch No 24-1 
of 17.10.7lf- - FO
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The Abdali sale of Shaikh Othman
The military authorities considered that Aden*s 
growing civilian population could be a liability to 
feed in any future siege of Aden, and that it was a 
potential threat to military security. They therefore 
wanted to move non-essential civilians out of Aden and 
to acquire territory for a new settlement from the Abdali 
chief (1). A new file was opened at the Residency in 
1380 Pealing with this development at Imad and at Shaikh 
Othman (2).
Major General F.A.E. Loch claimed that 1... it was 
entirely through Mr Salih Jaffir*s clever and able 
executions . ..* that the British *... obtain M  pos session 
of Shaikh Othman . ..* (3). Loch may have exaggerated 
slightly. Indeed, the British had not then occupied 
Shaikh Othman; !... negotiations ... regarding the form 
of the deed of sale of Shaikh Othman, etc., as also the 
[Abdali] Fadhli boundary question . (V) were still
(1) AIA 876, G of I No 192, M.D. - S of S, 9.6,79
(2) AF R/20 (AIA876)had this file incorporated in it
(3) AIA 85V, Res - SGB, 3.1.81 
(V) p. 7.7 n.V
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proceeding (1).. But Salih Jaffer had started action 
when he arranged a loan agreement on 11th June, I878 (2).
The Abdali chief was advanced money from the Residency 
for the wedding expenses of two of his counsins, on the 
condition that he would sell the Shaikh Othman area, if 
the Government of India wanted it, for $MT25,000 (3)* A 
further advance of RS3,600 was made for the Hajj expenses 
of two of the chief1 s uncles in 1880 (*+). They travelled 
at Fadhl bin Ali*s expense with Salih Jaffer. The 
suggestion of the pilgrimage, to the most influential 
uncle, Muhammad bin Mohsin, may have been officially 
inspired. Salih Jaffer1s journey with them was a duty 
journey, not leave (5).
(1) AAB 80/81 para 17
(2) The chief had heavy expenditures of RS20,000 in Subaihi 
territory in 1877 a^d of RS7,000 in 1879* AIA 855 f 59? 
Memo on Abdali Subaihi interests
(3) RS55,ooo
(If) AIA 876, Res - SGB, 3.1*81
(5) AIA 833? Salih Jaffer1 s leave application, l^A.SO,
noted no leave from 1870-1880
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The Government of India favoured the purchase of 
Shaikh Othman in June, 1879 (1)* hut that was delayed 
by the Secretary of State 1... until a more convenient 
financial season ...! (2)„ Loch considered that the 
delay might postpone the sale indefinitely (3)* However, 
funds for the purchase were approved in November, 1880 (2)* 
By then, Fadhl and his uncle, Muhammad, wished to 
withdraw from the sale. Loch believed that the Abdalis 
hoped to renegotiate a higher price later, recognising 
that the British were bound to acquire Shaikh Othman in 
time (3). Loch had obtained official authority to give 
a bribe of RSI,000 to the Qadhi of Lahej so that he, as 
the principal Abdali intermediary, had an interest in the 
sale (1).
Loch was of ficiallypessimistic in January, 1881, 
about the possibility of securing Abdali agreement C1-*-).
(1) AIA 876 f 22, G of I No 192 MD - S of S
(2) AIA 876, Quoted in B° Res11 No 5995 of 10.12.80
forwarded to Res with G of I 3580 E.P. of 12.11.80 
- SGB
(3) AIA 876, Res - SGB, 18.11.80
(>+) AIA 876, Res - SGB, 25.1.81, Cf. with p.7 .5 n. 3
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Possibly he hoped to buy more time by pessimism* In 
a note to Hunter, three days before, Loch described Fadhl's 
obstructions as *... most impertinent . ..* (1). Loch 
proposed to annex Shaikh Othman, despite the absence of 
any agreement with Fadhl on the extent of the area to be 
annexed. Loch first planned to warn Fadhl that the area 
would be officially occupied, with proclamations and gun 
salutes, so that Fadhl could sign a deed of sale 
beforehand Cl). But, in his letter to Bombay, Loch 
asked for approval to present Fadhl with a *fait 
accompli1 (2). The Bombay Government approved Loch*s 
suggestion on 3rd February (3). Loch, however, continued 
negotiations with the Abdali chief, warning him of his 
intention to occupy and annex the territory C*t). Fadhl 
complained that !... the sale of the border territories 
was like the taking of the soul from the body ...f (5).
(1) AIA 876, Loch Memo of 22*1*81
C2) p.7.7 n.*f
(3) AIA 876, Tel* SGB-Res
(b) AIA 876, Res - Fadhl Ali, 16.2.81
C5) AIA 876, Fadhl Ali - Res, received 6.2.81, translated
from the Arabic
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Contemporary Muslim opinion condemned, the surrender of 
Muslim territory to Christian countries, and Fadhl was 
a devout Muslim (1).
Fadhl was also required to give up his claims to 
Imad, 10 miles east of Aden. He denied any obligation 
to do so (2). But Loch brushed aside Fadhl*s refusal;
1 ... You have not only signed the agreement for the sale 
of the district of your own free will ... but have still 
further confirmed the sale by receiving from us KS20,000 
as earnest money ... You are bound to lose no time in 
giving over Shaikh Othman ... Regarding Ernad you should 
know that we have never recognised your ... title ...f (3). 
Major Hunter was as determined as the Resident that the 
sale of the whole Shaikh Othman area should proceed.
Hunter commented on Fadhl1 s objections over Imad; (*+)
* ... Saleh [jaffer] might go out ... settle that 
business ....At any rate Imad is not [_Fadhl1 ■] and
(1) Doughty 'Deserta' Vol II p. 5*+0
(2) AIA 876, Fadhl Ali - Res, *+.2.81
(3) AIA 876, Res - Fadhl Ali, 7.2.81 
(*+) p.7.8 n.5
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Major Goodfellow told him so . ..* (1). Both the Abdali 
Qadhi (2) and Muhammad bin Mohsin (3) considered, British 
pressure unreasonably harsh. Muhammad complained that 
he was being criticised locally for the sale (3). It 
is possible that he had originally considered the exchange 
of infertile land at Shaikh Othman for a vaster and 
agriculturally more valuable area of Subaihi land (*f) 
as good business.
Loch agreed to Fadhlfs request to postpone the 
British annexation briefly, to give Fadhl time to remove 
any Abdali opponents to the annexation from the area.
The annexation was oSicially proclaimed on 2*+th February (5). 
According to British sources, local reactions were 
favourable. This was understandable; Fadhl and his uncle 
were selfish rulers. However, the draft sale agreement
(1) AIA 876, Hunter1s comments on Fadhlfs letter (p.7.8 n.5)
(2) AIA 876, Qadhi - Salih Jaffer on 10.2.81
(3) AIA 876, Muhammad in P.S. to Fadhl*s letter - Salih
Jaffer, received 13.2.81
(if) See p.7.b-2 n.l
(5) AIA 876, Res - SGB, 8.3.81
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was not signed until May; Fadhl ffell sick1 on the way 
to Aden and deputed his uncle Muhammad to sign on his 
behalf (1). The Aden file contains no copy of this 
agreement. However, the official agreement of 
7th February, 1882 (2), did contain additional clauses (3) 
embodying points which the Qadhi had requested in 
February, 1881 (if). The Bombay Government prematurely 
welcomed !... the acquisition by purchase from the Sultan 
of Lahaj of ... Shaikh Othman ... as the most important 
event ...* in the Aden Annual Report for 1880/81 (5).
Muhammad bin Mohsin had brought with him to Aden 
Fadhl bin Ali*s brother, Ahmad, and Fadhl1s cousin,
Ahmad bin Fadhl (6); both witnessed the Abdali-Haushabi 
agreement (7)5 and the Subaihi agreement (8), which 
Muhammad signed on behalf of the Abdali chief, at the 
same time.
(1
(2
(3
(If
(5
(6
(7
(o
AIA 876, Fadhl bin Ali - Res, 1.5.81 
Aitchison 1 Treaties1 XXIV 
n.2 Articles 5,6,7
AIA 876, Qadhi - Salih Jaffer, 10.2.81
AIA 853, Bo Govt Resn 3696 of 8.8.81 on para 17 AAR
Abdali chief, in succession to Fadhl, 1898-I9llf
Aitchison 1 Treaties1 XXII
Aitchison treaties1 XXIII
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English translations were forwarded to Bombay (1). Loch 
admitted that a delicate situation was produced by 
opposition aroused by the agreements. The nature of the 
opposition was not specified; but Loch was not prepared 
to aggravate it. He consequently decided to postpone 
his plan to transfer the Abdali customs house from Crater 
to Khor Maksar, or to Shaikh Othman to a more opportune 
time (I).
The simultaneous signature of the three agreements 
has all the appearances of a package-deal; the Abdalis 
made concessions to the Ilaushabis and to the British (2); 
in return, the Resident offered the Abdalis assistance to 
purchase arms for the control of the independent Subaihi 
area and recognised Abdali sovereignty there. The prior 
approval of the Foreign Department should have been 
obtained to the Subaihi Agreement (3 ). It involved local 
arms sales, which were contrary to official policy, and
(1) AIA 855 f 15, Res - SGB, 17.5.81. There is no file 
copy of this draft Shaikh Othman agreement
(2) P. 7*11 n. 2 and n.7
(3) AIA 855 f 109, Res 22b - SGB mentions For. Dept, 
criticism
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an imprudent recognition of Abdali sovereignty, over 
areas which the British did not know, and over tribesmen 
who did not want Abdali rule.
In the official Shaikh Othman Agreement of 1882, 
Britain undertook to protect the Abdalis and Abdali 
Dependencies (1). It is possible that prior agreement 
would have been refused by the Foreign Department; yet 
without Subaihi 1 compensation*, it is unlikely that any 
Abdali faction would have accepted the sale of Shaikh 
Othman. Loch was pessimistic in January 1881 (2). Even 
in May, 1881, the Abdali agreements were not recorded 
as being sealed with Fadhl*s seal, which would have 
implied Fadhl1s endorsement of his uncle*s signature.
But, in the confusion of Fadhl*s •sickness1, the seal 
might have been forgotten*
Muhammad's authority for signing the agreements was 
a letter from his nephew to the Resident, giving '... full 
power to sign the agreement of Shaikh Othman, the Howshabee 
and the Subaihees (3)* One unexplained incident
(1) Article 7
(2) p.7.7 n.b
(3) AIA 876, Fadhl Ali - Res, 1*5.81
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occurred after the draft agreements had been signed, 
and the balance of the purchase money had been paid to 
Mohammad at his nephew's request (1). A payment of 
Rs300 was paid to one Seiyid Abdul Bari (2), out of the 
Rsl,000 originally earmarked for payment to the Lahej 
Qadhi for his services in securing the agreement (3).
A Seiyid Abdul Bari was in the Abdali chief1s ©rvice 
in 1876; he was possibly a clerk or secretary to the 
chief (>+). Loch did not want any queries about his 
authority for making this payment*. On Loch!s orders the 
Qadhi signed for Rsl,000, although receiving only Rs700. 
This illegal breach of financial regulations confirms 
Loch's determination, and Residency senior staff's 
willingness, to use unorthodox means where expedient.
It is therefore possible that Residency officials were 
unscrupulous about the manner in which the Shaikh Othman 
agreement was obtained in February, 1882.
(1) p.7*13 n*3
(2) AIA 876, Salih Jaffer - Loch, 9*5.81, Loch - Salih 
Jaffer, 10.5.81
(3) P. 7.7 n. 1 
(h) AIA 833 f 11^5
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Relations between Fadhl and his uncle Muhammad 
deteriorated quickly after the signing of the draft 
agreements in May* In July, the Qadhi of Lahej called 
on Hunter and enquired whether the Residency would 
support a 'coup d'etat* in favour of Muhammad (1).
The Qadhi was told that the Resident might intervene,if 
the coup was a b o r t i v e . at least temporarily upholding 
the Sultan but that he would not oppose it if
successful. The reasons for this internal Abdali quarrel 
were not given. It is possible that the quarrel developed 
because Muhammad signed the agreements at Aden (2).,
Hunter's sympathy was with Muhammad, whose death from 
fever in October, 1881, was described as *a heavy loss' 
to British interests (3). Ho 'coup* had occurred in the 
meantime.
In Loch's opinion in October, 1881, Muhammad's
(1) AIA 855, Hunter's Report of 12*7.81 - Res on Qadhi's visit
(2) It is possible that Seiyid Abdul Bari forged a letter 
of authority by Fadhl bin Ali, or tricked him into 
signing one, for Muhammad bin Mohsin
(3) AAR 1881/2
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agreements were unlikely to be ratified by his nephew (1)* 
Yet Muhammad had allegedly signed on Fadhl*s behalf, unless 
Fadhl*s authorisation had been obtained by a subterfuge 
possibly involving Seiyid Abdul Bari (2). Muhammad1s 
death placed Loch in an embarrassing position. The 
Residency accounts were debited with a payment totalling 
RS55,000 for the purchase of Shaikh Othman, which Fadhl 
might repudiate► Loch was responsible for paying the 
balance of that purchase price; and possibly Loch might 
have been required to refund Government money, if he had 
taken too much for granted. Development work began in 
Shaikh Othman,after the declarations of annexation in 1881, 
to lay out a township- for Aden's surplus civilian 
population. The money thus spent on public works was 
likewise at risk, if the Abdali chief denied that he had 
authorised the sale. The Aden files make no reference to 
these possible embarrassments; the subject was not one 
which would be placed on the files* But if the situation
(1) AIA 855? Res - SGB 307 - of 2^.10.81 referring to the 
Subaihi agreement, but probably applicable to Shaikh 
Othman too. See p. 7.11 - 7.12
(2) See p. 7.. 14 n* 2
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did exist, it had to be regularised. Loch was due to 
leave Aden in March, 1882. His successor might not 
accept an ambiguous situation without making some official 
comment. That would possibly lead to an enquiry and 
bring into the open embarrassing irregularities (1),
Loch's conduct of affairs at Mukalla had recently been 
criticised (2). Loch had probably relied upon the local 
experience of his subordinates, Hunter and Salih Jaffer, 
wno were as committed to the occupation of Shaikh Othman 
as he was*,
Despite Residency complaints (3) about Fadhl bin 
Ali's unreasonable behaviour after his uncles' death^, 
and Fadhl's stronger position then, the Residency reported 
that *.,, the deed of sale £for Shaikh OthmanJ was
duly signed on the 7th February, 1882 ...* (^i-). The 
contemporary Aden file does not explain why the Abdali 
chief dropped his opposition and signed the agreement (5).
Cl) e,g, p.7,lV n. 2
(2) p.*+.82 n, 1 and 2
(3) AIA 855, Res - SGB, 29.10,81 
(1+). AAR 81/82 para 10
(5) AIA 876
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It is possible that the Agreement was signed willingly*
A signed copy exists, but the signature of Fadhl bin Ali 
there is not the usual signature on contemporary letters 
to the Residency (1). It was as simple but not as firm 
as customary^and it lacks the diacritical points* Such 
differences could be due to Fadhl!s emotion at the time, 
or to other causes. It seems unlikely that any forger 
would have been so clumsy as to omit the diacritical 
points. But it is strange that the Abdali ratification 
of the treaty was not reported until 27th Hay, 1882, and 
then only after a coded telegraphic enquiry had been 
received from Bombay (2). Probably such important 
news would not have been delayed unless something was 
missing•
The published wording of the signatories to the 
treaty was unusual; it was officially published as being 
'Signed in vernacular, Sultan of Lahej and Dependencies1. 
That phraseology was not unique (3): but it was more
(1) AIA 876 f 21+0
(2) AIA 876, Coded tel. Res - SGB, 27.5*82, in answer to
coded tel.
(3) Cf. Aitchison 'Treaties1 No LXXIII of 23.1*76, Mahl'i
treaty
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customary to write the name of the local signatory. All 
such signatures were in Arabic. It is possible that the 
entry was in deference to Fadhl bin Ali's wishes, but 
it also left it ambiguous whether the signature was 
Sul tan Fadlil1 s, or an agent's. The treaty emphasized 
that the sale was '... in consideration of the sum of 
dollars (25000) twenty-five thousand already received ...’ (1). 
No mention was made of Muhammad bin Mohsin having received 
the money. Possibly Fadhl1s signature was required as 
an official receipt. Loch refused to submit the Subaihi 
agreement to Fadhl for ratification (2), because Loch 
anticipated an embarrassing refusal (3)- Yet the Shaikh 
Othman draft agreement was signed under similar 
circumstances to the Subaihi draft agreement. The earlier 
agreements were not authenticated by Fadhl bin Ali's seal.
This later ratification was.
(1) Article 1
(2) Aitchison' Treaties'No XXIII
(3) AIA, Loch - SGB, 10,1881. Possibly Muhammad was 
the main supporter of the Subaihi agreement which 
Fadhl was in no way committed to
7 .20
The Abdali chief's signature (1) was recorded as 
being made at Shaikh Othman on 6th February, before 
Major Hunter and the Qadhi of Lahej. General Loch 
signed at Aden, only 10 miles away, on 7th February 
before the same two witnesses. No explanation was given 
why the Resident and the Abdali chief did not sign in 
each other's presence. The published version does not 
state whose seal was affixed against the local signatures.
It was Fadhl bin Ali1s. The wording of the published 
version possibly implied that the vernacular signature 
witnessing the Resident's signature on the 7th was that 
of Fadhl bin Ali, In fact, it was that of the Lahej 
Qadhi (2),
A provocative postscript to this riddle involves 
the refrain of a traditional Abdali children's song;
'The Sultan's seal is lost. Look for it, oh slaves' (3).
(1) The signature is a very simple one, suggesting that the
chief was not very literate.
(2) AIA 876 f 2^ +0 Original
(3) J. Knox-Mawer 'The Sultans came to Tea* p.1^2, London, 
1961, quotes 'the Sultan's ring is lost 1 ^
can mean either 'ring* or 'seal*, Wehr's Dictionary p.227
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It is possible that Fadhl bin All's seal was 'borrowed*. 
Whether the signature of the agreement was acquired by 
trickery, Shaikh Othman was acquired by British pressure. 
That would account for Fadhl*s later consistent lack of 
co-operation with the British until his death. He was 
recorded as visiting Aden only once between April 1881 
and March 1882 (1), That is inconsistent with a 
customary annual visit to the Resident and a visit to 
Shaikh Othman to sign the agreement. The discrepancy 
can be explained as a mistake in the Annual Report, or 
by Fadhl bin Ali not having visited Shaikh Othman on 
February 6th, or by a precise limitation of ‘Aden1 to the 
town and not to the extended settlement including Shaikh 
Othman. In the absence of proof to the contrary, the 
Shaikh Othman agreement must be accepted as a genuine 
agreement voluntarily signed by the Abdali chief. In 
1892, Fadhl compared his own acquisition of the Seila (2) 
area from the Aqrabi Shaikhdom by force to the British
(1) AAR 1881/82 para 10
(2) AIA 1111*, Memo by Lt. Col. Stace on a meeting with 
Fadhl of 7.2.92
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seizure of Aden from him by force (1). The British did 
not seize 'Aden1 from Fadhl bin Ali. They did seize 
Shaikh Othman, by their ability to use force. It is 
possible that Lt. Col. E.V. Stace, talking through an 
interpreter, later wrote 'Aden' when Fadhl had referred 
to Shaikh Othman. Whether that was so or not, Fadhl 
recognised that, locally, might was right. He had to 
accept British expansion.
None of the correspondence on Shaikh Othman between 
Aden and Bombay was copied to the India Office between 
1881 and 1882; the India Office file contains, however, 
considerable correspondence on Somali Coast affairs (2). 
The Government of India did not notify the Secretary of
(1) Letters to the last Sultan, Ali bin Abdul Karim, 
and to Sharif Hussain bin Ahmad alHabili, 
formerly of Beihan, and now in Saudi Arabia, asking 
for family reminiscences on the incident, and on the 
song, have not been answered.
(2) L/P&S/9 (BSC 81/8b)
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State of the successful conclusion of negotiations until 
September, 1882 (1). It m s  not until November that 
Husurus Pasha, the Ottoman Ambassador, complained of 
f... ; agranaissement territorial chez les agentsde 
Gouvernement de Sa Kajeste Brittanique a Aden . .* par 
1 ’acjp.t des terrains d,une vaste etendue a l'est d*Aden 
. ..f (2). No notice was taken of the Ottoman protest, 
which emphasized that the Porte had not surrendered its 
ova claims to Lahej, and, bv implication, to all S.N. Arabia 
bar Aden (3).
+ + + + +
Abdali expansion at Kaushabi expense, in December,
1873? ensured complete Abdali control over the headvorks 
of the Abdali irrigation system and greater protection
(1) LI, G of I Despatch No 91 - S of S, 1.9.82
(2) FO 78 ^528, Porte1s 685Ll/lb2 of 16.11.82 - Musurus, 
passed to Granville, 27.11.82 at an interview.
(3) p.3.101n. 2
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for the earlier Abdali gains around Zaida (1). The
Haushabi chief made his peace with the Resident in March, 
187*+ (2). But no Haushabi chief could ever accept the 
Abdali right to possession of the land at Zaida, to 
Abdali gains at Shuqa in 1873/7*+> and later, at 2tlAnad 
in 189*+ (3)*> These grievances provided successive 
Haushabi chiefs with a justification, at least in their 
own eyes, for seeking Ottoman support, and they 
continued to draw an Ottoman stipend, albeit secretively, 
as well as their British stipend (*+).. But the Abdali 
superiority in resources, and the ease with which the 
Abdalis could approach his home at arRaha, on the northern 
edge of the coastal plain, induced, the Iiaushabi chief to 
withdraw to Museimir, beyond reach of surprise Abdali 
attacks. That further isolated the Haushabi chiefs from 
contact with the British and strengthened the Abdali 
capacity to blacken their Haushabi neighbour’s character,
(1) p.3.29 n. 3
(2) AIA 6V3, Res 58/228 - S of S of 31.3.7^
(3) AAR 1883A  para 10
(1+) IOL L/P & S/7, Vol 70 121 G of I - S of S, 20.6.93
and AIA/M/32 f U-7, Mote by Salih Jaffer, Feb 1881
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with little fear of contradiction.
Most Residents recognised that the Abdali seizure 
of Haushabi land was inequitable (1). But they felt, 
possibly mistakenly, that Haushabi resentment did not 
endanger British interests and that, therefore, the 
Residency should not intervene. Yet when the Haushabi 
chief made his only possible effective protest, and 
closed the caravan routes down to Abdali territory,
Aden's inter--sts, and Aden's trade, were harmed. The 
Resident, on such occasions, protested to the Haushabi 
chief and withheld his stipend. Such action increased 
Haushabi mistrust of the Residency. The Haushabis 
complained of an apparent British bias towards the nearer 
Abdali chief. There were traces of such a bias; the 
Residency Interpreter referred to the Haushabi chief as 
a 'jungleeArab 1 (2).
Hot even Schneider's prestige in 187*+ was sufficient 
to settle the Abdali-Haushabi dispute* Schneider 
recognised that the Haushabi chief, Ali bin Mana, had
(1) AAR 1883/8*+ para 10
(2) AIA/M/32 f 62+7- Salih Jaffer*s comment on Haushabi 
chief's letter - Res, received 27.12.81
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never interfered with the trade routes while the 
Ottomans were at Shuqa in 1873, that Ali had not broken 
any agreement with the British (1). Ali was therefore 
paid his arrears of stipend- Schneider believed that 
Fadhl bin Mohsin ought to return the Zaida land, Schneider 
told Ali bin Kana so and arranged for the latter to meet 
Fadhl bin Mohsin to discuss a settlement. But Schneider 
had no authority to enforce a settlement, or to require 
Fadhl bin Mohsin to surrender his new gains in the Shuqa 
area. Schneider realised that possession of Shuqa by 
the Haushabi would again enable Ali bin Mana to threaten 
the Abdali possession of the lands around Zaida (2). 
Schneider may not intially have recognised the value to 
the Abealis of controlling their irrigation headworks. 
Within two years the big increase in cultivation in the 
Abdali area snowed that value (3). Reference to Map F 
shows that by dominating the area up to alAnad, north 
of the fortified tower of Shuqa, the Abdalis could
(1) AIA 6^3 p.197, Res 58/228 of 31.3.7*+- - S of S
(2) AIA 6^3 p.*+83, Res 1 bb/577 of 29.7*7^ - SGB and 
of 30.7.7*+ - S of S
(3) P & S 75, News No 2 of 1876
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p r e v e n t  th e  H a u s h a b is  d i v e r t i n g  w a te r  down th e  Wadi 
B i l i h  i n t o  th e  d e s e r t ,
F a d h l "bin 1-Iohsin m et A l i  b i n  Mana w i t h  th e  F a d h l i  
c h i e f ,  H a id e ra  D in  Ahmad, i n  Ju n e , 187*+, a t  L a h e j .
F a d h l o f f e r e d  b a ck  up t o  200 Dhumds (1 )  o f  th e  b e s t  la n d s  
i n  th e  Z a id a  a re a  t o  A l i  b i n  Mana, b u t  th e  A b d a l i  c h i e f  
r e fu s e d  t o  r e t u r n  th e  to w e r  o f  Shuqa w h ic h  th e  H a u sh a b i 
c h i e f  demanded. Even th o u g h  A l i  had a d m i t te d  t o  S c h n e id e r  
t h a t  he c o u ld  n o t  r e c o v e r  h i s  t e r r i t o r y  by  f o r c e ,  A l i  
r e fu s e d  t o  a c c e p t  w ha t th e  A b d a l i  c h i e f  o f f e r e d .  I t  i s  
p o s s ib le  t h a t  F a d h l b i n  M o h s in *s  d e a th  e n co u ra g e d  A l i  
b i n  Mena t o  s ta g e  a to k e n  r a i d  on Shuqa on 27 .7  • 7*+• fh e  
r a i d  was s u p p o r te d  by  30°  n e ig h b o u r in g  D a i r i  and D h um b ari 
t r ib e s m e n ,  b u t  th e  o n ly  a c h ie v e m e n t was th e  to k e n  
s la u g h t e r  o f  one A b d a l i  camel and f o u r  b u l l o c k s .  The 
A b d a l i  r e p l y  was a r a i d  on a rK aha  i n  November, when f o u r  
H a u sh a b is  were k i l l e d  f o r  th e  lo s s  o f  two A b d a l i s .  I n  
th e  R e s id e n t 1s v ie w ,  th e  f i g h t i n g  was an i n t e r t r i b a l  
q u a r r e l  w h ic h  s h o u ld  n o t  i n v o l v e  th e  B r i t i s h .  S c h n e id e r  
was c o n f id e n t  t h a t  A l i  b i n  Mana w ou ld  n o t  i n t e r f e r e  w i t h
(1 ) Dhumd = as much la n d  as can be p lo u g h e d  i n  one da y  
by  a p a i r  o f  c a t t l e
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t h e  t r a d e  r o u t e s  t o  L a h e j , d e s p i t e  t h i s  q u a r r e l  ( 1 ) .
The H a u s h a b i c h i e f  d i d ,  h o w e v e r ,  c lo s e  th e  ro a d s  th ro u g h  
h i s  t e r r i t o r y .  The R e s id e n t  r e a c te d  p r e d i c t a b l y  and 
s to p p e d  th e  H a u sh a b i s t ip e n d .  B u t ,  more p r a c t i c a l l y ,  
S c h n e id e r  a r ra n g e d  f o r  A m ir  A l i  Muqbil o f  D h a la  t o  
m e d ia te  be tw een  th e  tw o  s id e s  ( 2 ) .  A s h o r t  t r u c e  i n  1875 
was f o l l o w e d  b y  a y e a r ’ s t r u c e  f ro m  F e b ru a ry  1876. T h a t 
t r u c e  was renew ed on S c h n e id e r ’ s m e d ia t i o n  f o r  a f u r t h e r
y e a r  i n  J a n u a ry  1877 ( 3 ) .  A f t e r  S c h n e id e r  l e f t ,  h i s
s u c c e s s o r ,  M a jo r  G e n e ra l F.A.E. L o c h ,  was u n a b le  t o  renew  
th e  t r u c e  b e fo r e  i t  e x p i r e d  i n  1878 (*+). A f u r t h e r  t r u c e  
was a r r a n g e d ,  i n  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t r a d e ,  th ro u g h  th e  
m e d ia t io n  o f  th e  A m ir  o f  D h a la  l a t e r  in 1878 ( 5 ) .  B u t  
i t  was n o t  u n t i l  May, 1 8 81 , t h a t  an  Abdali-Haushabi
( 1 )  FO 78. 27 56, Res bO  o f  21.11.71+ -  S o f  S passed  b y  
10 -  FO on 5 . 1 .7 5
(2 )  AAR 7 5 /7 6 ,  p a ra  6
(3 )  AAR 7 6 /7 7 ,  p a ra  6
(k) AAR 7 7 /7 8 ,  p a ra  8
( 5 )  AAR 1 8 7 8 /7 9 ,  p a ra  8
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settlement appeared to have been reached (1).
The new settlement gave back dhumds to Ali 
bin Mana (2). That was more than he had been previously 
offered, but less than he wanted (3). It appears that 
Fadhl bin Ali was also dissatisfied and that he was 
reluctant to bind himself by an agreement with the Haushabi 
chief before Residency officials. In February, 1881,
Fadhl bin Ali had written to the Resident that he was 
arranging a settlement of the dispute (*+). Fadhl bin 
Ali even pleaded sickness as an excuse for not himself 
signing the Abdali-Haushabi, and other, agreements in 
Aden (5)•
Ali bin Mana had paid Loch a visit in March, 1882 (6),
(1) Aitchison Treaties No XXII, p.39-90, dated 5*5*81.
Haushabi signed lL;-.7.8l (see AIA 855 p.l*+8)
(2) Wrongly marked as (acres) after ybumds1
(3) AIA/K/32 f 51+3, Ali bin Mana - Loch, undated but 
in the summer of 1881
(*+) AIA 876, Fadhl bin Ali - Res, received b.2.81
(5) p.7.11 n. 1
(6) AAR 1881/82, para 11
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when he r e c e iv e d  th e  R e s id e n t ’ s h i g h e s t  t r i b u t e  f o r  
r e l i a b i l i t y  and c o - o p e r a t io n .  He was p re s e n te d  w i t h  an 
o b s o le t e ,  b ro n z e ,  6 po u n d e r f i e l d  p ie c e  and 300 ro u n d s  
o f  s o l i d  s h o t  (1 ) .  I t  was in te n d e d  t o  a s s i s t  h im  i n  
c o n t r o l l i n g  h i s  t r ib e s m e n  and p r e s e r v in g  peace on t h e  
c a ra v a n  r o u t e s .  B u t ,  i n  th e  absence  o f  a c o m p e te n t  
g u n n e r ,  i t s  v a lu e  as a r t i l l e r y  was d o u b t f u l .  The 
R e s id e n t ’ s r e l a t i o n s  wTi t h  th e  H a u sh a b i c h i e f  re m a in e d  
c o r d i a l ,  w h i le  R e s id e n c y  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  F a d h l b i n  A l i  
d e t e r i o r a t e d  s t e a d i l y  f ro m  1882 ( 2 ) .  T h a t p ro c e s s  o f  
d e t e r i o r a t i o n  c o n t in u e d  u n d e r  s u c c e s s iv e  R e s id e n ts  u n t i l  
F a d h l ’ s d e a th  i n  18 9 8 . The d e t e r i o r a t i o n  i n  A n g lo -  
A b d a l i  r e l a t i o n s  may have e n c o u ra g e d  th e  H a u s h a b i c h i e f  
t o  an n o y  F a d h l b i n  A l i  f ro m  1883 ( 3 ) .  Bach c h i e f  b lam ed 
th e  o th e r  f o r  th e  re n e w a l o f  h o s t i l i t i e s .  I n  A l i  b i n  
l i a n a ’ s v ie w  th e  A b d a l i  c h i e f  e n co u ra g e d  h i s  t r i b a l  
o p p o n e n ts  (*+). P ro g re s s  i n  th e  e a r l i e r  t a l k s  t o  s e t t l e
(1 ) A IA  855 p . 1 ^ 7 ,  Loch  -  H u n te r  i n  a n o te  o f  1 3 .7 .8 1  and
SGB's No ^7 o f  5 .1 .8 2  -  Res
(2 )  AAR 1 8 8 2 /8 3  p a ra  15 and AAR 1883/8*+ p a ra  10
(3 )  AAR 1883/8*+ p a ra s  10 and 11
(*+) A IA /M /3 2 f  568, A l i  b i n  Mana -  Res, u n d a te d ,  r e c ’ d 2 7 .9 * 8 1
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t h e  d i s p u t e  had depended on Muhammad b i n  M o h s in ,  n o t  
on th e  A b d a l i  c h i e f  ( 1 ) .  Muhammad1 s d e a th  i n  1881. 
was soon f o l l o w e d  b y  H a u s h a b i - A b d a l i  a rg u m e n ts  and b y  
renew ed f i g h t i n g  (2 ) .  T h a t  was p r o b a b ly  i n e v i t a b l e ;
A l i  b i n  Mana d i d  n o t  t r u s t  F a d h l b i n  A l i ;  and th e  
A b d a l i - H a u s h a b i  s e t t le m e n t  o f  1881 l e f t  scope f o r  
m is u n d e r s ta n d in g s . The H a u sh a b i c h i e f  had w anted  a l l  th e  
la n d  w a te re d  by th e  Ober K h i l a f  i r r i g a t i o n  c h a n n e l ,  and 
n o t  j u s t  a p a r t  o f  i t .  Had he been g iv e n  a i l  th e  l a n d ,  
t h e r e  c o u ld  have been no su b se q u e n t d i s p u t e  o v e r  th e  
d i v i s i o n  o f  w a te r  b e tw e e n  th e  bunded f i e l d s  on th e  
Ober I Q i i l a f .  The re  i s  ho w e ve r no e v id e n c e  how much la n d  
was i n v o l v e d .  I n  t h e o r y ,  any  a rg u m e n t a b o u t  th e  H a u s h a b is  
w a s t in g  w a te r ,  and so d e p r i v i n g  th e  A b d a l i s  o f  i t ,  was
(1) p.7.11 n.7
(2 ) A IA /M /32 f  62 9 , R e p o r t  o f  R e s id e n c y  ‘ S e rg e a n t*  -  
Showeesh S a l i h  -  S a l i h  J a f f e r  o f  1 9 .1 2 .8 1 .
A IA /M /3 2 , A H  b i n  Mana -  L o ch , r e c ’ d 2 7 .9 * 8 1
1 . . .  w hoever e n t e r s  i n t o  f r i e n d s h i p  w i t h  them [ the 
A b d a l i s j  th e y  k n o c k  h im  down . . * * .
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t o  be s e t t l e d  b y  th e  R e s id e n t r s a r b i t r a t i o n  (1 ) .  Loch  
d e p u te d  t h a t  d u t y  t o  two l o c a l  s u b o r d in a te s ,  who la c k e d  
th e  p r e s t i g e  o f  more s e n io r  s t a f f  (2 ) .  I t  i s ,  h o w e v e r ,  
u n l i k e l y  t h a t  F a d h l b i n  A l i  w o u ld  have k e p t  an y  
a g re e m e n t t h a t  was n o t  c l o s e l y  e n fo r c e d .  F a d h l was 
r e s e n t f u l  o f  th e  c e s s io n  o f  la n d  a t  S h a ik h  Othman 
f o r c e d  upon h im  i n  1331/82 and c o n s e q u e n t ly  i l l - d i s p o s e d ,  
t o  a c c e p t  B r i t i s h  a d v ic e  ( 3 ) *  The B r i t i s h  were 
p re o c c u p ie d  w i t h  d e v e lo p m e n ts  i n  h g y p t  and on th e  
Hadhram aut C o a s t L a t e r ,  th e  S o m a li C o a s t m o n o p o l is e d
a t t e n t i o n  ( p ) .  The R e s id e n t  t h e r e f o r e  la c k e d  s u f f i c i e n t  
s t a f f  t o  s u p e r v is e ,  and th e  m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g t h  r e q u i r e d  
t o  e n fo r c e ,  any  A b d a l i - H a u s h a b i  s e t t le m e n t .  D is a g re e m e n t 
c o n t in u e d ,  w i t h o u t  f u r t h e r  s e r io u s  f i g h t i n g ,  u n t i l  A l i  
b i n  Mana d ie d  on 5 .1886  ( 6) .  T h ro u g h o u t  t h i s  p e r io d ,
(1 )  A i t c h is o n *  T r e a t i e s ' Mo XXII C la u se  I I I  o f  th e  A greem ent
(2 )  Showeesh S a le h ,  R e s id e n c y  head m essenger, and Jem adar 
M u sa b e in  o f  th e  Aden T roop
(3 )  See p . 7 .2 1
(h) See p .  *+.78 -  ^ .9 2
(5 )  p .6 .3*+ -  6 .7 9
( 6) AIA 107A, AAR 1 8 8 6 /7  P.7
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F a d h l  b i n  A l i  was to o  p r e - o c c u p ie d  w i t h  h i s  a t te m p ts  t o  
a c q u i r e  e f f e c t i v e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  S u b a ih i  t r i b e s ,  who 
had been p la c e d  u n d e r  h im  i n  18 81 , t o  a t t a c k  A l i  b i n  
Mana. F o r  h i s  p a r t ,  th e  H a ush ab i r u l e r  was re a d y  t o
1. . .  t h r o w  h i m s e l f  i n t o  th e  arms o f  t h e  P o r te  i f  he 
c o u ld  t h e r e b y  c ru s h  h i s  a r c h  enemy th e  A b d a l i  . .  . *  ( 1 ) *
Soon a f t e r  th e  a c c e s s io n  o f  26 y e a r  o ld  ( 2) H o h s in  b i n  
A l i  b in  Mana, th e  A b d a l i  c h i e f  fo u n d  h i m s e l f  f o r c e d  t o  
w i th d r a w  f ro m  th e  S u b a ih i  Otrea because o f  th e  h o s t i l i t y  
o f  th e  t r ib e s m e n  (2). F a d h l th e n  b o u g h t  b a c k  f ro m  t h e  
H a u sh a b i th e  la n d  r e t u r n e d  i n  1881 (2). T h a t  rem oved one 
cause f o r  A b d a l i - H a u s h a b i  f r i c t i o n .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ^ t h e  
young H a u sh a b i c h i e f  f a i l e d  to  c o n t r o l  h i s  t r ib e s m e n  and 
s e c u r i t y  w i t h i n  H a u sh a b i l i m i t s  on th e  t r a d e  r o u te s  
d e c re a s e d  ( 2 ) .  T h is  l e d  i n  t im e  t o  more A b d a l i - H a u s h a b i  
d is a g re e m e n t ,  a t  a t im e  when F a d h l b i n  A l i  was a b le  t o  
g iv e  more a t t e n t i o n  t o ,  and t o  e x e r t  more s t r e n g t h  a g a i n s t ,
(1 )  A IA  972 , Res -  SGB, 2 . 3 . 8 5
(2 ) AAR 1 8 8 6 /8 7  ■*,'
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the Haushabis, In September, 1889* Fadhl bin Ali was
informed that the Government of India no longer 
recognised his authority over the Subaihi tribes (1).
F o r  a t im e ,  A b d a l i  and H a u sh a b i d i f f e r e n c e s  w i t h  t h e i r  
S u b a ih i  n e ig h t b o u r s  were s t r o n g e r  th a n  an y  A b d a l i  
i r r i t a t i o n  w i t h  th e  H a u s h a b is ,  and an  u n e a sy  peace 
p r e v a i l e d  ( 2 ) .  The R e s id e n c y  in t e r v e n e d  i n  1 8 8 9 /9 0
when M o h s in  b i n  A l i  b i n  Mana b lo c k e d  th e  r o u te  t o  L a h e j
a t  & lA n ad  ( 3 ) •  R o th  c h i e f s  w ere  o rd e re d  t o  m eet t o
s e t t l e  t h e i r  d i f f e r e n c e s  p e a c e a b ly ,  A r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  
was a r ra n g e d  th ro u g h  th e  A m ir  o f  D h a la ,  b u t  i t  d id  
n o t  p r o v id e  a l a s t i n g  s e t t le m e n t  (*+).
H a u sh a b i g o o d w i l l  t o  th e  B r i t i s h  was re c o rd e d  i n  
I 889 ( 5 ) *  and M o h s in  b i n  A l i  b i n  Mana gave f u l l
c o - o p e r a t io n  t o  C a p ta in  W ahab 's  m app ing  s u rv e y  i n  1 8 9 1 /9 2 ( 6 ) ,
( 1 )  AAR 1 8 8 9 /9 0  p a ra  lb
( 2 )  AAR 9 0 /9 1  p a ra  1 3 , A IA  1095
(3 )  AAR 1 8 8 9 /9 0
(A ) AAR 1 8 9 0 /9 1  p a ra  18
(5 )  A IA  1 0 52 , AAR 8 9 /9 0  ( D r a f t ,  no p a ra s )
(6) IOL E 60 C o n f i d e n t i a l  R e p o r t  b y  C a p t .  Wahab o f  I 892, p .* t
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By c o n t r a s t ,  th e  A b d a l i ,  A q ra b i  and F a d h l i  c h i e f s  
i n i t i a l l y  r e fu s e d  t h e i r  c o - o p e r a t io n  o r  l e f t  c o r re s p o n d e n c e  
u n a n s w e re d . A b ou t t h i s  t im e ,  th e  R e s id e n t  l e n t  th e  
H a u s h a b i c h i e f  25 r i f l e s  and gave h im  1. . .  a l a r g e
l i m i t s  ( 1 ) .  S in ce  th e  J o b b a i r a  had p lu n d e re d  a t r a d e  
c a ra v a n  com ing f ro m  O ttom an t e r r i t o r y  and had l o o t e d  
goods and b e a s ts  w o r th  o v e r  K30Q, th e  m a t t e r  was an 
A n g lo -O t to m a n ,  n o t  an i n t e r t r i b a l ,  a f f a i r  (2) .
The a t t i t u d e  o f  R e s id e n c y  o f f i c i a l s  a t  t h i s  p e r io d  
was s t i l l  t h a t  i n t e r - t r i b a l  f i g h t i n g  was 110 c o n c e rn  o f  
th e  R e s id e n c y ,  u n le s s  i t  enda ng e re d  some f o r e i g n ,  i . e .  
n o n -Y e m e n i,  i n t e r e s t  (3). T hus, when C a p ta in  Wahab 
s u r v e y in g  i n  th e  H a ush ab i a re a  i n  1 8 9 2 ) th e  H a u sh a b i c h i e f  
was r e q u i r e d  * . . .  t o  keep th e  peace f w i t h  h i s  S u b a ih i
n e ig h b o u r sj u n t i l  th e  s u rv e y  i s  o v e r  -  th e n  th e  K i l k e n n y  
c a t s  can e a t  each o th e r  a t  l e i s u r e  . . . ! ( ^ ) .  T r i b a l
q u a n t i t y  o f  a m m u n it io n  t o  p u n is h  th e  J o b b a i r a
who had been r a i d i n g  c a ra v a n s  w i t h i n  H a u sh a b i 
(1 )  AAR 8 9 /9 0  p a ra  22
(2 )  AAR 89/ 9O p a ra  31
(3 )  In g ra m s  A r a b i a 1 p . 108
(!+) A IA  1115 f  383> S tace  t o  Wahab, 2 1 .1 .9 2
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b e h a v io u r  i n  th e  Yemen was v ie w e d  w i t h  c o n s id e r a b le  
d i s t a s t e  by  B r i t i s h  o f f i c i a l s . ,  ‘t r i b a l  a t t i t u d e s  w ere  
d i f f e r e n t  t o  th o s e  o f  th e  B r i t i s h .  The l a t t e r  fo u n d  
i t  re p u g n a n t  t o  e x e c u te  a p r i s o n e r  c a u g h t  r a i d i n g  b u t  
a c c e p ta b le  i f  he was s h o t  * . . .  i n  f a i r  f i g h t  On
th e  w h o le ^ th e  re m o te r  Yemeni t r ib e s m e n ,  i n c l u d i n g  th e  
H a u s h a b is ,  fo u n d  th e  B r i t i s h  d i f f i c u l t  t o  u n d e r s ta n d ,  
because  t h e r e  was so l i t t l e  c o n t a c t  be tw een  th e  two 
r a c e s .
The B r i t i s h  w a n ted  o n ly  t o  ‘ p r e s e r v e  t h e i r  s t r a t e g i c  
i n t e r e s t s *  so f a r  as p o s s ib le .  When th e  R e s id e n t  r e p o r t e d  
t h a t  t h e r e  w ere  O tto m a n -H a u s h a b i p r o p o s a ls  t o  c o n s t r u c t  
an e f f e c t i v e  H a u sh a b i cus tom s p o s t  a t  a lA n a d ,  to  p r e v e n t  
s m u g g l in g  i n t o  O ttom an t e r r i t o r y ,  th e  H a u sh a b i c h i e f  was 
i n v i t e d  t o  s ig n  a P r o t e c t o r a t e  t r e a t y  ( 1 ) .  The H a u s h a b i 
c h i e f  was p re p a re d  t o  a c c e p t  a t r e a t y  g u a ra n te e in g  B r i t i s h  
p r o t e c t i o n ,  b u t  n o t  one t h a t  f o r b a d  h im  t o  cede t e r r i t o r y  
t o  a f o r e i g n  Power w i t h o u t  B r i t i s h  c o n s e n t .  The B r i t i s h  
were n o t  p re p a re d  t o  a c c e p t  th e  p re s e n c e  o f  a c i v i l i a n
(1 )  L I ,  D e sp a tch  121 o f  20.6.93? r e c l d 10.7*93? e n c lo s in g  
Hes -  SGB, 13.3.93
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O ttom an cus tom s c l e r k  a t  a lA n a d .  The s i t u a t i o n  re a c h e d  
d e a d lo c k .  P o s s ib l y  th e  A b d a l i  c h i e f  d e c id e d  t o  a c t  
w h i le  A n g lo -H a u s h a b i r e l a t i o n s  w e re  s t r a in e d .
+ -h + + +
A b d a l i - H a u s h a b i  h o s t i l i t i e s  i n  189*+ may have  been 
p ro v o k e d  by  th e  B r i t i s h  i n s i s t e n c e  t h a t  t h e  c a ra v a n  
r o u te s  had t o  be p r o t e c t e d .  The H a u sh a b i c h i e f  c o u ld  
o n ly  g u a ra n te e  c a ra v a n s *  s a f e t y  i f  t h e y  were e s c o r t e d  
by  some H a u sh a b i t r ib e s m e n ,  who had to  be p a id  ( 1 ) .  The 
A b d a l i  c h i e f ,  F a d h l b in  M o h s in ,  had fa c e d  th e  same 
p ro b le m  i n  1865? and he had s o lv e d  i t  w i t h  B r i t i s h  
a p p r o v a l ,  by  i n s t i t u t i n g  t r a n s i t  dues on c a ra v a n s .
M oh s in  b i n  A l i  b i n  Mana l e v i e d  *+ annas p e r  cam el on 
c a ra v a n s ,  p a y a b le  t o  th e  e s c o r t  ( 2 ) .  T h is  t a x  was 
re p re s e n te d  as a * . . .  h e a v y  and u n a u th o r is e d  t a x  on 
K a f i l e h s  . ' b y  F a d h l b i n  A l i .  I t  a p p e a rs  t h a t  th e
(1) AIA/K/53? Cmdr. Aden Troop - First Assistant Res,
(Davies), writing from Museimir, 8.9*01
(2 )  AAR 9 V 9 5  p a ra  6
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Resident, Jopp, may not have appreciated the reasons for 
the introduction of the Haushabi tax on caravans. The 
Residency, at that period, had little contact with the 
interior. Jopp believed that the correct policy for the 
Residency was to be neutral in the quarrel (l)*
Fadhl bin Ali had recruited a large force of tribesmen 
from other, and more warlike, tribes than his own and he 
swept aside Haushabi opposition (1). He had asked for, 
but did not get, arms and ammunition from the Residency.
But he had received 250 rifles when he took over 
responsibility for the Subaihi area, in 1881. He also 
had access to arms from Djibuti, which were smuggled 
into the Yemen through Ras alAra. The Haushabi chief 
lacked the resources of Fadhl bin Ali, with the latter1s 
revenue from agriculture, and from taxes in the relatively 
wealthy and expanding Abdali area. Mohsin bin Ali bin Mana 
fled. He asked for, but failed to get, Ottoman assistance. 
After the Haushabi tribesmen had been persuaded to 1 elect1 
Fadhl bin Ali as their new ruler, Mohsin bin Ali bin Mana
( 1 )  A IA  1203 f 317? Muhammad S. J a f f e r f s D r a f t  AAR l8 9 * * /9 5 >  
l a t e r  r e - e d i t e d
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came t o  L a h e j and s u r re n d e re d  ( 1 ) .  M o h s in  a g re e d  t o  
l i v e  w h e re v e r  h i s  enemy r e q u i r e d  and p ro m is e d  F a d h l 
o b e d ie n c e  (2 ) .  B u t  th e  R e s id e n t  i n t e r v e n e d  and p re v e n te d  
a pe rm a n e n t A b d a l i  o c c u p a t io n  o f  t h e  H a u sh a b i a re a .  The 
A b d a l i  c h i e f  had p r o v i s i o n a l l y  a p p o in te d  two d e p u t ie s  to  
a d m in is t e r e d  th e  H a u s h a b is ,  w i t h  a g a r r i s o n  t o  e n fo r c e  
o b e d ie n c e .
A new A b d a l i - H a u s h a b i  r e l a t i o n s h i p  emerged w i t h  
th e  A n g lo -K a u s h a b i  P r o t e c t o r a t e  A g reem en t o f  6 .8 .1 8 9 5  
w h ic h  r e c o g n is e d  A b d a l i  s u z e r a in t y  o v e r  th e  H aush ab i 
c h i e f  ( 3 ) *  T h a t  ag re e m e n t was s ig n e d  b y  F a d h l  b i n  A l i ,  
as th e  H a u sh a b i s u z e r a in ,  and n o t  b y  th e  H a u sh a b i c h i e f .  
H e n c e fo rw a rd ,  th e  H a u sh a b i s t ip e n d  was p a id  th ro u g h  th e  
A b d a l i  c h i e f  and A b d a l i  o f f i c i a l s  c o l l e c t e d  b o th  A b d a l i  
and H a ush ab i c a ra v a n  dues a t  . a lAnad on th e  A b d a l i -  
H aush ab i b o r d e r .
The A b d a l i s  w i th d r e w  t h e i r  m e rc e n a r ie s  and o f f i c i a l s  
f ro m  H aush ab i t e r r i t o r y  and th e  H a u sh a b i c h i e f  resum ed
(1 )  AAR 1 8 9 V 9 5  p a ra  7
(2) AAR d r a f t ,  AIA 1203, f 319
(3 )  A i t c h i s o n  1 T r e a t i e s 1 No XXV
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h i s  r u l e ,  b u t  as an A b d a l i  c l i e n t .  T h is  new r e l a t i o n s h i p  
was c o n v e n ie n t  f o r  th e  B r i t i s h  as a n o th e r  a n t i - O t t o m a n  
b a r r i e r ,  b u t  i t  e m b i t t e r e d  H a u sh a b i r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  th e  
A b d a l i s  and w i t h  th e  B r i t i s h *  F a d h l  b i n  A l i  and h i s  
s u c c e s s o r  f ro m  1898, Ahmad b i n  F a d h l ,  had a l s o  a c q u i r e d  
some shadowy excuse  f o r  i n t e r v e n in g  i n  H a u sh a b i a f f a i r s .  
They d id  so to  keep th e  H a u sh a b i c h i e f  w eak, and t o  
re d u c e  h i s  i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  h i s  own t r ib e s m e n  (1 ) .  
U n d e r s ta n d a b ly ,  1• . .  th e  H a u sh a b i man h a te  [ 'd  L a h e d j 
l i k e  p o is o n  and h i s  k e e p in g  o f  a lA n a d  and c o l l e c t i n g  
h i s  t o l l s  . . . ! (2) .
The A b d a l i  c h i e f  was b e l ie v e d  t o  have been i n t r i g u i n g  
w i t h  d i s s i d e n t  H a u sh a b i s e c t io n s  t o  keep th e  H a u sh a b i 
c h i e f  weak. The h o p e le s s n e s s  o f  h i s  p o s i t i o n ,  and h i s  
i n a b i l i t y  t o  r e c o v e r  th e  la n d  t h a t  he and h i s  f a t h e r  had 
l o s t ,  a p pe a re d  t o  a f f e c t  M oh s in  b i n  A l i ! s h e a l t h  a d v e r s e ly  
a f t e r  189? . When Wahab m et h im  a g a in  d u r in g  th e  B o rd e r  
S u rv e y s ,  i n  1903-01+, Wahab d e p lo r e d  M o h s in1 s m e n ta l  and 
p h y s ic a l  d e t e r i o r a t i o n .  M o h s in  had become sou red  and
(1 ) p .9*1 n**+
(2 )  A IA  M/53? Cmdr Aden T rp  -  F i r s t  A s s t  He s. ( D a v ie s )
8.9.1901
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e m b i t t e r e d .  He was no lo n g e r  obeyed b y  h i s  t r ib e s m e n ;  
he had  been u n j u s t l y  t r e a t e d  by  th e  A b d a l i  c h i e f  and 
he was m is u n d e rs to o d  b y  th e  R e s id e n c y .  As a r e s u l t ,
A n g lo -H a u s h a b i  r e l a t i o n s  were s t r a i n e d .  The H a ush ab i 
c h i e f  and h i s  s u c c e s s o r  c o u ld  o n ly  hope t o  r e c o v e r  l o s t  
t e r r i t o r y  w i t h  O ttom an a i d .  M o h s in  b i n  A l i  d ie d  i n  1901+. 
He was succeeded by  h i s  c o u s in ,  who jo in e d  th e  O ttom ans 
on t h e i r  advance on L a h e j i n  1915*
4* 4* 4* 4* 4*
The B r i t i s h  a t t i t u d e  to w a rd s  S u b a ih i - A b d a l i  r e l a t i o n s
A b d a l i  in v o lv e m e n t  i n  S u b a ih i  a f f a i r s  had in c r e a s e d  
a f t e r  T rem enheere  em ployed th e  A b e a l i  c h i e f  as a B r i t i s h  
i n t e r m e d ia r y  i n  1871- (1 )«  The A b d a l i  c h i e f  re m a in e d  a 
c u s to m a ry  c h a n n e l f o r  B r i t i s h  c o m m u n ic a t io n  w i t h ,  and 
f o r  i n f o r m a t i o n  on , th e  S u b a ih is .  L a h e j was a m a rk e t  
c e n t r e  f o r  th e  S u b a ih is .  Some S u b a ih is ,  h o w e v e r ,  d i d  
v i s i t  th e  R e s id e n c y  s t a f f  w i t h o u t  a n y  i n t r o d u c t i o n s  f ro m
(1) See p . 2 .5 2  n .2
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t h e  A b d a l i  c h i e f *  The A b d a l i  c h i e f  and h i s  u n c le ,
Muhammad, a c q u i r e d  la n d s  i n  th e  S u b a ih i  a re a  w h ic h  t h e y
th e n  had t o  p r o t e c t  f ro m  l o o t i n g . ( 1 )  F a d h l b i n  A l i
c la im e d  t h a t  he s p e n t  ES20,0Q0 i n  1877 on o p e r a t io n s
a g a in s t  S u b a ih i  t r o u b le - m a k e r s  and RS7,000 i n  1879 ( 2 ) .
The S u b a ih is  were p o o r  and th e y  m a in ta in e d  a
r e p u t a t i o n  as t ro u b le s o m e  n e ig h b o u rs  t h r o u g h o u t  th e
p e r io d  ( 3 ) *  Betw een l A . 1 8 8 0  and 2 3 .7 * 1 8 8 0 ,  13 S u b a ih i
r o b b e r ie s  w ere  re c o rd e d  o o .  B u t  i t  was H u n te r * s  o p in io n ,
i n  O c to b e r ,  18 8 0 , t h a t  a B r i t i s h  o c c u p a t io n  o f  S h a ik h  
*
Othrnan need n o t  fa c e  a s e c u r i t y  p ro b le m  f ro m  S u b a ih i  
r a i d s .  * . . .  N e g o c ia t io n s  / " s i c j  now i n  p ro g re s s  to w a rd s  
th e  pe rm an en t s e t t le m e n t  o f  th e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  
th e  d e p r jd a t io n s  o f  th e s e  t ro u b le s o m e  B edaw ins  w i l l  remove 
a l l  p o s s ib le  a p p re h e n s io n  . . . * ,  H u n te r  w ro te  ( 5 ) .  The 
i n t e n t i o n  was t o  t r a n s f e r  t o  th e  A b d a l i  c h i e f  a p o t e n t i a l l y
(1 )  A IA  85 5 , .para 12, Res 1 1 7 -5 9 8  o f  1 6 .5 * 8 1  -  SGB.
These lands were valued at MTjSl0,000
( 2) P r o b a b ly  i n c l u d in g  th e  p r i c e  o f  a rm s, see p .  7 . tyJfn. 1
(3 )  A IA  855? p a ra  k, Res 1 1 7 -5 9 8  o f  1 6 .5 .8 1  -  SGB
(*+) AIA 855 f  59* D e t a i l s  f ro m  u n s ig n e d  memo o f  1880
(5 )  AIA 876, H u n t e r1 s M in u te  o f  2*+. 10.80 -  Res
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troublesome and expensive liability, which, it was hoped, 
the Abdalis could settle by using whatever methods they 
chose. Ultimately British prestige proved to be a 
greater safeguard0to Shaikh Othman than Abdali arms or 
intrigue.
The Abdali chief was encouraged to accept full 
responsibility for the Subaihi area by permission to 
purchase used, service, rifles from the Bombay arsenal (1). 
He also bought *+,000 rounds of ammunition. That was an 
economical price to pay for an intended solution of a 
problem that the British had left dormant since 1871 (2). 
Loch had optimistically asserted in July 1881 that 1... the 
[Abdali] Suit an will require no assistance from the 
Residency in bringing the Subaihi into subjection beyond 
the sanction to purchase rifles . ..* (3)* but Loch also 
admitted that the Abdali chief might require to buy 
ammunition, and might even require support from the Aden 
Troop.
(1) AIA 855? Military Dept.*s 6706 of 29.12.81 - Res
(2) 2.^5 - 2.5^
(3) AIA 855? Res 179-898 of 9*7*81 - SGB
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Fadhl bin Ali had been allowed to buy 20 Snider 
carbines and 1000 rounds of ammunition in 1876, but 
other, unauthorised, arms imports into Aden were banned (1). 
In May, 1881, Fadhl bin Ali had 12 rifles, imported from 
Britain, detained in the Aden arsenal (2), Another 51? 
bought from their Somali salvagers off a British wreck 
and imported for Fadhl bin Ali, had been destroyed (2).
The Subaihi agreement thus Introduced a new element into 
Residency policy in the area, that of assisting a 
supposedly dependable Yemeni protege" to extend his control 
to increase local security and keep out foreign influence, 
at the price of local arms imports. That innovation, and 
the Subaihi agreement of which it formed a part, was made 
by Loch on his own initiative. Loch was warned that his 
action was premature, and that it was not be treated as 
a precedent (3).
(1) IOL, BSC, P & S 76, B° Resolution No 6578 of 16.11.76, 
f 1339
(2) AIA 76, Loch's Memo of 7«5«81
(3) AIA 855, For Dept, G of I's Pol No 2207 E.P. of 
20.9.81 - G of B°, Extract forwarded by B° Resolution 
5-923 of 11.10.81 - Res
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Loch believed that Fadhl would refuse to ratify 
the Subaihi agreement (1)* Loch therefore informed 
Fadhl bin Ali that the Anglo-Abdali Subaihi agreement (2) 
had been ratified by the Indian Government and that 
*... we are prepared to carry its stipulations into 
effect by recognising you as the paramount power as 
regards the Subaihis ...* (3)* Loch did not even carry 
out his instructions that 1... the Sultan should be 
distinctly given to understand that it £the agreement] 
is liable to reconsideration in the event of his showing 
himself unable to maintain his authority over the 
Subaihis or failing to act up to the terms which he has 
accepted . ..* (*+). Consequently, the later British 
withdrawal of recognition was the source of another of 
Fadhl!s grievances.
The Anglo-Abdali agreement about the Subaihi 
tribes, in both the English and Arabic versions, referred
(1) See p.7*16 n.l
(2) Aitchison treaties1 No XXIII
(3) AIA 855, Fes - Fadhl bin Ali, 21.10.81
(L0 AIA 855, para 2, B° Resolution *+923 11.10.81
forwarded to Res
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to all the Subaihi sections, excluding only those which
acknowledged the Ottomans (1)* But the -Resident1s
subsequent letter to Bombay of 16.5*1881 showed that he
only expected the Abdalis to secure control over the
nearer sections (2). Loch mentioned the nakhdoomi,
PKans^iri, Rijai and Dhubaini sections. He specifically 
excluded the ’still independent' Maqtari and Athwari 
sections on the Ottoman frontier (2). Yet these sections 
had been forced to acknowledge Ottoman suzerainty in 
1673 according to Aden Residency reports (3).
Misunderstandings soon occurred; Fadhl's Abdali 
followers appeared in ’inconvenient places. The 
Governor-General of the Yemen complained to the new 
Resident, General J. Blair, of an Abdali occupation of 
the Athwari village of alMowlaa (^) * Blair ordered 
Fadhl to withdraw his men. Other Abdalis had appeared
(1) Aitchison ’Treaties' No XXIII
(2) AIA 855, Res 117-598 of 16.5.81 - SGB
(3) AIA 625, Aden News No 26 of 18-25.6.73 referred to 
the Maqtari
(R) BSC 81/8^ +, Vol V f 915? Izza+ Pasha's letter of 
25.12.83 - Res
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at Shaikh Said in the Hakimi section's territory. Since 
the British had recognised Ottoman control there in 
1869 CD, an Abdali claim to the right to search the 
coast for ambergris was unjustified* The Resident told 
Fadhl so (2).
Fadhl was pre-occupied. with any method of raising 
extra revenue from his new and ill-defined territory.
But the Subaihis were poor and wanted as much as possible 
from their rather inhospitable country. Abdali-Subaihi 
relations became strained. Security deteriorated and 
the Residency*s weekly overland mail to the garrison and 
coal depot at Perim was endangered (3). In August, 1886, 
an Abdali post in Subaihi territory was overrun and it's 
garrison was massacred. Fadhl appealed to the Resident (h). 
With the assistance of the Aden Troop the remaining 
Abdali garrisons were evacuated (5). Fadhl received the
(1) p.3.2 n. 3 ; but British Boundary Commissioners 
claimed it in 190*+, p.9.1l5n. 2 and on to 9.119
(2) BSC 81/8^ f 101+7, Res No 1725 of 19-3.83 - Fadhl 
bin Ali, passed to 10 by B°
(3) AIA 952 deals with this service, which was operating 
in 1881+
(k) AAR 1886/87
(5) Bury !Uz* p.80 mentions this event in a nursery rhyme
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loan of Residency rifles and ammunition to equip a 
relief force to accompany the Aden Troop (1). Thereafter; 
the Subaihi sections began to resume their earlier 
independent relations with the Residency. But Fadhl 
was not officially informed that the Anglo-Abdali 
agreement aas repudiated by the British for about three 
years (2.). He was then told l... not to interfere with 
the Subaihis beyond what might be necessary for the 
protection of Lahej territory ...* (2). Fadhl replied 
by asserting his own claims (3). One was to the Subaihi 
anchorage of Khor Umeira, some 60 miles west of Aden*which 
was used for the smuggling of arms and slaves into the 
Yemen. Both were profitable imports, but objectionable 
to the British. Fadhl bin Ali was known to participate 
in slave-dealing (^ f). Fadhl1 s irritation at the
(1) p.7A7 nA
(2) AAR 1889/90
(3) AIA 1086, draft 89/90 report para l1*. Fadhl had 
taken possession of the good anchorage of Khor AlUmeira
(b) p.7.52 n. 2 There is no evidence of the scale 
of his participation
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cancellation of the Subaihi agreement was recognised (1).
The growth in merchant shipping through the Gulf 
of Aden, off the Subaihi south coast, obliged the 
Residency te take measures to protect seafarers, ships 
and cargo wrecked along that shore* Since Fadhl could 
provide no protection, agreements were made directly 
with the coastal Subaihi sections (2). Where punitive 
action was necessary the Residency arranged that without 
calling for Abdali assistance. Thus in retaliation for 
some Barhimis plundering the Perim mail, the Native 
Assistant Resident, Muhammad Salih Jaffer, was sent 
against them with locally raised tribal levies, armed 
and financed by the Residency (3). But British 
supervision over the area was largely nominal. It was 
sufficient to prevent the establishment of foreign 
settlements on the coast, but not to prevent Subaihi 
agreements with other foreigners. British and Subaihi
(1) AIA 1-lllf f 69? Undated Memo by Brig. J. Jopp of ? Oct I89O
(2) Aitchsion 1 Treaties1 XXX, Atifi agreement 1889
XXXI, Barhimi agreement 1889
(3) AAR 1889/90
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understanding of the obligations of the new Protectorate 
Treaties differed] The Atifis saw no reason to refuse a 
monthly stipend of #MT75 p.m. from the Ottoman *Societe 
de Tombac* in return for banning tobacco imports through 
Khor Umeira (1). The Resident, however, deplored 
that *♦.. these wild and uneducated Arabs are not proof 
against pecuniary inducements and ... [that they] ignore 
the moral obligations of treaties . ..* (L).
+  +  +  +  H*
The Indian Government's attitude towards its own 
treaties was not always above criticism, Jopp had 
informed Fadhl bin Ali in I89O that 1..• the Arabic 
version of the ^Anglo-Abdali] treaty [ o r 18^9] (2) 
is useless end that our Great Government have ordered 
that the English version must be the one to be gone 
by ...* (3). Jopp was only repeating the official view 
of Sir William Lee-Warner, the Secretary to the Government
(1) BSC 89/96, Res 5^ of 15.11.9*+ - S of S
(2) Aitchison 1 Treaties* No XX
(3) AIA 111>+, Res - Fadhl bin Ali, 8.10.90
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of Bombay (1), Lee-Warner had no doubt that the English 
copy of all tribal agreements with the British was the 
master copy* He was confident that the inconvenience 
that Aden suffered from a recent Abdali tax on vegetables 
could be removed by sending Fadhl 1... a true Arabic 
translation of the English version . ..* of the treaty (1). 
That denied the Abdalis the right to tax vegetables going 
to Aden, whereas the Arabic version of the treaty made 
no reference to vegetables* Fadhl, however, refused to 
accept this one-sided British ruling (2). He claimed 
that each version of the treaty was equally valid. Jopp 
had to accept that he possessed no veto on the tax. He 
could only urge that the tax should be a light one (3).
Jopp endeavoured to secure British control over
(1) AIA 111^, SGB1s Ho ^265 of 9-7-90 - Res
(2) AIA 111k, Fadhl bin Ali - Res, 13-10.90 and 20,10.90
(3) AIA 111k, Res - Fadhl bin Ali, 7-1-91
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Fadhl bin Ali through the signing of an Anglo-Abdali 
Protectorate Treaty (1), Such a treaty would have given 
greater British powers of interference in Abdali affairs,
including slave trading. Fadhl denied that such a trade
existed, but it was admitted by other Yemenis, including 
Fadhl1s own brother (2). Fadhl had no intention of
accepting any ban on the trade. He argued that, since
there was *... no bazaar for slaves . ..* in Lahej, the 
British had no cause for concern (3). Fadhlfs successful 
opposition to a Protectorate treaty was embarrassing and 
irritating to the Resident* A rejected draft for the 
1890/91 Aden Annual Report recorded some details of 
Fadhlfs persistence in evading discussions with the 
Resident on the draft treaty which had been taken to 
Lahej by the Residency Interpreter for Fadhl to consider (*+).
Cl) p.7.*+9 n.l
(2) AIA lll^ f, Memo Stace - Res 1.8*90, quoting Fadhlfs 
brother who had himself 2 slaves, imported by Fadhl
(3) AIA 1111*, Fadhl bin Ali - Res, 15.5*92
(1+) AIA 1105, Draft by Muhammad Salih rejected by 
Lt. Col. E.V. Stace
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Fadhl1 s intransigence achieved, his purpose. The Abdali 
chief remained, until 1952, without a Protectorate treaty. 
All the other coastal tribal sections were obliged to 
accept Protectorate treaties as a part of the policy of 
strengthening the British position along the whole length 
of south Arabia (1). Mention of the Abdali refusal to 
accept a new treaty was omitted from the Annual Report 
for I89O/9I to avoid adverse publicity,
+ + + + +
Brigadier J.W. Schneider had possessed, great 
influence over the Abdali chiefs from 1873 and. he had 
secured Fadhl bin Mohsinfs agreement to commuting Abdali 
transit dues whenever the Indian Government wished. The 
dues had only been introduced in 1865$ and a case 
therefore existed for their abolition since the money 
raised was no longer needed for the protection of caravans 
trading with Aden from Fadhli raiders. Failure to arrange 
the early abolition of the dues was a mistake, possibly 
due to Residency staff changes. In 1880, the Government
(1) FQ 78 3974-- F0 I.-Icmo of 2,10.86
of India agreed to consider commuting the dues for 
RS^OOO p.m. (1). But no arrangements were made and 
Article IV of the Shaikh Othman agreement of 1.882 
recognised the continuing Abdali right to collect the 
tax in Crater !... so long as the Sultan of Lahej 
possesses the right to levy ...* it (2). It is probable 
that Loch considered that the abolition of the transit 
tax had a low priority beside the other matters under 
negotiation with Fadhl bin Ali, and that the time was 
inopportune for raising the subject. As Fadhl remained 
unco-operative with later Residents, his agreement to 
a revision was unlikely. Each year the tax became more 
profitable and more expensive to commute, as Aden*s 
trade and population grew, so the tax remained*
+  -h +  +  +
Anglo-Abdali relations improved when Ahmad bin 
Fadhl succeeded his cousin, Fadhl bin Ali, in 1898.
(1) Cf. p*7.7 n.2 Delay in buying Shaikh Othman
(2) Aitchison 1 Treaties 1 No XXIV
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British confidence in the new ruler was demonstrated by 
British approval of an Abdali re-occupation of some 
Subaihi areas. The British move was designed to increase 
security and to reduce Subaihi robberies (l). It also 
secured Abdali surveillance of the coastal anchorage of 
Has alAra, frequented by fishing boats and smugglers* 
craft (2). The closer Anglo-Abdali relations were due 
to the personality of Ahmad bin Fadhl (3), and to the 
efforts which G-eneral G-. O'Moore Creagh made to improve 
friendly relations with the Yemenis (4). Ahmad bin Fadhl 
was a frequent visitor to the gymkhanas which 0*Moore 
Creagh encouraged on the Maalla plain (3). Ahmad was 
for many years friendly with G.Wyman Bury (5) and he 
remained, until his death in 1914, a close friend of 
H.P. Jacob (6). Official British approval was marked
(1) Aitchison * Treaties* p.6
(2) Jacob 1 Kings* p.91, refers to the arms trade there.
(3) Jacob 1 Kings* p.269.
(4) AIA C 28 Private letter Haj-Gen. P.J.Maitland - Sir 
Y/illiam Lee lamer 26.12.1901.
(5) AIA 28/4, Bury - Lt.Col. H.M.Abud, 9.4.05.
(6) Jacob ’Kings* p. 88 & p. 153.
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by Ahmad's appointment to be a K.C, S.I.in 1901. But, 
throughout his chiefship, Sir Ahmad bin Fadhl was quick 
to emphasise his independence of British control whenever 
the reverse was suggested (1)*
+ + + + +
The Abdalis and. the Aqrabis
Fadhl bin Mohsin and Fadhl bin Ali each wanted to 
obtain control over the Aqrabi Shaikhdom (2). Ahmad 
bin Fadhl probably shared their ambition. Hunter 
accepted in 1885 that that would probably happen on the 
death of the Aqrabi Shaikh, Abdullah ba Haidera, because 
of the lack of a strong successor and because of internal 
Aqrabi divisions (3). hut Abdullah* s long life C*+) and 
developments in British policy in the Yemen during this 
period prevented the Abdalis taking over the whole area.
(1) Jacob •Kings1 p.87
(2)  p . 2 .34 -  2.44
(3) FO 78 *+528, 10 forwarded Hunter* s Memo of 28.9.85 
written in London - FO on 15.10.85
(*+) Shaijh.,1858 to March 1905? when he died
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F a d h l b i n  A l i  d i d ,  h o w e v e r ,  a c q u i r e  th e  S a i l a  a r e a > 
a f t e r  t h a t  s e c t io n  o f  th e  t r i b e  had r e j e c t e d  A b d u l l a h 's  
a u t h o r i t y .
F a d h l  b i n  A l i  a l s o  en co u ra g e d  S u b a ih i  r a i d s  on 
A q r a b i  t e r r i t o r y ,  even  th o u g h  S a l i h  J a f f e r  s u c c e s s f u l l y  
m e d ia te d  be tw een  th e  A b d a l i  and A q r a b i  c h i e f s  and s e t t l e d  
o u t s ta n d in g  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  June 1876 ( 1 ) .  The two c h i e f s  
th e n  a g re e d  n o t  t o  h a r b o u r  each o t h e r ' s  m a lc o n te n ts  w here  
th e  l a t t e r  were accused  o f  c r i m i n a l  a c t i v i t i e s  ( 2 ) .  B u t  
h o s t i l i t y  c o n t in u e d  be tw een  th e  A q ra b is  o f  S a i la h  and 
th o s e  o f  th e  p r i n c i p a l  s e t t le m e n t  a t  B i r  Ahmad. The 
R e s id e n t  banned th e  S a i l a  A q r a b is  f ro m  e n t e r i n g  Aden 
and o b ta in e d  a 2 y e a rs  t r u c e  be tw een  th e  tw o  f a c t i o n s  ( 3 ) .  
A q r a b i  t r o u b le  f ro m  th e  S u b a ih is  co n t in u e d , th r o u g h o u t  
1 8 8 0 /8 1  ( V ) .  I n  1882, F a d h l b i n  A l i  p r o f i t e d  b y  h i s  new 
c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  S u b a ih i  a re a  t o  d i v e r t  c a ra v a n  t r a f f i c  
th r o u g h  Waht and away f ro m  B i r  Ahmad, th u s  d e p r i v i n g  th e
(1 )  BSC I 876 f  2 3 75 Copy o f  a l e t t e r  f ro m  A q r a b i  S h a ik h  
t o  A^ Res (G o o d fe l lo w )  r e c ' d  1 2 .6 .7 6
( 2 ) AAR 76/ 77? p a ra  10
(3 )  AAR 7 7 /7 8 ,  p a ra  10 
(A ) AAR 1 8 8 0 /8 1 ,  p a ra  20
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A q r a b i  S h a ik h  o f  re v e n u e  ( 1 ) .  F a d h l b i n  A l i  pa id , no
a t t e n t i o n  t o  B r i t i s h  rcm ons i^ances, a n d , i n  1890 , 
f . . .  th e  n a t t e r  uas d ro p p e d  as i t  a p p e a re d  u s e le s s  t o  
do a n y th in g  f u r t h e r  ( 2 ) .  S u b a ih i  r a i d s  a g a in s t  th e
A q r a b is  c o n t in u e d ,  i n c i t e d  b y  F a d h l  b i n  A l i  ( 3 ) .  S in c e  
B r i t i s h  p o l i c y  was t o  a v o id  i n t e r f e r i n g  i n  i n t e r n a l
Yemeni a f f a i r s  th e  A q ra b is  were l e f t  t o  a r ra n g e  t h e i r
own p r o t e c t i o n ,  b u t  t h e y  c o n t in u e d  t o  c o - o p e r a te  w i t h
th e  R e s id e n c y  when asked  t o  do so.
+  •+* +  +  +
R e s id e n c y  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  th e  n e a r e r  Yemeni t r i b e s  e a s t  
o f  Aden, 18 73 -1901
T r i b a l  a f f a i r s  e a s t  o f  Aden w ere  o f  l i t t l e  i n t e r e s t  
t o  th e  R e s id e n c y  a f t e r  1867, so lo n g  as  f o r e i g n
(1 )  AAR 1 8 8 2 /8 3  p a ra  17
(2 )  A IA  1 1 05 , D r a f t  AnR I 89O /9I  by  Muhammad S a l i h  J a f f e r .
The f i n a l  AAR was more d i s c r e t e
(3 )  e .g .  AAR lS S S /S ^  p a ra  11
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i n t e r f e r e n c e  was p r e v e n te d .  The Abyan d e l t a  p r o v id e d  
Aden w i t h  some l o c a l  s u p p l ie s ,  m a in l y  c h a r c o a l  and 
f o d d e r ;  b u t  th e  A b d a l i  a re a  p r o v id e d  th e  g r e a t e r  p a r t .  
B r i t i s h  p o l i c y  as i t  d e v e lo p e d  d u r in g  th e  1 9 t h ,  and e a r l y  
i n  th e  2 0 th  c e n t u r y ,  was t o  i n t e r v e n e  l o c a l l y  o n l y  t o  
c o u n te r  i n t e r e s t  b y  f o r e i g n  P o w ers , and t o  d is c o u ra g e  
B r i t i s h  and f o r e i g n  t r a v e l l e r s  i n  a re a s  o f  A r a b ia  u n d e r  
B r i t i s h  i n f l u e n c e  ( 1 ) .  O f f i c i a l  B r i t i s h  c o n ta c t  was 
l a r g e l y  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  v i s i t s  t o  th e  c o a s t a l  p o r t s .  The 
c h i e f s  i n  th e s e  p o r t s  were p r o v id e d  w i t h  U n io n  J a c k s ,  
f o r  use on th e  a p p ro a c h  o f  s t r a n g e  c r a f t ,  t o  p r o c la im  
A n g lo -A ra b  a c c o rd .  The A ra b s  w is h e d  t o  p re s e rv e  th e  l i f e  
t h e y  knew ( 2 ) ;  and i t  s u i t e d  B r i t i s h  p o l i c y  t h a t  t h e y  
s h o u ld .  F o r e ig n  in f l u e n c e s  w ere  k e p t  o u t  and B r i t i s h  
i n f l u e n c e  i n  th e  a re a  c o n t in u e d  u n c h a l le n g e d  and a t  l i t t l e  
c o s t .
+  H- +■ +  +
(1) e.g. p. 1,5 n,.4
(2) Jacob  1 Kings1 p .73
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The Fadhli tribe was brought into contact with 
the Residency by Merewether’s operations in 1865-67 (1); 
their future chief, Haidera bin AbdAllah, developed a 
friendship with the future Residency Interpreter,
Salih Jaffer; and the latter was the tribal Agent 
in Aden from I867-I876. When Haidera was murdered 
in 1877? bis 16 year old nephew, Ahmad bin Husain, was 
elected chief. Ahmad needed, and received, guidance 
and help from the Residency in the early years of his 
chiefship. In 1879? the British captured and deported 
the young chief1s father, who was opposing his son (2). 
In 1881, Ahmad agreed to sell his dubious rights to the 
possession of Imad village to the British (3)* The 
Abdali-Fadhli border agreement, and the British purchase 
of the coastal strip up to Imad in 1881, brought British 
territory up to the Fadhli limits. The British were 
interested in peaceful Abdali-Fadhli relations; the
(1) p . 2 . 3  - 2 . 2 0
(2) AIA 1878/79? para 9
(3) p.7.10 n.l
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R e s id e n ts  w ere  p re p a re d  t o  use th e  Aden T roop  t o
s t r e n g th e n  s e c u r i t y  i n  th e  c o a s t a l  p l a i n  n e a r  Aden; h u t
B r i t i s h  i n t e r e s t  d i d  n o t  e x te n d  f a r t h e r  e a s t .  They c o u ld  
n o t  e x e r t  e f f e c t i v e  m i l i t a r y  p re s s u re  beyond th e  c o a s t a l  
p l a i n , o r  even on i t ,  beyond s u p p o r t  f ro m  th e  Aden 
g a r r i s o n  o r  n a v a l  s u p p o r t ;  and th e  R e s id e n ts  were n o t  
a u t h o r i s e d  t o  in t e r v e n e  i n  i n t e r n a l  Yemeni a f f a i r s .
Ahmad b i n  H u s s a in  asked  f o r  B r i t i s h  i n t e r v e n t i o n  t o
/
s e t t l e  th e  F a d h l i - Y a f a i  d i s p u te  o v e r  w a te r  r i g h t s  i n  
A byan , and t o  p r o lo n g  t h e i r  t r i b a l  t r u c e  ( 1 ) .  The 
R e s id e n t  r e fu s e d  t o  in t e r v e n e  and a d v is e d  th e  F a d h l i  
c h i e f  t o  a r ra n g e  a s e t t le m e n t  t h r o u g h  l o c a l  i n t e r m e d i a r i e s .  
T h is  r e p l y  p r o b a b ly  d is a p p o in te d  Ahmad, who p o s s i b l y  
c o u n te d  on B r i t i s h  s u p p o r t  t o  e n fo r c e  T re m e n h e e re 1s 
e a r l i e r  u n r e a l i s t i c  s e t t le m e n t ,  w h ic h  gave th e  F a d h l i s  
a l l  t h e  w a te r  th e y  w a n ted  f o r  a t r i f l i n g  paym ent t o  th e  
Ya f a i s  o f  #MT25 p . a .  ( 2 ) .  D e s u l t o r y  t r i b a l  f i g h t i n g  
d e v e lo p e d  and Abyan s u f f e r e d  f ro m  i n s e c u r i t y .  The F a d h l i
( 1 )  A IA /M/32 f  30 9 -3 1 3  5 C o rre sp o n d e n ce  and m in u te s  on 
a F a d h l i  r e q u e s t  o f  2 2 .5 * 8 1
(2 )  p . 2 .73  n .2
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area of Abyan had never recovered the prosperity it 
had enjoyed before Merewetherfs punitive operations 
there in 1866. Wahab referred to the old Fadhli centre 
of Assala having only 3° families in 1892, where before 
it had had 600 (1). Other Fadhli villages were 
completely deserted.
The Fadhli chief had derived much of his revenue 
from the non-tribal cultivators, craftsmen, and traders, 
of Abyan before 1866. Anglo-Abdali operations destroyed 
Abyan*s prosperity and revived Yafai raids increased 
insecurity.. Ahmad bin Husain* s pique at the British 
attitude is understandable. He did not understand the 
British and he was no match for the Abdali chief in 
cunning (2). It is possible that Fadhl bin Ali alAbdali 
had some share in the resurgence of tribal fighting in 
Abyan (3)« In 1878, Fadhl secured Fadhli recognition 
of the Abdali claim to Imad as the price of his neutrality 
in internal Fadhli feuds. Possession of Imad gave Fadhl 
opportunities for intervention in Abyan. Abyan1s decay
(1) IOL E60, Wahab*s report
(2) AAR 1880/81, para 19
(3) Cf. Belhaven !Road! p.152-153
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as an a g r i c u l t u r a l  c e n t r e  enhanced L a h e j 1s v a lu e  and
im p o r ta n c e ,  f o r  i t  l e f t  L a h e j w i t h o u t  a l o c a l  r i v a l .
By 1 8 8 9 5 th e  R e s id e n c y  was r e s ig n e d  t o  i n s e c u r i t y  i n
un
Abyan and b e l ie v e d  t h a t  i n t e r f e r e n c e  w a s v n e c e s s a ry .
B r i t i s h  i n t e r e s t  c o n c e n t r a te d  on th e  A b d a l i  a re a .
On th e  F a d h l i  e a s te r n  b o r d e r  F a d h l i - A u l a q i  fu n d s  
p r o v id e d  as i n s o l u b le  a p ro b le m  as F a d h l i - Y a f a i  d i s p u t e s  
i n  th e  w e s t .  Ahmad b in  H u s /a in  had p o o r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  
some o f  h i s  t r ib e s m e n ;  th e  M e rq a s h i t r i b e ,  th e  m a in  
s u p p o r t  o f  th e  F a d h l i  c h i e f s ,  were p a r t i c u l a r l y  
t r o u b le s o m e .  They had been l a r g e l y  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  
o r i g i n a l  F a d h l i  s e iz u r e  o f  th e  Abyan a re a  f ro m  th e  Y a f a i s ;  
and th e y  had b e n e f i t e d  a c c o r d i n g l y  f ro m  A b y a n 1s c r o p s .
.'/hen th e  F a d h l i  c h i e f  l o s t  m ost o f  h i s  Abyan re v e n u e ,  
th e  M e rq a s h is  s u f f e r e d  t o o .  I n e v i t a b l y ,  some tu r n e d  t o  
r a i d i n g  t o  s u p p o r t  th e m s e lv e s .  They gave t r o u b le  t o  
H a id e ra  b i n  A b d u l la h  ( 1 ) ,  and th e y  w ere  a t  t im e s  beyond 
th e  e f f e c t i v e  c o n t r o l  o f  Ahmad b i n  H u s s a in  ( 2 ) .  I n  187*+?
(1 ) p.2 . 3 1  n . 2
(2 )  A IA  1203 , AiiR 9 ^ /9 5 ?  p a ra s  5 & 6
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t h e  Merqashis r a id e d  th e  Low er A u la q is  (1 )  and th e  
Aulaqis r e t a l i a t e d  w i t h  a m a s s iv e  r a i d  ( 2 ) .  I n  1876 , 
th e  M sq a sh i w ere  f i g h t i n g  th e  U pper A u la q is  i n  
D a th in a  ( 3 ) *  I n  1878 /79?  and i n  1882 /33?  Ahmad b i n  
K u s /a in  r e c e iv e d  !m u n i t io n s  o f  w a r 1 and ‘ s u b s t a n t i a l  
a s s i s t a n c e 1 t o  h e lp  h im  a g a in s t  h i s  A u la q i  n e ig h b o u r s ,  
and a g a in s t  h i s  own M e rq a s h i t r ib e s m e n .
I n  1 8 90 , th e  R e s id e n t  m is g u id e d ly  c a l l e d  th e  F a d h l i  
and Low er A u la q i  c h i e f s  t o  Aden for a s e t t le m e n t  of 
t h e i r  d i s p u t e s .  O n ly  when th e y  a r r i v e d  d i d  th e  R e s id e n t  
r e a l i s e  t h a t  th e  c la im s  w ere  v e r y  c o m p l ic a te d  and had
a r i s e n  f ro m  i n t e r - t r i b a l  q u a r r e l s  and j ^ t h a t j  t h e r e  
was no p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  s e t t l i n g  th e  d i s p u te s  . . .  w i t h o u t  
i n t e r v e n in g  i n  t r i b a l  d i s p u t e s ,  w i t h  w h ic h  we have no 
c o n c e rn  . . . ’ (*+). B o th  t r i b e s  r e t u r n e d  home d i s s a t i s f i e d  
a t  an a b o r t i v e  m e e t in g ,  and a t  th e  R e s id e n c y 1s poor
( 1 )  P r o b a b ly  th e  Ba Kaz im  f ro m  th e  name o f  a dead 
A u la q i  ‘ b i n  Am boor'
(2 )  A IA  6kQ, News No bl, 1 2 - 2 0 . 1 1 . 7 ^ ,  A l l e g e d l y  1000 
men r a id e d  and 36 were k i l l e d
(3 )  Aden News No 20 o f  1 7 - 2 ^ .5 .7 6  
(b) AIA 1052, aaR 8 9 /9 0 ,  p a ra  8
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h o s p i t a l i t y .  The  L o w e r  A u l a q i  d e l e g a t i o n  w a s  l a r g e r  
t h a n  i n v i t e d  a n d  t h e  s u r p l u s  m e m b e rs  w e r e  n o t  e n t e r t a i n e d ;  
n o r  w e r e  •any o f  t h e  F a d h l i s .  T h e  F a d h l i  c h i e f  r e f u s e d  
a p a r t i n g  p r e s e n t  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  i n h o s p i t a b l e  t r e a t m e n t  
h i s  p a r t y  h a d  r e c e i v e d .  The  A u l a q i s  v e n t e d  t h e i r  s p l e e n  
on l e a v i n g  b y  h o u g h in g  tw o  c a m e ls  n e a r  S h a ik h  O thm an C l ) .
The d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t  o f  t h e  F a d h l i s  a n d  A u l a q i s  w i t h  t h e  
R e s id e n c y  w a s ,  h o w e v e r ,  l e s s  i m p o r t a n t  t h a n  i t  m i g h t  
h a ve  b e e n  e a r l i e r :  b o t h  c h i e f s  Lha.d a g r e e d  t o  P r o t e c t o r a t e
T r e a t i e s  i n  1 8 8 8  ( 2 ) .  T h e s e  a g r e e m e n ts  p r o v i d e d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
l e g a l  s t a t u s  f o r  B r i t a i n 1 s p r e v i o u s l y  u n d e c l a r e d  
P r o t e c t o r a t e  a l o n g  t h e  S o u th  A r a b i a n  c o a s t .
The  F a d h l i  c h i e f ' s  d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t  w i t h  t h e  
R e s id e n c y ! s i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s  e s t r a n g e d  h im  f r o m  t h e  
B r i t i s h .  H i s  f a t h e r ,  r e l e a s e d  f r o m  e x i l e  i n  I n d i a ,  
h o w e v e r  a c c e p t e d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o n  h i s  s o n 1s b e h a l f ,  f o r  
c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e  M e r q a s h i s ,  w i t h i n  B r i t i s h  l i m i t s ,  i n  
1886 ( 3 ) .  Ahm ad b i n  Hus a im  becam e l e s s  c o - o p e r a t i v e ;
( 1 )  AAR 8 9 / 9 0 ,  P a r a  10
( 2 )  A i t c h i s o n  * T r e a t i e s 1 X X V I & X X X V I (1 9 3 3  e d i t i o n )
(3 )  A i t c h i s o n  ' T r e a t i e s *  p . 11
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Section 8. The Dhala Area 1874 - 1900
Dhala was a non-tribal village, with a weekly market, 
inhabited by Muslims and Jews; it had a population oi 
about 1,000 in 1892 (l). The village was dominated by 
the Amirfs fort; it faced across the fertile Dhala 
plateau to the Yafai hills on the east; to the west 
was Jebel Jihaf. Much of the Dhala plateau belonged 
to the Shairi tribe, which accepted Ottoman suzerainty 
by 1873. The Amirs of Dhala possessed an Ottoman firman 
from 1 Sultan Suleiman1 (probably Suleiman II, 1520-1566). 
The date was not given; the document was Joosely 
described as being of *... nearly 300 years ago ... 1 
in 1902 (2). It is probable that the Amir's ancestors 
were minor Easulid officials, confirmed in their 
authority after the Ottoman conquest of 1539.
The Amirs of Dhala were of partly slave descent; 
they had no tribal backing in the area, but they were 
the head of an extended family group possessing three
(1) IOL, L/P & S/20, E.60, p. 5. Captain li.A. Wahabfs
Survey Report
(2) AIA C 29, Wahab - Res, 14.2.02
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enclaves separated by Shairi territory (l). They were 
known locally as *the house of Kharafa, from the name 
of one of their principal villages (2). These Amiri 
enclaves were inhabited toy members of the family, 
their 1 followers1 and slaves, and toy non-tribal, Muslim 
and Jewish, cultivators and artisans. The British 
always had vague ideas of the extent of the Amir:. fs 
authority; and the first member of the Amirial family 
to visit Aden officially did so only in 1867, although
the Amir had been receiving an annual British stipend
of MT# 50 since 1839. In 1872, Amir Shafil died. His 
successor, Ali bin Muqtoil, acknowledged Ottoman 
suzerainty. But, having second thoughts, Amir Ali 
came to Aden in 1873 to appeal for support against the 
Ottomans (3)* On his return, the Ottomans imprisoned 
him (4). In his place they appointed his uncle,
Muhammad Mussad, as Amir, and as an Ottoman official 
over the Shairis.
(1) Map C
(2) Jacob 'Kings p.170-171
(3) PO 78 2753, Hes - SGB, 12.5.73, passed to FO by 10 
17.6.73
(4) FO 78 2753, Bes - SGB, 6.6.73, passed to FO by 10,11.7.73
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Later internal British comments, as late as 1902, 
accepted that the Amir of Dhala was free to accept 
Ottoman suzerainty and that Britain could not dispute 
any subsequent Ottoman claim to his territory (l).
No such admission was ever made publicly. There was 
also a tendency for Residency staff to support 
successive Amirs more strongly when the officials were 
unfamiliar with conditions at Dhala, than when they 
had closer personal experience, or, when they could 
be more objective about local affairs after leaving 
Aden. Following British success in 1873 in forcing 
an Ottoman withdrawal from Lahej (2), British officials 
at Aden were aggressively possessive about Adenfs 
hinterland. The British claim to Dhala, and British 
demands for an Ottoman withdrawal from the area, were 
unjustified; and they were confused because no British 
officers knew the area. The "Amiri tribe", which the 
British claimed to^protect, did not exist, even as a 
tribal confederation. With such British misconceptions, 
Anglo-Ottoman misunderstandings in the area were 
inevitable.
( ! )  p . 9 . 5 3  n.l (and  p . 8 . 4 6  n . l )
(2) See Chapter 3
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In March, Sidney Locock, the Charge d*Affaires,
reported that talks with hoth the Grand Vizier and
Vere
the Foreign Ministernstill 1... indicating a disposition 
on the part of the Porte to extend its authority ...' 
up to the immediate vicinity of Aden (l). The Porte 
was asked to instruct their officials in the Yemen 
*... to desist from interference with the affairs of 
the Amir tribe [sic] , who are among those whom the 
Turkish Government have pledged themselves to refrain 
from interfering with ...' (2). Lord Derby, as 
Foreign Minister, warned Ambassador Musurus Pasha 
that Ottoman delays in withdrawing from Dhala might 
cause an Anglo-Ottoman clash (3). Ten days later,
Derby warned that Britain would not allow Ottoman 
interference with any stipendiary chief, including the 
Amir of Dhala (4). By then, the India Office had 
received a letter from the Resident, enclosing a
(1) FO 78 2754 HBM Charge * FO, 17.3.74
(2) FO 78 2755, FO - I1BM Charge", C'ple, 16.3.74, referring
to Ottoman promise at 3.96 n.5
(3) FO 78 2755, Derby - Musurus Pasha, 20.4.74
(4) FO 78 2755, FO - HBM Charge, Cfple, 30.4.74
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translated letter of complaint from the Pasha at 
Sanaa ahout Amir Ali's maltreatment of Ottoman subjects 
and complaints by the Amir about the Ottomans (l).
General J.VJ. Schneider telegraphed to London on 3rd May 
urging that the Pasha should be ordered to withdraw 
from Dhala (2).
/
The British Charge found 1... an entire 
ignorance respecting the localities in question . ..* 
at the Porte; he accepted that some confusion arose 
from different pronounciations and spellings in English 
and in Turkish (3); but he did not know that the 
Ottomans were better informed about Dhala than the 
British. He believed that the Porte was denying that 
Dhala was an 'Amiri* village only as a pretext for 
keeping the village. However, in June, under 
persistent British pressure, the Porte ordered the 
withdrawal of Ottoman troops from Dhala village.
Late in April, the Porte had offered local talks
(1) FO 78 2755, lies - S of S No 19, 10.4.74, passed to FO
(2) FO 78 2755, tel to S of S, passed to FO
(3) FO 78 2755, HBM Charge - FO, 24.4.74
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between the Ottoman Governor^General and the Aden 
Resident on Dhala (l)* Lord Northbrook had anticipated 
in 1873 that Anglo-Ottoman talks would be necessary to 
settle a boundary in the Yemen. But the weak position 
of the Liberal Government in 1873 and the change of 
Ministry in February/March 187^ made such negotiations 
inconvenient for the British Government. Lord Salisbury 
continued Argyll1s strong support for Lord Northbrook1s 
Indian administration over the Yemen; and Lords
Salisbury and Derby were content with informing the
/
British Charge that Britain would recognise no 
Ottoman claim to Arabia based on past conquests or on 
the Sultan’s position as Caliph (2). That information 
may have convinced the Porte that negotiations would 
achieve nothing. Sidney Locock had advised that f... 
the susceptibilities of this Government on the question 
of Turkish domination in Arabia are so strong ... that 
it would be well to accept the de facto position which 
we have secured, without insisting on debating a question
(1) FO 78 2755, tel Elliot - FO, 18.6.7^
(2) FO 78 2755, FO - Charge", Constantinople 30.4.7^
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which is to a Moslem one of principle ...! (l). No 
local border talks were held.
Amir Ali had retired below the Dhala plateau to 
his family village, Kharafa, from where he controlled 
'... only four or five villages ...'. By contrast, his 
uncle controlled some twenty five villages for the 
Ottomans (2). The Ottoman Governor General considered 
that Dhala was under Ottoman administration, and that 
the 'Amir' had no claim to it (3)• The Pasha was, 
however, prepared to compromise when Amir Ali's uncle 
was killed whilst collecting taxes. The Ottomans 
offered to appoint Amir Ali to his uncle's post, if 
he womld accept Ottoman suzerainty (4). The Amir 
rejected the Ottoman offer and counted on 'the great 
English Government' to recover for him the 'rights' that 
he claimed his uncle had wrongfully exercised (4).
Ottoman overtures, made through the Mufti of Taiz,
(1) FO 78 2755, Charge, C'ple - FO, 7*4.74, rec'd 17.4.74
(2) FO 78 2755, lies - S of S, 30.7.74, quoting Pasha of Sanaa
(3) FO 78 2755 f 49, Ottoman telegram of 9*4.74, passed
by HBM Charge to FO
(4) AIA 643 f 411, Amir - Res
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emphasized that 1 •.. the High Government £the PorteJ 
is a shadow of God on His earth ...' (l), Ottoman 
calls for local support in this area were to continue 
to stress religious ties between the Yemenis and the 
Ottomans throughout this period until the final border 
settlement in 1902-04. The British feared, and resented, 
these appeals to religious feelings. The Resident 
informed the Amir that his report had been forwarded 
to Britain (2). That was a virtual assurance of British 
support.
Both Lord Tenterden (3) at the Foreign Office and 
Aarifi Pasha while Ottoman Foreign Minister, realised 
that local differences arose, and developed into Anglo- 
Ottoman disputes, because local rivals looked f... 
respectively for support to the British and Ottoman 
authorities ...f (4). Elliot agreed; *... each 
£competitorJ ... attributes any success of his opponent 
to the support he has received from his Patrons ...* (4).
(1) AIA 643 f 409, Translation Mufti - Amir
(2) AIA 643, Res - Amir, 1.7.74
(3) P.3.93 n.l
(4) FO 78 2735, Elliot - FO, 17,10.74
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The Amir was far beyond Residency control; he complained
that the Ottomans had diverted the caravan route away
from his territory (and so possibly reduced his taxes);
and he retaliated by seizing goods belonging to an
Ottoman Jewish subject (l). The Resident warned the
Amir not to interfere with trade; but the Amir was
not ordered to return the goods (2). The Amir's action
was probably a calculated slight on the Ottomans. They
taxed the Jew; and, by tribal custom, they were therefore
his protector from any tribal wrongdoer. Any Ottoman
failure to secure redress from the Amir would damage
Ottoman prestige, indicating that the Ottomans could
✓ ✓
not apply force against a British protege. A Yemeni 
tribesman might have retaliated personally for any 
wrong done by the Amir, but a Jew could not.
Early in September, 1874, the Residency received 
copies of Elliot's correspondence with the Foreign 
Office about Ottoman troops' withdrawal from Dhala.
Elliot had commented that '... the proceedings of the
(1) AIA 643 f 4459 Amir - Res in Arabic
(2) AIA 643, Res - SGB, 21.7.74
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Porte had been ... such that it ... [was]impossible not 
to look with some suspicion upon every expression of 
...[the Porte1sjinstructions which ...Jwasjsusceptible 
to a double meaning . ..* (l). The OttomaiB had withdrawn 
their regular troops - but had kept irregulars in Dhala 
village. Such ambassadorial comments could only confirm 
existing Residency prejudices that Ottoman promises 
wTere not to be taken at face-value (2). Meantime,
Husain Avni Pasha, whom Elliot had blamed for provoking 
the Anglo-Ottoman confrontation of 1873 (3), had 
become Grand Vizier,
Late in July the Residency had, optimistically, 
suggested that 1... the Ameer would easily regain his 
position [sicj > ^  Turkish officials at Kattaba 
were peremptorily ordered by the Porte to abstain 
from ...f supporting the Amirfs cousin?who had succeeded 
the Amir’s uncle as an Ottoman official (4). The F.O. 
drafted a mild note of protest to the Porte; but, at
(1) FO 78 2755, Elliot - FO, 18.6.74
(2) Cf. 3-90 n.l
(3) p.3.101 - 3.102
(4) FO 78 2755 f 245 - f 246, Res - S of S, 30.7.74
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the I.O’s request, delivery was postponed until 24th 
December 1874, while the 1.0. waited for more proof 
of Ottoman interference against the Amir. In the 
interval, the Ottoman protege remained in Dhala village.
Schneider had returned from leave in Britain in 
November; he assured the Amir that the British would 
’... not cease to exert ourselves on your behalf ...' (l); 
and he wired to the Secretary of State that the position 
at Dhala was ’unchanged1 (2). The Amir was probably 
sufficiently encouraged to take further provocative 
measures against Ottoman subjects, for Musurus Pasha 
complained to Lord Derby about Amir Ali’s misbehaviour 
in January (3). Musurus had also mentioned an Ottoman 
project for a Yemeni telegraph link with Aden, and the 
necessity for protecting the proposed line from trouble­
makers like Amir Ali. Lord Derby misguidedly considered 
the Ottoman representations ’a very menacing communication*(4).
(1) AIA 643 f 597, Res - Amir
(2) AIA 643 f 599, tel Res - S of S, 13.11.74
(3) FO 78 2756, Note - Verbale of 4.1.75
(4) FO 78 2756 fs 2-3
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But Lord Tenterden:commented that the F.O. records 
were very incomplete, because there was much demi- 
official correspondence and the 1.0. customarily passed 
on many telegrams to the F.O.’for information and 
return1 (l).
The Amir visited Aden in December, 1874; the 
Resident assured him that Ahmad Ayub Pasha had been 
*... told to withdraw immediately all troops from 
Dhala in or about the house of the Amirfs uncle 
[sic cousin] ...f. The Amir had then announced his 
f... intention of endeavouring to displace the usurper 
. ..*. Such resolution was very different to fears of 
Ottoman power that the Amir had recently expressed (2). 
He had written that he and his people w'ere ’affrighted* 
and * seeking refuge in the hills*. Evidently he 
received the pledges of support from the Resident that 
he had demanded, and reassurance that Ottoman artillery 
at Qataba could not be employed against him (2). 
Possibly the Resident*s awareness of the growing revolt
(1) FO 78 2756 f 29, Res - S of S, 30.1.75
(2) AIA 643 f 605, Arabic letter, Amir - lies
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in the northern Yemen encouraged him to reassure the 
Amir (l). The Resident believed in November 1874 
that Ottoman power was 1... on the decline ...1 in 
the Yemen (l).
The Resident submitted complaints by the Amir 
about Ottoman behaviour to London in January 1875 (2)* 
They were passed to the Foreign Office, with critical 
Indian Government comments on the proposed Ottoman 
telegraph line to Aden, on 10th March, 1875, by the 
India Office (3). Elliot was instructed to warn the 
Porte that, unless Ottoman interference ceased within 
the territories of the nine tribes, the British 
Government would be 'reluctant1 to support the proposed 
telegraph line (4). Elliot astutely recognised, from 
a copy of correspondence sent to the Amir and forwarded 
to London by the Resident, that the faults might not all 
be on the Ottoman side (5)* Some "Sheikhs of Dhali”,
(1) AIA 658 News No 14 of 1.4.74 & No 44 of 21-27.11.74
(2) FO 78 2756 f 29, Res - S of S, 30.1.75
(3) FO 78 2756
(4) FO 78 2756, FO - Elliot, 18.3.75
(5) FO 78 2756, Elliot - FO, 31.3.75
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possibly Shairi tribesmen, had rejected the Amir’s 
overtures, emphasising their religious loyalties to the 
Sultan Caliph. Elliot commented that, if the Amir had 
proposed that the tribesmen should renounce Ottoman 
suzerainty, ’... such a letter would, however unauthorised, 
... inspire in the minds of the Turks ... a distrust of 
the intentions of the Resident, and a suspicion that he 
was endeavouring to obtain ... the recognition of 
British authority over that part of the country ...’ (l). 
But there was no comment on the Foreign Office file 
on Elliot's remarks.
By encouraging Amir Ali, whom he could not control, 
and by believing the Amir's claims at the expense of 
Ottoman counter-claims, the Resident had increased the 
risk of an Anglo-Ottoman clash (2). But Schneider had 
wrongly believed that, since Ahmad Ayub Pasha had been 
ordered by the Porte to withdraw troops from the Dhala 
area, gendarmes and irregulars would also be withdrawn. 
Schneider told the Amir that that would happen; and he 
wrote to the Pasha requesting him '... to direct the
(1) p.8.13 n.3
(2) Cf.p.3,76 n. 2
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withdrawal of any Saptyas or other Turkish officials 
who might he in Dhala ...f (l). Schneider had read 
into such brief information as he received more than 
the Porte had promised. When officials and irregulars 
remained at Dhala, Schneider considered that the 
Ottomans had broken a promise.
In June, Elliot protested formally at the Ottoman 
failure to withdraw troops from Dhala (2). There was 
no reason for delaying the protest longer for the 
Ottoman appointment of the Governor General had again 
been changed (3). In March, the Grand Vizier had made 
a new appointment to Sanaa the excuse for delaying 
discussions with Elliot. The Vizier then stated that 
he wanted to wait till the new Pasha arrived at 
Constantinople; and Elliot complained that the new 
Foreign Minister, Safvet Pasha, was f... absolutely 
unacquainted with the -whole subject ...' (4). By 
the summer, Elliot fully appreciated the Yemen’s
(1) FO 78 2756, lies - S of S, 30.1.75, forward to FO, 10.3.75
(2) FO 78 2756 f 60-61
(3) FO 78 2756, Elliot - FO, 3.6.75
(4) FO 78 2756, Elliot - FO, 31.3.75
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importance, as the Porte assessed it. Safvet Pasha 
described a rumour, mentioned by Elliot, that the 
Porte wished to sell the Yemen to the Khedive for 
£1,000,000 as funfoundedf. Such an action would be 
f... the first step to the end of the ICaliphate ...f (l). 
Elliot agreed. The Porte had no intention of 
condoning the surrender of Ottoman territory in Arabia 
to a foreign Power. The Ottomans had not recognised 
any British authority outside Aden; they had not 
admitted British suzerainty over Lahej nor renounced 
their own (2). The Ottomans were, therefore, unlikely 
to withdraw from the village of Dhala because a British 
stipendiary was known to the British as fthe Amir of 
Dhala1 and claimed that village. Until April, 1876, 
there was no improvement in the Amir’s position (3)-
4* + + + +
(1) FO 78 2756 f 66-68, Elliot - FO, quoting Safvet
(2) p.3.101 n.2 and p.8.7 n.l
(3) AAR 1875/76, para 9
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At the India Office, Lord Salisbury considered, 
by August 1876 that '... it might be expedient to suggest 
to the ... Porte that Her Majesty's Government cannot 
be expected to be satisfied for an indefinite time with 
constantly renewing remonstrances to which no kind of 
attention was paid ...' (l). At the Foreign Office, 
the Porte's troubles in Bulgaria were considered to 
be a sound reason for Ottoman conciliation of 'the 
Arabs', to avoid additional trouble in the Yemen (2).
There was no evidence of local sentiment favouring the 
Amir father than an Ottoman appointee, but that was 
assumed, despite some indications to the contrary.
However, the Amir had benefited by his cousin 
quarrelling with, and losing the support ofy.his Ottoman 
superiors. The Amir was lent a field gun by the Abdali 
chief and recovered Dhala when his cousin evacuated it (3)« 
That news was, however, received at the Foreign Office 
after Elliot had been instructed to make another
(1) FO 78 2756, 10 - FO, 14.8.76
(2) Note on the Memo Cover (n.l above)
(3) LA, Res - SGB, copied to S of S, 12.8.76
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protest (l). That protest was delivered on 
13th September (2).
In Constantinople, Abdul Aziz had been dethroned 
in May and his successor, Murad, had been replaced on 
31st August by Abdul Hamid II. Times were too 
uncertain for Ottoman Ministers to give much attention 
to developments in the insignificant Dhala area. But 
the new Governor General in Sanaa was Mustapha Azem 
Pasha. His economical reforms possibly contributed to 
the disaffection ox Abdullah Muhammad Mussad at Dhala. 
The Pasha tried to obtain the Amirfs recognition of 
Ottoman suzerainty in return for Ottoman recognition 
and for his appointment as an Ottoman official to 
replace his cousin. Although the Amir refused the 
Pasha's offer, Mustapha Azem proclaimed Ali Muqbil 
locally as the new 'Shaikh of Dhala' (3).
General Schneider, the Aden Resident, was on leave 
in England during the summer; he wrote a Confidential
(1) FO 78 2756, FO - Elliot, 26.8.76
(2) FO 78 2756 f 210, Elliot - FO, Note Verbale No 67 
to the Porte
(3) FO 78 2756 f 219, Res 26.8.76 - S of S
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Memo on 'JShali: Turkish Aggression1 (l). This
probably influenced Lord Salisbury to call for a 
protest to the Porte. It was Schneider's view that 
there was '... danger in allowing matters to slide 
and H.M.'s Government is bound to do all it can to 
obtain a restoration of Ali Mokbil to the position fsic3 
he held in 1872 ...'. Failing that, Schneider feared 
that, when Ali died, an Ottoman nominee would succeed 
him. He went further and argued that, without British 
support for the Amir, Ottoman control would spread 
from Dhala to the Alawi, Subaihi and Eaushabi areas.- 
Such an Ottoman expansion would disturb the confidence 
of the Abdali and Fadhli chiefs. Schneider wanted 
military support for the Amir if diplomatic measures 
failed to secure an Ottoman withdrawal.
Captain Goodfelloi* officiated as Resident during 
Schneider's leave in 1876; Goodfellow was irritated 
by Mustapha Azem Pasha's 'interference' in proclaiming 
the Amir as the Shaikh of Dhala (2). Goodfellow
(1) IOL B 13
(2) FO 78 2756 A9, Res - SGB, 26.8.76 forwarded to S of S
by G of I, 28.9*76
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proposed that an accredited, native, Agent should he 
stationed on the border between Ottoman territory and 
that of the Amir and other stipendiary chiefs (l).
But Schneider, on his return, wisely opposed so forward 
a policy (2). Such contact in the unsettled state of 
the stipendiary tribes, would have increased Anglo- 
Ottoman friction. Both Powers would have been appealed 
to, as the protectors of their clients1 local interests, 
instead of the customary local settlements of disputes 
being arranged. In 1877, the Government of India,
however, authorised the Resident to arrange a
definitive local settlement of the Amir's border with 
Ottoman territory by arbitration between British and 
Ottoman officers. Lord Derby, at the Foreign Office, 
approved the proposal which had India Office support (3). 
Lord Salisbury had by then visited Constantinople, in 
December 1876, and had returned critical of the Sultan, 
the Porte and Elliot.
This border demarcation was never arranged: the
(1) LA, Ag Res - S of S, 12.10.76
(2) LA, Res - S of S, 1.11.76
(3) FO 78 2756, FO - 10, 9.5*77, in reply 10 - FO, 3.3.77
8.21
Pasha at Sanaa was not authorized to act locally. But 
the Ottomans^needing all their resources for war with 
Russia, and hopeful of British support, were conciliatory 
in 1877-78. The Amir was left in peaceful possession 
of Dhala (1). The Resident optimistically reported 
the Amir as having 1... no obstacle to success ...f (2). 
But the Resident was preoccupied with affairs on the 
Hadhramaut Coast. He was grateful to the Amir for 
arranging an Abdali Haushabi truce (3); and he later 
showed his appreciation by the present to the Amir of 
a howitzer. That was taken up by Captain F.M. Hunter 
and Major Stevens with the Aden Troop on a first visit 
to Dhala by British officers in 1880 (4). Hunter 
and Stevens made a thorough sketch map of the area and 
Hunter wrote a detailed report, providing clear evidence 
of Ottoman control in the Shairi area.
This visit contributed to a gradual reassessment
(1) AATl 1876/77, para 11
(2) IOL P & S Vol 5 f 251, Res - SGB, 12.3.78
(3) AAR 1878/79, para 11
(4) FO 78 4528, Res - SGB, 30.3.80, with copy of sketch
map and report
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of the tribal situation in the Dhala area; for Hunter 
realised some of the military difficulties of the Aden 
Troop operating there. Fodder for the horses was in 
short supply in the summer; and the road north from 
the Alawi border to the Dhala plateau was ideal for 
tribal ambushes (l). The road was not under the Amir's 
control. Since Ilunter travelled in company with the 
Amir the Shairi tribal area was not shown on Hunter's 
sketch map as being outside the Amir's claimed borders, 
but most of the Shairi villages were marked in as 
Ottoman controlled. There were however no Ottoman 
troops south of Qataba. Later, the Ottomans protested 
at this British visit to Ottoman territory. But the 
Amir's influence was on the wane; in April, 1881, the 
Amir was described as '... weak and foolish ... not 
strong enough in character or position to enforce 
obedience over his own family, still less over hill 
tribes owing him but slight allegiance ...* (2). Yet, 
the Acting Resident, Goodfellow, had believed that the
(1) AIA 855, Report on visit, 27.9*80
(2) AAIi 1880/81, para 22
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informal, third party, agreement of 18.39 (l) should he 
formalized by a written agreement between the Amir and 
the Residency (2). The India Office approved (3). 
Goodfellow had already signed an agreement^which he 
considered set out the customary obligations accepted 
by both sides^on 2nd October, 1880 (4). The Foreign 
Office asked the Ambassador at Constantinople to propose 
arbitration (5), but Mr. Gosclien was unpopular with the 
Sultan, who was resentful of British policy and no 
progress was made. The India Office authorized a 
direct approach by the Resident to the Governor General 
at Sanaa (6). But, without the Sultan's authority, 
Muhammad Izzat Pasha, the new Governor-General at Sanaay 
was unable to co-operate (7). No orders came from the
(l) AF1, Letter of Seiyid Hussain to Cmdr. S.B. Haines 
of 14.2.39
AIA 855, Ag Res - SGB, 5.10.80 
FO 78 4528, 10 - FO, 12.12.80 
Aitchison 'Treaties' LXVII
(2
(3
(4
(5
(6
(7
FO 78 4528, FO - HBMA C'ple, 28.1.81 
FO 78 4528, 10 - FO, 24.11.81
FO 78 4528, Pasha - Res, 5.9.82, copy forwarded 
hy 10 - FO/ 18.12.82
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Porte.
Goodfellow believed that an agreement was 
politically expedient (l); it made the Amir answerable 
'... fox any outrages or wrong doings committed by 
the tribes Radian and Ilalimain ...1. Goodfellow was 
impetuous; but hermay have wished, also^to prevent 
the Amir intriguing with these neighbouring tribes to 
embarrass the British. At the same time, it allowed 
the British to claim to the Ottomans that these tribes 
were considered to be under the Amir. The Amir's 
gesture in accepting this responsibility was an empty 
one; he had no control over these tribes. Indeed, 
Goodfellow recognised that the Shairi Shaikhs had 
been independent of the Amirs long before the Ottoman 
occupation of Qataba (2); and the Shairis were outside 
the Radian confederation (3). But the Shairi Shaikh 
had requested British protection, and a separate agreement. 
Goodfellow proposed that protection should be given,
(1) AIA 855, para 8, Ag Res - SGB, 5.10.80
(2) n.l above, para 7
(3) Belhaven 'Uneven Road' p.l60 wrote that racially 
they were 'of the Jaud'
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through the Amir, hut that a separate agreement should 
he refused. Goodfellow1s strategic aim was to secure 
a British claim to control all the Dhala plateau. The 
proposal w^ as, however, unrealistic, because it relied 
011 the Amir. It was objected to by Ismail Haqqi Pasha 
at Sanaa. He claimed that, whatever the Shairi Shaikh, 
as an individual, might wish, the Shairis rejected the 
Amir's leadership, and their territory was Ottoman 
territory (l).
Goodfellow blamed '... to a great extent ... the 
acts of subordinate Ottoman officials ...' rather than 
the administration at Sanaa for a deterioration in the 
situation at Dhala (2). Indian, and India Office, 
officials accepted a case which blamed the Amir's 
opponents for provoking unrest. In reality, Goodfellow 
was excusing the Amir's arbitrary injustices which 
provoked the unrest. Later, the cause became more obvious. 
The Amir and his heir, Shaif bin Saif, were at odds.
(1) AIA 855, Ismail Pasha - Res, received 24.1.81
(2) AIA 855, Ag Res - SGB, 4.10.80
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Family support was given to Shaif, not to the Amir (l).
A report toy the Residency head peon, specially sent 
toy the Resident to Dhala, bluntly blamed the Amir's 
behaviour for the troubles (2). But the Resident 
suppressed the report's findings. Instead, he argued 
that Ottoman irritation at British intervention in 
Mukalla (3) was being vented on the Amir's innocent 
head. Loch, the Resident, quoted selectively; it 
was '... chiefly the family of the late usurper,
Mahomed Masaad, £who werej inducing the Amir's people 
to waver in their allegiance ...' (4). But Muhammad 
Mussad was * the Amir's uncle too; and it was the Amir's 
own family who had turned against him. Loch admitted 
that the Amir's opponents '... reside in Turkish 
villages in the centre and rear of the Amir's 
territory ...' (2); he blamed the Amir's dissidents
(1) AIA 855, Letter of Shaif and his cousins to Resident, 
received 9.10.81
(2) AIA 855 f 401, Report of Shaweesh Saleh al Azaibi 
to Resident, 9*10.81
(3) Cf. p.4.79 n.l
(4) AIA 855, Res - SGB, 17.X.81
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for Ali Muqbil's collisions with the Ottoman authorities. 
But the Amir's disregard of traditional standards of 
behaviour (l) and his greed were probably more likely 
causes.
Loch wanted to commit British resources and 
prestige to enforcing the Amir's claims. That proposal 
was unrealistic; the Aden Troop would have been 
operating beyond reach of support from Aden's small 
garrison; and Loch knew too little about the area to 
assess how strong local opposition to the Amir was.
The international situation was not opportune for 
aggressive gestures; Britain was first preoccupied 
with the Boers and then applying naval and diplomatic 
pressure on the Sultan for Montenegro's benefit over 
Dulcigno, in 1881; and Britain hoped for the possible 
assistance of the Sultan in solving Egypt's problems 
until September 1882. The Porte was bitter about the
(l) Eg p.8,26 n.l & AIA 855, Critical letter from
Amir's relatives, including his successor, to
Resident, detailing the Amir's faults, rec’d 9.10.81
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British occupation of Shaikh Othman in 1882 (l), 
resentful of British action in Hadhramaut, and resentful 
of the withdrawal of British proposals for co-operation 
in Egypt after the victory of Tel el Kabir. Once again, 
the British had failed to appreciate that the Porte, 
or Abdul Hainid II, could not accept the British case 
that Ottoman territorial claims in the Yemen did not 
reach Aden (2). There was no basis for an Anglo-Ottoman 
agreement on a border across the 'Ottoman1 Yemen.
In Lord Dufferin's' opinion, as Ambassador to the 
Porte, there was evidence of intensified Ottoman naval 
and political religious proposals to counter Christian 
threats to Ottoman control of Arabia (3). That 
supported the Indian Government's concern, a year earlier, 
about possible Muslim propaganda to arouse support for 
the Caliphate or 'a Mahomedan League' (4). In Aden, a 
closer watch had been kept on the activities of Muslims
(1) FO 78 4528, HBMA C'ple - FO, 10.10.82
(2) p.3.101 n.2 and 8.7 n.l
(3) FO 78 4528, HBMA C'ple - FO, 28.11.82 with enclosures
(4) AIA 855 f 525, Confidential Circular 3242 of 15.7.81
from SGB - Res
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passing through Aden who were collecting money for 
community charities (l). These traditional activities 
appear innocuous, but there was suspicion of the 
Anglophobe Grand Sharif, Abd al/Mutalib, and his 
connections with the Seiyids of South Arabia.
European suspicion of Muslim attitudes towards Christians 
was widespread. Allegedly, throughout the Muslim world, 
Friday prayers for the protection of the Sultan were 
combined with prayers for the destruction of non-Muslims (2). 
Insuch a climate, British hopes for a border demarcation 
were unrealistic.
+ + + + +
The Qotaibi Shaikh wished to emulate the Abdali 
chief and to profit by taxes on caravans passing across 
his tribal borders; he re-established a customs post, 
earlier destroyed by the Aden Troop (3), and levied
(1) AIA 855, details in File No 12 of 1881 bound in with it
(2) fLa Palestine1, Ludovic de Vaux, Paris 1883, p.-^ 29
(3) f)< 10.27 - 10.28
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taxes in 1879* He also asked for a treaty with the 
Residency. Qotaibi territory lay north of Alawi and 
south of Shairi territory, across the route between 
Qataba and Aden. The western end, through which the 
caravan route passed up the YJadi Hardaba, was country 
in which the Aden Troop could operate, but with some 
danger. The central and eastern portions covered 
rugged, mountainous, valleys running up to Jebel Radfan, 
unsuitable for cavalry. However, the Resident considered 
that it did !... not seem expedient to increase the 
number of ... stipendiaries or sub-divide those already 
in existence ...f (l). But the Indian Government was 
opposed to any intervention in support of the Amir (2); 
and the Amir was unable to remove the Qotaibi post.
The foreign Department favoured direct negotiations 
between the Residency and the Qotaibis. In answer to 
Ottoman enquiries, the Porte was informed that Qotaibi 
affairs 1... exclusively £coneernedJ the British
(1) AIA 855, Res - SGB, 15.4.82
(2) FO 78 4528, G of I - SGB, 1.2.83
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Government and its stipendiary the Amir of Dhala ...' (l).
The justification for that claim was slim. The Qotaihis
belonged to the Jaud Confederation of Radfan, which
Goodfellow had made the Amir nominally responsible for
in 1880 (2). But the Resident admitted that, prior to
1873, the Amir had paid an annual blackmail to the
Qotaibis, for the protection of the road (3)* Ottoman
troops had marched through the Wadi Hardaba in 1873.
The Qotaibi were not only independent of the Amir, they
«
were possibly in contact with the Ottomans at Qataba.
In the Ottoman view, British attempts to coerce the 
non-stipendiary and independent Qotaibis, like British
concern with the Ottoman controlled Shairi tribe,
/ s
showed that f... les Autorites Anglaises continuent a
✓ ✓ 
vouloir empieter sur nos possessions et ne negligent
aucun moyen pour se rallier, a nos depens, les Cheikhs
des territoires avoisinants ...! (4). Ottoman
(1) FO 78 4528, FO - HBMA C’ple, 22.5.83
(2) 8.25 n 4
(3) FO 78 4528, lies - SGB, 11.10.84
(4) FO 78 4528, Porte's Note of 11.8.84 presented 
privately to FO by Musurus Pasha on 23.8.84
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indignation was justified; the British were not 
consistent in claiming influence outside the territory 
of any of their nine stipendiaries. They had claimed 
connections with the stipendiaries, only, in 1873*
The Qotaibis never admitted any connection with the 
Amir; and in 1887, the Residency aelmowledged that the 
Amir had no influence over them (l).
+ + + + +
Muhammad Izzet Pasha complained to the Resident 
on 22nd December 1884, that Ali Muqbil had besieged 
the Shairi village of Jalila (2). The Ottoman 
garrison in the Qataba area ifas possibly withdraw 
for service elsewhere during Imam Sharif ud Diiw1 s 
revolt, which began in 1882 (3)* The Pasha alleged 
that the Amir enjoyed British assistance and was 
provided with a field gun (4). Artillery was greatly
(1) BSC 85-88, Res - SOB, 24/170 of 22.1.87
(2) BSC 81/84, lies - S of S, 11.1.85
(3) BSC 81/84 f 1116, Off Res - S of S, 6.5.84
(4) Delivered 1880, p.8.21 n.4 above
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respected by south Arabian tribesmen; and the Amir 
was able to obtain 8 hostages. The Resident knew that 
the Shairi area was Ottoman controlled (l); he informed 
the Pasha that he had told the Amir to cease correspondence 
with the Shairi Shaikhs (2), and, not to interfere in 
territory which he did not contol in 1880. The Porte 
was also informed that the Amir had been so instructed (3); 
but the Foreign Office did not specifically renounce 
the Amir's claims in the Shairi area.
The Resident now recognised that the Amir's '... 
capricious vagaries and thoughtless stupidities make it 
seem hopeless to expect him ... to rule rationally ...'.
The Amir thought of '... nothing but his own gain; he 
care[d] nought for his dependants and followers: he
[wasj always at feud with his relations: he possess [ed]
no dignity and [was] a tyrant at heart ... It[was] 
difficult to say a good word for him ...' (4).
(1) BSC 81/84 f 1407 has a map of the Shairi borders
(2) BSC 81/84, Res 433 of 1884 & f 1453 Hes - Amir
(3) FO 78 4528, tel FO - HBMA C'ple, 16.2.85 & FO Note 
Musurus Pasha of 19.2.85
(4) BSC 81/84, f 1376, Res - SGB, 17.11.84
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When the Ottomans established a garrison of 
250 men at Jalila early in 1885 (l) the Amir retired 
to Aden. The n e w  Resident disagreed with this 
criticism of the Amir, he wanted a Border settlement 
to stabilize the area (2).
The India Office persuaded the Foreign Office 
that if Ottoman troops were not withdrawn from Amirif.„. 
villages steps would have to be taken to protect the 
Amir as a British stipendiary ... to maintain British 
p r e s t i g e 3) • On the 14th February, the Resident 
wired nev:s of Ottoman demands on the village of 
Khoraibah, 'below the pass leading to the uplands' (4).
Lord Kimberley at the India Office had informed the F.O. 
that such..'aggressive proceedings ... are assuming a
(1) BSC 85/88, Res - S of S, 17.2.85
(2) BSC 85/88, lies - S of S, 21.4.85
(3) FO 78 4528, 10 - FO of 6.2.85. Five villages were named
not including Jalila, reported by Res tel of 29.1.85
(4) 10 Note - FO of 14.2.85 following Ees wire of 14.2.85 
to S of S. S of S rarely corresponded direct with the 
lie si den t, awaiting Gov. of India's comment before taking 
any action. Usually correspondence to the Resident 
wrent through the Foreign Dept.
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serious aspect, and cannot be allowed to continue 
unchecked1•.. Most unusually, the Secretary of State 
wired back asking the Resident what immediate steps 
he recommended and whether the despatch of the Aden 
Troop would help 1... to stop further aggression 
without risk of actual collision with Turks ...'.
Granville accepted Kimberly's requirement of a warning 
to the Porte of 'very serious consequences' if there 
was encroachment upon'Dhala (l); and a wire and a 
Despatch was sent to Constantinople. Having no clear 
replies to his verbal remonsti'ances, the Charge^ d'Affaires 
at Constantinople sent the Porte a note asking for a 
quick, clear reply.
The Ottoman view was that '... Her Majesty's 
Government ... meet but indifferently the friendly 
disposition and overtures of Turkey • ••;* and that the 
British representations produced a 'painful impression (2).
(1) FO 78 4528, Kimberley - Granville, 16.2.85
(2) Charge's No 27 of 6.3.85 - FO, quoting the Foreign 
Ministry Adviser, Fahri Bey, on 3.3*85, to Sir Alfred 
Sandison of the Embassy
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On 19th March, the Charge d'Affaires reported to the 
Foreign Office that orders would he sent to Ottoman 
officers to stop levying tribute in the area; but it 
was hoped that '... II.M. Govt would not insist on 
immediate withdrawal of troops ... because the prestige 
of imperial govt would suffer in Arabia if they appeared 
to be acting at the bidding of II.M. Govt. ...' (l).
The Foreign Office replied with a request for f... positive 
orders ... without any very great delay ...f and for a 
border demarcation (2). The Resident assured the 
Secretary of State that such a demarcation 'need1 
present 'no great difficulty* and should 'satisfy both 
sides', besides finally settling the border disputes (3). 
That showed how little the Residents, who never received 
courtesy calls from Ottomans in transit through Aden, 
understood the Ottoman attitude towards Arabia (4).
(1) FO 78 4528, Charge Constantinople, tel No 30 of 
19.3.85 - FO
(2) FO 78 4528, FO wire of 11.4.85 - British Embassy, C'ple
(3) IOL BSC 85/88, Res 15-815 of 23.4.85 - S of S
(4) L/P&S/10/17 File 137 Pt II, Ag Res - SGB, 14.1.13
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Counting on British preoccupation with Somali 
affairs (l), Ottoman officials tried to obtain local 
recognition of their suzerainty in Dhala and other 
Yemeni areas (2). Ottoman action against territory 
the Amir claimed was explained at Constantinople as
due to 1... la necessite de proteger les populations
taken against the Ottoman establishment of a garrison 
in the Shairi area, at Jalila, 1... because the Turkish 
force ... was too large to be met by any counter­
demonstration by the Aden Troops . ..* (A). On 21st May 
Musurus Pasha communicated to the Foreign Office the 
Forte's 78823/111 to Musurus, claiming Dhala as a part
(1) p.6.37 - 6.72
(2) FO 7S 4528, Res 15-815 of 23.4.85 - S of S, submitted 
to FO on 18.5
(3) FO 78 4528, Ottoman note Verbale of 16.5*85 to Brit. 
Ambassador forwarded with his No. 271 of 18.5*85 to FO
(4) FO 78 3974, Memo 10 - FO, 12.3*85
/ /
paisible qui se trouvaient en butte a ses 
mauvaises proeedes . . 1 (3)* l^ o counter action was
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of the Sanjak of Taiz. Ottoman activities were 
defended as protecting the rights of Ottoman subjects 
against the Amir's aggressions. At the Porte, the 
Foreign Minister explained that Yemen affairs were the 
concern of the War Minister (l); and the latter was 
awaiting the preparation of a map on the disputed areas 
before replying (2). The Ottomans also increased their 
control in the Subaihi area garrisoning Absi and ICobati 
territory in 1885/86 (3).
General Schneider and Major Hunter were on leave 
in England in September 1885; and both wrote^ at India 
Office request, Memos on the Dhala situation (4); both 
recommended abandoning Dhala to the Ottomans for political 
and strategic reasons. Both papers pointed out that 
*... relations with the tribes were not ... in the nature 
of treaties guaranteeing their independence ...'. The 
papers emphasized that the Amir's behaviour had alienated
(1) FO 78 3974, HBMA C’ple No 292 of 9.6.85 - FO
(2) FO 78 3974, HBMA C'ple No 349 of 8.8.85 - FO
(3) L/P&S/10/14, Aden Prot. Turkish Aggression Memo by
G. Fitzmaurice sent by HBMA C’ple No 805 - FO, 14.12.06
(4) FO 78 4528, Hunter Memo of 28.9.85. Schneider Memo
of 1.10.85
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local support and that his exactions on the population 
were more oppressive than the Porte's. Hunter proposed 
a new framework of treaties with the local tribes:-
"1. Abdali )
) now united
2. Subahi )
3. Akrabi
4. Fadli
5. Haushabi
6. Alowi
7. Yaffai, Lower
Yaffai, Upper
8. Aulaki
9. Amiri
) New treaties to be
) made placing those
) tribes under
} British protection
) Non-cession treaties
) etc.
)
j Independent
Abandoned. "
When these proposals were accepted in principle 
and passed to the Embassy at Constantinople (l), the 
Ambassador suggested that, pending the Government of
(l) FO 78 4528, FO 468 of 30.X.85 to Embassy
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India's decision, he should relax his efforts to make 
the Porte delimit the frontier. The India Office 
agreed (l). This coincided with Sir Henry Drummond 
Wolff's Mission to the Porte, which made a relaxation 
of tension desirable. A fierce Zaidi revolt, 
destroying Ottoman authority in the area;followed.
The Ottomans wrere in no position to profit by a 
frontier delimitation which was in fact never offered 
to them officially. It was a decision with which the 
Resident, General Hogg, disagreed (2); it was based on 
Major Hunter's personal view, and was a probable cause 
for the Resident's successful attempt to have Hunter 
transferred to India. The Resident visited the area 
and then argued for a delimitation of the frontier, 
for which he was ready to provide an officer (3). But 
a note on his letter in the India Office file remarked 
that; 'The whole question ... was hung up pending the
(1) FO 78 4528, 10 - FO, 19.11.05
(2) AIA 1052jA.A :.R \>. para 6. He gave the new Amir 
2000 rds in 1889/90 and supported him against the 
Qotaibis
(3) BSC 85/88, Res 7-279 of 15.2.86 - S of S
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receipt of the Government of India Is views . But 
involvements on the Somali Coast meant that there 
would he 110 officers available.
The Amir died on 10.9.86 (l): his death was
attributed to smallpox, possibly helped byppoison (2). 
lie was succeeded by an abler cousin, Shaif bin Saif, 
then aged about 30, to whom the customary stipend was 
continued (3).
The Resident maintained the previous practice of 
supporting the new Amir; he had rejected a local 
Ottoman protest, of 9.12.85, at a visit by fifty Sabres 
of the Aden Troop to Dhala, and at the Amir's request, 
the Resident protested to Aziz Pasha at an Ottoman 
official of Taiz writing to local Shaikhs in the Amir's 
area (4). The Pasha accepted that the letters should 
not have been written (5). But, when the Amir protested
(1) AIA 1074, Ad.An.Rep. 86/87
(2) Jacob 'Kings ■ *, p.194 says locals blamed 
poisoned qat leaves
(3) IOL BSC 85/88 Res 365-1852 of 20.9.86 - SGB
(4) IOL BSC 85/88 Res 8/14 of 5.1.86 - SGB
(5) Pasha's letter of 25.3.S7 - Bes
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to the Resident that the Ottomans had secured, in
his predecessor's time, villages hereditarily dependent
on the Amir, the Resident advised him to rest content
with what he had and to secure his people's allegiance
by good government, for if they chose Ottoman rule,
the British '... might not be prepared to interfere ...' (1).
In 1899, General G. 0'Moore Creagh reported that the
Amir's policy of resistance to absorption had checked
his ellipse and tended to consolidate his territory
and rule (2). In that, the Amir was helped by the
gratitude of the local Ottoman officials who took
refuge with him when the Saidis occupied Qataba.
The Amir's area was officially considered to be
outside the area of direct British influence (3); the 
survey of 1891/92 was not instructed to go up to 
Dhala. The Amir was not approached as other stipendiary
(1) As quoted , Res 266-1622 of 12.8.87 - Amir
(2) BSC 97/99, Quoted in Res 347 of 18.11.99 - SGB
(3) AIA 1115 f 511 & f 515, map of area surveyed
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chiefs were for their co-operation before the survey 
began. The Ottomans protested at the Indian Government 
survey party's intrusion into Ottoman territory near 
Dhala in 1892, but Capt. R.A. 1/ahab inaccurately 
rejected their complaints (l). Possibly he was not 
aware that Shairi territory belonged to the Ottomans.
The new Amir continued his predecessor's role as 
a mediator between the Iiaushabi and Abdali chiefs: 
and in recognition of his mediation in 1890, which 
temporarily prevented hostilities, the Resident gave 
him a rifle (2). But the Residency was not prepared 
to press the Abdali chief to ban the Qotaibi tribe 
from visiting Lahej, although the Qotaibis were 
banned from Aden, at the Amir's request, because of 
Qotaibi rejection of the Amir's suzerainty (3). But 
the Resident maintained pressure on the Ottoman Governor 
General to leave the Amir in peace in May '95 and 
August *96; but a more powerful factor was probably
(1) AIA 1114 f 931, Wahabs confidential -^ | of 3.3.92 - Res
(2) IOL AIA 1095A para 18 AAR 90/91 para 16
(3) IOL AIA 1052 AAR 89/90, para 6
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the Zaidi threat to Sanaa in November 1895. The Imam 
then had 40,000 men under arms (l). In January 1897, 
however, the Ottoman Governor General intervened to 
restore looted property, recognising the Amir's 
position under British aegis; the Pasha hoped that 
the Amir would treat others as he wanted his own 
subject treated (2). That made an unrealistic contrast 
between Ottoman authority and the Amir's slender 
resources. He could not effectively control the 
tribesmen he claimed as his subjects.
The Government of Bombay believed in 1899 that 
British policy was still to allow 'the process of 
absorption' by the Ottomans, by which '... many 
villages once Amiri [have becomej ... Turkish ...' (3). 
That was a policy which the Residency continued to oppose 
as unjustified, because Amiri territory diould not have
(1) BSC 89/96, Res 78 of 20.11.95 - S of S
(2) BSC 97/99, Res 347 of 18.11.99 quoting earlier 
precedent to SGB
(3) FO 78 5098, Bo Resolution 6723 of 30.9.99 - Res, 
forwarded by For.Dept. - 10, Dec.*99
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come under Ottoman influence after 1873 (l). In 
the Resident's view, while the 'status quo' might he 
maintained without a protectorate treaty, it could 
not he guaranteed (2). Lord Curzon believed that the 
Ottoman threat to Dhala appeared to have been 
exaggerated (3). He considered that no Protectorate 
treaty was necessary under the existing conditions.
By v/riting that no action was required, then, but 
that action might be necessary later, Curzon had 
quietly reversed British policy. He made it possible 
for him to propose action in the future with complete 
consistency.
The Residency dogma that a British stipendiary 
could not accept another Power's suzerainty Y/as disowned 
by the Bombay Government in 1898 in Dhala's case, and 
therefore, by implication, in every other stipendiary's (4).
(1) Res 233 of 24.7.99 - Bo D.A.G, encl. with (3)
(2) Res tel of 16.1.00 - SGB encl. with n.l above
(3) FO 78 5098, Govt.India Secret No 16 External of 
1.2.00 to 10, sent to FO, 28.2.00
(4) n.3 above, enclosing SGB's no 6531 of 19.11.98
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The Amir's reported intention of placing himself under 
Ottoman protection had been held to be an eventuality; 
which prevented consideration of increasing his 
stipend (l). The transfer had not taken place, but 
it was accepted as a possibility; so Amir Ali Muqbil's 
submission to the Ottomans before May 1873 was belatedly, 
and privately, accepted as valid.
The Ottoman's claims had not been treated as 
international law required: thei’e had been British
prejudice, and an unnecessary loss of Ottoman prestige, 
for close on 30 years. The same pattern was going to 
be repeated, thanks to Curzon's intervention, in the 
following six years. The Porte's claims in Dhala, 
and also in the Ilaushabi, and much of the Subaihi area 
were valid; and the population preferred Ottoman rule 
to intervention by local, self-styled 'chiefs', by the 
Abdalis, or by the British, in their affairs. But 
British 'amour-propre*, and strategical considerations, 
could not accept that the Yemenis could reject British 
patronage. Successive Residents feared that Ottoman
(l) FO 78 2753, f 214-216 Kes 139-538 of 12.5.78 - SGB
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progress, if it was not checked at Dhala, could reach 
the southern Haushabi Yafai border near Abyan. But 
the Dhala area was outside the area of official British 
concern from 1885-1900. Dhala was Expendable1; and 
the recognised strategic frontier of Aden began on the 
northern Haushabi and Alawi borders. But, if Lord 
Tenterden's proposal for an Anglo-Ottoman border 
agreement in 1873-74 had been followed, he would have
to secure Ottoman agreement (l). In effect, a British 
Protectorate would have been declared; and Gladstone 
presciently saw f... every imaginable objection to the 
proposed Protectorate. It binds us to support those (2) 
over whose conduct to others we have no control ...f. 
That prospect was accordingly deferred in the Amir's 
case for another 30 years.
(l) FO 78 3974, Memo on a proposed Arabian Coastal 
Protectorate, quoting Memo by Lord Tenterden of
14.11.73. See p.4.92 n.l an£ p.3.84 n.l and n.2
(2) n. 1 above. Gladstone's comment on 17*11.73
made ' some concessions to the Turks
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Section 9* She Anglo-Ottoman Boundary Commission
1901 - 1905
The Haushabi Sultan1s health deteriorated between 
I89I and 1901 and his control over his tribesmen had been 
weakened by Abdali action and intrigues (1). The ruthless 
methods the Haushabi chief used for controlling his people 
were criticised (2). His Amri tribesmen were on bad terms 
with him. They therefore allowed one Muhammad Nasr, a 
Yusifi Shaikh and a minor Ottoman official, to build a 
tower within Amri limits at adDareja. That, theypossibly 
hoped, would provide them with a safe refuge from their 
ruler. G.W. Bury stressed that the Ottoman administration 
was not responsible for the situation (3). This developed 
into a minor crisis when Muhammad Nasr refused to 
dismantle his tower. Locally, the Abdali chief was 
believed to have encouraged Muhammad (b). India Office 
officials viewed the 1 encroachment1 as l... a serious
(1) p.7.Vo
(2) p.9.110 n.2-V
(3) Bury 'Uz' p.23 note 1
(V) AIA/M/53, CmcTt. Aden Troop - First Asst.Res., 13.7*01
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d is a g re e m e n t  . . . '  ( 1 )  and British m i l i t a r y  o p e r a t io n s  were 
authorised. The tower was stormed i n  J u l y  1 9 01 ; and 
this action was regarded as raising local British 
prestige ( 2 ) .  I t  was described as 1 restoring o r d e r  
in the Haushabi c o u n t r y 1 (3). I t  l e d  to the A n g lo -  
Ottoman border negotiations,
+  ■+• +  -I- +
The Ottoman reoccupation of the Shairi area with a 
military garrison, at Jalila in 1901, alarmed the Amir (*+). 
His two smaller enclaves could be effectively isolated 
by the Ottomans. The Resident knew that the Ottoman 
reoccupation altered the local situation on the Dhala 
plateau. The Amir, encouraged by British action at 
adDareja, asked whether the British would resist Ottoman 
expansion at his own expense (5)* He claimed, improbably,
(1) IOL B 136, Lee-Warner’s Comment of 18.6.02
(2) Details of operations in AlA/M/53
(3) IOL BSC 1900/1902 U/S, 10 - U/S FO, 3O.7.I9OI
(V) AIA/M M+, Amir - Res*s First Asst, received 21.9*01.
Amir wrote from Lahej
(5) AIA M M+, Amir-Res. First Asst., received 23*9*01
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t h a t  he w o u ld  do so . These a p p ro a c h e s  by  th e  A m ir  were  
p o s s i b l y  p ro m p te d  b y  th e  A b d a l i  c h i e f ,  who w is h e d  t o  
p ^ reven t O ttom an f o r c e s  m ov ing  s o u th  down t o  th e  H a u sh a b i 
b o r d e r ,  w here th e y  m ig h t  i n f l u e n c e  t r i b a l  o p in io n  a g a in s t  
t h e  A b d a l i  c h i e f  ( 1 ) .  as a r e s u l t  of t h e  A m i r ! s e n q u i r i e s ,  
t h e  R e s id e n t  s e n t  h i s  F i r s t  A s s i s t a n t ,  M a jo r  J .  D a v ie s ,  
t o  v i s i t  th e  D h a la  a re a  a t  th e  end o f  O c to b e r  ( 2 ) .
D a v ie s  had fo u n d  th e  O ttoman p o s i t i o n  much as i t  had 
b e e n  when H u n te r  v i s i t e d  t h e  a re a  i n  i8 6 0 ,  w i t h  th e  1885 
a d d i t i o n  o f  a g a r r i s o n  a t  J a l i l a .
+  +  +  +■• +
The O f f i c i a t i n g  R e s id e n t ,  G e n e ra l P .J *  M a i t l a n d ,  
was in fo rm e d  o f  t h e  O ttom an p r o p o s a l  f o r  a f r o n t i e r  
d e l i m i t a t i o n  on 3 1 s t  O c to b e r ,  1901 (3); he was aske d  
t o  p o s tp o n e  D a v ie s1 d e p a r tu r e  f o r  D h a la  a t  th e  r e q u e s t
( 1) Jacob  1K in g s 1 p . 10 2 -1 03
(2 )  A IA /G  28 , Res -  F i r s t  A s s t . ,  29. 10.01
(3 )  A IA  G 28, t e l  SGB -  Res
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o f  th e  I n d i a  O f f i c e  ( 1 ) .  M a i t l a n d  c o u ld  have  r e c a l l e d  
D a v ie s ,  who had o n ly  l e f t  two days  b e f o r e ,  b u t  i t  i s  
p r o b a b le  t h a t  M a i t l a n d  w a n ted  more d e t a i l e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  
a b o u t  th e  D h a la  a re a  th a n  he h a d . The S e c r e ta r y  o f  
S ta te  was n o t  in fo r m e d  o f  D a v ie s1 d e p a r tu r e  u n t i l  
2nd November ( 2) .  M a i t l a n d  e x p re s s e d  h i s  v ie w s  i n  a 
lo n g  d e m i - o f f i c i a l  l e t t e r  t o  S i r  W i l l i a m  L e e -W a rn e r ,  
a t  th e  P o l i t i c a l  and S e c re t  D e p a r tm e n t  o f  th e  I n d i a  
O f f i c e > on 6t h  November (3)« M a i t l a n d  w anted  a p r e l i m i n a r y  
s u rv e y  o f  th e  a re a  t o  be d e m a rc a te d ,  g o in g  f u r t h e r  n o r t h ­
e a s t  th a n  C a p t .  R.A*  Wahab*s s u rv e y  o f  1 8 9 1 /9 2 ;  he 
w a n te d  a d e la y  b e fo r e  a r ra n g e m e n ts  w ere  made w i t h  th e  
P o r te  f o r  th e  d e m a rc a t io n ;  an d , i n  th e  i n t e r v a l ,  he 
w a n ted  P r o t e c t o r a t e  t r e a t i e s  w i t h  th e  C h ie fs  o f  B e ih a n ,  
B e id h a  and th e  U ppe r Y a fa i  a r e a s ,  b u t  n o t  D h a la ,  t o  be
(1 )  L /P  & 3 /1 0 /6 3 ?  L e e -W a rn e r  was r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  
p ro p o s in g  t o  s to p  D a v ie s  once news o f  th e  O ttom an 
w is h  f o r  a Com m iss ion  was r e c e iv e d
(2 )  A IA  C 28 , t e l  Res -  S o f  S
(3 )  A IA  C 28
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a p p ro v e d .  I n  M a i t l a n d 1s v ie w ,  th e  d e m a rc a t io n  s h o u ld  
c o v e r  th e  w h o le  b o r d e r  f ro m  Ras a lA r a  (1 ) ,  on t h e  I n d ia n  
Ocean, some 30 m i le s  e a s t  o f  S h a ik h  S a id ,  to  th e  Rub 
a l K h a l i  d e s e r t .  T h a t  d e m a rc a t io n  w ou ld  b lo c k  O ttom an 
a c c e s s  t o  H a dh ram a u t.  I t  was, as L e e -W a rn e r  m in u te d ,  
r . . .  a u s e f u l  l e t t e r ,  a l t h o u g h  we may n o t  a g re e  w i t h  
a l l  o f  i t  . . . f ( 2 ) .  A cop y  was s e n t  t o  th e  F o r e ig n  
O f f i c e .
Lee-Warner had few illusions; *... the situation 
in the Amirfs country is peculiar - the Dthali Amir is 
a British stipendiary who nominally rules over a 
collection of tribes, some of whom are undoubtedly 
under Turkish rule . ..1. Villages are 1.. . mixed- 
together in the wildest confusion ...!; it was, therefore, 
impossible to be guided by 1... tribal rather than 
geographical considerations [as Maitland wished/} - and 
a certain amount of give and take will be necessary in 
order to secure a workable frontier line . .♦* (2).
(1 ) L a t e r ,  i n  190*+, M a i t l a n d  c la im e d  much m ore , i n c l u d i n g
Shaikh Said
( 2) L/P & S /1 0 /6 3 ,  M in u te  d a te d  19. 11.01
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Lee-Warner appreciated that Wahab's survey would only 
provide a guide for the western portion of the frontier; 
and that Lord Curzon and the Foreign Department wanted 
to include all the south coast within British limits, 
whereas Maitland did not claim the most westerly 30 odd 
miles. Lee-Warner considered that Curzon1s proposed 
northern border should run east from the northernmost 
point of the Amiri border. That border would not have 
reached the Rub alKh.li to block an Ottoman expansion 
eastwards to Inner Hadhramaut. Lee-Varner1s draft 
proposed acceptance, after Anglo-Ottoman negotiations, 
of an arbitrary frontier line dividing the Amiri area 
between British influence and Ottoman control,with both 
portions 1under' the Amir.
Lee-Warner warned his colleagues; 'We must be very 
firm and not allow either the Government of India, or 
the Amir, to alter the 'status quo'. The Amiri country 
quite differs from the Haushabi country, and the Turks 
certainly have some rights over the Amiris ...' (1).
Lord George Hamilton, the Secretary of State, noted
(1) L/P & S/10/63 Lee-Warner's minute of 28.10.01
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Lee-./arner1 s comments on 30th October. Maitland's 
expansionist aims were again criticised by Lee-Warner 
on 3rd December (1). Following Davies* report of his 
visit to Dhala in November, the Resident claimed a much 
larger area for the Amir, as a British stipendiary. 
Lee-Warner noted; fWe can do nothing. Everything must 
be left to the Com10il on the spot* (1). Six days later 
Lee-Warner commented; *... The opportunity is wholly 
unfavourable for going behind the Wahab Line of 1892 ... (2) 
In our present international position it would savour 
of grab to ask Turkey to accept a line, and after showing 
the line to say not this but another. A l l  appearances
would be against us ...1.
+ + + + +
Curzon had proposed to consult the Bombay Secretariat
about his proposals for a Boundary Demarcation (3)* The
(1) L/P & S/10/63, Correspondence copied to FO and
Lee-Warner1s minute on Davies’ Report
(2) Reference was frequently made to this line shown
on Map V
(3) L/P & S/lO/63, Tel Viceroy - S of S, 2.10.01
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Bombay S e c r e t a r i a t  asked  th e  R e s id e n t  f o r  1. . .  p ro p o s e d  
i n s t r u c t i o n s  t o  our C o m m iss io n e rs  . . . ! ( 1 ) .  The R e s id e n t  
commented t e l e g r a p h i c a l l y ;  ’ . . .  Wahab’ s l i n e  makes bad 
f r o n t i e r  and w o u ld  be . . .  u n ju s t  t o  A m ir ,  who i s  now i n  
p o s s e s s io n  o f  a number o f  v i l l a g e s  t o  th e  w e s t o f  i t  . . . * .  
M a i t l a n d ’ s comments were  based on D a v ie s ’ R e p o r t  f ro m  
the a r e a .  L a t e r  e v e n ts  p ro v e d  t h a t  D a v ie s  a c c e p te d  th e  
A m i r ’ s c la im s ,  u n j u s t i f i a b l y ,  a t  f a c e  v a lu e .  I t  i s  
p o s s ib le  t h a t  th e  A m ir  was e n co u ra g e d  to  make e x c e s s iv e  
c la im s ,  an d , s u b s e q u e n t ly ,  t o  b r i n g  n e ig h b o u r in g  t r i b a l  
s e c t io n s  i n t o  c o n t a c t  w i t h  th e  B r i t i s h  C o m m is s io n e rs ,  by  
the A b d a l i  C h ie f .  The l a t t e r  was a consummate i n t r i g u e r  
i n  Yemeni p o l i t i c s ,  c o r re s p o n d in g  w i t h  th e  Imam, th e  
O ttom ans and w i t h  v a r i o u s  Yemeni C h ie f s  ( 2) .
C o rre sp o n d e n ce  f ro m  th e  B o rd e r  a re a  b y  t r ib e s m e n  
c la im in g  t o  seek B r i t i s h  c o n n e c t io n s  c o n t in u e d  f ro m  th e  
t im e  o f  D a v ie s ’ d e p a r tu r e  f ro m  D h a la  u n t i l  th e  a r r i v a l  
o f  th e  B r i t i s h  C o m m iss io n e rs  l a t e  i n  J a n u a ry ,  1 9 0 2 , and 
c o n t in u e d  t h e r e a f t e r  ( 3 ) .  The R e s id e n t ,  who was i n  no
(1 ) A IA /C  28 , t e l  SGB -  Res, 17. 11.01
(2 )  C f .  Jacob  ’ K in g s ’ , p .88 and p . l h l
( 3) B.g. A IA  C 28 p . 1 ^ 5 .  L e t t e r  f ro m  A z r a k i ,  M ih r a b i  & 
Ahrnadi t r ib e s m e n  t o  M a jo r  D a v ie s ,  r e c ’ d 2 7 .1 1 * 1 9 0 1
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p o s i t i o n  t o  ch e ck  th e  s t a n d in g  o f  th e  w r i t e r s ,  o r  t h e  
g e n u in e n e s s  o f  t h e i r  l e t t e r s ,  a c c e p te d  such  c o r re s p o n d e n c e  
as j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  c l a im in g  t h a t  t h e  A m i r ' s  b o r d e r  l a y  
t o  t h e  w e s t o f  W ahab's s u rv e y  l i m i t  ( l ) .  O n ly  l a t e r  d id  
t h e  R e s id e n t  l e a r n  t h a t  th e s e  t r i b e s  p a id  no t i t h e s  t o  
t h e  A m ir ;  b u t ,  by  t h e n ,  th e  R e s id e n t  had made o u t  h i s  
case  t h a t  t h e s e  t r i b e s  s t r a t e g i c  1 . . . p o s i t i o n  makes i t  
h i g h l y  d e s i r a b le  t h a t  t h e y  s h o u ld  be on th e  B r i t i s h  s id e  
o f  t h e  f r o n t i e r  l i n e  . . . '  ( l ) .
The V ic e r o y  p ro p o se d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i n s t r u c t i o n s  
f o r  t h e  B r i t i s h  C o m m is s io n e rs ;  ’ . . . A d e n  d e l i m i t a t i o n  
. . .  The l i n e  s h o u ld  commence a t  w e s te rn  l i m i t  o f  A t i f f i
and f o l l o w  th e  b o r d e r  o f  S u b a ih i  and H a u sh a b i t r i b e s .  
H e re ,  t h e r e  i s  p r o b a b ly  no need o f  g o in g  beyond  W ahab 's  
l i n e  o f  1891 . T h e re  w i l l  p r o b a b ly  be more d i f f i c u l t y  i n
■ f + +
s e c t i o n  o f  S u b a ih i  t r i b e ,  n e a r  Ras lu n b a
( 1 )  A IA  G 28, Res -  SGB, 1 .1 2 .0 1 ,  f o r w a r d in g  11.3  
p . 9.8 a b ove .
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the Amiri country, owing to interlacing of villages, 
and here Wahab should endeavour to return on the British 
side all villages paying revenue to, or in the a c t u a l  
occupation of, the Dhali Amir; and also villages within 
tribal limits of which the Turks cannot prove continuous 
occupation, tribal rather than geographical considerations 
being guiding principle. Wahab should inform the Turks 
that the Upper Yafai and Upper Aulaki are covered b y  
our declaration of 1873? which asserts the right of the 
British Government to make such arrangements with all 
nine tribes as may from time to time be desirable, 
although this right has not hitherto been reserved in 
these two cases. If our tribes show anxiety, or 
willingness to define this section of the boundary b y  
agreement, the line we should claim would be the 
northernmost limit of the Upper Yafai and Wahidi (1) 
tribes, which tract should also be stated to include the
( 1 )  AIA C 28 f l7 7 ?  Marginal file comment b y  Maitland; 
'Aulaki ? The Wahidi are not included in the "nine
minor chief ships of Beda and Behan
tribes".
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Any p o i n t  on w h ic h  th e  C o m m iss io n e rs  f a i l  t o  a g re e  t o
be re s e r v e d  and r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  G ove rnm en ts .
P le a s e  t e le g r a p h  i f  you  a p p r o v e.1 ( 1 ) .
L a t e r ,  C u rzo n  b lam ed th e  I n d i a  O f f i c e  f o r  in a d e q u a te
p r e p a r a t i o n .  The I n d ia  O f f i c e ' s  r e p l y  showed an
u n d e r s ta n d a b le  r e lu c t a n c e  t o  i s s u e  d e f i n i t e  o r d e r s  i n
th e  in c o m p le te  s t a t e  o f  i n t e l l i g e n c e  on th e  f r o n t i e r  ( 2) .
Much was l e f t  t o  th e  good sense o f  th e  B r i t i s h
C o m m is s io n e rs .  I n  p r i n c i p l e ,  t h e  w e s te rn  l i m i t  o f
Wahab1s s u rv e y  was a c c e p te d  as p r o b a b ly  a s u i t a b l e
a p p ro x im a te  l i n e ;  b u t  v a r i a t i o n s  f ro m  t h a t  l i n e ,  a g re e d
be tw e e n  th e  B r i t i s h  and O ttom an C o m m is s io n e rs ,  w o u ld  be
p
a c c e p te d .  H ow ever, a q u a l i f i e d  approval was a l s o  g iv e n  
t o  th e  F o r e ig n  D e p a r tm e n t 's  c o n f l i c t i n g  i n s t r u c t i o n s .
I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  th e  U pper Y a fa i  and U ppe r A u la q i  a re a s  
were a c c e p te d  as b e in g  w i t h i n  a B r i t i s h  p r o t e c t o r a t e ,  
as C u rzon  w a n te d  -  p r o v id e d  O ttoman ag ree m en t c o u ld  be
(1 )  A IA  C 2 8 , t e l  F o r .D e p to  -  SGB, 2 7 .1 1 .0 1  r e p e a t in g  
F o r.D ep ths . t e l  o f  2 6 .1 1 .0 1  -  S o f  S
(2 )  A IA  C 28 f2 5 3 ,  t e l  F o r .D e p t .  -  SGB, 20. 12.01 
q u o t in g  S o f  S t e l s  o f  9 * 1 2 .0 1  <§c 17. 12.01
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obtained.
The India Office instructions read as follows:- 
' . .. The importance of securing an outer line which the 
Turks will respect outweighs any advantage of attempting 
tribal division. Secondly, that we have appealed to 
iahab's line in past controversies, and even shown the 
map to the Turkish Ambassador, and are disposed to follow 
it as far as it goes. Thirdly, that if the Commissioners 
agree to an amendment of the line we need not object; 
and we ourselves may retire the line at points if 
desirable. Otherwise I agree to your proposals, except 
that reservations of final reference to respective 
Governments must be qualified by these propositions.
As regards the Upper Yafai and Upper Aulaki I agree 
to instruction, but if difficulties are raised as to 
the instructions you propose, I would detach this portion 
of our protectorate from the present discussion
News of the Foreign Office's approval of the India 
Office's instructions was received in India on 
17th December (1). The Foreign Office added a caution;
(1) AIA C 28, S of S - Viceroy
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' ... the number of points reserved for decision by the 
two Governments should be limited as much as possible in 
order to avoid difficulty with the Porte1. The India 
Office's telegram ended; 'Please instruct Wahab 
accordingly and inform the Resident*.
The Resident produced a private4Memo of Instructions 
regarding Delimitation of frontier as contained in 
S of S's telegrams of 9th and 17th Decr  and in V i c e r o y ' s  
telegram to S of S of 26th Nov.* (1). Maitland gave a 
copy of this ambiguous amalgamation of instructions to 
Lt. Colonel R.A. Wahab, the Senior British Boundary 
Commissioner (2). No copies were sent elsewhere. 
Maitland's Memorandum combined and distorted the various 
instructions to read just as Maitland wished. Wahab's 
survey line could be altered as a frontier by 'arranging 
small exchanges of territory if this seems expedient* (3). 
'... Tribal rather than geographical considerations are
(1) AIA C 28 f 257* No date but probably written about 
26th Dec.
(2) AIA C 29 f 333 contains a reference to Wahab's copy
(3) No reference was made to any need to secure Ottoman
agreement
to be considered ... although geographical considerations 
... need not be altogether ignored . ..* (1). Ottoman 
claims *... to villages which have not been continuously 
occupied by them may be opposed ...'. * Continuously1 was
to mean 'during the last ten years' (1), thus ensuring 
that Ottoman claims would be invalid, in Wahabfs and 
Maitland's opinions, because the Ottomans had been forced 
out of the area in 1891/92 during the Zeidi revolt.
Maitland had no doubts about the British rights 
’... with regard to the Upper Yaffai and Upper Aulaki, 
with whom at present we have no treaties; the Turks 
are to be informed that these tribes are covered by 
the declaration of 18735 which asserts the right of the 
British to make such arrangements with the "nine tribes" 
as may from time to time prove desirable..*.. But a 
demarcation of the frontier beyond the north-eastern 
border of Dhala was to depend, upon the Ottoman 
Commissioners' agreement to the work. Failing such an 
agreement, no demarcation was to be attempted beyond 
Dhala. Maitland possib^ had some idea of the
(1) A marginal note by Maitland
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difficulties of the terrain and realised that local 
opposition to foreign interference was strong.
Maitland was not alone in considering that the 
British Boundary Commissioners were to be guided both 
by the original instructions of the Viceroy (1), and, 
by the later comments of the Secretary of State (2).
The Foreign Department instructed the Bombay Secretariat 
that !... Wahab ... should take Viceroy1s telegram of 
26th November as indicating the aims to be attained, 
bearing in mind the views of the Secretary of State if 
points are disputed or differences arise...1 (3)«
Copies of this telegram were passed to Wahab and Maitland 
"for information and guidance” on 27th December.
From the beginning it was clear that much was 
;oing to be left to Wahab1s discretion. On 26th December, 
the Foreign Department informed the Bombay Secretariat 
that Wahab was to decide whether the Joint Commission 
should start from the coast and work north-eastwards,
(1) p.9.11 n.l
(2) p.Q.12 n.l
(3) AIA C 28, For.Dept. - SGB, 23.12.01
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or work from Dhala south-westwards (1). The Ottoman 
instructions, however, were to begin near Qataba; and 
the Ottoman Governor-General had no choice (2). On 
ljth January, Amir Shaif bin Saif was warned that Wahab 
and Major H.M. Abud, the new First Assistant Resident, 
who had replaced the sick Major Davies, would be arriving 
shortly at Dhala (3)* The Amir was asked to provide 
guides when necessary. The Ottoman Governor-General 
was told that the British Commissioners would arrive 
about 29th January.
British interest in th e  frontier area had disturbed 
th e  ’status quo’; the arrival of the British Commissioners 
stirred up the Yemeni tribesmen more. En route to Dhala 
the British Commissioners met the Qotaibi Shaikh (k) ; 
he had already decided to visit Aden, although his 
relations with Residency staff had for a long time been 
cool, because he persisted in taxing caravans passing
(1) AIA C 28, tel For.Dept - SGB
(2) AIA C28, tel Res - Gov*Gen.Sanaa k.1.02
tel Gov.Gen.Sanaa - Res, 11.1.02
There was no direct telegraph between Aden and Sanaa
(3) AIA C 28, Res - Amir, 15.1.02
(k) AIA C 28, Abud - Res, from Jimil, 2k.1.02
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through his territory (1). Abud urged that the Shaikh 
should again ’... receive presents, etc. ...' which he 
had not received for many years. Nominally, the British 
claimed that the Qotaibis were ’under1 the Amir. 
Practically, the Qotaibis had never recognised Amir 
Shaif as having any control over them (2): and the
Amir claimed no such authority (3). Ihe Qotaibis were 
just one of over six tribal areas which the British 
loosely referred to astAmiri>, but which the tribesmen 
considered to be quite separate. Unless the Ottoman 
Commissioners could be persuaded to accept such areas 
as*Amiri’, the Amir would be surrounded in his three 
isolated enclaves, by Ottoman territory.
When the Commissioners arrived at Dhala, Abud 
wrote: ’... the weak point of our position is the
tacit admission of our Government of the Turkish claim 
to Jalila - it dominates the whole valley ... The only 
routes from the alKhureiba Pass or from Dhala north-
(1) p.9-16 n.k
(2) AIA 111?, Wahab - First Asst.Res., 25.12.91
(3) AIA M kk, Arabic Letter Amir - Capt. Pottinger, 
Asst. Res., rec’d 1.9.02
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wards ...pass close under it ...* (1). Abud believed
that no satisfactory settlement was possible if the 
Ottomans were •allowed1 to hold it. He wanted Maitland 
to impress on the Government the importance of acquiring 
Jalila; and, recognising the validity of Ottoman claims, 
Abud saw the consequent need for 1.., giving money 
compensation if possible to secure [ Jalila and a 
frontier^ line compatible with our obligations to the 
Amir,1.,. Maitland sent extracts from Abud*s letter about 
Jalila to Lee-Warner at the India Office (2). No one 
referred to the inevitable Ottoman objections to any such 
sales,
Abud had no sooner arrived at Dhala than he began 
referring to ‘our obligations to the Amir 1, Such 
references were incompatible with a demarcation of the 
existing Amiri-Ottoman border; Jalila was the home of 
the principal Shairi Shaikh; it had a large Ottoman 
garrison; and the Ottomans had controlled the area,
(1) AIA G 28, Abud - Res from Dhala, 27.1.02
(2) AIA G 28, Note on Abud1s letter initialled by
Maitland
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e i t h e r  d i r e c t l y  o r  th ro u g h  th e  S h a ik h ,  s in c e  1873 ( 1 ) .
B u t  th e  B r i t i s h  C o m m iss io ne rs  w ere  i n s t r u c t e d  t o  
a c c e p t  th e  w e s te rn  l i m i t  o f  Wahab*s map, p u b l is h e d  i n  
1893? as th e  a p p ro x im a te  f r o n t i e r  l i n e ,  J a l i l a ,  and 
th e  w h o le  S h a i r i  t r i b a l  a re a ,  w h ic h  Wahab*s s u r v e y o rs  
had n o t  m arked as O ttom an t e r r i t o r y ,  were w e l l  w i t h i n  
th e  w e s te rn  l i m i t  o f  t h a t  s u r v e y ,  and m ig h t  t h e r e f o r e  
be presumed t o  be w i t h i n  th e  B r i t i s h  b o r d e r .  One 
disadvantage o f  th e  absence o f  a g re e d  A n g lo -O t to m a n  
i n s t r u c t i o n s  f o r  th e  w o rk  o f  th e  B o u n d a ry  Commission., 
was now o b v io u s .  The B r i t i s h  C o m m iss io n e rs  d id  n o t  
c o n s id e r  th e m s e lv e s  bound t o  d e m a rca te  th e  e x i s t i n g  
f r o n t i e r ;  i n s t e a d ,  th e y  w is h e d  t o  n e g o t i a t e  a new 
f r o n t i e r ,  t o  th e  A m i r ' s  b e n e f i t .
Wahab re m a rke d  t h a t  th e  w e s te rn  l i m i t  o f  th e  1891 
s u rv e y  * . . .  i s  q u i t e  i n  o u r  f a v o u r  £a s  a b o u n d a ry ]  ,
u n le s s  th e  T u rk s  a re  h o p e le s s ly  o b s t i n a t e  i n  s t i c k i n g
t o  t h e i r  p r e s e n t  p o s i t i o n s  on th e  D h a la  p la t e a u  . . . *  ( 2 ) .
(1) A IA  C 28 D .0, M a i t l a n d  -  L e e - .E a rn e r ,  6,2.02
(2) AIA C 28, Wahab -  Res, 29.1.02
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But Wahab was even then looking beyond the limits of 
his survey. He remarked that the Amir1s revenue 
accounts showed payments to the Amir by the westerly 
Kihrabi, Ahmadi, Mafari and Humedi tribes; the Humedi 
was !... a tribe not noticed before, west of the Ahmadi 
...’ (1). Less than two months before, the Resident 
had written that the first three tribes paid no taxes 
to the Amir (2), when forwarding a petition by individual
territory.
The Amir evidently tried to secure sympathy by 
suggesting that he had suffered from the ex-Native 
Assistant’s corrupt practices. Muhammad Salih Jaffer
that Muhammad Salih1s dismissal was due, i n  part, t o  
Abdali intrigue ( 3 ) .  B u t Wahab accepted the A m i r ’ s 
charges that he was robbed of p a r t  of his re v e n u e ,  
subsidy and presents, and denied access, with his
(1) AIA G 28, Wahab - Res, 29.1.02
(2) AIA G 28, Res - SGB, 1.12.01
(3) IOL File 758/1908 - H.K. Abud1s letter, Appendix J
of G.W. Bury's petition of Nov. 1905 to Gov.Bombay
tribesmen, asking for their inclusion Amir 1s
had been disrnissedin 1900. Abud. implied, in 1905?
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complaints of Ottoman aggression, to the R e s id e n t  by  
Muhammad Salih (1).
Muhammad Salih was probably not, as Wahab alleged,
*a Turkish agent1. Corruption was an accepted part of 
the Indian way of administration, partly attributable 
to the low rate of local pay (2). Maitland, however, 
accepted the Amir1s explanation that Ottoman advances 
had occurred at his expense because of Muhammad Salih1s 
failings (3). In Wahab1s, Maitland1s, and even in Abudfs 
views, 'honour1 required that British officials should 
try to make up to the Amir for what, the .amir alleged, 
were oast British failings. That attitude was opposed 
to Lee-Warner1s acceptance of dual allegiance by the 
Amir to both the British and the Ottomans (b). It i s  
probable that the British officers were less concerned 
about increasing the Amir's local prestige than .about
(1) p.9.20 n .2
(2) Cf. Lawrence 'India' p,21+1+
(3) AIA C 28, Wahab - Res, 29.1*02. Marginal file note 
of Maitland's, reads 'sent to Lee-Warner*.
(L0 p.9.6 n.l
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securing a more strategically desirable, and clearly 
definable, frontier* So long as Ottoman and Amiri 
villages, and, still more, fields and grazing areas, 
were interwoven on the Dhala plateau, Ottoman and Amiri 
charges and counter charges would persist* The British 
Commissioners later claimed that any British failure to 
support the Amir might forfeit other stipendiary Chiefs1 
loyalty.
+ + + + +
Wahab*s attitude towards the Shaibis, who were 
never claimed as Amiris, who lived beyond the north­
eastern limits of Amiri territory, and who, therefore, 
were outside the probable scope of the Commissions1 
work, illustrates his concern about a strategic frontier. 
Wahab had discussed British protection for the Shaibis 
by 31st January. In his view, 1... even if it would add 
a little to the amount to be paid in subsidies it would 
be money well spent ...’ (1). The Shaibi area overlooked
(1) AIA C 28, Wahab - Maitland, 31.1.02
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the Dhala plateau on the north-east. Wahab described 
the Shaibi Shaikhs as ‘the most uncouth lot we have met 
so far, but a very intelligent and apparently well- 
disposed lot, whom ... we ought to try to include ... 
within our boundary ...‘ for strategic reasons. The 
Shaibis had no previous connections with the British; 
and the Ottomans had annexed their area. Yet, within 
a week of arriving at Dhala, Wahab was entertaining 
♦these half-clothed Arabs*, and proposing alterations 
to the ‘status quo* on the frontier. It is probable 
that the Amir worked with Ali Muhsin Askar of Mausetta 
to rrange for the Shaibis* visit. The ill-written 
Shaibi application for British protection asked for 
the arrangements to be made through the Amir (1); 
but the Shaibis wanted a direct agreement with the 
British, as an independent tribe, not as clients of the 
Upper Yafais, or of the Amir. When Shaibi tribal leaders 
came through Ottoman picquet lines in force to visit 
Wahab in 1903? he payed them the large sum of MT# 7^0 
for their blatant disregard of Ottoman objections (2).
(1) AIA G 28, Sh.Ali.Mani Saqladi - Wahab, rec*d 11.1.02
(2) A IA  G 33, Wahab - Res, 6.5*03
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Wahab also paid Ali M u h s in  Askar handsomely for 
1 i n t r o d u c i n g 1 the Shaibis to him (1).
I n  Aden, M a i t l a n d  was also upsetting t h e  ‘status 
quo* b y  a s s u r in g  th e  C h ie f  of Beidha and some Upper 
Y a fa i  S h a ik h s  1. . .  t h a t  t h e y  a re  considered within the 
sphere  o f  B r i t i s h  i n f l u e n c e ,  and t h a t  treaties may be 
c o n c lu d e d  w i t h  them as soon as th e  demarcation is 
c o n c lu d e d  ...‘ (2). There had been earlier contacts, 
b u t  no previous suggestions of Protectorate treaties.
In hinting at treaties to these Yemenis, the Resident 
was acting on his own initiative, but he had the 
justification of the India Office tentatively including 
the Upper Yafais and Upper Aulaqis within the British 
sphere of influence (3). His aim was to strengthen 
th e  B r i t i s h  position at a vulnerable point on the 
frontier. B u t ,  f ro m  th e  Ottoman point of view, the 
R e s id e n t * s  actions were provocative. In 1900, the 
U pper Yafai area was a c c e p te d  b y  I n d ia n  o f f i c i a l s  as
(1 ) p . 9 .2 3  n .2
( 2) A IA  C 28 , Res -  Wahab, 12. 2.02
(3 ) p .9*11 n .2 and p .9 . 12. n . l
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being beyond British influence: the Upper A u la q i
area was remoter (1).
The Foreign Department wanted no publicity for 
the Commissions work; all the British officers were 
warned that they should not make 1..• any communication 
... to the public press in India ... or in England 
regarding the progress of the work of the Commission ...'
(2). It is probable that the Foreign Department was 
concerned to avoid criticism in Britain and abroad.
Curzon wished to ‘grab* additional territory and to 
impose a boundary that met his requirements for the 
better isolation of Aden by land from foreign contacts. 
Press reports might provoke controversy, discussion and 
criticism. Considerable expense was involved; and 
there were no easily identifiable benefits. Later, 
during 190^, The Times carried regular brief reports from 
Aden and from Constantinople.
+ + + + +
(1) BSC 1900/1902, tel Res - S of S (r) SGB 29.1.1900
(2) AIA C 28, U/S FOR.DEPT. - SGB, f^.2.02
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British and Ottoman motives in wanting a border 
demarcation in the sensitive Dhalai and Haushabi 
areas were different. The Porte wished to avoid any 
more Anglo-Ottoman clashes, damaging to Ottoman prestige, 
such as had occured at ad/Dareja (1). But the Porte 
did not wish to recognise any international Anglo- 
Ottoman ‘border1, because the Porte recognised no British 
claims in Arabia. The Porte proposed, as the Boundary 
Commission1s Ortoman Secretary emphasised (2), the 
demarcation of the existing boundary between the Sanjak 
of Taiz and the Nine Cantons, in the neighbourhood of 
Aden, in treaty relations with the British. The Ottomans 
claimed sovereignty over all Arabia (2). Sultan Abdul 
Hamid considered that it was ‘ his sacred duty not 
to give Lip territory to which he believed he was entitled 
. ».* (3). The Ottoman description of the demarcation 
implied only a distinction between Ottoman-administered
(1) p.9•2 n.2
(2) AIA C 28, Wahab1s tel 17.2.02 - S of S (r) SGB,
reporting the First Meeting
(3) AIA C 31? tel HBM Cfple - F0, 2b.10.02, reporting
an interview with Sultan
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and unadministered, territory.
The Foreign Office*s aim was to obtain an acknowl­
edged border line which the Ottomans would not cross 
to approach closer to Aden. The non-committal Foreign 
Office instructions were 1... to delimit the boundary 
between the territories of the tribes in the vicinity 
of Aden having direct relations with His Majesty*s 
Government and the Dominions of His Majesty the Sultan 
...* (1). The word *Dominions* was considered to be 
sufficiently vague to avoid expressing any opinion as 
to the nature of Ottoman sovereignty, or suzerainty, 
or administration, beyond the British sphere o f  
influence (1); and no reference was made to a British 
‘Protectorate* or to a British ‘Sphere o f  Influence*, 
to avoid offending the Porte. But both these terms 
were used in contemporary correspondence between Aden,
India and London to describe the territory of the 
stipendiary tribes (2). But a contemporary legal
(1 ) IOL B I36, Lee-Warner*s 10 Memo o f  18. 6.02 on
Boundary Commission
(2) AIA C 28, Resident - Wahab, 12.2.02. IOL L/P & S/10/15
Memo Fitzmaurice 8.8.05 for U/S F0, passed to 10, 31-6.05
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a u t h o r i t y ,  P r o fe s s o r  J .  W e s t la k e ,  s p e c i f i c a l l y  e x c lu d e d  
1 * . .  th e  A rab  C h ie fs  a t  th e  b a ck  o f  Aden . . . *  f ro m  h i s  
a n a l y s i s  o f  C o lo n ia l  P r o t e c t o r a t e s  ( 1 ) .  By e v e n t u a l l y  
a c c e p t in g  th e  w o rd in g  o f  th e  O ttom an p r o p o s a l  th e  B r i t i s h  
h a d  t a c i t l y  a d m i t te d  th e  r/i  c t i o n ,  f ro m  th e  B r i t i s h  
v i e w p o in t ,  t h a t  th e  n in e  C an tons  w ere  s u b d i v i s io n s  o f  
t h e  O ttom an P ro v in c e  o f  T a is  ( 2) .
+ + + + +
The O ttom ans had p ro p o s e d  t h a t  th e  d e m a rc a t io n  
c o u ld  be a r ra n g e d  a t  i n f o r m a l  m e e t in g s  o f  B r i t i s h  and 
O ttom an  o f f i c e r s  a l r e a d y  s e r v in g  l o c a l l y  ( 3 ) .  The 
G overnm ent o f  I n d ia  had e n v is a g e d  a y e a r ! s w o rk  b y  a 
J o i n t  C om m iss ion  w i t h  q u a l i f i e d  s u r v e y o r s  s p e c i a l l y  
a p p o in te d  f o r  th e  s u rv e y  w o rk .  N e i t h e r  th e  P o r te  n o r
(1 )  J .  W e s t la k e  1I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Law 1, C a m brid ge , 2nd 
e d i t i o n ,  1910, p .  1*+1 .
( 2 )  L /P  & S / l 0 /1 5  F i l e  137 P t . I I ,  Memo b y  G. F i t z m a u r i c e  
-  U .S e c .  FO o f  8 . 8 . 0 5
(3 )  L /P  & S /1 0 /6 3 ,  HBM Amb. C ’ p le  -  FO, 2 6 .1 0 .0 1 ,  p a sse d  
to  10
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the Foreign Office had any reason to foresee problems 
in a straightforward demarcation of an existing border. 
The 1de facto1 limits of Ottoman authority and of the 
Amir of Dhala1s authority were known locally; and the 
Foreign Office accepted the conciliatory India Office 
view that the British Commissioners should be prepared 
to give up territory to obtain a clearly defined line 
acceptable to the Porte (1).
Disagreements arose because the Porte and the 
Foreign Office did not exchange views and agree on 
instructions for their Commissioners. The British 
Commissioners, the Resident, the Government of Bombay, 
and most importantly, the Viceroy, had far less 
conciliatory attitudes than those held at the India 
Office and at the Foreign Office.
+ + + + +
The first meeting of the Joint Commission, on 
11th February, 1902, at Dhala, set a pattern of British
(1) AIA C 28, S of S - Viceroy, 17.12.01
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charges of Ottoman obstruction, later extended to bad 
faith, that was to continue for three years. The Ottoman 
Commissioners !... claimed whole Shairi tribe, Jabal 
Juhaf and Mafari as belonging to District of Kataba 
. ..* (1) in defining Ottoman territory adjoining the 
Amir*s land. The British Commissionersrejected these 
reasonable Ottoman claims. The Amir had submitted 
claims to some of this area to Wahab. But Wahab, and 
the Resident, complained principally to the Foreign 
Department, and to the India Office, about Ottoman claims 
that *... Amir and Chiefs under British protection hold 
their countries under authority of Turkish firmans . ..*. 
Wahab alleged that that Ottoman claim, if accepted,
?... threatened ... our whole position in Southern 
Arabia ...' (1). The Commissions work was suspended 
while the dispute was referred home.
If Britain recognised Ottoman suzerainty over all 
the Yemen, the territory of Yemeni tribes which had no 
stipendiary agreements with the British was open for
(1) AIA C 28, tel Res - S of S, 17.2.02, based on Wahab*s
report of 122.02
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Ottoman administration and occupation. The ’status quo' 
would then only be preserved in the territory of the 
British stipendiary tribes; and the British Commissioners 
had appreciated on their arrival at Dhala that the Amir 
could only claim three isolated enclaves,, Previously, 
the British had accepted that there were ’independent1 
tribes in the Southern Yemen, outside British or Ottoman 
influence (1). But, by accepting the Ottoman definition 
of the Commission’s duties, the area was under either 
British, or, Ottoman, influence. So Wahab wrote to 
Maitland:- *... Unless we can prove that many of the 
smell, tribes which cannot be included generically under 
the nine tribes are subjects of one of the nine tribes 
they must fall ’a fortiori* to the Turks ... who, in 
some cases, have never even entered their countries 
...* (2)0
(1} ’Britannica1, 1902 edn, p.518. Article on Arabia 
by Sir T.H. Holdich, under whom Wahab surveyed 
the Pamirs in 1895/96 
(2; AIA C 28, Wahab - Maitland, 12.2.02
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The Ottoman Ambassador correctly pointed out to 
the Foreign Office that the Commission^ work was 
suspended because the British Commissioners denied 
the validity of Ottoman firmans appointing the Shairi 
Shaikh as a proof of Ottoman control over the Shairis (1), 
and because they counter-claimed the area for the Amir.
The Ambassador asked that the British delegates should 
be instructed not to raise claims to territories outside 
the Nine Cantons. The Ottoman representations received 
no definite answer because the British Government was 
1 ... awaiting a full report . ..* (2) but the matter was 
not followed up, and later, charges and counter-charges 
overlaid this valid Ottoman complaint.
+  ■+■ ■+■ +  +
Wahab1s Kingfs Commission appointed him 
1 Commissioner for the demarcation of the frontier between
(1) FO 78 52^2, Ottoman Amb. London - FO, 26.2.02
(2) FO 78 52^2, n.l above, note on file
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the territory of the tribes near Aden with which 
H.M.*s Government have direct relations and the Turkish 
territory* (1). Those tribes were known, but the 
British Commissioners intrigued with others, the Amir*s 
tribal neighbours, to obtain statements that the tribes 
accepted the Amir*s suzerainty, or, that, as Yafais, 
they wanted treaties (2). Probably as a counter measure, 
the Ottomans strengthened their local patrols and 
increased their guardposts. That made local contact 
with the British, across the Ottoman lines, more risky. 
Wahab complained that the increased Ottoman military 
activity was a breach of the 1 status quo* (3)* But 
the arrival of the British Commissioners at Dhala, 
nearly two weeks before their Ottoman counterparts, 
had itself disturbed the 1 status quo*. As the Resident
(1) FO 78 52^2, dated 12.2.02. There is no file copy.
(2) Eg. AIA C 29, Wahab Res. Secret 3A.02, reported a
secret rendez-vous with an Ottoman-appointed 
paramount Shaikh of Jebel Mafari
(3) AIA C 28, Wahab - Res, 11.2.02, on Ottoman Arab
irregulars moving into the Ottoman Mafari area
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remarked, the tribesmen were 1... poor and avaricious
and of course try to make what they can out of us, but
way ...* (1). Wahab had given cash presents lavishly 
during his Survey in 1891-92 (2); he had maintained 
that such behaviour was customary amongst Residency 
officers in the interior. He did the same in 1902-190*+. 
British liberality brought in both 1 independentr and 
Ottoman-dominated tribesmen. Not all such visitors 
were truly Anglophile. After British operations in the 
Shaibi area in 19°3 a ;ainst 1dissidents1, some dead 
Shaibi opponents were wearing clothing given to them as 
presents by the British Boundary Commissioners (3).
Not surprisingly, the Ottoman Ambassador protested 
at British military detachments travelling outside the 
area under the Amir*s jurisdiction and within Ottoman
(1) AIA C 29, Res - Wahab, 3*3*02
(2) AIA 1115 f 363 & f ^21, Wahab spent over MT# 1000
a few hundred rupees in presents goes a long
in January, I892, alone
(3) Bury !Uz! p.3*+
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territory (1). As Lord George Hamilton recognised,
Wahab 1 ... had a tendency to enlarge his enquiries to 
the Amir!s claims which had nothing to do with the status 
quo ... 1 (2). Hamilton realised, helplessly, that 
*... the Aden delimitation is getting into a regular 
mess . ..* (3). British surveying parties were sent out 
into Ottoman-claimed territory and an Ottoman strengthening 
of their patrols followed. Such Ottoman moves 
inconvenienced the Amir, and he threatened quasi- 
military counter-moves (*+). The Amir employed fnon- 
Amiri1 Hal main tribesmen to collect revenue from 1Amiri1 
villages beyond the Ottoman picquets adjoining Shairi 
country*
Wahab mistrusted the attitude of the India Office 
to the negotiations; he complained that 1... we cannot 
definitely offer [the Shairisl British protection for
(1) FO 78 52^2, Ott.Ambassador - FO, 12.3*02
(2) FO 78 52^2, U/S 10 - U/S FO, 13-3.02
(3) C.P. Hami1ton-Curzon, 2 5.3*02
(If) AIA C 29, D/0 Wahab - Res, 6.5.02
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you  know how o u r  Government f ro m  m o t iv e  o f  p o l i c y
th ro w s  o v e r  i t s  p r o te g e s ,  and . . .  t h e y  may g iv e  i n  a l l
round s im p ly  t o  g e t  a s e t t le m e n t  ...f ( 1 ) .  Wahab,
h o w e v e r ,  had d e c id e d  t h a t  he m ust i n c lu d e  S h a i r i
t e r r i t o r y  w i t h i n  B r i t i s h  l i m i t s  ( 2) ;  an d , f a l l i n g  a n y
o t h e r  g ro u n d ,  he c la im e d  them as the  A m ir * s  d e p e n d e n t s 1
(3). The Shairi Shaikh was a local O ttom an official,
however, and he did not approach Wahab until after the
Ottomans had been forced out of the area by British 
and
naval!diplomatic pressure in 1903* iahab never mentioned 
this fact, nor the general local anglophobia amongst the 
settled villagers (*+). Throughout the Yemen prayers in 
the mosques were said for the Sultan (5).
The Foreign and India Offices agreed that f... the 
sole object of the Commission was to define existing 
boundaries by local investigation ...* (6). Past
(1) AIA C 29, Wahab - Res, 28.2.02
(2) AIA C 28, D/0 Wahab - Maitland & D/0 Abud - Maitland,29.1.02
(3) BSC 1900/02 Wahab - S of S, 16.3.02 & For.Dept., 12.3.02
(h) Bury *Uz! p.20
(5) Jacob 1 Kings1 p.82
(6) AIA C 29 f 53, tel. SGB - Res, 1f . 3 .0 2  quoting S of S tel
to G of I of 28.2.02
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history and the Amir’s present claims were irrelevant.
But Wahab relied heavily upon both. While the India 
Office awaited 'Wahab1 s reports on the reasons for the 
’impasse* in the Commission’s work, Wahab was preoccupied 
with building up his case for including Shairi and other 
territory in the Amir’s possessions. Wahab knew that 
that case was weak. Possibly he began his campaign 
against local Ottoman ’intrigues which 'endangered the 
lives of the British Commission staff,as a calculated 
diversion from the weakness of the British case (1). 
Comments on the Foreign Office file showed that Wahab’s 
remarks did influence official opinion against the 
Ottomans. Wahab had written; *... Turkish conduct on 
border outrageous ...' because the Ottoman Commissioners 
had asked that British surveyors should not work inside 
Ottoman borders in Azraki and Mihrabi country* (2).
Wahab had lodged a counter-complaint asking that
(1) FO 78 52*+2. Copy of D/O, Res - Lee-Warner of 26.2.02,
enclosing extracts of Wahab - Res, 22.2.02
(2) AIA 855? Col. G. Stevens’ Report^27.9*80, reported 
Azraki & Ahmadi areas under Ottoman suzerainty
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O ttom an I r r e g u l a r s  s h o u ld  be w i th d ra w n  f ro m  J e b e l  M a f a r i .  
He a l l e g e d  t h a t  t h e i r  i n t r o d u c t i o n  was a b re a c h  of 
th e  1 s t a t u s  quo1; he d id  n o t  a d m it  t h a t  th e  B r i t i s h  had 
a ls o  a l t e r e d  th e  1 s t a t u s  quo1, n o r  t h a t  th e  M a f a r i  a re a  
was n o t  u n d e r  B r i t i s h  in f l u e n c e  b e f o r e .  The 'R e s id e n t  
s u p p o r te d  Wahab. He commented, i n a c c u r a t e l y ,  m a r g i n a l l y :  
1 . . .  The T u rk s  a p p a r e n t l y  w an t t o  j u s t i f y  t h e i r  
o c c u p a t io n  o f  S h a i r i  v i l l a g e s  b y  th e  q u ib b le  t h a t  t h e y  
do n o t  b e lo n g  t o  th e  A m i r i  t r i b e ,  th o u g h  th e  S h a i r i s  
were e q u a l l y  s u b je c t  t o  th e  A m ir  o f  D h a l i  . . . ! ( 1 ) .
M a i t l a n d  knew that th e  R e s id e n c y  had a d m i t te d  i n  
188*+ t o  t h e  Pasha i n  Sanaa t h a t  th e  O ttom ans c o n t r o l l e d  
th e  S h a i r i s  ( 2) .  B u t  he ig n o r e d  t h a t  in c o n v e n ie n t  f a c t ;  
i n s t e a d ,  he c la im e d  that any O ttom an p re s e n c e  am ongst 
the S h a i r i s  was a b re a c h  o f  th e  P o r t e 1s u n d e r ta k in g  i n  
187*+ t o  w i th d r a w  f ro m  D h a la ,  w h ic h  he i n t e r p r e t e d  as 
any o f  the A m i r f s t e r r i t o r y 1 ( 3 ) *  M a i t l a n d  vas
(1 ) p .9.37 n . l
(2) FO 78 *+528, FO -  Musurus Pasha, 1 9 .2 .8 5
(3 )  FO 78 27 55 , t e l .  E l l i o t  -  FO, 1 8 . 6 . 7 ^
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committed to a strategic frontier for Aden!s hinterland, 
not to a demarcation of the Amir's existing border, 
from the beginning. Maitland*s private correspondence 
with Lee-Warner at the India Office developed so as to 
create hostility against the Ottomans in the Yemen. An 
artificial impression was given, that the Ottomans were 
undermining local British prestige and endangering the 
safety of British troops, to arouse patriotic emotions (1). 
In such a climate Wahab and Maitland might obtain support 
in Whitehall for their policy of 'grab1.
Sinister interpretations were placed on minor 
incidents. The Ottomans were blamed for a single shot, 
fired by an unknown assailant at a British surveyor (2).
But the possibility is that 'the ambush' might have been 
'arranged* by the Amir. An Ottoman ban on the Amir 
sending camels behind their lines to collect fodder was
( 1) B .P j .  B a l f o u r  *+9733* C o rre s p o n d e n c e  w i t h  Curzon,
190*+. Cf. Curzon - Balfour 11.12.08. '... The
moment European life is held cheap in India & the 
prestige of the British Raj has gone ...'
(2) AIA C 29, Wahab - Res, 12.3*02
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described as a hostile act. But, as the Aden Troop knew 
from past experience, the area could not provide fodder 
for extra horses in the summer. The Ottomans were 
merely conserving fodder for their own additional 
hundred cavalry horses (1). Plainly, the deeper purse 
of the British could buy up the limited local supplies 
through the Amir, when there was a shortage, unless the 
Ottomans protected their supplies; and a drought 
occurred in the area in 1903*
Maitland used Wahab's complaints of Ottoman 
hostility to justify increasing Wahabfs escort by a 
half company of Native Infantry in 1902 (2). Possibly 
Maitland was unduly influenced in his approach to the 
boundary settlement by his personal experiences on the 
Russian-Afghan frontier, and by his own earlier 
intelligence work. He suggested that f... the Turks 
are playing for another *Panjdeh Incident* which is to 
counterbalance the adDareja incident. I hope H.M.s
(1) AIA G 28, Wahab - Res, 8.2.02
(2) AIA G 29, Res - S of S, 20.3.02
Govt, are adopting a strong line of policy. If they 
are not I lm afraid there w i l l  be trouble . ..*(1). 
Maitland1s own lack of objectivity about affairs in 
Dhala was further increased by Wahab*s exaggerations. 
Wahab was unsatisfied with the size of the reinforcement 
that Maitland had despatched on his own authority.
Wahab asked for more troops, including some British 
detachments (2). Unrealistically, Wahab offered to 
explain to the Ottoman Commissioners that the troops 
were coming up to the cooler climate of Dhala *for the 
summer1.
Wahab1s reliance upon the Amir for local news 
increased Wahab1s bias; thus he reported a wild 
rumour, that the Mutesarif of Taiz was collecting 
!... 90C or 1000 Arabs ...’ to threaten the British 
Commissioners* camp, as a justification for asking for 
British troops. He admitted that the Amir had advised 
him to make the request (&). A calmer man, or one with
(1) AIA C 29, D/0 Maitland - Lee-Warner, 30.3-02
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more local experience, would have realised that no 
Ottoman official could take such action, unless the 
Porte wanted war with Britain. There was never any 
evidence to justify such an assumption. But it suited 
Wahab*s tactics to impute the worst motives to the 
Ottomans. The Amir and Wahab had also an interest in 
destroying trust between local tribesmen and the Ottomans.
A 'secret1 meeting was arranged - probably through 
the Amir - between the paramount Shaikh, Ali Zindani, 
on Jebel Jihaf and the British Commissioners1 
representative (1). Shaikh Ali was reluctantly persuaded 
to apply for British protection, on the understanding 
that his application would be kept secret until 
protection could be offered to him. But the meeting 
was reported to the Ottomans. Since they had appointed 
the Shaikh to his office, they considered his 
negotiations to be treasonable. The Ottomans tried, 
vainly, to arrest Shaikh Ali. He fled to Dhala. This 
breach helped Wahab and the Amir. For, having previously 
requested protection, secretly, as an independent
(1) AIA C 29, Wahab - Res, 3^.02
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Shaikh, All Zindani was now obliged to request it 
openly, as a client of the Amir, thus coining under the 
Amiri ‘umbrella’. It is possible that these manoeuvres 
were engineered by the Amir.
Wahab admitted on his arrival at Dhala that the
Aden Residency ... was ... quite in the dark about the 
frontier ...' (1). Wahab had recognised in 1392 that 
the Yemeni tribes in ’... the more remote and 
inaccessible hills have little or no respect for our 
power, and though willing enough to accept subsidies, 
which are black mail lslc3 , refuse unequivocally ... * 
to render any service in return (2). There had been 
virtually no contact, apart from Davies’ brief visit 
in November 1901? since. 'Wahab relied on local informants 
such as the Amir and one Ali Kohsin Askar, who proved to 
be untrustworthy and uninfluential after the Border 
demarcation (3 )?  he even relied upon the Amir as a
(1) AIA G 28, Wahab - Res, 29.1.02, copied to Lee-Warner
by Maitland
(2) L/P&S/20 E.60, Wahab’s Report on 1891/92 survey p.3
(3) AIA File No.18/1 of 1907, f 9 & f 13. Reports of 
Major H.F. Jacob, 2.9.06 and 18.5.06
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tribal affairs adviser when the Commission moved away 
from the Dhala area (1). The Amir!s role as Wahab*s 
intermediary was probably financially rewarding and 
politically exhiliarating. Bury suggested that the 
Amir knew how to benefit politically b y  arousing !the 
just indignation1 of British political officers (2).
Lven Wahab admitted that * ... the Amir is always rather 
an anxiety to us, it is impossible to find out what he 
is up to, and in a moment of excitement he is capable 
of a great deal of mischief . ..' (3). Other officers 
did not *. .. trust the Amir very far ... 1 (h).
Maitlanc was more cautious than Wahab in 
championing the extremer border claims; he wanted 
the Viceroy to support the Amir*s claims to Shairi 
territory and to demand an Ottoman withdrawal (5).
Maitland admitted that it was a new British frontier,
(1) AIA C 36, Res - Sir Louis Dane, 20.2.Oh
(2) Bury *Uz* p.17
(3) AIA C 29 D/0, Wahab - Maitland, 6.5.02
(h) AIA/H/55? Major Merewether, P.O. Dhala - Res, i7.ll.0h
(5) a IA C 29 D/0, Maitland - W.H. Barnes, Sec.for.Dept.
13.h.02 (r) Lee-Warner D/0, l6.h.02
Iw e s tw a rd  o f  th e  e x i s t i n g  b o r d e r ,  w h ic h  th e  B r i t i s h  
C o m m is s io n e rs  were  p r e s s in g  f o r .  B u t  M a i t l a n d  r e fu s e d  
* . . .  i n  t h e  e x i s t i n g  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  . . . ! t o  recommend 
th e  e x t e n s io n  o f  th e  b o r d e r  w e s tw a rd s  t o  in c lu d e  
J e b e l  J i h a f ,  w h ic h  was c la im e d  by  th e  O ttom ans ( 1 ) .  
P r i v a t e l y ,  M a i t l a n d  was aware o f  th e  s t r a t e g i c  
a d v a n ta g e  o f  p o s s e s s io n  o f  J e b e l  J i h a f .  I n  s u g g e s t in g  
t h a t  t h e  O ttom ans s h o u ld  r e c e iv e  f i n a n c i a l  o r  t e r r i t o r i a l  
c o m p e n s a t io n  f o r  w i th d r a w in g  f ro m  th e  S h a i r i  a re a ,  
M a i t la n d  a d m i t te d  t h a t  t n e y  had s t r o n g  c la im s  t o  th e  
a re a .
M a i t l a n d  asked Wahab t o  * . . .  g i v e  . . .  d e t a i l e d  
e x p la n a t i o n  o f  th e  re a s o n s  . . .  f o r  g o in g  so much b e3/ond 
th e  l i n e  you  were p re p a re d  t o  a c c e p t  i n  J a n u a ry ,  and 
w h ic h  H . M . ’ s G o v t ,  a re  e v i d e n t l y  u n w i l l i n g  t o  d e p a r t  
f ro m  . . . *  (2). Wahab*s d e t a i l e d  e x p la n a t io n s  were n o t  
r e c e iv e d  u n t i l  November ( 3 ) .  fh e  A m ir  t o o k  t im e ,
( 1 ) A IA  C 29 D /0 ,  M a i t l a n d  -  Wahab, 6 . 5 .0 2
(2) A IA  C 29, Res -  Wahab, 10.b.02
(3) A IA  C 29, Wahab -  Re s ( r ) F o r . D e p t . ,  1 9 •1 1 .0 2  & p .33
A IA  C 29, Res -  Wahab, 10.R«02
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‘ d i g g i n g ’ am ongst h i s  f a m i l y  p a p e rs ,  t o  d e v e lo p  h i s  
maximum c la im s .  Wahab r e s te d  h i s  case upon th e s e  c la im s .
He b ru s h e d  a s id e  O ttoman c la im s ,  and even o c c u p a t io n ,  
and he e s t a b l i s h e d  th e  m y th  o f  th e  A m i r ' s  ’ r i g h t *  t o  
th e  s t r a t e g i c  S h a i r i  v i l l a g e ,  and O ttom an c e n t r e ,  o f  
J a l i l a .  T h a t  m y th  was e v e n t u a l l y  a c c e p te d  as f a c t  
i n  D e lh i  and i n  W h i t e h a l l .  U l t i m a t e l y ,  th e  w h o le  
S h a i r i  a re a  was p la c e d  u n d e r  th e  A m ir ,  b u t  th e  S h a i r i s  
a lw a y s  d e n ie d  t h a t  t h e y  were ' s u b j e c t s ’ o f  t h e  A m ir .
Wahab d e n ie d  O ttom an a u t h o r i t y  i n  th e  Yemen b e fo r e  
t h e i r  e v a c u a t io n  i n  1630 as a b a s is  f o r  p re s e n t  c l a im s 5 
and he d is m is s e d  any  O ttom an o c c u p a t io n  f ro m  1873 as 
’ a g g re s s io n *  on th e  t e r r i t o r y  o f  one o f  th e  n in e  
s t i p e n d i a r y  t r i b e s .  H a v in g  ma.de h i s  own r u l e s  f o r  
r e j e c t i n g  any O ttom an c la im s ,  Wahab e n cou rag ed  th e  
A m ir  t o  make as e x te n s iv e  c la im s  as p o s s ib le .  The A m i r ’ s 
c la im s  p a r t l y  r e s t e d  on Im am ic  do cu m e n ts . B u t  Imam 
lluhammad Yahya a d m i t te d  S u l t a n  A b d u l H a m id 's  s u z e r a in t y  
i n  1905? r e j e c t i n g  o n ly  c u r r e n t  c o r r u p t  O ttom an 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  ( 1 ) .  Wahab p o s s ib l y  c la im e d  more t e r r i t o r y
(1) L/P & S / lO /68 ( F i l e  57/19^5)? Imam - Sultan Abdul Hamid
o f  3 • 7 • 0 5 ,  th ro u g h  K in g  Edward V I I ,  f o rw a rd e d  by  
Ag.Res -  Bombay, 2 0 . 8 . 0 5
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because  he knew t h a t  th e  P o r te  w is h e d  t o  be c o n c i l i a t o r y ,  
lie  r e c e iv e d  i n  m id  M arch  a co p y  o f  th e  S e c r e ta r y  o f  
S t a t e * s  t e le g r a m  t o  th e  F o r e ig n  D e p a r tm e n t .  I t  r e a d 5 
' . . .  G rand V i z i e r  w i l l  i n s t r u c t  Yemen a u t h o r i t i e s  t o  
a v o id  an y  c o l l i s i o n  w i t h  C o m m iss io n . F irm n e s s  and 
m o d e r a t io n  on th e  p a r t  o f  t h e  Aden A u t h o r i t i e s  s h o u ld  
e n s u re  s a t i s f a c t o r y  s o l u t i o n  . . . '  ( 1 ) .  B u t  th e  P o r te  
a l s o  a n t i c i p a t e d  a c o n c i l i a t o r y  B r i t i s h  a p p ro a c h ,  
ia h a b  was n o t  c o n c i l i a t o r y .
L e e -V a rn e r  commented c o o l l y  on M a i t l a n d ' s  a l a r m i s t  
c h e o r ie s  and on r e p o r t s  o f  Wahab1s s t i l l  more e x tre m e  
v ie w s .  A l a r g e r  B r i t i s h  e s c o r t  was, i n  L e e - V a r n e r1 s 
v ie w ,  u n n e c e s s a ry .  ' . . .  D e l i m i t a t i o n  w i l l  n o t  be 
c o m p le te d  . . . . B u t  we d o n ' t  t  t o  seem s e l f i s h  and 
a g g r e s s iv e  . . . . W e  m ust ta k e  f r o n t i e r s  as we f i n d  them .
Ye d o n ’ t  c a re  w h a t t i e  A m irs  o c c u p y  o r  own. What we 
do c a re  a b o u t  i s  th e  l i n e  a t  w h ic h  o u r  i n t e r e s t ,  c o n t r o l ,  
o r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  ends . . . ’ ( 2 ) .  L e e -V a rn e r  had n o t  
had th e  f ra g m e n te d  n a tu r e  o f  th e  s t i p e n d i a r y  c h i e f s '
(1 ) A IA  C 29 f  257? t e l  SGB -  R es. No d a te  v i s i b l e
(2 )  A IA  C 29 D /0  L e e -.E a rn e r -  M a i t l a n d ,  23.^ - .0 2 ,  r e c e iv e d
5.5.02
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t e r r i t o r i e s  e x p la in  d t o  h im .  It i s  p o s s ib le  t h a t  he 
w o u ld  have  fa v o u r e d  a b a n d o n in g  th e  A m ir  t o  th e  
O tto m a n s , i f  he had known. H is  c o n c e rn  was o n ly  f o r  
Aden. H a i t i a n d  was u n c o n v in c e d .  He u rg e d  on L e e -W a rn e r  
t h a t  a l o c a l  r i g h t  o f  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  s h o u ld  be 
a c c e n te d ,  g i v i n g  a c h o ic e  f o r ,  o r  a g a i n s t ,  O ttoman 
r u l e  ( 1 ) .  M a i t l a n d  o b v io u s l y  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  a c h o ic e  
w o u ld  show l o c a l  a n g lo p h i l e  s e n t im e n ts .  The p r o p o s a l  
was u n r e a l i s t i c  and u n r e la t e d  t o  th e  I n d i a  O f f i c e * s  
i n s t r u c t i o n s  5 an d , i f  c a r r i e d  o u t ,  th e  r e s u l t  m ig h t  
have been i n  th e  O tto m a n 1s f a v o u r  ( 2 ) .
L e e -W a rn e r  p la c e d  M a i t l a n d * s  l e t t e r s  on th e  I n d i a  
O f f i c e  f i l e .  The S e c r e ta r y  o f  S ta te  t h e r e f o r e  knew 
t h a t  M a i t l a n d  and Wahab w ere  opposed t o  th e  o f f i c i a l  
I n d i a  O f f i c e  p o l i c y .  L o rd  George H a m i l to n  was c o n c e rn e d  
t h a t  th e  B r i t i s h  C o m m iss io n e rs  s h o u ld  n o t  make more 
e x te n s iv e  c la im s  th a n  th e  l i m i t s  o f  Wahab*s 1 8 9 1 /9 2  
s u rv e y .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  he was opposed t o  th e  use o f
( 1 ) A IA  C 29 D /0 ,  M a i t l a n d  -  L e e -W a rn e r ,  6 .5«C 2
( 2) B u ry  ‘ Us* p .20
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f o r c e  t o  o b t a i n  such new and u n a u th o r i s e d  o b je c t i v e s  as 
a h o t - w e a th e r  s a n i t o r iu m  s i t e  o r  new a c c e s s  r o u t e s  i n t o  
th e  Yemen ( 1 ) .  I n  m e n t io n in g  the m , M a i t l a n d  was 
a d v o c a t in g  a new p o l i c y ,  a l t h o u g h  one l a t e r  s u p p o r te d  
b y  th e  G o v e rn o r  o f  Bombay ( 2 ) .  The I n d i a  O f f i c e  d i d  
n o t  * . . .  w is h  t o  in c r e a s e  o u r  i n t e r f e r e n c e  o r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  
t h e  t r i b e s ;  and we have no i n t e n t i o n  t o  u n d e r ta k e  t h e i r  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  . . . *  (3)* So f a r  so good ; b u t  th e  I n d i a  
O f f i c e  th e n  in fo rm e d  th e  R e s id e n t  t h a t  t h e  O ttom ans 
w o u ld  be a s k e d ,  i f  th e  F o r e ig n  O f f i c e  a g re e d ,  t o  m arch  
a lo n g  th e  l i m i t  o f  th e  1891/92 s u rv e y  w o rk in g s  and t o  
w i th d r a w  any  O ttom an t r o o p s  e a s t  o f  t h a t  l i n e  (3).
T h a t  w au ld  i n v o l v e  an O ttoman w i t h d r a w a l  f ro m  J a l i l a  
and  sone S h a i r i  t e r r i t o r y ,  because  IJahab had d is r e g a r d e d  
h i s  i n s t r u c t i o n s  i n  I 89I  t h a t  h i s  s u rv e y  s h o u ld  cease 
s o u th  Df th e  D h a la  p la t e a u  . The I n d i a  O f f i c e  th u s  
conceded th e  s t r a t e g i c  f r o n t i e r  w h ic h  I n d ia n  o f f i c i a l s  
h a d  s u p p o r te d  f ro m  th e  b e g in n in g .  The I n d i a  O f f i c e
(1) AIA G 29, t e l  S o f  S -  V ic e r o y ,  7-5.02
( 2 )  C?, G urzon -  H a m i l to n ,  ^ . 6 . 03, r e f e r r i n g  t o  a 
P r iv a te  Memo b y  L o rd  N o r th c o te
( 3 )  A 'A C 29, S o f  S -  Res, t e l  12.5.02
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a c c e p te d  t h a t  th e  b o r d e r  was o n l y  1 . . .  f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
p u rp o s e s  t o  a c t  as a b a r r i e r  t o  f o r e i g n  a p p ro a c h  t o  Aden 
. . . ’ (1 ) .  B u t ,  once th e  b o r d e r  was d e l i n e a t e d ,  th e  
B r i t i s h  had t o  a c c e p t  new i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  
s o u th  o f  i t .
The R e s id e n t  q u i c k l y  we lcom ed th e  I n d i a  O f f i c e ’ s 
r e v i s e d  p o l i c y  ( 2) ;  so d id  th e  V i c e r o y  ( 3 ) .  B u t  Wahab 
w a n te d  m ore . ’ . . .  The V ic e r o y  t h o r o u g h ly  u n d e rs ta n d s
th e  p o s i t i o n  and i t  may be p o s s ib le  t o  g e t  h im  to 
im p re s s  on th e  Home p e o p le  t h a t  now i s  th e  t im e  to t a k e  
up th e  l i n e  t h a t  i s  th e  m os t a d v a n ta g e o u s  to us . . . ;  
b u t  i t  i s  no good o u r  t r y i n g  t o  say a n y th in g  t o  th e  
Home A u t h o r i t i e s  ( * f ) . The l a t t e r  r e a l i s e d  t h a t
Vahab was * . . .  d is p o s e d  t o  push B r i t i s h  c la im s  . . .  
beyond th e  b o u n d a ry  as f i x e d  by  h i s  map o f  I 892 
and th e y  w a n te d  no ’ . . .  e x te n s io n  o f  B r i t i s h  p r o t e c t o r a t e  
i n  c o n f l i c t  w i t h  o u r  a s s u ra n c e s  t o  th e  P o r te  . . . ’ ( 5 ) .
( 1 ) A IA  C 29 , S o f  S -  Res, t e l  1 1 5 .0 2
(2 )  A IA  G 29 , D/0 M a i t l a n d  -  Wahab, l Lf - .5 .0 2
( 3 )  A IA  G 29, t e l  V ic e r o y  -  S o f  S, 1 6 .5 .0 2
(k) A IA  G 29 , D /0  Wahab -  Res, 1 6 .5 .0 2
(5 )  A IA  G 29 f  k 9 7 ,  10 -  F0 , 5. 5.02
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H ow ever, M a i t l a n d  p ro v o k e d  th e  I n d i a  O f f i c e  t o  move 
f u r t h e r  b y  a l l e g i n g  t h a t  ' . . . t h e  T u r k s . . . s e iz e d  
a lm o s t  e v e ry  im p o r t a n t  p o s i t i o n  as soon as o u r  C om m iss ion  
a p p e a re d  a t  D t h a l i . . . '  ( l ) .  T h is  s ta te m e n t  was passed 
t o  t h e  F o r e ig n  O f f i c e  w i t h  th e  comment t h a t  i t  was so
s e r io u s  as t o  make ' . . . a l l  j o i n t  d e l i m i t a t i o n  im p o s s ib le
/ ^. . . '  ( 1 ) .  H a m i l t o n  w a n ted  O 'C o n n o r  ' . . . t o  speak p l a i n l y
t o  t h e  T u r k i s h  G ove rn m e n t. . .  and r e q u e s t  . . .  t h e
w i t h d r a w a l  o f  t h e i r  t r o o p s  . . . '  ( 1) .
O 'C o n n o r  spoke f o r c e f u l l y  and t h r e a t e n i n g l y ;
there was no suggestion o f  c o n c i l i a t i o n  o r  n e g o t i a t i o n s .
B r i t a i n  d id  ' . . .  n o t  r e c o g n is e  th e  T u r k is h  o c c u p a t io n
o f  J e l a l e  [ s i c  J a l i l a ]  , and i f  t h e  M i l i t a r y  Commandant
j a t  Q ataba j s h o u ld  be e n co u ra g e d  i n  h i s  p re s e n t
i n t r a n s i g e n t  a t t i t u d e  [ j i . e .  d e fe n d in g  O ttom an i n t e r e s t s
a g a in s t  in r o a d s  b y  th e  A m ir  and t h e  B r i t i s h  ( 2 7 } . . .
a s a t i s f a c t o r y  s e t t le m e n t  o f  t h e  f r o n t i e r  q u e s t io n
w i l l  be d i f f i c u l t  w i t h o u t  i t s  e n t a i l i n g  u n p le a s a n t
( 1 )  A IA  C 29 , 10 -  FO, 1 3 .5 .0 2 ,  q u o t in g  t e l  Res -  S o f  S, 
1 3 .5 .0 2
( 2 )  E.g. p . 9 .4 0  n .2
(3) H.8 M. to ftc
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consequences  so o n e r  o r  l a t e r  f o r  th e  T u rk s  . . . '  ( 1 ) .
U n l i k e  th e  I n d i a  O f f i c e ,  th e  F o r e ig n  O f f i c e  d id  n o t
r e c e iv e  c o p ie s  o f  M a i t l a n d 1s l a t e r  d e m i - o f f i c i a l  l e t t e r s
t o  L e e -E a rn e r  w i t h  t h e i r  e x p a n s io n is t  v ie w s .  L e e -W a rn e r
c o n s id e r e d  them to o  ' c o n f u s in g '  t o  pass on t o  th e
F o r e ig n  O f f i c e  ( 2) .  So th e  F o r e ig n  O f f i c e  and Of Connor
la c k e d  t h i s  means o f  a s s e s s in g  th e  c r e d i b i l i t y  o f
O ttom an r e p l i e s  t o  th e  R e s id e n t 's  c h a rg e s .  B u t O 'C o n n o r
d id  know t h a t  th e  O ttom an p o s i t i o n  i n  th e  Yemen was
v e r y  weak. R e v o l t  had b ro k e n  o u t ;  ' . . .  th e  S u l t a n  w i l l
n o t  be so f o o l i s h  as t o  r i s k  d is a g re e m e n t  w i t h  us  i n
>
r e g a rd  t o  Aden f r o n t i e r  ( 3 ) *  • * *
Once th e  Home G overnm ent had in c lu d e d  th e  S h a i r i  
a re a  w i t h i n  th e  new B r i t i s h  h o r d e r  c la im s ,  M a i t l a n d  
so u g h t an e x te n s io n  f u r t h e r  w e s tw a rd s .  He had 
r e j e c t e d  t h a t  b e fo r e  as u n r e a l i s t i c  (*+). Now
( 1 ) L/P & S / l O /63. Aden F r o n t i e r  D e l i m i t a t i o n  P t .  I 
1 9 0 5 -3 7 .  FO -  10 , 1 0 .6 .0 2  fo rw a rd e d  HBMA 7 C 'p le  -  F 0 , 
*+.6.02
( 2 ) L/P a S /1 0 /6 3 .  N o te  by  L e e -W a rn e r  on M a i t l a n d ' s  
D /0  l e t t e r  o f  22.5 -0 2 ,  r e c ' d  6 . 6 .0 2
(3 )  A IA  G 29, t e l  O 'C onno r -  FO, lb.$.02 
M  A IA  C 29, D/0 M a i t l a n d  -  Wahab, 6 . 5 * 0 2
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M a i t l a n d  u rg e d  p r i v a t e l y  t h a t  th e  new b o rd e r  w o u ld  
be ' . . .  d i s a s t r o u s .  The A m ir  w i l l  p r o b a b ly  go o v e r  
t o  th e  T u rk s  and t h a t  w ould  p u t  us i n  a v e r y  
e m b a r ra s s in g  p o s i t i o n  . . . '  ( 1) .  C u rz o n , t o o ,  u rg e d  
H a m i l to n  t o  a d o p t  a more ' r e s o l u t e 1 p o l i c y ;
th e  r e s u l t  o f  o u r  ex tre m e  c i v i l i t y  [_ s ic ]  . . .  and 
o f  o u r  f a i l u r e  t o  s u p p o r t  o u r  men w i t h  a s u f f i c i e n t  
show o f  t r o o p s ,  has been t h a t  th e  T u rk s  a re  now i n  
t r a n q u i l  o c c u p a t io n  o f  a c o n s id e r a b le  s t r i p  o f  
c o u n t r y  on th e  in n e r  o r  B r i t i s h  s id e  o f  th e  f r o n t i e r  
. . . '  ( 2 ) .  G urzon d e c la re d  t h a t  th e  O ttom ans w o u ld  
e i t h e r  ' . . .  have t o  r e t i r e ,  o r  we s h a l l  have t o  t u r n  
them o u t .  They have t h r o u g h o u t  ta k e n  a d v a n ta g e  o f  
o u r  good n a tu r e  and s i m p l i c i t y  . . .  1. G urzon th e n  
c r i t i c i s e d  th e  c lu m s y  h a n d l in g  o f  th e  C o m m is s io n 's  
a f f a i r s  b y  th e  p o o r l y  c o - o r d in a te d  a c t io n s  o f  th e  
I n d i a  O f f i c e ,  th e  G overnm ents o f  I n d i a  and o f  Bombay 
and o f  th e  R e s id e n t  a t  Aden. 1. . .  We a re  a l l  more o r  
l e s s  a t  c ro s s -p u rp o s e s  w i t h  each o t h e r ,  and when th e
(1 )  A IA  G 29 , D/0 M a i t la n d  -  S i r  II. B a rn e s ,  S e c .F o r  .D e p t .  1 . 6 . 0 2
( 2) L o rd  HP, C u rzon  -  H a m i l to n ,  2 1 . 5 . 0 2 ,  r e c ' d  9*6.02
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t e le g r a m s  come, r e p o r t i n g  someone e l s e ! s te le g r a m ,  
and c r i t i c i s i n g  someone e l s e ' s  a d v ic e ,  a l l  th e  p a r t i e s  
c o n c e rn e d  b e in g  s im u l t a n e o u s ly  a t  w o rk  i n  in d e p e n d e n ce  
o f  each  o t h e r ,  i t  i s  a lm o s t  im p o s s ib le  t o  u n d e rs ta n d  
. . .  o r  t o  make head o r  t a i l  o f  th e  e n t i r e  c o n c e rn  . . . .
I n  th e  p r e s e n t  a b s u rd  p o s i t i o n ,  . . .  no bo dy  knows whose 
o r d e r s  a re  b e in g  e x e c u te d ,  o r  w ha t i s  a c t u a l l y  t a k i n g  
p la c e  . . . '  ( 1 ) .  G urzon sug g e s te d  t h a t  th e  G overnm ent 
o f  I n d i a  s h o u ld  is s u e  o r d e r s  t o  th e  B o u n d a ry  C o m m is s io n e rs ,  
i n  c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h  th e  I n d i a  O f f i c e .
G u rz o n 's  s u g g e s t io n  was n o t  a d o p te d ;  th e  I n d i a  
O f f i c e  c o n t in u e d  t o  send o c c a s io n a l  te le g ra m s  d i r e c t  
t o  th e  R e s id e n t ,  and t o  r e c e iv e  te le g ra m s  f ro m  th e  
C o m m iss io n e rs  and th e  R e s id e n t .  The Governm ent o f  I n d i a  
s t i l l  passed  i t s  i n s t r u c t i o n s  th r o u g h  th e  G overnm ent 
o f  Bombay. B u t ,  i f  t h e  fo rw a rd  p o l i c y  t h a t  was f o l l o w e d  
a l r e a d y  w en t beyond G u rzo n *s  o r i g i n a l  r e q u i r e m e n ts ,
-  p o s s ib l y  w i t h o u t  h i s  f u l l  r e a l i s a t i o n  -  i t  was G urzon  
who p re s s e d  i t  on H a m i l to n .  The l a t t e r  se cu re d  th e
(1) p.9.53 n.2
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B r i t i s h  G o v e rn m e n ts  a c q u ie s c e n c e .  I n  S i r  W a l te r  
L a w re n c e1 s v ie w ;  ’ . . .  The r e a l  b u s in e s s  o f  th e  
G overnm ent o f  I n d i a  was t r a n s a c t e d  i n  th e  p r i v a t e  l e t t e r s  
. . .  be tw een  th e  V ic e r o y  and t h e  S e c r e ta r y  o f  S ta te  
. . . '  ( 1 ) ;  and Law rence c o u ld  h a r d l y  remember one 
in s ta n c e  w here  th e  I n d ia  O f f i c e  o v e r r u le d  G u rzo n . I n  
S i r  A r t h u r  G o d le y 's  v ie w ,  i n  r e t r o s p e c t ,  i t  was 
G u rz o n *s  p o l i c y  on th e  Aden B o un da ry  C om m iss ion  t h a t
s f o l l o w e d ,  n o t  th e  C a b in e t * s  o r  th e  I n d i a  O f f i c e * s  ( 2 ) ,  
f ro m  th e  summer o f  1902.
G urzon  c la im e d  t h a t  * . . .  no one i n  I n d i a  has th e  
s l i g h t e s t  d e s i r e  t o  e x te n d  th e  Aden b o u n d a ry  o r  t o  
a d o p t  a p o l i c y  o f  e x p a n s io n  ( 3 ) .  We a re  m e r e ly  s ta n d in g  
up a g a in s t  w h a t we re g a rd  [ s i c ]  as i n t o l e r a b l e  
p r e t e n s io n s  on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  T u rk s  . .  . * . Gurzon 
c la im e d  t h a t  t h e r e  was a s i g n i f i c a n t  u n i t y  o f  o u t lo o k  
b e tw ee n  a l l  t h e  I n d ia n  o f f i c i a l s  co n ce rn e d  w i t h  th e  
f r o n t i e r  d e m a rc a t io n  ( 3 ) .  The B r i t i s h  C o m m is s io n e rs ,
( 1 )  Law rence  * I n d i a 1 p . 268
(2) MP,M999 , V e ry  P r i v a t e  PS, G od ley  -  M in to ,  29.6 .06
(3) GP, G urzon  -  H a m i l to n ,  28.5.02
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Aden, Bombay and th e  F o r e ig n  D e p a r tm e n t  were i n  a g ree m en t 
that th e  I n d ia  and F o r e ig n  O f f i c e s 1 c o n c e p t io n  o f  a 
s u i t a b l e  f r o n t i e r  was d i s a s t r o u s l y  u n r e a l i s t i c ,  B u t  
t h a t  was r e a l l y  th e  l i m i t  o f  t h e i r  a g re e m e n t.  The 
c l o s e r  o f f i c i a l s  were t o  th e  f r o n t i e r  th e  more 
e x p a n s io n i s t  t h e y  became.
+ + + + +
G urzon  warned H a m i l to n ,  l a t e  i n  J u n e , t h a t  an y  
c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  th e  same c a u t io u s  r e l i a n c e  on 
d ip lo m a c y ,  and on a w h o l l y  i m p r a c t i c a l  l i n e  o f
b o u n d a ry  . . . *  ( 1 ) p r e v i o u s l y  o f f e r e d  t o  th e  P o r te ,  
w o u ld  p ro d u c e  no d e l i m i t a t i o n .  F r o n t i e r s  c o u ld  n o t  
be d raw n up by  a c o m m itte e  l o o k in g  a t  a map i n  Downing 
S t r e e t .  B u t ,  because t h a t  had been done , H a m i l to n  and 
th e  I n d i a  O f f i c e  were a t  lo g g e rh e a d s  w i t h  th e  w h o le  o f  
t h e i r  I n d ia n  a d v is e r s  . . . '  (1 ) .  G urzon  was i n s i s t e n t  
t h a t  th e  O ttom ans m ust e v a c u a te  J a l i l a ,  and th e  f e r t i l e  
S h a i r i  a re a .  G urzon u rg e d  H a m i l to n  t o  1 . . .  le a v e  a
(1) CP, Gurzon - Hamilton, 25.6.02
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good d e a l t o  th e  men on th e  s p o t  . . .  1 even at t h i s  
e le v e n th  h o u r .  F a i l u r e  w o u ld  be 1 . . .  w h o l l y  due to 
mismanagement a t  home . . . ’ ( 1 ) .  a week l a t e r  G urzon  
w r o te :  1 . . .  I f  ou r p o s i t i o n  i n  th e  n e ig h b o u rh o o d  of 
Aden is  t o  depend upon ou r r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  th e  T u r k s ,  
and iJ th e s e  a re  t o  be c o n t r o l l e d  by  th e  F o r e ig n  O f f i c e  
i n  e n t i r e  in d e p e n d e n ce  o f  o u r s e lv e s  . . .  I  see no 
advan tage  o f  Aden re m a in in g  u n d e r  I n d i a  . . . ’ ( 2 ) .
Gurzon made h i s  b i t t e r n e s s  p l a i n  t o  th e  P e rm anen t 
S e c re ta r y ;  1. . .  Zou have re d u c e d  o u r  l o c a l  o f f i c e r s  t o  
d e s p a ir ,  Bombay t o  i n d i g n a t i o n  and th e  G o v t,  o f  I n d i a  
t o  r ig h te o u s  f u r y ,  and you w i l l  e i t h e r  have t o  g iv e  
way o r you w i l l  s a c r i f i c e  th e  w ho le  p o s i t i o n  . . .  Had 
I  t r i e d  my b e s t  o r  w o r s t  I c o u ld  n o t  have made th e  
i n f e r n a l  m uddle  . . .  t h a t  has been made a t  home . . . ’ ( 3 ) .  
Gurzon was an e x p e r t  on I n d ia  and he d i d  n o t  i n t e n d  t o  
c o n t in u e  t o  be t r e a t e d  as he had so f a r  been ; ‘ . . .  some 
more d e c i le  v i c t i m  w i l l  be r e q u i r e d  . . .  ‘ . P r o b a b ly ,
(1) p.9. 56 n.l
(2) CP, Gurzon - Hamilton, 2.7.02
(3) K?, Gurzon - Godley, 18.6.02
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d e m i - o f f i c i a l  l e t t e r s  f ro m  Wahab, and f ro m  M a i t l a n d ,  
t o  th e  S e c r e ta r y  a t  th e  F o r e ig n  D e p a r tm e n t ,  e n a b le d  
G urzon  t o  a p p r e c ia t e  t h a t  o f f i c e r s  i n  Aden f e l t  t h a t  
t h e y  w ere  n o t  b e in g  a d e q u a te ly  s u p p o r te d .
M a r ly  i n  June, H a m i l to n  had a l r e a d y  a c c e p te d  th e  
d e s i r a b i l i t y  f o r  a change i n  th e  p ro p o s e d  f r o n t i e r ;  
he s p e n t  two to  t h r e e  h o u rs  on * f th  June g o in g  ' . . .  t h ro u g h  
th e  maps, docum ents  and c o r re s p o n d e n c e  o f  t h a t  t i r e s o m e  
iidexi d e l i m i t a t i o n  ( 1 ) .  T h a t  was b e fo re  he  r e c e iv e d
C u rz o n *s  c r i t i c a l  l e t t e r  o f  2 1 s t  May ( 2 ) .  H a m i l t o n  th e n  
a r ra n g e d  f o r  a j o i n t  I n d i a  O f f i c e  -  F o r e ig n  O f l i c e  
C o m m itte e  t o  c o n s id e r  w h e th e r  a more f a v o u r a b le  f r o n t i e r  
c o u ld  be demanded. The C om m ittee  c o n s id e re d  t h a t  t h e r e  
was no j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  r e s i l i n g  on e a r l i e r  B r i t i s h  
u n d e r t a k in g s  t o  th e  P o r t e .  H a m i l to n  a c c e p te d  t h a t  
v ie w  ( 3) . B u t ,  he w r o te ;  1 . . .  0 1C onnor w i l l  :soon be 
h e r e .  I  w i l l  go c a r e f u l l y  th r o u g h  th e  case w i t h  h im *
I f  we can escape i n  good f a i t h  f ro m  th e  l i n e  o :f  f r o n t i e r
(1 )  L o rd  HP, H a m i l to n  -  G urzon , 5 .6 .0 2
(2) p.9.53 n« 2
(3) Lord HP, Hamilton -  G urzon . No date, July ‘02, 
answering one of Gurzon1s letters of June 102
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you d e p re c a te  I  w i l l  g l a d l y  do so . . . 1. H a m i l to n  
th o u g h t  he r e a l i s e d  1. . .  how th e  d i f f e r e n c e  be tw een  us  
has  a r i s e n  . . . »  The A m i r i s  have advanced  . . .  Wahab 
n a i v e l y  re m a rk s  . . .  t h a t  th e  1 s i t u a t i o n  had m a t e r i a l l y  
changed i n  f a v o u r  o f  th e  A m i r i s  s in c e  1 8 9 1 -9 21 ( 1 )  . . .  
B u t ,  i f  we d e p a r t  f ro m  th e  f r o n t i e r  we have  a lw a y s  
a d h e re d  t o ,  we s h a l l  justly be accused  by  th e  T u rk s  
o f  a b re a c h  o f  f a i t h  . . .  I  w i l l  l o o k  c l o s e l y  i n t o  th e  
m a t t e r ,  and see i f  we can h i t  upon an y  com prom ise by  
w h ic h  we can e s t a b l i s h  a f r o n t i e r ,  w h ic h ,  w i t h o u t  g i v i n g  
annoyance t o  o u r  a l l i e s ,  w i l l  be r e s p e c te d  by  th e  
T u rk s  . . . ’ ( 2 ) .  The F o r e ig n  O f f i c e  w ere  bound b y  p a s t  
d is c u s s io n s  w i t h  th e  P o r te  on th e  f r o n t i e r .  T h e r e fo r e ,
‘ . . .  i t  was im p o s s ib le  t o  a l l o w  a n y  i n s t r u c t i o n s  . . . ,  
i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  o r  o v e r - r i d  [ in g j  th e  a s s u ra n c e s  t h e y  
had g iv e n  t o  th e  T u rk ,  and b y  w h ic h  th e  P o r te  was in d u c e d  
t o  a g re e  t o  a j o i n t  d e l i m i t a t i o n  . . . *  ( 1 ) .  H a m i l to n  was 
d o in g  h i s  b e s t  t o  appease G urzon and h i s  I n d ia n  o f f i c i a l s
(1 ) A c t u a l l y ,  Wahab was c la im in g  non 1 . a m i r i1 a re a s  as 
b e in g  u n d e r  th e  A m ir
( 2) CP, H a m i l to n  -  G urzon , 10 . 7.02
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w i t h o u t  - b r e a k in g  f a i t h  w i t h  th e  P o r t e .
O’ C o n n o r ! s a t t i t u d e  was h e l p f u l  f o r  H a m i l t o n ;
O’ C o n n o r,  w r o n g ly ,  a c c e p te d  t h a t  th e  O ttom ans had 
i n d u l  ed i n  d a n g e ro u s  b r in k m a n s h ip  s in c e  th e  B r i t i s h  
C o m m iss io n e r  a r r i v e d  a t  D h a la  (1 ) .  He a c c e p te d  Wahab*s 
r e p o r t s  a t  f a c e - v a lu e ,  and , m os t n o t a b l y ,  Wahab1s 
c la im s  t h a t  th e  n e ig h b o u r in g  t r i b e s  w e r e * A m i r i .  As a 
r e s u l t ,  1 . . .  01 Connor saw no o b j e c t i o n ,  so f a r  as he 
p e r s o n a l l y  was c o n c e rn e d ,  t o  in f o r m in g  th e  T u rk s  t h a t ,  
by  th e  a c t i o n  t h e y  had ta k e n ,  t h e y  had so u p s e t  th e  
p r o p o s a l  t h a t  we had made t o  them , t h a t  we w i th d r e w  f ro m  
i t  . . . ! . C y n i c a l l y ,  i t  was s a fe ,  and c o n v e n ie n t ,  t o  
b r o v b e a t  th e  O ttom ans  o v e r  th e  Yemen. The way was now 
open t o  s u p p o r t  th e  *men on th e  s p o t1 as C u rzon  w a n te d .
The v o ic e  o f  m o d e ra t io n ,  and o f  e x p e r ie n c e ,  was 
s t i l l  r a i s e d  b y  L e e - l a r n e r . P o s s ib l y  L e e -W a rn e r  was 
r e a l i s t i c  because he hoped t o  be made G o ve rn o r o f  Bombay, 
i n  s u c c e s s io n  t o  L o rd  N o r th e o te  ( 2) .  C u rzon  had 
s u g g e s te d  h i s  a p p o in tm e n t  b e fo r e  L o rd  N o r th e o te  was
(1 ) L o rd  HP; H a m i l to n  -  C u rzo n , 17. 7 . 02, d e s c r ib in g  m e e t in g
H a m i l t o n ,  G o d le y ,  O’ C onnor a t  10
(2) LW, L e e -W a rn e r  -  G o d le y ,  2 3 .7 * 0 2
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a p p o in te d  ( 1 ) .  M a i t l a n d ,  h o w e v e r ,  was due f o r  le a v e ;  
and he was a l lo w e d  t o  come and p u t  t h e  l o c a l  case f o r  
a i c e r  A m i r i  b o r d e r s  i n  p e rs o n  a t  London . H a m i l to n  
c o n s id e re d  M a i t l a n d 1s demands ( 2) ' . . .  to o  p r e t e n t i o u s  
. . . f and d o u b te d  w h e th e r  ' . . .  e x c e p t  by so m e th in g  l i t t l e  
s h o r t  o f  w a r ,  o r  a d e c la r a t i o n  o f  w ar . . . ,  th e  T u rk s  
w o u ld  ta k e  . . . *  M a i t l a n d 1s p ro p o s e d  f r o n t i e r  ( 3 ) .  B u t ,
ice  of l o c a l  c o n d i t i o n s ,  ; l t o n  r a s h l y  
p ro p o s e d  t h a t  1 . . .  m ea n t im e , th e  d e l i m i t a t i o n  can go 
t o  th e  e a s t  o f  th e  p la t e a u  . . . ! , w h i l e  M a i t l a n d 1s 
p r o p o s a ls  were b e in g  s t u d ie d  ( b ) . T h a t  e a s te r n  a re a  
was ru g g e d ,  u n p e n e t ra te d ,  c o u n t r y ,  w i t h  a p e o p le  who 
w ere  f i e r c e l y  in d e p e n d e n t  o f  b o th  th e  O ttom ans and o f  
th e  B r i t i s h  (5)*
+  -h +  -h +
M a i t l a n d ' s  Memorandum was e x t r e m e ly  p r e ju d ic e d
(1 ) LW, S i r  W a l te r  Law rence -  L e e -W a rn e r ,  1 6 .1 1 *99
( 2 )  IO L , M a i t l a n d ' s  unnum bered memo o f  2 8 .7 * 0 2 ,  w r i t t e n  a t  10
(3 )  CP, H a m i l to n  -  C u rzo n , 7 * 6 . 0 2  
(*+) CP, H a m i l to n  -  C u rzo n , 3 1 *7 *0 2  
(5) p.9*72 n.3
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i n  f a v o u r  o f  th e  A m ir ;  i t  was based on s e l e c t i v e  
r e f e r e n c e s  t o  p a s t  h i s t o r y ,  and d e c id e d ly  a l a r m i s t  as 
t o  f u t u r e  d e v e lo p m e n ts ,  i f  M a i t l a n d ’ s p r o p o s a ls  were 
r e j e c t e d .  Such v e i l e d  b la c k m a i l  was e f f e c t i v e  by  'a  
l o c a l  e x p e r t1 f a c in g  o f f i c i a l s  w i t h  no o t h e r  s o u rce  o f  
c u r r e n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  and many o t h e r  co m m itm e n ts .  M a i t l a n d  
d e n ie d  t h a t  any O ttom an c la im s  e x i s t e d  o u t s id e  th e  
J a l i l a  e n c la v e  ( 1 ) ,  w h ic h  he a d m i t t e d  had been Ottoman 
t e r r i t o r y  s in c e  1873* The O ttom ans had ! . . .  no maps, 
[ h a d j  p ro d u c e d  no docum ents  o f  an y  v a lu e  . . .  and 
t h e y  a p p e a r  t o  r e l y  on th e  . . .  p r e t e n s io n s  o f  th e  S u l t a n  
t o  th e  w ho le  o f  A r a b ia  ( 2 ) .  By c o n t r a s t ,  M a i t l a n d
b r a z e n ly  c la im e d  t h a t  ! . . .  th e  A m ir  i s  i n  p o s s e s s io n  o f  
deeds show ing  a n c ie n t  p o s s e s s io n  b y  h i s  a n c e s to r s  o f
d o c u m e n ta ry  e v id e n c e ,  such as re v e n u e  a c c o u n ts  o f  r e c e n t  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  'The a b s u r d i t y  o f  th e s e  c la im s  on
b e h a l f  o f  th e  A m ir  w ere  exposed i n  190Li-, when th e  A m ir
t h e  t e r r i t o r i e s  w h ic h  he now r u l e s and has
(1 ) The v i l l a g e s  o f  J a l i l a ,  Lakhm at a l  Ha j j a r ,  J a la s  
& alW abh
( 2 ) p.9 .6 1  n .2 > p a ra  38 o f  Memo
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had o n l y  15 ‘ s o l d i e r s 1 and th e  n e ig h b o u r in g  A m i r i  
t r i b e s  w ere  e f f e c t i v e l y  r e j e c t i n g  h i s  n e w - fo u n d  
p r e t e n s io n s  t o  r u l e  them ( 1 ) .  B u t t h a t  was i n  th e  
u t u r e .  I n  J u l y ,  i l a i t l a n d  w r o te ;  ! . . .  A m ir  S h a i f  has  
. . .  a c te d  w i t h  g r e a t  m o d e ra t io n  and fo r b e a ra n c e  . . .  a t  th e  
h ig h -h a n d e d  p ro c e e d in g s  o f  th e  T u rk s  i n  h i s  d o m in io n s  
. . . 1. M a i t l a n d  w arned t h a t  th e  A m ir  m ig h t  1. . .  e n d e a vo u r  
to  a s s e r t  h i s  r i g h t s  b y  f o r c e  (w h ic h  a t  th e  p r e s e n t  t im e  
he m ig h t  be a b le  t o  do) a g a in s t  . . .  t h e  T u rk s  . . . *  (2).
+ + + + +
H a m i l t o n  and th e  F o r e ig n  O f f i c e  gave B r i t i s h  
re q u i r e m e n ts  i n  th e  Yemen a lo w  p r i o r i t y  b e s id e  th e  
o th e r  a re a s  o f  j o i n t  A n g lo -O t to m a n  i n t e r e s t .  In 
p a r t i c u l a r ,  H a m i l to n  ' i d  n o t  w is h  t o  a l i e n a t e  th e  P o r te  
so t h a t  a j o i n t  O ttom an, R u s s ia n ,  F re n c h  and German 
f r o n t  d e v e lo p e d  i n  th e  P e r s ia n  G u l f  a g a in s t  B r i t a i n  ( 3 ) .
(1) A IA  Kbh, Memo on A m i r ’ s a n n u a l v i s i t ,  7*11.OH-
( 2) p . 9 * 6 1 .  n .2 , p a ra  b2  o f  Memo
(3 )  L o rd  HP^  C u rzon  -  H a m i l t o n ,  3 . 8.02
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G urzon had o t h e r  id e a s .  He would '... land troops a t  
Aden, . . .  m arch  them up to  Dhali, and . . .  g iv e  th e  
T u r k is h  C om m iss ion  f u l l  w a rn in g  t h a t ,  unless t h e y  come
d r i v e  them o u t  . . . ' .  G urzon  p ro p o s e d  t h a t  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  
f r o n t i e r  s h o u ld  be im posed and h e ld  by f o r c e  i f  th e  
O ttom ans w o u ld  n o t  ' n e g o t i a t e 1. Such a p o l i c y  r e q u i r e d  
' . . .  r e s o l u t i o n  a t  rh e  F o r e ig n  O f f i c e  and t r o o p s  i n  
Aden . . . '  ( 1 ) .  C u rzon  was p re p a re d  to  p r o v id e  th e  
( I n d ia n )  t r o o p s .  A t  th e  end o f  A u g u s t ,  G urzon c la im e d  
t h a t  , /a h a b 's  r e p o r t s  showed ' . . .  how e n t i r e l y  f a l s e  th e  
T u rk s  a re  p la y in g  . . . . U n t i l  H is  M a je s t y 's  Governm ent 
b e g in  t o  t h r e a t e n  no p ro g re s s  w i l l  be made . . . '  ( 2) .
B u t  O 'G o iy fo r  had t h r e a te n e d  th e  P o r te  i n  June ( 3 ) .
C u rz o n 1s p a t ie n c e  was t o  be s t r a in e d  s t i l l  m ore .
' . . .  I f  we do n o t  e x e r c is e  o u r  u n d is p u te d  P r o t e c t o r a t e
(1 )  L o rd  HP, C urzon  -  H a m i l t o n ,  3 .8*02
( 2 ) L o rd  HP, G urzon -  H a m i l t o n ,  27. 8.02
(3 )  L /P & S /1 0 /6 33 Aden F r o n t i e r  D e l i m i t a t i o n  Pt 1 , 1 9 °5 -3 7
t o  te rm s  by  a c e r t a i n  d a te w ou ld  o ccu py  a l l  th e
v i l l a g e s  i n  d i s p u t e .  I f  t h e y  r e s i s t e d would
FO - 10, 10.6.02, fo rw a rd e d  HBMA 7 C'ple -  F0, If.6.02
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a lo n g  t h e  e n t i r e  S ou th  A r a b ia n  c o a s t  f ro m  Aden to  
M u s c a t ,  . . .  some f o r e ig n  Power w i l l  a p p e a r  . . .  and s t i c k  
i t s  head i n t o  an y  v a c a n t  o p e n in g  . . . ’ ( 1 ) .  The O ttoman 
C o m m is s io n e rs  w o u ld  c e r t a i n l y  n o t  have a c c e p te d  t h a t  a 
B r i t i s h  P r o t e c t o r a t e  e x i s t e d ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  one w h ic h  
in c lu d e d  a l l  H adhrarnau t. C u rzon  o b je c te d  s t r o n g l y  to  
L o rd  L a n sd o w n e ! s e x c lu s io n  o f  Hadhrarnaut f ro m  such a 
P r o t e c t o r a t e  ( 1 ) .  I n  D h a la ,  Wahab was n e g o t i a t i n g  w i t h  
Y a fa i  c la n s  t o  move B r i t i s h  c la im s  n o r th w a rd s  to w a rd s  
th e  ^ u l a q i s  and th e  d e s e r t ,  and so to  b lo c k  O ttom an 
e x p a n s io n  i n l a n d  t o  Hadhrarnaut ( 2 ) .  M a i t l a n d  was 
n e g o t i a t i n g  s e p a r a t e ly  i n  Aden. The B r i t i s h  were th u s  
i n t r i g u i n g  w i t h  Y a fa i  t r i b e s  who had p r i o r  c o n n e c t io n s  
w i t h  th e  O tto m a n s . I n  1895  even th e  Low er Y a fa is  had 
been a d m i t t e d  t o  be o u t s id e  B r i t i s h  in f l u e n c e  ( 3 ) .
H a m i l t o n 1s p r o p o s a l  (K) t h a t  th e  b o r d e r  s h o u ld  
m ean tim e  be d e l i m i t e d  t o  th e  e a s t  o f  th e  D h a la  p la t e a u ,
( 1 )  L o rd  HP, C u rzon  -  H a m i l t o n ,  1 7 * 9 .0 2
( 2 )  BSC 1 9 0 0 /0 2 ,  Wahab*s d i a r y  1 - 1 ^  a u g u s t .  O f f . R e s id e n t  
-  S o f  S, 8 . 8 .0 2  & 1 8 .8 .0 2
( 3 )  A IA /C  10 .£ 99 /1 0 0  N o te  on Ag SG-B’ s l e t t e r  o f  1 2 .2 .9 5  
(*+) p .  9.61 n . lF
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was passed to, and accepted by, the Porte* It was 
agreed that the border should be delimited north-east
towards the desert. O ’Connor commented, 1... I can
understand the objections of the [ottoman] Commissioners 
who a.re on the spot, and know the geography of the 
country and the importance to us of the delimitation
towards the Hub alKhali desert, but, fortunately, the
Ottoman declarations ... are too precise and recent to 
admit of any back-sliding ... If I  hear that there is 
an inclination at the Porte to support the views of the 
Ottoman delegates that the Yafai (1) area was not one of 
the Nine Cantons, I  will submit to Your Lordship, by 
telegraph, the necessity of instructing Colonel Wahab 
to get into communication ... with the Yaffai Headman 
... to counter these intrigues ...! (2).
The Ottoman Commissioners had rejected, in 
September (3)? that the U pper Yafais and Aulaqis were
( 1 ) P o s s ib l y  the in te n d e d  r e f e r e n c e  was t o  Lower Yafai, 
r a t h e r  than U pper Y a fa i
(2) A IA  C 31 , 0 1 Conofor -  FO, 10*9.02, fo rw a rd e d  3GB -  
Res, 7.H.02
(3) BSC 1900/02, Res - S of S, 3.10.02, forwarding 
Wahab1s report of 25*2*99
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included amongst the nine stipendiary tribes. Since 
no B r i t i s h  stipends were paid to them, the Ottomans 
w ere  correct; but both names had been included with 
t h o s e  of stipendiary tribes by the British in 1873? to 
cover th e  Lower Yafais and Lower Aulaqis. Instead, 
th e  Ottomans listed the Urnerah (1) and the Zaida (2). 
T h a t ,  Wahab warned, indicated an Ottoman intention to 
limit B r i t i s h  influence to the Fadhli area on the east, 
and t o  e x c lu d e  th e  rest, including Hadhrarnaut, Curzon, 
h o w e v e r ,  had a l r e a d y  noted a stiffening of the British 
a t t i t u d e  by October; he believed that !... the threat 
of m oving  troops may be sufficient to dislodge
th e  Ottomans from the Dhala neighbourhood (3)* He 
deplored 1 ... the extraordinary [British] weakness 
. ..'. On 26th October Curzon wrote firmly; 1... Please 
get out your Aitchison ... The Protectorate exists
I
• • • (*+). Curzon intended to keep the 'status quo* as
(1) Probably from Khor al Umeira
(2 ) The Abdali area acquired from the Haushabis in 1868
(3 ) Lord HP, Curzon - Hamilton, 15*1C.02
(l0 Lord HP, Curzon - Hamilton
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he i n t e r p r e t e d  i t ,  d e s p i t e  L o rd  L a n sd o w n e 's  o b je c t i o n s  
t o  i n c l u d i n g  th e  U p p e r ,Y a fa i  and A u l a q i ; a re a s .
+ + + + +
0*C onnor fo u n d  t h a t  th e  P o r te  r e a c te d  quickly 
t o  n a v a l  p r e s s u r e ,  a p p l ie d  a t  H o d a id a  by  th e  v i s i t  o f  
H .K .S .  ‘ H a r r i e r 1, t o  e n cou rag e  th e  s e t t le m e n t  o f  
O ttom an d e b ts  due t o  B r i t i s h  I n d ia n  r e s id e n t s  t h e r e .
In answer to hopes for ‘ H a r r i e r ' s 1 e a r l y  d e p a r t u r e ,  
O'Connor threatened the F o r e ig n  M i n i s t e r ,  t h a t  if
this Aden question were n o t  s e t t l e d  p r o m p t ly  i t  was 
... likely that two o th e r  s h ip s  w o u ld  be s e n t  (1 ) .
Probably n a v a l  pressure and O 'C o n n o r 's  p l a i n  s p e a k in g  
influenced the P o r te  and the S u l t a n .  The O ttom an 
Commissioners reported that t h e y  had r e c e iv e d  o r d e r s
to c o o p e ra te  i n  d e f i n i n g  b o u n d a ry  t o  n o r t h - e a s t  and in 
arranging e v a c u a t io n  f ro m  J e b e l  J e h a f ,  J e b e l  M a f a r i ,  
Lakm at As S a le h  and S uha f ( 2) as a g e s tu r e  of good­
(1 )  A IA  C 31 , t e l  O 'C onno r -  F0 , 3 1 .1 0 .0 2
( 2) AIA C 31, Wahab -  F o r . D e p t . ,  8 .1 1 .0 2 ,  r e p o r t i n g  
meeting o f  7 . 11*02
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will. The Ottomans made no mention of evacuating 
Jalila. Both the villages they named were small, 
outlying, ungarrisoned, villages. In addition, the 
Mausetta and Dhubi areas were claimed as parts of the 
Ottoman Rada district, and the Shaibi area as belonging 
to the neighbouring Muresi area* The Ottoman evacuation 
of the Mafari area had limited value since the senior 
Ottoman Commissioner had recently negotiated with the 
Mafari and Ahmadi Shaikhs for a new local basis for 
Ottoman control in the area (1).
November 1902 was later considered to mark a 
t u r n i n g  point; * ... Lord Curzon*s policy had borne 
fruit, as ... the Turkish troops had been withdrawn 
f ro m  the posts w h ic h  th e y  had occupied, with the 
exception of Jalila ...* ( 2 ) .  That withdrawal might 
have destroyed the illusion, fostered by Wahab and 
M a i t l a n d ,  t h a t  local sympathies were pro-British. The 
Grand Vizier pointed out that one shot fired at the
(1) A IA  C 31? Wahab - pol*diary entry for Nov*3.1902
(2) KP/M827, Foreign Dept. Report, Jan 1899 - Apr.
190*+, page 6
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B r i t i s h  C om m iss ionere* camp s h o u ld  n o t  be b lam ed on 
w hat th e  B r i t i s h  c a l l e d  *A rab L e v ie s *  of th e  O tto m a n s , 
They were 1. . .  s im p ly  n a t i v e  A ra b s  who a re  a p p a r e n t l y  
opposed t o  th e  d e l i m i t a t i o n  . . . *  ( 1 ) ,  As th e  O ttom ans 
had e v a c u a te d  th e  a re a  a t  B r i t i s h  r e q u e s t  t h e y  c o u ld  
no I o n  e r  c o n t r o l  th e  t r ib e s m e n  ( 1 ) .  I t  i s  p o s s ib le  
t h a t  such i n c i d e n t s  were e n g in e e re d  b y  th e  A m ir ,  t o  
m a in t a in  A n g lo -O t to m a n  i l l - f e e l i n g  and B r i t i s h  s u p p o r t  
f o r  h i s  c la im s .  M a i t l a n d  d e s c r ib e d  th e  O ttom an 
C o m m iss io n e rs *  a im s as b e in g  * . . .  t o  lo w e r  t h e i r  B r i t i s h  
c o l le a g u e s  i n  th e  s i g h t  o f  th e  A ra b s  i n  e v e ry  way 
p r a c t i c a l  . . . *  ( 2) .
+ + +  +  4*
The R e s id e n t  had r e a c te d  v i g o r o u s l y  t o  th e  
O ttom an c la im  t h a t  t h e  Y a fa is  and A u la q is  were n o t  
u n d e r  B r i t i s h  p r o t e c t i o n  ( 3 ) .  M a i t l a n d  now b e l ie v e d
(1 )  A IA  G 31, O 'C om /or -  FO, 3 . 1 2 . 0 2 ,  q u o t in g  Vizier
(2 ) BSC 1 9 0 0 /0 2 ,  Res -  SGB (r) S o f  S, 6 .1 2 .0 2
(3 ) A IA  C 3 1 , Res -  F o r .D e p t ,  (r) SGB, 1 1 .1 1 .0 2
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t h a t  o f f i c i a l  o p in io n  i n  London c o n s id e re d  a demarcation 
u n l i k e l y .  He t h e r e f o r e  su g g e s te d  t h a t  th e  P o r te  s h o u ld  
be w arned  t h a t  th e  A m ir w o u ld  1 resum e h i s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 1 
i n  O t to m a n -o c c u p ie d  a re a s  and t h a t  a B r i t i s h  f o r c e  should 
th e n  s u p p o r t  th e  A m ir .  The I n d i a  O f f i c e  v e to e d  th e  
G overnm ent o f  I n d i a ' s  p r o p o s a l  t o  im p le m e n t th e  
R e s id e n t ' s  id e a ,  and r e q u i r e d  an A n g lo -O t to m a n  s e t t le m e n t  
b e fo r e  th e  A m ir  could o ccu py  O tto m a n -e v a c u a te d  t e r r i t o r y  ( 1 ) .  
Maitland had a ls o  p ro p o se d  t h a t  B r i t i s h  i n t e n t i o n s  s h o u ld  
be emphasized by  the return o f  HMS ' H a r r i e r 1 t o  H o d a id a ,  
b y  th e  m o b i l i s a t i o n  o f  th e  Aden Column and b y  th e  
precautionary purchase o f  1000 baggage cam e ls  ( 2) .
M is t a k e n ly ,  M a i t l a n d  s u g g e s te d  t h a t  the  cam e ls  w o u ld  be 
e q u a l l y  s u i t a b l e  f o r  S o m a li c o a s t a l  o p e r a t io n s  i f  n o t  
r e q u i r e d  f o r  D h a la .  M a i t l a n d  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  1. . .  a c tu a l  
c o l l i s i o n  a p p e a rs  . . .  u n l i k e l y  . . . *  (2) .  Wahab had 
a r r i v e d  a t  a r a t h e r  s i m i l a r  c o n c lu s io n .  H is  e s c o r t  
o u g h t  t o  be r e i n f o r c e d  and s u p p o r t in g  t r o o p s  s h o u ld  move 
h a l f - w a y  up t o  M u s e im ir ,  w here w a te r  and f o r a g e  were
(1 )  A IA  C 3 1 , 10 -  F0 & F0 -  10 , I k  12 & 6 .1 2 .0 2
(2 )  A IA  C 3 1 , t e l  Res -  SGB ( r )  S o f  S, 1 2 .1 1 .0 2
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p l e n t i f u l  (1). Wahab fa v o u re d  a f o r w a r d  move of h i s  
British camp t o  th e  Y a fa i  b o rd e r  as ! . . .  a c l e a r  proof 
to t h e  i^ rab t r i b e s  t h a t  th e  T u rk s  have been c o m p e l le d  
t o  y i e l d  . . . as an o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  r e c o n n o i t e r i n g  
u n f a m i l i a r  c o u n t r y ,  and t o  t e s t  Y a f a i  r e a c t i o n s .
Wahab1s p o s i t i o n  was d i f f i c u l t ;  he had c la im e d  
t o  find s t ro n g  t r i b a l  s u p p o r t  f o r  a B r i t i s h  c o n n e c t io n ,  
b u t  now t h a t  he was a u th o r is e d -  (2) t o  p ro c e e d  to  the 
n o r t h - e a s t  he p r o b a b ly  knew t h a t  i t  was im p o s s ib le .  I t  
was n o t  O ttoman i n t r i g u e s  w h ich  b a r r e d  ia h a b 1s w a y} i t  
was th e  s u s p ic io u s  x e n o p h o b ia  o f  t h e  h i l l  t r i b e s .
1 . . .  I t  would be as w e l l  t o  p o in t  o u t  t o  H.M. G overnm ent 
that th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  b e fo r e  us . . .  [ t o ]  th e  n o r t h - e a s t  
... will depend a t  l e a s t  as much on th e  a t t i t u d e  of t h e  
nrabs as on t h a t  o f  th e  T u rk s ;  . . .  t h e i r  re s e n tm e n t  o r  
even d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  [_at B r i t i s h  m oves '] w i l l  make o u r  
..ask im p o s s ib le  . . . '  ( 3) *  A passage c o u ld  n o t  be f o r c e d  
through the Y a fa i  a r e a ,  because o f  th e  d i f f i c u l t  t e r r a i n
(1 )  A IA  G 31, Wahab -  Res, 1 2 .1 1 .0 2 ,  r e c ' d  Aden 1l f . 1 1 . 0 2
(2) A IA  G 31 , S o f  S -  V ic e r o y ,  2 5 .1 1 .0 2
(3 )  A IA  G 31 , Wahab -  M a i t l a n d ,  1 6 .1 1 .0 2 ,  r e c ' d  1 8 .1 1 .0 2
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and th e  n a tu r e  o f  th e  p e o p le  and t h e i r  w eapons. Wahab 
knew t h a t  i t  was n o t  in te n d e d  t o  make new t r e a t i e s  w i t h  
th e  Y a fa is  f o r  th e  p r e s e n t ;  b u t  he w is h e d  t o  be a b le  t o  
p ro m is e  such t r e a t i e s  i n  f u t u r e .  He w o u ld  t h e r e f o r e  
have t o  depend upon b u y in g  t r i b a l  f r i e n d s h i p ,  i f  he was 
t o  be a b le  t o  s u rv e y  t o  th e  n o r t h - e a s t .  Such a s h o r t ­
te rm  p o l i c y  w o u ld  be i n  c o n f l i c t  w i t h  an y  R e s id e n t 's  
l o n g - t e r m  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  a s t a b le  c o n n e c t io n  w i t h  th e  
t r ib e s m e n .  M a i t l a n d  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  Rs 10,000 w o u ld  be 
r e q u i r e d  t o  b u y  th e  B r i t i s h  C o m m is s io n e rs '  p a ssa g e , 
once th e  O ttom ans e v a c u a te d  J a l i l a  ( 1 ) .  L a t e r ,
M a i t la n d  opposed b r i b i n g  th e  Y a fa is  t o  r e c e iv e  th e  
C om m iss ion .
Wahab' s e a r l i e r  c la im s  o f  Y a fa i  s u p p o r t  f o r  th e  
B r i t i s h  were n o t  im m e d ia te ly  t e s t e d ,  because  th e  Ottoman. 
C o m m iss io n e rs  r e fu s e d  t o  d e m a rca te  t o  th e  n o r t h - e a s t  ( 2 ) .  
L i g h t  days e a r l i e r ,  Wahab had r e p o r t e d  t h a t  h i s  O ttom an 
c o l le a g u e s  a d m i t te d  t h a t  t h e y  were  u n d e r  o r d e r s  to  do so ( 3 )«
(1 )  A IA  C 31 , t e l  Res -  S o f  S, 2 0 .1 2 .0 2
( 2) A IA  C 31, Wahab -  Res, 1 5 .1 1 .0 2
(3 )  A IA  C 31? 'Wahab -  F o r . D e p t . ,  8 . 1 1 . 0 2 ,  r e p o r t i n g
m e e t in g  o f  7 . H . C 2
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Now, he c la im e d  t h a t  t h e y  c o n t in u e d  t o  r e g a rd  th e  Y a fa i  
a r e a ,  i n c l u d in g  th e  S h a ib i  c la n ,  as O ttom an t e r r i t o r y ;  
and t h a t  t h e y  p ro p o se d  in s te a d  t o  d e m a rca te  s o u th - e a s t  
down th e  Sana r i v e r  t o  th e  e a s te r n  F a d h l i  b o rd e r *
* . . .  W h i le  T u rk s  m a in t a in  t h i s  j^ c la im  t o  Y a fa is  and 
A u la q i s J  no s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  can be fo u n d  f o r  f u r t h e r  
d e m a rc a t io n  . . . *  ( 1 ) .  No p ro g re s s  c o u ld  be made b u t  no 
e m b a r ra s s in g  Yemeni h o s t i l i t y  w o u ld  be a ro u s e d ,  and 
th e  r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  Wahab*s a sse ssm e n ts  and th e  p r a c t i c a l i t y  
p r o p o s a ls ,  w ou ld  n o t  be c a l l e d  i n t o  q u e s t io n .  The 
R e s id e n t  r e la y e d  Wahab*s c o n c lu s io n  to  London and t o  
D e lh i .  S ta le m a te  ensued , d u r in g  th e  m os t f a v o u r a b le  
w o rk in g  season o f  th e  y e a r .
The d e m a rc a t io n  ap pe a re d  t o  have no p r o s p e c ts  o f  
s u c c e s s .  D o ub ts  w ere  e x p re s s e d  a b o u t  Wahab*s a b i l i t y  
t o  n e g o t i a t e  w i t h  th e  O ttom ans ( 2 ) .  A dragoman f ro m  
th e  B r i t i s h  Embassy a t  C o n s ta n t in o p le ,  G e ra ld  F i t z m a u r i c e ,  
was, t h e r e f o r e ,  s e n t  t o  th e  Yemen t o  c o n d u c t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
w i t h  th e  O tto m a ns . He a r r i v e d  on 2 6 th  November ( 3 ) *
(1 ) p . 9 . 73 n .2
(2) A IA  C 31, S o f  S -  V ic e r o y ,  2 J .1 1 .0 2
(3 ) A IA  1368 f  6 +^0 , M a jo r  Tod -  C a p t .  P o t t i n g e r ,  u n d a te d
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Wahab was t o  re m a in  th e  s e n io r  B r i t i s h  C o m m is s io n e r ,  
b u t  F i t z m a u r i c e  was a l lo w e d  to  com m un ica te  i n f o r m a l l y  
w i t h  O’ C onnor i n  C o n s ta n t in o p le ,  a l t h o u g h  n o t  o f f i c i a l l y  
i t h  th e  F o r e ig n  O f f i c e ,  so t h a t  Wahab*s p o s i t i o n  as 
head o f  t h e  Com m iss ion  w o u ld  n o t  be c h a l le n g e d *  
F i t z m a u r i c e 1s l i c e n c e  t o  w r i t e ,  o r  w i r e ,  t o  0 *C om {or, 
b u t  n o t  t o  r e p e a t  h i s  c o r re s p o n d e n c e  t o  th e  F o r e ig n  
O f f i c e ,  e n su re d  f o r  th e  B r i t i s h  C o m m iss io n e rs  a 1 p r i v a t e  
l i n e *  w i t h  Of C o n ^ o r ,  u n s u p e r v is e d  b y  th e  F o r e ig n  O f f i c e  
o r  by  th e  G overnm ent o f  I n d i a .  T h is  was t o  be o f  v e r y  
g r e a t  v a lu e  t o  F i t z m a u r i c e  and Wahab; th e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  
o f  such a l i n k  had n o t  been f o r e s e e n ,  and i t  does n o t  
a p p e a r  t o  have  been a p p r e c ia te d  d u r in g  th e  C o m m iss io n *s  
e x i s t e n c e .  F i t z m a u r i c e  a c c e p te d  Wahab*s a sse ssm en t o f  
th e  s i t u a t i o n  (1 ) .
+ + + + +
Wahab s u b m it te d  a Memorandum on th e  A m ir  * s 
e x te n s iv e  c la im s  i n  th e  D h a la  a r e a ,  and on th e  O ttoman
( 1 ) A IA  C 31? F i t z m a u r i c e  -  O’ C o n h o r,  2.12.02 ( b a d ly
w o rm e a te n )
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comments r e j e c t i n g  th e  A m i r ’ s c la im s  (1 ) *  'Th is  was 
fo rw a rd e d  by  th e  R e s id e n t  t o  London on 2nd December ( 2 ) *  
These p a p e rs  p r o v e d 1 th e  B r i t i s h  ca se , i f  Wahab1s 
i n t e g r i t y  and i m p a r t i a l i t y  were n o t  q u e s t io n e d .
O f f i c i a l  o p in io n  i n  t i e  I n d i a  O f f i c e  now a c c e p te d  t h a t  
a case e x i s t e d ,  and t h a t  O ttom an o f f i c i a l s  had been 
o b s t r u c t i v e  ana d e c e i t f u l .  Wahab1s ju d g e m e n t was n o t  
q u e s t io n e d .  L o c a l l y ,  a more r e a l i s t i c  v ie w  p r e v a i l e d ;
* . . .  A s c r u t i n y  o f  th e s e  v a r io u s  c la im s  £ o f  th e  A m ir j  
was j u d i c i o u s l y  o m i t t e d  b y  o u r  C o m m iss io n e rs  as 
i r r e l e v a n t  t o  th e  b ro a d  is s u e s  b e fo r e  them . . . *  (3 ) .  
' ia ha b  a l l e g e d  t h a t  th e  A m i r ’ s t e r r i t o r y  e x te n d e d  f ro m  
Wadi T ib a n  on th e  w e s t to  Wadi Sana on th e  e a s t ,  and 
f ro m  Wadi Qataba on  th e  n o r t h  t o  W adi S a h e b iya  i n  th e  
s o u th .  An o b v io u s  w eakness o f  th e s e  c la im s ,  o b s e rv e d  
b y  M a i t l a n d  ( l f 0 , was t h a t ,  i n  a r i d  a re a s ,  r i v e r  v a l l e y s  
do n o t  fo rm  n a t u r a l  b o u n d a r ie s .  The p o p u la t i o n
( 1 ) A IA  C 32 , Wahab -  M a i t l a n d .  The d a te  may be 1 6 th  
o r  1 8 th  Nov
(2 )  BSC 1 9 0 0 /0 2 ,  Res -  S o f  S, 2 .1 2 .0 2
( 3 ) Jaco b  1K in yS  1 p . 81
(L )  A IA  C 32, Res -  Wahab, 2 2 .1 1 .0 2
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c o n c e n t r a te s  i n  such a re a s .  Wahab even p ro p o s e d  to  
d i v i d e  th e  Dakkam t r i b a l  a re a  aLong th e  Wadi T ib a n ,  
as n e i t h e r  th e  O ttom ans no r th e  A m ir  had more th a n  a
' . . .  vague and i n s u b s t a n t i a l  c la im  . . .  1 (1 ) .  M a i t l a n d
c r i t i c i s e d  th e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  t h e  Dakkam; 1. . .  t h i s  i s
th e  f i r s t  t im e  t h a t  we have h e a rd  a n y th in g  o f  th e
Dukkam . . . '  ( 2 ) .  U l t i m a t e l y ,  th e  w h o le  Dakkam a re a  
was p la c e d  w i t h i n  B r i t i s h  l i m i t s .
The A m ir  c la im e d  t h a t  some t r i b a l  t e r r i t o r y  had 
been 'p u r c h a s e d1 and t h a t  t i e r e  were t r i b a l  a g re e m e n ts  
to  pay th e  A m ir  t a x .  These a g re e m e n ts  were s ig n e d  be tw een  
A .H .  1276 (1 8 5 9 )  and A „H . 1319 (1 9 0 2 ) .  They c o n c e rn e d  
th e  w e s te rn  a re a s  o f  J e b e l  J i h a f ,  w i t h  a num ber o f  
s m a l l  t r i b a l  s e c t io n s ,  and th e  M a f a r i ,  Ahmadi and 
Humedi a re a s  ( 3 ) .  None o f  th e s e  a re a s  had been r e p o r t e d  
as  p a y in g  th e  A m ir  t a x  b e fo r e  ( ^ ) .
(1 ) A IA  G 3 2 , Wahab -  M a i t l a n d .  The d a te  may be 1 8 th  Nov.
( 2) A IA  G 32, Res -  Wahab, 2 2 .1 1 .0 2
( 3 )  A IA  C 28 , f  * f l 5 -^2 0  i n  Wahab Memo I  fo rw a rd e d  to  
Res, 1 2 .2 .0 2
(*+) A IA  G 28 , Res -  SGB, f o r w a r d in g  a p e t i t i o n  f o r  
p r o t e c t i o n ,  1 . 12.01
A t y p i c a l  case was t h a t  o f  t h e  M a f a r i  t r i b a l  
la n d s ;  th e  A m i r f s docum ents  were a l l e g e d  t o  p ro v e  
th e ir  s a le  i n  S eptem ber 18 62 , (R a b ia  Aw a l A .H .  1279) and 
i n  187*+* The f i r s t  s a le  was f o r  M l#  2500; th e  l a t e r  
one was f o r  MT# 380. I t  was c u s to m a ry ,  p a r t l y  t o  
c i r c u m v e n t  th e  K o ra n ic  v e to  on u s u r y ,  t o  make a 
f i c t i t i o u s  s a le ,  when a r r a n g in g  a lo a n .  R e fe re n c e  t o  
c o n te m p o ra ry  r e c o r d s  show t h a t  th e  M a f a r i s  m ig h t  have 
r e q u i r e d  a lo a n  a t  b o th  p e r io d s .  1862 was an u n s e t t l e d  
y e a r  i n  th e  Yemen; th e  p e o p le  o f  Sanaa deposed th e  
Imam and e le c t e d  i n  h i s  p la c e  one te m p o r a l ,  and a n o th e r  
s p i r i t u a l ,  l e a d e r .  1863- 6*+ was m arked by  c a t t l e  d is e a s e  
i n  A d en *s  n e ig h b o u rh o o d ;  i t  had sp re a d  f ro m  th e  i n t e r i o r  ( 1 ) .  
P o s s ib l y ,  th e  d is e a s e  was p r e s e n t  am ongst th e  M a f a r i  i n  
1862. I n  Aden, 1 . . .  v e r y  fe w  a n im a ls  w ere  sp a re d  and 
t h e  p e o p le  were re d u c e d  t o  so re  d i s t r e s s  . . . * .  The 
f u r t h e r  ’ s a l e *  i n  187*+ m ig h t  a ls o  be e x p la in e d  by  
c a t t l e - d i s e a s e  and 1. . .  n e a r - fa m in e  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  th e
(1 )  H u n te r  ! A d e n ! p . 178
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Yemen . . . *  ( 1 ) .  The d is c r e p a n c y  i n  th e  tw o ’ s a le *  
p r i c e s  o f  th e  two ‘ h a l v e s 1 01 M a f a r i  t e r r i t o r y  makes 
a g e n u in e  s a le  s t i l l  l e s s  p l a u s i b l e .
4- 4* 4- 4* +
Wahab*s u n c o n c i l i a t o r y  a p p ro a c h  to w a rd s  th e  
O ttom ans i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  b y  a l e t t e r  he w ro te  t o  M a i t l a n d  
when th e  l a t t e r  was on a d u t y  v i s i t  t o  I n d i a  ( 2) .
* . . .  The o n ly  way t o  g e t  a n y th in g  s a t i s f a c t o r y  o u t  o f  
th e  T u rk s  i s  t o  make th e  consequences  o f  t h e i r  a t t i t u d e  
as u n p le a s a n t  t o  them as we can -  i n  f a c t  t o  show them 
t h a t  we a re  d e te rm in e d  to  e n fo r c e  o u r  j u s t  ^ s i c j  c la im s ,  
and make them bow t o  n e c e s s i t y  . . . *  ( 2 ) .  Wahab had
(1) PRO FO 78 3188, C o n su l G e n e ra l S ta n to n  i n  E g y p t 
-  FO, 17.3.75? re m a rk in g  t h a t  Yemen c o n d i t i o n s  
in c o n v e n ie n c e d  Aden more th a n  th e  E g y p t ia n  
c lo s u r e  o f  B u lh a r  ro a d s te a d
( 2) A IA  C 31 D /0 ,  Wahab -  M a i t l a n d ,  1 2 .1 2 .0 2 ,  r e c e iv e d  
i n  I n d ia  26.12.
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p r o b a b ly  l e a r n t  f ro m  F i t z m a u r i c e  t h a t  th e  O ttom an 
1 . . .  c la im  t o  s o v e r e ig n t y  £ o v e r  a l l  A r a b ia J  i s  one 
t h a t  n e i t h e r  th e  S u l t a n  n o r  an y  T u r k is h  o f f i c i a l  w i l l  
e v e r  re n o u n ce  . . . *  (1 ) .  Wahab i n s i s t e d  t h a t  1. . .  th e  
G overnm ent a t  home m ust make up i t s  m ind on th e  f a c t s  as 
s t a t e d  b y  us  ( 2) .  I t  i s  no use r e f e r r i n g  them to  
C o n s ta n t in o p le  . . . *  ( 1 ) .  M a i t l a n d  was in t e r v ie w e d  by  
C u rzon  a b o u t  th e  d e m a rc a t io n  e a r l y  i n  J a n u a ry .  C u rzon  
was 1 . . .  s i c k  a t  t h e  f e e b le  b l u s t e r  o f  th e  T u rk s ,  th e  
l y i n g  o f  th e  P o r t e ,  th e  v a c c i l a t i o n  o f  o u r  d ip lo m a c y ,  
and th e  humbug o f  th e  w h o le  a f f a i r  . . . ‘ ( 3 ) .  M a i t l a n d 1s 
v i s i t  an t’ Wahab1 s l a t e r  r e p o r t s  c o u ld  o n ly  have 
s t r e n g th e n e d  C u rz o n 1s d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t . C u rzon  was 
b l u n t l y  c r i t i c a l  o f  1 . . .  B r i t i s h  t a c t i c s  . . .  b e t t e r  
f i t t i n g  a Power l i k e  Siam o r  B e lg iu m  th a n  th e  fo re m o s t  
E m p ire  o f  th e  w o r ld  . . . '  ( 3 ) .  As a r e s u l t  o f  M a i t l a n d 1s 
i n t e r v i e w  i n  D e lh i  C urzon  began t o  d o u b t  Wahab*s
( 1 ) p .9.79 n . 2
( 2) P o s s ib l y  r e f e r r i n g  t o  th e  o f f i c i a l  I n d ia n  a c c e p ta n c e  
o f  h i s  a g re e m e n ts .  See 9 .6 9  n .2
(3 )  C .P , C u rzon  -  H a m i l to n ,  1 8 .1 2 .0 2
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s u i t a b i l i t y ,  M a i t l a n d  had d e s c r ib e d  Wahab as 1. . .  r a t h e r  
o v e r - a n x io u s  and w a n t in g  i n  c o n s is t e n c y  and d e c is io n  . . . '
(1 ) .  B u t  C u rzon  re c o g n is e d  t h a t  f . . .  u n d e r  Tsuch 
s t r a i n j as Wahab1s . . .  th e  te m p e r  o r  th e  c o u ra g e  o f  
a n y  o r d in a r y  man m ig h t  be e x p e c te d  t o  b re a k  down . . . ‘ (1 ) .  
C u rzon  h a d . a l s o ,  no l i k i n g  f o r  M a i t l a n d  ( 2) .
A ty p e d  Memorandum on Aden s e n t  ro  th e  P r im e 
M i n i s t e r ,  p r o b a b ly  i n  J a n u a ry ,  b la c k g u a rd e d  O ttom an 
a c t i o n  i n  th e  Yemen. 1. . .  The T u r k is h  C o m m iss io n e rs
. . .  have . . .  a d o p te d  an im p r a c t i c a l  and o b s t r u c t i v e
V - . ]
t h e  A m i r ! s j u r i s d i c t i o n  . . . ,  f o r c i b l y  d i s p l a c i n g  h i s
a t t i t u d e ,  . . .  o c c u p ie d  d i s t r i c t s  h i t h e r t o  [ s i c ]  u n d e r
a g e n ts  and s u b s t i t u t i n g  t h e i r  own n o m in e e s .  R epea ted  
a s s u ra n c e s  . . .  f ro m  th e  ^O ttom an"] S u l t a n  . . .  t h a t  
t h e  t r o o p s  and i r r e g u l a r  l i n e s  w ou ld  be w i th d ra w n  . . .  
r e c e iv e d  no e x e c u t io n  . . . *  ( 3 ) .  So B r i t a i n  had been 
o b l i g e d  to  w arn  th e  P o r te  t h a t  t h e y  w o u ld  c o n s id e r  how 
t o  p r o t e c t  ! . . .  t h e  t r i b e s  w i t h  whom we a re  i n  t r e a t y
( 1 )  C . P j  C u rzon  -  H a m i l t o n ,  5* 3* 03
( 2 ) L o rd  HP^ C u rzon  -  H a m i l t o n ,  2 9 .7 .C 3
( 3 )  B .P ,  1+97^7 • U n d a te d  Memo o f  c .  J a n u a ry  1903
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r e l a t i o n s  . . • 1. L o rd  Lansdowne n o te d  t o  Balfour 
a b o u t  th e  s i t u a t i o n ;  1. . .  th e  o n l y  q u e s t io n  . . .  s t i l l  
t o  r e q u i r e  c o n s id e r a t i o n  i s  w h e th e r  o t h e r  fo rm s  o f  
p re s s u re  o u g h t  n o t  to  be p u t  on th e  P o r te  i n  a d d i t i o n  
to  th e  t h r e a t  o f  t u r n i n g  o u t  b y  f o r c e  t h e i r  t r o o p s  f ro m  
th e  t e r r i t o r y  c la im e d  b y  us . . . ‘ ( 1 ) .  A n o th e r  o f f i c i a l  
v ie w  i n  London was, h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  C u rzon  u n d e r e s t im a te d  
B r i t a i n 1s need t o  keep on good te rm s  w i t h  all th e  
G re a t  Powers ( 2 ) .  I n d i a  was 1 . . .  s h e l t e r e d  f ro m  e x t e r n a l  
d a n g e rs  by  B r i t i s h  pow er H a m i l to n  was s u r p r i s e d
t h a t  M a i t l a n d  r e q u i r e d  (3 )  a n o th e r  B r ig a d e  i n  Aden and 
was r e l u c t a n t  t o  a g re e  t h a t  th e  need e x i s t e d  (*+).
B r i t a i n  was a l r e a d y  c o m m itte d  t o  a b lo c k a d e  o f f  
V e n e z u e la ,  t o  o p e r a t io n s  i n  S o m a l i la n d ,  and t o  s m a l le r  
o p e r a t io n s :  i n  N i g e r i a  (*+). The F o r e ig n  O f f i c e ,  and 
O1C o nn or, o b je c te d  t o  an open r u p t u r e  w i t h  th e  P o r t e .
The F o r e ig n  O f f i c e  were  1. . .  a n x io u s  n o t  t o  p e r t u r b
( 1 ) B .P ,  *+9728, Lansdowne -  B a l f o u r ,  9 .1 .0 3
(2) C.P, Hamilton - Curzon, 6.1.03
( 3 ) A IA  C 31 , t e l  Kes -  S o f  S (r) SGB 1 1 .1 .0 3  
(*+) C .P , H a m i l to n  -  C u rzo n , l h . 1 . 0 3
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i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o p in io n  b y  a t r a n s a c t i o n  i n  w h ic h  we s h a l l  
be r e p r e s e n te d  as g r a b b in g  w h a t does n o t  b e lo n g  t o  
u s  . . . ’ ( 1 ) .  B u t th e  C a b in e t  d i d  a g re e  t o  a t h r e a t  
o f  n a v a l  a c t i o n  t o  p r e v e n t  10,000 O ttoman t r o o p s ,  due 
f o r  g a r r i s o n  r e l i e f s ,  b e in g  la n d e d  a t  H oda id a  ( 1 ) .
1 . . .  The P r im e  M i n i s t e r  and L o rd  Lansdowne 
a g re e  [d ]  as t o  th e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  o u r  s e c u r in g  th e  
f r i e n d s h i p  o f  t h e  U p pe r Y a fa i  S a h ik h s ,  b u t  u n t i l  th e  
f a c t s  c o n c e rn in g  th e  l i m i t s  o f  t r i b a l  t e r r i t o r y  . . .  
Q w e re ] a s c e r t a in e d  . . .  t h e y  [were"] u n w i l l i n g  t o  be 
c o m m it te d  f u r t h e r  t h a n  i s  n e c e s s a ry  . . . *  ( 2) .  I t  was 
d e s i r a b le  t h a t  th e  R e s id e n t  s h o u ld  a t te m p t  t o  g a in  
Y a f a i  s u p p o r t  by  money pa ym en ts , b u t ,  i f  b r i b e r y  f a i l e d ,  
* . . .  a T r e a t y  o f  f r i e n d s h i p  and p e ace , com bined w i t h  a 
s t ip e n d  . . . *  m ig h t  be c o n c lu d e d  by  th e  R e s id e n t  ( 2) .  A 
n o te  o f  c a u t io n  was s t r u c k  b y  a m a r g in a l  comment on th e  
A c t in g  R e s id e n t ’ s a l a r m i s t  l e t t e r  on Y a fa i  a f f a i r s  o f  
4-th J a n u a ry ,  1903 ( 3 ) .  1 -fe c l a r l y  w a n t more k n o w le d g e .
( 1 )  C .P , H a m i l to n  -  C u rzo n , 5 * 2 .0 2
(2) A IA  C 31 , S o f  S -  V ic e r o y ,  9 .1 .0 3
(3 )  La, 1903 , L t .  C o l .  J.S. A shby t o  S e c .P o l .  & S e c re t  
D e p t . , 10 , h . 1 .0 3
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The Y a f f a i  a re  e v i d e n t l y  a d o u b t f u l ,  s t r o n g ,  u n d e s i r a b le  
l o t  f o r  a p r o t e c t o r a t e  and to o  f a r  f ro m  Aden and th e  
c o a s t  g e n e r a l l y  t o  make i t  w o r th  o u r  w h i le  t r o u b l i n g  
a b o u t  th e m.1 a ) .
The A c t in g  R e s id e n t  a rg u e d  t h a t  o n ly  a P r o t e c t o r a t e  
a g re e m e n t w o u ld  re a s s u re  th e  t r i b e s  and make a s u rv e y  
p o s s ib le  a lo n g  th e  Y a fa i  b o r d e r .  He i n j e c t e d  a n o te  o f  
u rg e n c y  b y  a te le g r a m  r e q u e s t in g  i n s t r u c t i o n s  on th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a Y a fa i  t r e a t y .  The Y a fa i  c h i e f s  were 
due to  v i s i t  th e  C o m m iss io n e rs  a t  D h a la  i n  a week o r  
t e n  days f o r  d is c u s s io n s  ( 2) .  The A c t in g  R e s id e n t  
w a rn e d  t h a t  th e  1. . .  Y a f f a i  m ig h t  d e f i n i t e l y  t h r o w  i n  
t h e i r  l o t  w i t h  th e  T u rk s  as a r e s u l t  o f  o u r  r e f u s i n g  
t o  concede t h e i r  demands ( 2 ) .  On h i s  r e t u r n  f ro m
I n d i a  th e  R e s id e n t  m a in ta in e d  th e  p r e s s u r e .  In 
te le g ra m s  o f  l A t h  and 1 5 th  J a n u a ry  M a i t l a n d  a rg u e d  t h a t  
f a i l u r e  t o  a g re e  t o  a P r o t e c t o r a t e  t r e a t y  w i t h  th e  U pper 
Y a f a i  w o u ld  be ta k e n  l o c a l l y  as a B r i t i s h  a d m is s io n  o f
( 1 )  I n i t i a l l e d  HAH
( 2) LA, 1903, t e l  A g .R es -  S o f  S, ^ . 1.03
O ttom an r i g h t s  i n  th e  a re a  (1 ) .  The U p pe r Y a fa is  w o u ld  
th e n  t u r n  t o  th e  O tto m a ns , w i t h  a d v e rs e  e f f e c t s  on th e  
Low er Y a f a i  and even i n  th e  D h a la  a r e a ,  w h ic h  had Y a f a i  
im m ig r a n ts .  The A u la q is  and B e ih a n is  w o u ld  be a d v e r s e l^ y  
a f f e c t e d  and Hadhrarnaut m ig h t  be opened t o  Ottoman 
i n f l u e n c e  o v e r la n d  ( 1 ) .  L e e -W a rn e r  n o te d  on t h e  
R e s id e n t 1s te le g ra m  o f  th e  l A t h  t h a t  he had a l r e a d y  
asked  th e  G overnm ent o f  I n d i a  t o  j u s t i f y  i n c l u d i n g  th e  
U p p e r Y a f a i  w i t h i n  th e  B r i t i s h  P r o t e c t o r a t e  ( 2) .
L e e -W a rn e r  s t r o n g l y  opposed any  new t r e a t y ;
1 . . .  We a re  t o  u n d e r ta k e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  w h ic h  we have 
h i t h e r t o  d e l i b e r a t e l y  a v o id e d ,  and w h ic h  we c a n n o t  f u l f i l  
w i t h o u t  a d d i t i o n a l  t r o o p s  a t  Aden because
i )  Our p r e s t i g e  r e q u i r e s  i t .  S u r e ly  o u r  p r e s t i g e  
w i l l  s u f f e r  i f  we a c c e p t  a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
w h ic h  we c a n n o t  f u l f i l ,
i i )  n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e  w i l l  l o o k  l i k e  w eakness .
I  answ er i n t e r f e r e n c e  w i l l  c r e a te  w eakness .
( 1 ) A IA  G 31? t e l s  Res -  S o f  S
(2 )  LA 19^3? N o te  by  L e e -W a rn e r
i i i )  absence o f  a t r e a t y  w i l l  l i m i t  o u r  pow ers
o f  i n t e r f e r e n c e .  F o r  t h a t  we may be t h a n k f u l ,  
i v )  a t r e a t y  w i l l  g i v e  us pow ers  o f  p B s s u re .  B u t
th e  q u e s t io n  i s  w h e th e r  we w a n t t o  use p r e s s u r e .
These seem weak re a s o n s  f o r  r e v e r s in g  a p o l i c y  
which has p re s e rv e d  peace a ro u n d  Aden f o r  30 y e a rs  o r  
m o re.1 (1 ) .
L e e -W a rn e r  was w a rm ly  s u p p o r te d  b y  a n o th e r  shrewd 
m in u te .  The w r i t e r  ended; * . . .  As t o  th e  l o s s  o f
once you b e g in  t o  p l a y  a game o f  " g r a b " , t h e r e  i s  some 
l i t t l e  l o s s  o f  p r e s t i g e  i n  l e t t i n g  a n y th in g  go , even i f  
you  f i n d  i t  wd. be an a b s o lu te  encum brance . . .  t o  have  i t  
b u t  t h i s  i s  a p t  t o  be e x a g g e ra te d  by  l o c a l  o f f i c e r s ,  
a c t u a l l y  engaged i n  th e  game . . . *  ( 2) .
p r e s t i g e  \±n l e t t i n g  th e  O ttom ans have
(1 ) LA 1903? N o te  b y  Lee W arner o f  1 9 .1 .0 3
(2 )  LA 1 9 0 3 j I n i t i a l s  n o t  c l e a r ,  2 0 .1 .0 3
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I n  C o n s ta n t in o p le ,  O’ C ory lo r c la im e d  t h a t  th e  
Grand V i z i e r  a c c e p te d  t h a t  th e  Y a fa i  ( 1 )  t r i b e s  were 
i n  th e  B r i t i s h  sphere  o f  i n f l u e n c e ;  b u t  t h a t  th e  
M i n i s t e r  o f  War was m ak ing  e v e ry  p o s s ib le  e f f o r t  t o  
e x t r i c a t e  h i m s e l f  f ro m  th e  P o r t e ’ s u n d e r t a k in g  to  
d e m a rca te  n o r t h - e a s tw a r d s  to  th e  d e s e r t  f ro m  D h a la  ( 2) *  
However, th e  B r i t i s h  C a b in e t  ( 3 )  was a g re e d  t h a t  any 
O ttoman o p p o s i t i o n  s h o u ld  be swept a s id e .  * . . .  When th e  
p ro p e r  moment a r r i v e s ,  01Conjrtor w i l l  be i n s t r u c t e d  t o  
in fo r m  th e  P o r te  t h a t  i f  i n s t r u c t i o n s  . . .  a re  n o t  s e n t  
[ t o j  , and a re  n o t  obeyed b y ,  th e  T u r k is h  C om m iss ion , 
th e  B r i t i s h  C om m iss ion  v a i l  p ro ce e d  b y  i t s e l f  t o  
a s c e r t a i n  th e  b o u n d a r ie s  £ to  th e  n o r t h - e a s t l  , and 
t h a t  an y  a t t e m p t  t o  i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  t h e i r  l i n e  o f  
c o m m u n ic a t io n s  w i l l  be s u m m a r i ly  d e a l t  w i t h ;  and . . .  
f o r c e  w i l l  be used to  e x p e l  T u r k is h  t r o o p s  o r  A rab
(1 )  A v a l i d  d i s t i n c t i o n  c o u ld  be d raw n be tw een  th e  
U p p e r and Low er Y a fa i  t r i b e s .  The Low er Y a fa i  
S u l ta n  had no c o n t r o l  o v e r  U ppe r Y a f a i .  C f .  
B e lh a v e n  ’ Uneven R o a d ’ p . 152 and B u ry  'U z1 p . 28
(2) AIA C 31, O’Connor - FO, 5.1.03
(3 )  p.9*81 n .3  and p .9 . 82. n . l
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l e v i e s  f ro m  A m i r i  t e r r i t o r y ,  . .  . o r  i f  th e  T u rk s  o r  
t h e i r  A ra b  l e v i e s  m o le s t  th e  B r i t i s h  t r o o p s  i n  an y  way 
. . . « P l e a s e  l e t  me know . . .  w h e th e r  our troops at D h a l i  
a re  o f  s u f f i c i e n t  s t r e n g t h  w i t h  r e in f o r c e m e n ts  a v a i l a b l e  
f ro m  Aden to  c a r r y  o u t  q u i c k l y  and e f f e c t i v e l y  th e  
e x p u ls io n  o f  T u rk s  f ro m  th e  A m i r i  t e r r i t o r y .1 ( 1 ) .
+ + + + +
Wahab and M a i t l a n d  now fa c e d  some p r o s p e c t  o f  
f i g h t i n g  Yemenis i n  th e  b o r d e r  a re a ;  Wahab knew how 
exposed h i s  p o s i t i o n  w ou ld  be i f  th e  B r i t i s h  and the  
O ttom an C o m m iss io n e rs  were no lo n g e r  i n  f r i e n d l y  
c o n t a c t  ( 2 ) .  F o r ,  d e s p i t e  d e l i b e r a t e l y  a l a r m i s t  
te le g r a m s ,  th e  C o m m is s io n e rs1 s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s  were 
good . Wahab t h e r e f o r e  made o u t  a case f o r  n e e d in g  more 
t r o o p s ,  s t a t i n g  t h a t  th e  O ttom ans had in c r e a s e d  t h e i r  
s t r e n g t h  i n  a n t i c i p a t i o n  o f  th e  a r r i v a l  o f  B r i t i s h  
r e in f o r c e m e n ts .  ! . . .  T u r k is h  f o r c e  . . .  jp ie a r j  D t h a l i
( 1 ) LA 1903. T e l  S o f  S -  V ic e r o y  ( r )  R e s id e n t ,  9 .1 .0 3
(2 )  S . g .  LA, Wahab1s d i a r y  e n t r y  o f  I . I . 03. E n t e r t a i n i n g
O ttom an C o m m iss io n e rs  t o  c e le b r a t e  th e  C o r o n a t io n .
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c o n s id e r a b ly  s u p e r io r  t o  o u r s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  guns ,
. . .  8 m odern  b re e c h  lo a d in g  guns to  o u r  b  o b s o le te  
seven p o u n d e rs  . . . *  ( 1 ) .  M a i t l a n d  a ls o  r e la y e d  Wahab1s 
r e p o r t s  t h a t  th e  O ttom ans were r a i s i n g  600 A ra b  
a u x i l i a r i e s  f o r  d u t y  i n  th e  d i s p u te d  a re a  and had 
’ . . .  in c r e a s e d  s t r e n g t h  a t  J a l e e la  i n  t e r r i t o r y  n o t  
a d m i t t e d l y  T u r k is h  . . . '  ( 1 ) .  T h is  l a s t  i n f o r m a t i o n  
im p l i e d  t h a t  th e  O ttom ans d id  n o t  i n t e n d  t o  e v a c u a te  
J a l i l a .  I t  i s  p o s s ib le  t h a t  th e  in c r e a s e  i n  O ttom an 
t r o o p s  was due r a t h e r  t o  th e  g ro w in g  d a n g e r  f ro m  th e  
Imamus r e v o l t ,  t o  a w is h  t o  m a in t a in  O ttom an p r e s t i g e  
b e s id e  an  e n la rg e d  B r i t i s h  e s c o r t ,  o r  t o  th e  need f o r  
a s t r o n g e r  e s c o r t  i f  a j o i n t  s u rv e y  was t o  be a t te m p te d  
a lo n g  th e  d a n g e ro u s  Y a fa i  b o r d e r .  Wahab! s and M a i t l a n d ' s  
r e p o r t s  m a in ta in e d  o f f i c i a l  B r i t i s h  and I n d i a n  s u s p ic io n  
o f  O ttom an i n t e n t i o n s  and made a n e g o t ia t e d  s e t t le m e n t  
l e s s  l i k e l y .  C u rzon  re m a in e d  c r i t i c a l  o f  th e  I n d i a  
O f f i c e  and o f  th e  F o r e ig n  O f f i c e  o v e r  th e  .aden b o u n d a ry ,  
th e  P e rs ia n  G u l f ,  K u w a i t ,  M u s c a t ,  A f g h a n is t a n ,  C h in e se
(1) LA 1903, tel Res - SGB (r) S of S, 1lf.1.03
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T u rk e s ta n ,  T i b e t ,  Yunnan and Siam ( 1 ) .
F o u r  h u n d re d  men and f o u r  guns were  s e n t  t o  D h a la  
i n  J a n u a ry ,  1903 ( 2 ) ;  and f u r t h e r  r e in f o r c e m e n ts  
f o l l o w e d ,  u n t i l ,  b y  May, B r i t i s h  s t r e n g t h  i n  D h a la  
and on th e  l i n e s  o f  c o m m u n ic a t io n  re a c h e d  1500 men.
I n  o r d e r  t o  be a b le  t o  p r e v e n t  th e  a r r i v a l  o f  Ottoman 
r e in f o r c e m e n ts  a t  H o d a id a ,H . I ; .S .  *H erm ione* and 1 I n t r e p i d *  
w ere  s e n t  t o  Aden f ro m  th e  M e d i te r r a n e a n  ( 3 ) -  The 
O ttom an s i t u a t i o n  i n  th e  Yemen was g ra v e ;  b u t  th e  P o r te  
was w arned  b y  0 * Connor n o t  t o  send t r o o p s  t o  th e  Yemen, 
because a B r i t i s h  n a v a l  b lo c k a d e  w o u ld  be e n fo rc e d  ( b ) .
The P o r te  t h e r e f o r e  conceded m ost o f  th e  B r i t i s h  demands 
i n  D h a la  b y  m id  F e b ru a ry  ( 5 ) •
The S e n io r  O ttom an C o m m iss io n e r announced t h a t  
he had been o rd e re d  t o  d is b a n d  A rab  L e v ie s  i n  th e  
d i s p u te d  a r e a s ;  t o  r e c o g n is e  th e  A m ir * s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
(1 )  KP, C u rzo n  -  G o d le y ,  2 2 .1 .0 3
( 2) p .9.89 n . l
( 3 )  LA, t e l  Res -  S e c .F o r .D e p t ,  ( r )  S o f  S, 23. 2 .0 3
(>+) P . 9 .8 3  n . l
( 5 )  LA, ¥ a h a b *s  d i a r y  e n t r y  o f  1 5 .2 .0 3
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as i t  was when th e  J o i n t  C om m iss ion  b e g a n5 (1 ) t o
re c o g n is e  th e  Y a fa i  a re a  as one o f  th e  s t i p e n d i a r y  
a re a s ;  and t o  a r ra n g e  f o r  th e  f r o n t i e r  d e l i m i t a t i o n  
n o r t h - e a s tw a r d s  to w a rd s  th e  d e s e r t .  B u t f . . .  t o  le a v e  
f o r  d e c is i o n  b tw een  th e  two G overnm ents  p o in t s  on w h ic h  
th e  C o m m iss io n e rs  on b o th  s id e s  c a n n o t  a g re e  . . . *  ( 2) .  
P o s s e s s io n  o f  J a l i l a  and th e  S h a i r i  a re a  was one such 
p o i n t  o f  d is a g re e m e n t .  The S h a i r i  a re a  was, h o w e ve r ,  
a c c e p te d  by  th e  O ttom ans as Y a fa i  t e r r i t o r y ,  and 
t h e r e f o r e  w i t h i n  B r i t i s h  l i m i t s .
I n  M a rch ,  th e  B r i t i s h  demanded th e  e v a c u a t io n  o f  
J a l i l a ;  C u rzon  was d e l i g h t e d  ( 3 ) .  A t  l a s t ,  W h i t e h a l l  
and D e lh i  were * . . .  p l a y in g  th e  same hand ♦ . . 1 . C u rzon  
b lam ed th e  F o r e ig n  O f f i c e  f o r  t h e  d e la y .  M e a n t im e , 
S u l t a n  A b d u l Hamid had t r i e d ,  b u t  f a i l e d ,  t o  s e cu re  
German a s s is ta n c e  (*+). On th e  2 1 s t  M a rch , th e  O ttom ans 
s l i p p e d  q u i e t l y  o u t  o f  J a l i l a  ( 5 ) .  The P o r te  r e s e rv e d
(1 )  My u n d e r l i n i n g ,  t h a t  was v e r y  much l e s s  th a n  
Wahab c la im e d ,
( 2) p . 9 .9 0  n . 5
(3 )  C . P j  C u rzon  -  H a m i l to n ,  1 9 * 3 *G3
(40 A IA  C 33? HBM Am bassador, B e r l i n  -  FO, 1 6 .3 * 0 3
( 5) LA, B n t r } /  f ro m  Wahab1 s d i a r y
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th e  S u l t a n * s  ‘ s o v e re ig n  r i g h t s *  t h e r e ,  ( 1 ) when n o t i f y i n g  
th e  O ttom an i n t e n t i o n  t o  e v a c u a te  th e  a r e a .  The F o r e ig n  
O f f i c e  was co n c e rn e d  t h a t  * . . .  G e n e ra l M a i t l a n d  s h o u ld  
a v o id  any  a c t i o n  t h a t  m ig h t  g iv e  n e e d le s s  o f f e n c e  . . . '  
t o  th e  P o r te  ( 2) .  Wahab and F i t z m a u r i c e  h e ld  an 
o p p o s i te  v ie w .  F i t z m a u r i c e  a r ra n g e d  f o r  th e  U n io n  J a c k  
t o  be f l a u n t e d  o v e r  th e  e v a c u a te d  O ttom an p o s i t i o n s  ( 3 ) -  
I n  answ er t o  th e  P o r t e ' s  p r o t e s t s ,  'Wahab d e fe n d e d  t h i s  
a c t i o n  b y  s a y in g  t h a t  O ttoman t r o o p s  had t o r n  down 
a U n io n  J a c k ,  f lo w n  w i t h o u t  a u t h o r i t y  by  th e  A m i r ' s  
son , o v e r  th e  v i l l a g e  o f  a lW a r ra ,  and p u t  th e  p ie c e s  
i n t o  th e  b a r r a c k  l a t r i n e s  a t  Ja ft. la  i n  1901 (4 -) .  Wahab 
c o n s id e re d  t h a t  th e  g e s tu re  was n e c e s s a ry  to  r e s t o r e  
B r i t i s h  p r e s t i g e  l o c a l l y ;  he h a d , h o w e ve r ,  n o t  p r e v io u s l y  
m e n t io n e d  th e  a lW a r ra  i n c i d e n t .  I t  was an o p p o r tu n e ,  
and p o s s ib l y  e m b ro id e re d ,  c o u n t e r - c o m p la in t .  C u rzon
(1 )  A IA  C 33? M usurus  Pasha -  L o rd  Lansdow ne, 1 9 -3 .0 3
( 2) A IA  C 33? F0 -  10 , when fo r w a r d in g  on th e  O ttom an
n o te ,  24*.3.03
(3 )  L o rd  H .P ;  C u rzon  -  H a m i l t o n ,  13 .4-.03
(40 A IA  C 33 , Wahab -  F o r . D e p t . ,  12 .4 -.03
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c o n s id e re d  th e  f l a g - r a i s i n g  f a l i t t l e  s u p e r f lu o u s  * ;  
b u t  he was p re p a re d  to  a c c e p t  i t  as r a i s i n g  th e  B r i t i s h  
C o m m is s io n e rs ’ m o ra le  a f t e r  s u f f e r i n g  many O ttoman 
1 i n d i g n i t i e s 1• He d id  n o t ,  h o w e v e r ,  t r u s t  F i t z m a u r i c e  ( 1 ) ,  
who had w r i t t e n  c r i t i c i s i n g  01C onnor t o  a c o l le a g u e  o f  
C u rz o n ’ s ( 2) .
+ + + + +
A c la s h  o f  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  came t o  a head be tw ee n  
Wahab, s u p p o r te d  by  F i t z m a u r i c e ,  and M a i t l a n d ,  d u r in g  
A p r i l  and May 1 9 ° 3 ;  i t  c o n t in u e d  u n t i l  20t h  A u g u s t ,  
when M a i t l a n d  w e n t up t o  D h a la .  F i t z m a u r i c e  w is h e d  
t o  push  th e  Com m iss ion^ w o rk  ahead n o r t h - e a s tw a r d s  to  
th e  d e s e r t ,  once th e  O ttom ans had e v a c u a te d  J a l i l a  ( 3 ) .
I n  th e  absence o f  B r i t i s h  t r e a t i e s  w i t h  th e  U p p e r Y a f a is ,  
j u s t i f y i n g  B r i t i s h  s u rv e y s  i n  t h e i r  a re a s ,  t r i b a l  
a g re e m e n t c o u ld  o n ly  be s e c u re d  b y  a c o n s id e r a b le
(1 ) L o rd  H .P ; C u rzon  -  H a m i l t o n ,  1.J+.03
( 2) C . P j  C u rzon  -  H a m i l to n ,  29. 7.03
( 3 )  AIA C 3 2 , F i t z m a u r i c e  t e l  -  Pies, 2 6 • ^ • 0 3 .
Res -  F i t z m a u r i c e  l e t t e r  ( ? )  3 0 . 1+ .03  -  d a te  u n c e r t a in
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e x p e n d i tu r e  on ’ p r e s e n t s 1 t o  i n f l u e n t i a l  t r ib e s m e n ,  
M a i t l a n d  p r e f e r r e d  t o  a l lo w  t im e  t o  a r ra n g e  t r e a t i e s ,  
p o s s i b l y  t a k in g  6 m on ths  ( 1 ) ; Wahab p o in te d  o u t  t h a t  
t h e  S e c r e ta r y  o f  S ta te  had a u t h o r i s e d  one t r e a t y ,  
w h e re a s  M a i t l a n d  e n v is a g e d  s e v e r a l ,  Wahab a ls o  o b je c te d  
t o  th e  d e la y ;  he c la im e d  t h a t  th e  C om m iss ion  c o u ld  n o t  
w o rk  s o u th -w e s tw a rd s ,  as th e  F o r e ig n  D e p a r tm e n t  had 
o rd e re d  on th e  I n d ia  O f f i c e ’s s u g g e s t io n  ( 2) ,  d u r in g  th e  
summer h e a t .  U n le s s  w o rk  c o n t in u e d  n o r t h - e a s t w a r d s ,  
the h e a v y  e x p e n d i tu r e  on th e  C om m iss ion  and i t s  e s c o r t  
w o u ld  be w a s te d .  He a ls o  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  any  a p p e a ra n ce  
o f  th e  C o m m is s io n ’ s dependence upon th e  s ig n in g  o f  Y a f a i  
treaties w o u ld  en co u ra g e  e x h o r b i t a n t  demands.
M a i t l a n d  d is a g r e e d ;  i n  h i s  v ie w ,  once th e  A m i r i  
b o r d e r  had been d e m a rc a te d ,  th e  C om m iss ion  c o u ld  w o rk  
s o u th -w e s tw a rd s ,  u n t i l  th e  p o l i t i c a l  o b s ta c le s  to  th e  
n o r t h - e a s tw a r d s  had been c le a r e d  by  th e  s p r in g  o f  190^ .  
M a i t l a n d  was r i l e d  b y  Wahab’ s c r i t i c i s m  o f  h i s  h a n d l in g
(1 ) A IA  C 32 , Wahab -  Res, 6 . 6 . 03, q u o t in g  Res t e l  -  
Wahab, 29. 5.03
( 2) AIA C 33? S o f  S -  V ic e r o y ,  16. 5  & F o r e ig n  D ep t -  
Res, 1 9 .5 .0 3  C& t o  S o f  S)
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o f  t r i b a l  p o l i t i c s  (1 ) ,  and b y  th e  s u g g e s t io n  t h a t  
B u r y 1s a b o r t i v e  jo u r n e y  t o  th e  U ppe r A u la q is  s h o u ld  
o n ly  have been made a f t e r  p r i o r  c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h  Wahab; 
and he re s e n te d  Wahab1s a p p e a l d i r e c t  t o  th e  F o r e ig n  
D e p a r tm e n t ,  c o p ie d  t o  London , Bombay and C o n s ta n t in o p le  ( 2 ) ,  
a s k in g  f o r  p e r m is s io n  t o  s u rv e y  n o r t h - e a s t w a r d s .
M a i t l a n d  h e ld  up Wahab’ s te le g r a m s ,  s u g g e s t in g  th e y  
s h o u ld  be se n t b y  m a i l  t o  save £200. He was p iq u e d
t h a t  t h e  C o m m iss io n e rs  p ro p o se d  to  d i s r e g a r d  h im  and
t o  s u rv e y  th e  S h a ib i  b o r d e r ,  n o r t h - e a s t  o f  D h a la  ( 3 ) .
The C o m m iss io n e rs  had been s tu n g  b y  M a i t l a n d ’ s r e q u e s t  
f o r  a c c o u n ts  o f  a l l  e x p e n d i tu r e  on th e  Y a f a is .  They 
had s p e n t  Hs 3371 i n  u n d e r  t h r e e  m o n th s ,  i n c l u d in g  Rs 7^+0 
p a id  t o  th e  S h a ib is  (*+).
(1 ) A IA  C 32 , Res -  Wahab, r e p l y i n g  to  W ahab 's  l e t t e r  o f  
6 . 6 . 03, b y  f i e l d  te le g ra m
(2 )  A IA  C 3 2 , W ahab 's  t e l  N o .275 o f  6 . 6.03
(3 )  A IA  C 32 , t e l  Res -  S im la ,  London , Bombay & C o n s t a n t in o p le ,
12. 6.03
(A) AIA C 33? Wahab - Res, 6.5.C3
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B o th  s id e s  w ere  f r u s t r a t e d ;  th e  s u rv e y  was n e a r  
a s t a n d s t i l l ;  and M a i t l a n d  was m e e t in g  u n e x p e c te d  
r e l i g i o u s . d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  s e c u r in g  a t r e a t y  w i t h  th e  
R a s s a s i S u l t a n  o f  B e id h a  (1). The I n d i a  O f f i c e  ban on 
s u r v e y in g  n o r th - e a s tw a r d s  p r o b a b ly  o r i g i n a t e d  f ro m  
L e e -W a rn e r 's  c a u t io u s  m in u te  on th e  R e s id e n t 1s r e p o r t  
o f  r e l i g i o u s  a n t i - B r i t i s h  f e e l i n g  am ongst th e  Y a fa is  ( 2) .  
I n  M a i t l a n d ’ s v ie w ,  Wahab w r o n g ly  h e ld  M a i t l a n d  
r e s p o n s ib le  ( 3 ) .  A l lo w a n c e  s h o u ld  be made f o r  o t h e r  
s t r a i n s ;  t h e r e  was a d ro u g h t  i n  t h e  D h a la  a re a  ( i f ) ; 
Maitland was n o t  w e l l ,  and th e  w e a th e r  was ' f r i g h t f u l l y  
h o t *  ( 3 ) .  I t  seemed t o  M a i t l a n d  t h a t  he needed to  r e g a in  
more c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  B o u n d a ry  C o m m iss io n e rs  ( 3 ) .  He had 
s t i l l  n o t  d e s p a tc h e d  Wahab’ s e x p e n s iv e  te le g ra m s  of 
6t h  June (5 )  •
On 1 5 th  J u n e , th e  S e c r e ta r y  o f  S ta te  gave c a u t io u s
( 1 )  AIA G 3 2 , Res -  Wahab, 1 3 . 6 . 0 3 ,  p a ra  8
( 2 )  LA, t e l  Res -  S o f  S ( r )  V i c e r o y ,  SGB & HBMA, C ’ p le
( 3 ) AIA C 32 , Maitland D/0 -  S i r  L o u is  Dane, l )+ .6 .0 3
(>+) AIA G 32, Wahab -  F o r .D e p t . ,  28 .7 .03
(5)  p . 9 .95  n .2
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a p p ro v a l  f o r  th e  s u rv e y  t o  resume i n  t h e  S h a ib i  a re a  
’ . . .  i f  . . .  w i t h o u t  d i f f i c u l t y  o r  r i s k  M a i t l a n d
p u t  h i m s e l f  i n  th e  wrong b y  w i t h h o ld in g  th e  te le g ra m  
fro m  Wahab. B u t th e  B r i t i s h  C o m m is s io n e rs1 a t t e m p t  t o  
s u rv e y  as f a r  as th e  Wadi Sana had a l r e a d y  f a i l e d  
th ro u g h  S h a ib i  o p p o s i t i o n ;  th e  s u rv e y  p a r t y  r e t u r n e d  
to  camp on th e  l* f th «  M a i t l a n d  s e n t  a c o n c i l i a t o r y  
l e t t e r  t o  Wahab on th e  2 1 s t  ( 1 ) .  Wahab was n o t  
r e c o n c i l e d ;  he s e n t  a 12 page , t y p e d ,  f o o ls c a p  l e t t e r  
o f  p r o t e s t  t o  th e  F o r e ig n  D e p a r tm e n t ,  c o m p la in in g  o f  
M a i t l a n d ’ s i n t e r f e r e n c e  i n  B o u n d a ry  C om m iss ion  a f f a i r s ,  
o f  M a i t l a n d ’ s presumed f a i l u r e  to  d e s p a tc h  Wahab’ s 
te le g ra m  o f  6t h  Ju n e , and o f  th e  f u t i l i t y  o f  m ak ing  
t r e a t i e s  w i t h  th e  Y a f a is ,  who d id  n o t  seem a n x io u s
f o r  t r e a t i e s ,  qua t r e a t i e s ,  r e g a r d in g  them s im p ly  as a 
means o f  e x t r a c t i n g  money f ro m  th e  B r i t i s h  I n
h i s  v ie w ,  t h e r e  was u n l i k e l y  t o  be an y  d i r e c t ,  o r  
i n d i r e c t ,  b e n e f i c i a l  r e t u r n  f ro m  such a g re e m e n ts  ( 2) .  
Wahab a ls o  s e n t  a t e le g r a m ,  en c l a i r ,  b y - p a s s in g
(1 )  A IA  C 32
( 2) A IA  C 32 , Wahab -  F o r e ig n  D e p to ,  2 6 .6 .0 3
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Maitland, to the F o r e ig n  Department; he alleged that 
im p o r t a n t  d e c is io n s  on the Commission*s w o rk  were being 
made w i t h o u t  th e  C o m m iss io n e rs *  views, w h ic h  were in 
c o n f l i c t  w i t h  th e  h e s i d e n t ’ s, b e in g  heard. Wahab c o u ld  
n o t  * . . .  a c c e p t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  u n le s s  t h i s  i s  p u t  a 
s to p  t o  . . . *  ( 1 ) .  Wahab p i l e d  fuel on th e  R e s id e n t * s  
w r a th  w i t h  c r i t i c i s m s  t h a t  M a i t l a n d  was e x a g g e r a t in g  
h i s  own d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  s e c u r in g  a treaty w i t h  Beidha. 
N e i t h e r  C u rzon  n o r  H a m i l to n  were * . . .  enamoured . . .  o f  
Wahab*s . . .  p ro c e e d in g s  and a d v ic e  . . . *  b u t  C u rzon  
r e c o g n is e d  t h a t  Wahab*s i n d e c i s i o n  m i r r o r e d  o f f i c i a l  
f a u l t s  . . .  1 ( 2) .
M a i t l a n d  c o m p la in e d  p r i v a t e l y  o f  Wahab*s 
* o u t r a g e o u s ,  and u n p ro v o k e d  a t t a c k s '  ( 3 ) ;  o f f i c i a l l y ,  
he a t t r i b u t e d  them to  i r r i t a t i o n  a t  h i s  r e j e c t i o n  o f  
t h e  C o m m is s io n e rs ' p r o p o s a ls  t h a t  Q ataba tow n  and 
th e  Y u b i and H a i k i  t r i b a l  a re a s  s h o u ld  be in c lu d e d
(1) AIA C 32 , tel Wahab - F o r .Dept., SGB, London & Clple,
7 .7 .0 3
(2 )  L o rd  IIP, C u rzon  -  H a m i l t o n ,  2 *+.6 .03
(3) AIA C 32, D/0 M a i t l a n d  -  Dane, I O .7.03
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w i t h i n  th e  A m i r ' s  b o rd e rs  (1 ) .  S im la  and W e s tm in s te r  
were annoyed b y  t h i s  e x p e n s iv e ,  t im e - w a s t in g ,  b i c k e r i n g  ( 2) .  
C u rzon  was a n x io u s  to  end th e  d e m a rc a t io n  a f t e r  
c o m p le t in g  th e  l i n e  f ro m  Vi. Bana t o  th e  w e s te rn  
H a u sh a b i b o r d e r .  A rra n g e m e n ts  f o r  t r e a t i e s  w i t h  th e  
Y a fa is  and A u la q is  c o u ld  th e n  c o n t in u e  w i t h o u t  h a s te .  
Maitland was t o  fo r w a r d  on t o  th e  C o m m iss io n e rs  c o p ie s  
of all c o r re s o o n d e n c e  on th e  C o m m is s io n 's  w o rk  ( 3 ) ?  b u t  
th e  C o m m iss io n e rs  w ou ld  r e c e iv e  o rd e rs  th r o u g h  th e  
R e s id e n t  and ' l o y a l  c o - o p e r a t i o n '  was r e q u i r e d  f ro m  
all i n v o l v e d  ( ^ ) . M a i t l a n d  p o c k e te d  h i s  i n j u r e d  p r i d e  
and c o p ie d  b o th  te le g ra m s  to  'Wahab; M a i t l a n d  f e l t  
t h a t  h e ' d  r e c e iv e d  'a  w ig g in g 1 ( 5 ) .  Wahab, s l i g h t l y  
sm ug ly , b lam ed th e  R e s id e n t  when f o r w a r d in g  c o p ie s  o f  
h i s  own c o r re s p o n d e n c e  s e n t  a b ro a d  e a r l i e r ,  d i r e c t l y *
(1 ) AIA C 32, Res -  SGB, 10.7.03 ( r )  S o f  S, F o r .Dept.
& C1 p ie
(2) AIA C 3*+, F0 -  0 ' C o rq /o r, 20.8.03
(3) AIA C 32, tel F o r .Dept. - Res, 25.7.03
(1+) A IA  C 32, t e l  F o r .D e p t .  -  Res ( r )  SGB, 25. 7.03
(5 )  A IA  C 32 , D/0 Res -  Dane, 2 .8 .0 3
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Wahab waived his intention to ask for an enquiry 
because of ‘ ... Government's ... expressed wish to close 
this correspondence ...' (1). Four days later Wahab 
criticised Maitland's negotiations for Yafai treaties, 
claiming that the Commissioners were not surprised at 
the local deposition of Maitland's candidate for the 
Upper Yafai Sultanate Treaty (2). Wahab suggested that 
such treaties were undesirable whilst 'delimitation* 
was proceeding. That doubtless strengthened Maitland's 
complaint that the Commissioners believed that *... the 
Aden Protectorate exists for the purpose of being 
demarcated, and thatvnothing else matters ...'(3). 
Following further critical telegrams from Wahab and 
Fitzmaurice, they were warned that *... continuance 
of factious spirit ... will call for serious notice 
The survey of the Shaibi border appears to be delayed 
for hardly adequate reasons ...' (**) • On 16 th August,
(1) AIA C 32, Wahab - Res, 30.7.03 & to For.Dept.
(2) AIA C 32, Wahab - Res
(3) AIA C 32, D/0 Res - Louis Dane, lLi-.6• 03
(h) AIA C 32, tel For.Dept. - Res, for communication
t o  th e  Commissioners, 8.8.03
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M a i t l a n d  w en t up t o  Dhala f o r  a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  with 
th e  C o m m is s io n e rs ,  and t o  make p r o g r e s s  w i t h  th e  Yafai 
t r e a t i e s .  Wahab a c c e p te d  M a i t l a n d ' s  olive b ra n c h  C l ) .  
C u rzon  p r e f e r r e d  th e  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  t o  s u p e rs e d in g  
M a i t l a n d  * . . .  and l e a v in g  th e s e  te m p e s tu o u s  C o m m iss io n e rs  
t o  do a p p a r e n t l y  w h a t t h e y  l i k e  . . . *  ( 2) .
M a i t l a n d ' s  f i r s t  v i s i t  t o  D h a la  s u r p r i s e d  h im ;
* . . .  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  [ f o r  th e  C o m m iss io n ] . . .  a re  n e a r l y  
as d i f f i c u l t  as can be im a g in e d  . . .  ‘ . M a i t l a n d  and th e  
C o m m iss io n e rs  a g re e d  t h a t  th e  M a u s e t ta  Y a fa i  s e c t io n ,  
w i t h  whom M a i t l a n d  had r e c e n t l y  c o n c lu d e d  a T r e a t y  ( 3 )5 
had l e s s  power th a n  M a i t l a n d  had b e l i e v e d ;  t h e y  d id  
n o t  c o n t r o l  th e  S h a ib i s ,  M a i t l a n d  t h e r e f o r e  s u g g e s te d  
a s e p a ra te  S h a ib i  T r e a t y  ( * f ) .  He s ig n e d  a t r e a t y  w i t h  
th e  H adhram i Y a fa i  s e c t io n ,  s u b je c t  t o  r a t i f i c a t i o n  b y  
th e  V ic e r o y ;  th e  s e c t io n  was * . . .  one o f  th e  s m a l le r  
s e c t io n s  . . . '  b u t  l i v i n g  i n  a s t r a t e g i c ,  O t to m a n -c la im e d ,  
a re a  (*+). The re  was l i t t l e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  th e  t r e a t y ;
(1 ) A IA  C 32, Wahab -  M a i t l a n d ,  21. 8.03
( 2) CP^Curzon -  H a m i l t o n ,  2 6 .8 .0 3
(3 )  A i t c h i s o n  ' T r e a t i e s '  No LVI
(h )  A IA  C 3h , Res -  SGB, 3 0 .9 .0 3
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b u t  i n  th e  p r e v a i l i n g  c l im a t e  o f  h o s t i l i t y  t o  O ttom an 
c la im s ,  C u rzon  r a t i f i e d  i t .  By O c to b e r ,  M a i t l a n d  hoped 
t o  o b t a in  a P r o t e c t o r a t e  t r e a t y  w i t h  th e  U pper A u la q i  
S u l t a n ,  by  se n d in g  th e  t r e a t y  t o  N is a b  f o r  s ig n a tu r e  ( 1 ) .  
T r i b a l  p ro b le m s  p re v e n te d  th e  p r e s t ig u o u s  A u la q i  S u l t a n  
f ro m  le a v in g  h i s  home a r e a .  S in c e  th e  S u l t a n  was 
i l l i t e r a t e ,  M a i t l a n d  had r e l u c t a n t l y  d e c id e d  t h a t  he 
m u s t send G. 7. B u ry ,  as h i s  o n ly  l o c a l l y  e x p e r ie n c e d  
P o l i t i c a l  O f f i c e r ,  t o  w i tn e s s  th e  s ig n a tu r e  ( 1 ) .
L e e -W a rn e r  a t  th e  I n d i a  O f f i c e  was a n x io u s  t o  
f o r e g o  th e  l i a b i l i t i e s  t h a t  a t r e a t y  w i t h  th e  Upper 
Y a f a i  w o u ld  im p ly .  Wahab had d e n ie d  any  b e n e f i t s  f ro m  
i t  (2). L a t e r  ju d g e m e n ts  c o n f i rm e d  h i s  o p in io n s  ( 3 ) .
B u t  M a i t l a n d  was now more d e e p ly  enmeshed i n  i n t r i g u e s  
t o  o b t a in  a t r e a t y .  O ttom an l e t t e r s  had been 
* . . .  i n t e r c e p t e d  b e fo r e  th e y  g o t  t o  th e  p e rs o n s  f o r  
whom they w ere  in te n d e d  T i n  Y a fa iJ  and b ro u g h t  t o
(1 ) AIA C 3If, Res -  L o u is  Dane, 9 .1 0 .0 3
(2 )  p . 9 .9 7  n . 2
(3 )  L /P & S /1 0 /1 5 ,  M a jo r  H.F. J a c o b , Memo o f  I 3A . O 6
on U p p e r Y a fa i
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u s  . . . '  (1 ) .  The ' i n t e r c e p t o r *  c e r t a i n l y  r e c e iv e d  a 
reward, b u t  M a i t l a n d ' s  r e a c t i o n  t o  an a b o r t i v e  Q o t a ib i  
ambush of a British p o s t a l  o r d e r l y ,  w i t h i n  a week, was 
t o  d e s t r o y  th e  Q o t a ib i  v i l l a g e  o f  D th i - I I a g e r a b  ( 2) .
Such d o u b le  s ta n d a rd s  i n  B r i t i s h  a t t i t u d e s  w e re " n o t  
uncommon d u r in g  th e  B o u n d a ry  C o m m iss io n .
Maitland asked Wahab t o  ' r e m o n s t r a t e '  w i t h  th e  
O ttom an C o m m iss io n e rs  a t  Ottoman o f f i c i a l s  i n v i t i n g  
Upper Y a fa i  leaders to meet A b d u l la h  Pasha, th e  Acting 
Ottoman Governor, .hen the P o r te  had r e c o g n is e d  * . . .  t  
canton o f  Y a f fa  . . .  t o  be h L t h in  th e  sph e re  o f  B r i t i s h  
in f l u e n c e  . . . ! ( 1 ) .  The C o m m iss io n e rs  w ere  as anxious 
as M a i t l a n d  t o  e n la r g e  th e  B r i t i s h  's p h e re  o f  i n f l u e n c e * ;  
t h e y  c a r r i e d  o u t  a * . . .  u n i l a t e r a l  s u rv e y  i n  R u b e a te n ,  
c la im e d  . . .  as an integral p a r t  o f  t h e  Ottoman E m p ire
( 3 ) .  I t  was f i n a l l y  l e f t  o u t s id e  th e  B r i t i s h  
'b o r d e r *  a f t e r  a c r im o n io u s  w r a n g l in g  i n  190*4—05* B u t ,
(1) AIA C 3If D/0 Res -  Wahab, 19.10.03
( 2 )  B u ry  *Uz* p.75-99
(3) AIA.C 3*f, Wahab -  F o r . D e p t . ,  20.10.03
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i n  O c to b e r ,  th e  F o r e ig n  O f f i c e  had i n s t r u c t e d  O 'C on no r 
t o  p r o t e s t  a t  O ttom an i n t e r f e r e n c e  ( l ) .  On 2 1 s t  O c to b e r ,  
M a i t l a n d  s e c u re d  t h e  s ig n a tu r e  o f  S u l t a n  Q ah tan  b i n  
Umar t o  an U p pe r Y a f a i  t r e a t y  ( 2 ) .  M a i t l a n d ,  i n  h i s  
h a s te  o r  ig n o r a n c e ,  r e f e r r e d  t o  Q ah tan  as b e in g  o f  th e  
Lo w e r, n o t  o f  t h e  U p p e r ,  Y a f a i  ( 2 ) .  M a i t l a n d  d e s c r ib e d  
h im  as p o w e r fu l ;  he t u r n e d  o u t t o  be a 'man o f  s t r a w '  ( 3).
The F o r e ig n  D e p a rtm e n t a p p ro v e d  B u r y 's  d e p a r tu r e  
for Nisab, w i t h  a p a r t y  t o  s u rv e y  t h e  a re a s  as f a r  
north as B e ih a n  ( 4 ) .  B u t ,  on 8t h  N ovem ber, t h e  D e p a rtm e n t 
expressed c o n c e rn  a t  ' . . . t h e  c o n t in u o u s  f i g h t i n g  and 
casualties. ...The l a s t  t h i n g  we want i s  m i l i t a r y  t r o u b l e  
in Aden i n t e r i o r .  . ( 5 ) .  T h a t  w o u ld  have been p ro b a b le  
i f  t h e  Ottomans had s u p p l ie d  arms and a m m u n it io n  t o  
tribes a t  odds w i t h  th e  B r i t i s h .  W h i t e h a l l  was a ls o
( 1 ;  A IA  C 34 , t e l  F0 -  O 'C o n n o r ,  2 3 .1 0 .0 3
( 2 )  A IA  C 34 , Res -  SGB, 2 2 .1 0 .0 3
( 3 )  p .9.102 n . 3
( 4 )  AIA C 34 , t e l  F o r .D e p t .  -  Res, 2 3 .1 0 .0 3
( 8j AIA C 34 , t e l  t o  R e s id e n t
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a p p re h e n s iv e  (1 ) .  The I n d i a  O f f i c e  w a n te d  an e a r l y  
r e s u m p t io n  o f  d e l i m i t a t i o n  s o u th  w e s tw a rd s5 and o n ly  
O’ C onnor u rg e d  one s u rv e y  n o r t h - e a s t w a r d s ,  t o  b lo c k  
a c c e s s  t o  I la d h ra m a u t,  as w e l l  as a n o th e r  t o  th e  s o u th ­
w e s t  ( 2 ) .  The C a b in e t  was ’ . . .  m os t u n w i l l i n g  t h a t  
th e  p ro c e e d in g s  s h o u ld  be p r o t r a c t e d  beyond th e  p r e s e n t  
c o ld  w e a th e r  . i . e .  e a r l y  A p r i l  190*+ ( 3 ) .  I T  
p r a c t i c a l ,  t r e a t y  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  B e ih a n  and B e id h a  
s h o u ld  be s to p p e d .  Q u e s t io n s  w ere  e x p e c te d  i n  P a r l ia m e n t ,  
and M a i t l a n d  was w arned t o  be re a d y  to  p r o v id e  m a t e r i a l  
i n  n a r r a t i v e  fo rm  (*+); t h a t  was a way o f  i l l u s t r a t i n g  
O ttom an ' p r o v o c a t i o n s ’ as ’ j u s t i f y i n g 1 B r i t a i n ’ s 
e s c a la t i n g  demands f o r  more t e r r i t o r y .  The same 
te c h n iq u e  had been a p p l ie d  d u r in g  th e  1873 C o n f r o n t a t i o n  ( 5 ) .
P ro g re s s  was made; b y  l*+ th  Decem ber, F i t z m a u r i c e  
e x p e c te d  t o  s e t t l e  th e  l a s t  r e m a in in g  p o i n t  o f  d i f f e r e n c e  
on th e  A m i r i  O ttom an B o rd e r  soon ( 6 ) .  L o c a l l y  u n r e s o lv e d
(1 )  A IA  C 3*+, t e l  S o f  S -  V i c e r o y ,  20. 11.03 ( r )  Res
(2 )  AIA C 3 ^ ,  t e l  O’ C onnor -  F0 , 2*+.11.03
(3 )  AIA C 3^? f  *+97? S o f  S -  V i c e r o y  ( r )  Res
(*+) A IA  C 3*+, t e l  S o f  3 -  V ic e r o y  ( r )  Res, 1 2 .1 2 .0 3
(5 )  p . 3.10*+ n .  2
(6 )  AIA C 3^? t e l  F i t z m a u r i c e  -  O’ C o nn o r, t h r o u g h  R e s id e n t
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differences between the A n g lo -  Ottoman Commissioners 
were settled by negotiations in Constantinople as 
they arose. The British withdrawal from Dhala, and 
the Commission's move south-westwards, began on 
17th December (1). The Resident accepted that a treaty 
with Beihan was perhaps unnecessary (2), as the 
Aulaqis claimed it as a dependency. Maitland was 
less willing to give up prospects of a treaty with the 
Beidha ruler. But, nine days later, Sharif Ahmad was 
granted a protectorate treaty for Beihan (3)>covering 
the extensive tribal areas of the Musabain, the 
BalHarith and the Marada.' Mu shaikh (*+). Maitland had 
no knowledge of the area covered. Bury had passed 
through Beihan in 1901; he later claimed to have
(1) AIA C 3*+, tel Res - S of S, For.Dept. SGB & C'ple,
19.12.03, quoting Wahab
(2) AIA C 3*+, tel Res - For.Dept., S of S, SGB, & C'ple,
21.12.03
(3) Aitchison 'Treaties1 No. XLVIII
(*+) AIA C 3A, Res - S of S, For.Dept., SGB & C'ple, 30.12.03
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E n g in e e r e d 1 th e  t r e a t y  ( 1 ) .  He was a f f e c t i o n a t e l y  
remembered b y  th e  S h a r i f * s  son ( 2) ;  and th e  A s h ra f  
m a in ta in e d  c o n ta c t  w i t h  B u ry  a f t e r  h i s  d i s g r a c e .  I n  
r e a l i t y ,  M a i t l a n d ,  by t h i s  t r e a t y ,  c r e a te d  a 1 c h i e f *  
o u t  o f  a sh rew d , r e s p e c te d ,  l o c a l  i n t e r m e d ia r y ,  who 
had no c i v i l  a u t h o r i t y  o v e r  th e  p o w e r fu l  d e s e r t  
B a lH a r i t h  t r i b e ,  an o f f s h o o t  o f  th e  Yam C o n fe d e r a t io n  
o f  N e j r a n ,  o r  o v e r  th e  r a c i a l l y  and c u l t u r a l l y  d i s t i n c t  
n e ig h b o u r in g  h i l l  t r i b e  o f  th e  M u s a b a in .  By i n c l u d i n g  
th e  M arada M u sh a ikh  (3 )  M a i t l a n d  l a i d  th e  f o u n d a t io n s  
f o r  su b se q u e n t f r i c t i o n  be tw een  f u t u r e  r u l e r s  o f  B e ih a n  
and th e  d e s e r t  K a ra b  t r i b e ,  o v e r  whose b o u n d a r ie s  th e  
M arada g ra z e d .
M a i t l a n d  hoped f o r  more i n f o r m a t i o n  f ro m  B u r y 's  
v i s i t  t o  B e ih a n .  B u ry  l e f t  on 3 1 s t  December. H is  
in te n d e d  l o c a l  Hammami e s c o r t  o f  v i s i t o r s  t o  Aden were  
u n e x p e c te d ly  c a l l e d  away b y  th e  U pper A u la q i  S u l t a a in
28
( 1 ) AIA If” , Bury -  L t .  C o l .  H.M. Abud, 7 » ^ .C 5
( 2 ) S h a r i f  H u s s a in  b i n  Ahmad t o  w r i t e r ,  i n  c o n v e r s a t io n s  
i n  1955
( 3 )  See 1.11
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t h e  m id d le  o f  December ( 1 ) ,  T h a t  was p o s s ib l y  because 
th e  S u l ta n  c la im e d  th e  B e ih a n  a re a  and o b je c te d  t o  a 
s e p a ra te  A n g lo - B e ih a n i  a g re e m e n t.  M a i t l a n d  th e n  
v a i n l y  e x p e c te d  t h a t  th e  U ppe r A u la q i  S h a ik h ,  who 
r e c o g n is e d  th e  U p pe r A u la q i  S u l ta n  as th e  head o f  h i s  
own M aan i d i v i s i o n  o f  th e  U ppe r A u la q i s ,  as w e l l  as o f  
t h e  M a h a j r i  d i v i s i o n ,  w ou ld  e s c o r t  B u ry  and h i s  p a r t y  ( 1 ) .  
M a i t l a n d  had h a s t i l y  s ig n e d  an i l l - c o n s i d e r e d  t r e a t y  
w i t h  th e  S h a ik h  ( 2 ) .  B u ry  c la im e d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  ( 3 ) .
M a i t l a n d  had e x c e s s iv e ,  and m is ta k e n ,  c o n f id e n c e  
i n  B u ry * s  l o c a l  e x p e r ie n c e ;  he a l lo w e d  B u ry  t o  le a v e
w i t h ,  and i n c r e a s i n g l y  a p p re h e n s iv e  o f ,  l o c a l  c o n d i t i o n s ,  
a c ro s s  c o u n t r y  u n f a m i l i a r  t o  B u ry  s in c e  1899 (*+) • B u ry  
chose t o  t r a v e l  t h r o u g h  I l l a h i  t e r r i t o r y  w i t h  a F a d h l i  
g u id e .  The I l l a h e e n  r e j e c t e d  F a d h l i  s u z e r a in t y ,  so B u r y 1s
(1 ) AIA G 31+, f  527 D /0  M a i t l a n d  -  Wahab
(2 )  A i t c h i s o n  1 T r e a t i e s 1 No X X X I I I
( 3 )  p . 9 .1 0 ?  n . l
(k) B u ry  'U z 1 p . 1 1 1 -1 1 7
w i t h  f a la r g e  n a t i v e s u rv e y  p a r t y 1, u n f a m i l i a r
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c h o ic e  o f  company was t a c t l e s s .  He p ro p o se d  th e  
s h o r t e s t  c a ra v a n  r o u te  t o  N is a b ,  p a s s in g  th ro u g h  
m o u n ta in o u s  c o u n t r y  beyond D a th in a ,  w here he c o u ld  o n ly  
t r a v e l  w i t h  th e  g o o d w i l l  of th e  I l l a h e e n ,  w h ic h  he 
e v i d e n t l y  la c k e d  ( 1 ) .  I n  such c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  an e s c o r t  
of t h e  102nd B . N . I .  and a d o zen , I n d ia n ,  Aden T ro o p e rs  
was p r o b a b ly  a p r o v o c a t i v e  h in d r a n c e ,  l i k e  th e  s u rv e y  
p a r t y ,  and in a d e q u a te  f o r  an e s c o r t .  M a i t la n d  n a i v e l y  
e x p e c te d  th is ,  m o t le y  e x p e d i t i o n  ! . . .  t o  e n d e a vo u r  t o  . . .  
s u rv e y  . . .  th e  b o r d e r  r e g io n  s o u th -w e s t  f ro m  B e ih a n  as 
f a r  as th e  Y a f f a i  c o u n t r y  . . . ’ ( 2 ) .  He hoped t h a t  B u ry  
w ou ld  a ls o  c o v e r  th e  R a s s a s i S u l t a n a te  o f  B e id h a .  The 
e n t e r p r i s e  was f o o lh a r d y ;  B u ry  c o u ld  p r o b a b ly  have made 
th e  jo u r n e y  a lo n e ;  b u t  M a i t l a n d  was f o r t u n a t e  t h a t  th e  
p a r t y  r e t u r n e d  f ro m  D a th in a .  M a i t l a n d  b lam ed th e  s e tb a c k  
on th e  E u ra s io n  s u r v e y o r ,  M r.  C la u d iu s ,  r e f u s i n g  t o  
continue * . . .  a f t e r  one o f  h i s  s u b - s u r v e y o r s  was k i l l e d
(1 ) LA, B u ry * s  R e p o r t  o f  10. 1 . 0*+ a d m i t t e d  t h a t  th e  A h l  
Hassana had r e fu s e d  h im  passage on th e  7 th
( 2) La , Res -  F o r .D e p t ,  ( r )  S o f  S, 17. 1 . 0*+
9.110
.,. at long range . ..* on January 8th (1).
+ + + + +
The survey of the Haushabi areas was completed 
quickly and without Anglo-0ttoman friction; but the 
frail truce between Maitland and Wahab collapsed again.
The Haushabi Sultan1s methods of controlling his 
tribes 1... were not altogether such as would commend 
themselves to a British officer but British
-olicy was !... to interfere as little as possible with 
Chiefs .. . 1 . Wahab1s 1... well-meant exhortations to 
the Haushabi ... 1 on behalf of the Amri tribesmen were 
embarrassing (2). Wahab was politely asked to mind his 
own business. Maitland (3) and Wahab (h) each gave their 
own version of the affair. Wahab implied that the
(1) AIA C 3h, Res - For.Dept., ih.l.Oh
(2) AIA C 35, Res - Wahab, 13.2.Oh
(3) AIA C 35, Res - SGB, 13.2.Oh
(h) AIA C 35? Wahab - Res, 18.2.Oh, commenting on Res letter
to SGB of 13.2.Oh & LA, Wahab - Sec, P & S Dept.,
India Office, 5*2.Oh
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Eaushall chief1s ill-health incapacitated him as a 
ruler, and that his methods alienated his tribesmen. 
Meantime, Wahab had invited the Amir of Dhala, paying 
him a farewell visit, to remain as the Commissioners1 
unofficial tribal adviser (1). Wahab also began to 
criticise Maitland1s preparations for the Commission's 
security in Subaihi territory (2). Maitland answered 
Wahab's criticism (3).
The Subaihi boundary delimitation was a hurried 
affair; existing maps of the area were inadequate; 
and there was no paramount Shaikh; but Maitland had 
orders to complete the survey during the cool weather (4). 
As a result, the boundary cut through some tribal 
sections’ territory (5). The intention was to demarcate 
a border; and no new treaties were made. Maitland 
was disillusioned; he was 1... being turned out in
(1) AIA C 35 D/0 Ees - Sir Louis Dane, 20.2.04-
(2) AIA C 35? iahab - Res, 27.1.04- & tel Wahab - For.Dept.
(3) AIA C 35? tel Res - For.Dept., 30.1.04-
(4) p.9.105 n.3
(5) L/P&S/10/15 f 539? Minute sheet of 22.2.06
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June ...1; he believed Wahab to 1... be a little off 
his head ...' (1); and he now saw no benefit from 
demarcating a Subaihi border which the British could 
not control (2). Maitland was, originally, content 
that Wahab should conduct all negotiations with the 
Subaihis and ’dictate1 the military arrangements, 
provided that no fighting occurred (2). Minor fighting
occurred early; the small Khalifi section, uninformed
of the survey’s coming by Wahab1s 'tribal adviser1, 
the Amir, fired on the Commission. One of their towers 
was destroyed in retaliation; the Amir departed for 
Dhala; and Wahab blamed the incident variously on the 
Amir, or on intrigue by the Haushabi, or Abdali, Sultans (3). 
Wahab also blamed the Abdali Sultan, probably with reason, 
for earlier Government differences with the Matarfi,
Makhdumi and Mansouri sections (4).
In Wahab's view, the Abdali chief poisoned the
(1) AIA C 35 D/0 Maitland - Bdgerly (SGB), 31.1.04
Sir Louis
(2) AIA C 35 D/0 Maitland -/Dane, 31.1.04
(3) AIA C 35, Bury - Res:, 14.2.04
(4) AIA C 35, Wahab - Res, 10.2.04
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Residency against his Subaihi neighbours. In Bury!s 
view, Wahab was too undiseriminating in assessing 
intelligence (1), Towards the end of February, Maitland 
visited Wahab in camp; the Commissioners were camping 
separately from the Political Staff, because of the 
shortage of water and grazing. During a return visit 
by Wahab, Maitland gave Wahab his views !... pretty 
freely He criticised Wahab, f... the most
egotistical and conceited person Fast of Suez 
who 1... always looked on himself as a heaven born 
political (2). It irritated Maitland that Wahab
should * ... pose as having a far superior acquaintance 
with the Arabs ...1. The Chief Secretary in Bombay 
sympathised with Maitland1s views; he believed the 
Foreign Department were f... tired of the Egotism . ..' 
of Wahab (3).
+ + + + +
(1) AIA C 35, Bury - Maitland, 12.2.01*
(2) AIA C 35, D/0 Maitland - Edgerley, 28.2.0^ -
(3) AIA C 35, D/0 Edgerley - Maitland, 10.3.0)+
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S.W. Edgerley, in principle, supported Maitland*s 
wish for a permanent Political Officer at Dhala, for 
raising a tribal lev^y for service in the hinterland 
and other measures for extending British influence 
outside Aden; but he wished to go slowly (1). He 
believed that patience would bring this, even though 
’... the India Office ... were altogether opposed to 
any development outside Aden ...*. Lord Lamington, 
the Governor of Bombay, also supported Maitland; he 
asked Curzon to approve the Dhala Political Officer and 
an increased subsidy for the Amir, before Curzon went on 
leave (2). Lamington continued his pressure and claimed 
that Curzon, who was his personal friend, had accepted 
Maitland*s proposal (3). Maitland had stayed with 
Lamington in May. On 23rd. September 190)+, the Dhala 
political appointment was approved for a year; it was 
later made into a permanent appointment (*+). A brief
(1) p.9.113 n.3
(2) LPy Heel 675, Lamington - Curzon, 19.*+.0)+
(3) LP, Lamington - Ag. Viceroy, Lord Ampthill, 31*5.0+ 
()+) M.P.,(M931+) para 21 of the 1901-05 Admin. Report
•forward1 policy in the hinterland had begun. It was 
cancelled by Lord Morley as Secretary of State in 1906
+ +  +  +  •+*
Subaihi territory was lacking in water supplies 
and sparsely inhabited with difficult terrain. Wahab 
could not work there quickly enought to satisfy 
Maitland. By April, Wahab had reached the south-west 
corner; he asked Maitland for information on the 
original Ottoman occupation of Shaikh Said (1); and, 
when that was not forthcoming from the Residency, he 
suggested asking the India Office (2). Probably Wahab 
wished to dislodge the Ottomans to make Perim more 
secure. To bring more pressure upon the Ottoman 
Commissioners, Wahab asked for reinforcements to his 
escort, including artillery. Maitland refused, becaus 
the gunners in widen were British. By 17th April, 
Maitland decided to withdraw all British troops from
a) p.3.1 - 3.5
(2) AIA C 35, Wahab - Res, 10.lh.05-
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Subaihi country, because of the hot weather. Wahab 
was informed that the Commission would, thenceforward, 
be supplied by sea, replacing land communications (1).
The Ottomans objected to the British claim to the 
Atifi section; the Atifis had claimed to be under 
Ottoman suzerainty in 1871 (2). The Ottomans now 
reproached the Atifis for ’associating*, as Wahab 
indignantly described it, ‘with Infidels’ (3). The 
disadvantages of a hasty, arbitrary, Subaihi border, 
cutting across nomadic tribal grazing grounds, now 
became obvious. The British and Ottoman Commissioners 
disagreed about the coastal limits. The Ottomans claimed 
the Atifis* coastline; Maitland had advised that the 
Atifis were within the Ottomans’ eastern coastal limits 
in 1901; and control of the Atifis was important to the 
Ottomans, because the anchorage of Ras al Ara, used by 
arms and tobacco smugglers, would then have come under 
their control. But the British Commissioners counter-
(1) AIA C 35, Res - Wahab, 22^.0^
(2) p.2.53 n.3
(3) L /P & S /1 0 /1 5  f 85, Wahab - 10, Ik.5.Ob
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claimed a border line from Mudariba to Kuddam on the 
Red Sea, taking in Hakimi territory, recognised as Ottoman 
since before 1870 (1).
01Connor proposed, on August 11th, to renounce 
any claims along the Red Sea, provided that the Ottomans 
accepted a line running from Mudariba to Ras Turba, placing 
the Atifi within British limits, as well as the inclusion 
of additional Ottoman-claimed Yafai dependencies north 
east of the Shaihi border (2). These included the 
Rubatain area (3)* Wrangling however continued, from the 
autumn of 190*+ (*+), until 21st April. The Porte was 
reluctant to concede British demands recognising any 
boundary ’north-east* of Shaibi territory ’to the desert’; 
instead, Britain was offered control of the Red Sea 
coast up to Kuddam, but excluding Shaikh Said, on 
December 30th, 190*+ (5). Mo mention was made of any
(1) p.3.2 n.3
(2) IOL, F0 Memo B156 of 11 Dec 1905, printed March '06
(3) P.9.103 n.3
(*+) LA (L/P&S/9/61), Fitzmaurice, Perim - For.Dept, (r)
S o f  S, 6 .11 .0 *+
(5) B0 78 5lK39, tel HEM C d’A, C ’ple - F0
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d e l i m i t a t i o n  t o  th e  d e s e r t ;  b u t  an u n d e r ta k in g  was 
made t h a t  n e i t h e r  c o u n t r y  s h o u ld  send t r o o p s  i n t o  th e  
'N in e  C a n to n s ' ;  and th e  P o r te  u n d e r to o k  t o  cede no 
t e r r i t o r y  t o  a t h i r d  P ow er. The F o r e ig n  O f f i c e  r e j e c t e d  
th e  O ttom an p r o p o s a ls  ( 1 ) .  On 7t h  F e b ru a r y ,  B r i t a i n  
o f f e r e d  t o  d e m a rca te  th e  b o rd e r  f ro m  M u d a r ib a  t o  
S h a ik h  M urad ( 2) .  B r i t a i n  re s e rv e d  h e r  r i g h t  t o  move 
t r o o p s  w i t h i n  th e  l i m i t s  o f  th e  N ine  C a n to n s , w h i l e  
n o t in g  th e  P o r t e ' s  i n t e n t i o n  n o t  t o  do so . The P o r te  
was w arned  t h a t ,  f a i l i n g  A n g lo -O t to m a n  a g re e m e n t,
B r i t a i n  w o u ld  d e c l i n e  f u r t h e r  n e g o t i a t i o n s  and ta k e  
a p p r o p r i a t e  u n i l a t e r a l  m easures t o  d e f in e  th e  b o r d e r ,  
and t o  m a in t a in  h e r  r i g h t s .
A f t e r  F i t z m a u r i c e ' s r e t u r n  to  Aden, and a 
d e m o n s t r a t io n  o f  'm o r a l*  n a v a l  f o r c e ,  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  
B r i t i s h  C om m iss ion , th e  P o r te  gave way and a c c e p te d  th e  
B r i t i s h  d e m a rc a t io n  l i n e s ,  w h i le  th e  B r i t i s h  d e le te d  
a n y  r e fe r e n c e  to  O ttom an f o r c e s  u n d e r t a k in g  n o t  t o  e n t e r  
th e  N in e  C a n to n s .  B u t th e  P o r te  m a in ta in e d  some
(1 )  FO 78 5V+0, t e l  FO -  HBM C ' p l e ,  9 . 1 . 0 5
(2), FO 78 51A 0 ,  t e l  FO -  HBM C 'p le
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r e s e r v a t i o n s .  The b o u n d a ry ,  was ' . . .  g e n e r a l l y  i n  a 
l i n e  n o r t h - e a s t  f ro m  Lakm et es Shab t o  th e  d e s e r t  .
No m e n t io n  was made o f  B e ih a n ,  w i t h  w h ic h  th e  B r i t i s h  
now had a t r e a t y ,  w h ic h  had n o t  been a c c u r a t e l y  mapped. 
N or was any  r e fe r e n c e  made t o  B e id h a ,  w here  th e  
R e s id e n t  had  been a u t h o r i s e d  t o  c o n c lu d e  a T r e a t y  w i t h  
th e  R a s s a s i S u l t a n .
I t  was n o t  t i l l  2 6 th  A p r i l  t h a t  a d e s p a tc h  f ro m  
P e r im  i s l a n d  r e p o r t e d  t h a t ,  a f t e r  's t r e n u o u s  
n e g o t i a t i o n s '  ' . . .  t h e  300 m i l e s  f r o n t i e r  be tw een  th e  
Aden P r o t e c t o r a t e  and Yemen . . . '  f ro m  th e  g r e a t  A r a b ia n  
d e s e r t  t o  P o in t  M urad on th e  G u l f  o f  Aden . . . '  had 
been ' s a t i s f a c t o r i l y '  s e t t l e d  (1 ) .  The d e s p a tc h  f ro m  
C o n s ta n t in o p le  on 29t h  A p r i l  was s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
d i f f e r e n t ;  t h a t  re c o rd e d  th e  f i x i n g  o f  ' t h e  W e s te rn  
and N o r th e r n  f r o n t i e r  o f  th e  Aden H in t e r l a n d  i n  th e  
d i r e c t i o n  o f  th e  d e s e r t  . . . '  f ro m  th e  R iv e r  Bana s o u th ­
w e s t t o  S h a ik h  M urad (2) .  The O ttom ans were n o t  
p re p a re d  t o  a d m it  o f  any  e x te n s io n  o f  th e  b o r d e r  t o
(1 )  The T im e s , 27.b-.05
( 2) The T im e s , 1 . 5 * 0 5
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*the d e s e r t  w h ic h  w o u ld  b a r  t h e i r  a cce ss  e a s tw a rd s .  
In d e e d ,  S u l t a n  A b d u l H am id , n o t  u n e x p e c te d ly  ( l ) ,  
n e v e r  r a t i f i e d  t h e  B o u n d a ry  A g re em e n t. I n s t e a d ,  t h e r e  
was an A n g lo  O ttom an exchange o f  n o te s ,  maps o f  th e  
f r o n t i e r  and o f  t h e  1p r o c e s - v e r b a l ' , exchanged be tw een  
t h e  C o m m iss io n e rs  ( 2 ) ;  and b y  1914 t h e  B r i t i s h  c o p ie s  
o f  th e s e  docum ents had been l o s t  ( 3 ) .
+ + + + + +
The P o r te  had n e g o t ia t e d  f ro m  a p o s i t i o n  o f  
i n c r e a s in g  w eakness : t h e  a n n u a l d e a t h t o l l  o f  t r o o p s  
i n  t h e  Yemen was e s t im a te d  a t  1 0 ,0 0 0  a y e a r ,  w i t h  a 
m i l i t a r y  e x p e n d i tu r e  o f  £500,000 p . a . ,  d u r in g  th e  S a id i  
r e v o l t  f ro m  1902 ( 4 ) .  The Yemen d is tu r b a n c e s  e n cou rag ed  
' . . . d i s c o n t e n t  among t h e  w h o le  A rab  p o p u la t i o n  o f  t h e
( l )  See p.$ . 2 6  n . 3
( 2 ;  LIP, M934, O 'C o n n o r -  S i r  Edward G-rey, 7 . 2 . 0 6
( 3 ;  70 1 9 5 /2 4 5 6 /8 4 ,  70 -  HBMA C ' p l e ,  1 9 .1 .1 4
( 4 )  IOL P i l e  5 7 /1 9 0 5 ,  HBMA C 'P le  -  PO, 2 4 .7 .0 7
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n e ig h b o u r in g  r e g io n s  . . . *  ( 1 ) .  D e s e r te r s  f ro m  o th e r  
A ra b  a re a s  c ro s s e d  i n t o  th e  B r i t i s h  zone th r o u g h o u t  
th e  p e r io d .  Some were j u n i o r  o f f i c e r s  ( 2) .  
R e in fo rc e m e n ts  had t o  be s e n t  f ro m  T u rk e y  i n  E u rope  
t o  th e  Yemen; B u lg a r ia  w a tch e d  th e s e  t r o o p  movements 
f w i t h  c o n s id e r a b le  i n t e r e s t 1 ( 3 ) ;  and th e  Yemen 
o p e r a t io n s  w ere  u n p o p u la r  i n  T u rk e y  (3) «
(1) p.9.120 n.k
( 2 )  BSC 1 9 0 0 /0 2 ,  Wahab1s BG d i a r y  o f  1 1 .8 .0 2 ,  fo rw a rd e d  
Res -  3 o f  S, 18. 8.02
(3 ) I0 L  F i l e  5 7 /1 9 0 5 , HBMA C ’ p l e  -  FO, 2 ^ .5 . ,0 5
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S e c t io n  LO. A d e n ’ s G a r r is o n  and R e s id e n c y  S t a f f
Commander S.B. H a in e s  had c o n s id e re d  Aden t o  be 
th e  b e s t  s i t e  on th e  Bombay Suez m a i l  r o u t e  f o r  a c o a l i n g  
s t a t i o n .  H a in e s  s ta te d  t h a t  Aden c o u ld  be made 
im p re g n a b le .  The ‘ f o r t r e s s  o f  A d e n ’ d id  r e s i s t  Yemeni 
a t t a c k s  i n  1839? 18*4-0 , 18*+1 and l8*+6; b u t  l o c a l  
a s s a i l a n t s  la c k e d  a r t i l l e r y  and seapow er. A d e n 's  
' f o r t r e s s '  was c e n t r e d  on th e  I s th m u s ;  t h e r e ,  th e  
a r r i s o n ,  th e  O rd /n a n ce  and C o m m is s a r ia t  s t o r e s ,  t h e  
fo o d  re s e r v e s  and o th e r  e s s e n t i a l  s u p p l ie s  were c o n c e n t r a te d .  
The c a p tu r e ,  o r  d i s l o y a l t y > o f  C r a t e r ' s  l o c a l  p o p u la t i o n  
c o u ld  n o t  a p p r e c ia b ly  weaken th e  g a r r i s o n  ( 1 ) .  B u t  th e  
g a r r i s o n  c o u ld  n o t  se cu re  A d e n 's  h a r b o u r ,  o r  th e  c o a l  
d e p o t ,  th e  r a i s o n s  d ' e t r e  f o r  th e  B r i t i s h  p re s e n c e .  T h e i r  
s e c u r i t y  depended upon th e  I n d ia n  Navy u n t i l  1863? and on 
th e  R o y a l Navy t h e r e a f t e r .  By th e  l 8 6 0 ' s ,  B r i t a i n  had  
s e a g o in g  i r o n c l a d s  ( 2 ) ;  t h e r e  were  50 i n  1872 a g a in s t
(1 )  L/Mll/7/6*+*+-6*4-9? Q u o ta t io n  f ro m  L o rd  Harding*? s
Memo o f  22 .6 .*+7  i n  C o l .  J e r v o i s ’ R e p o r t
(2 )  J . R . U . S . I .  V o l  XVI o f  1872 p . 58 ‘ M odern S h ip s  o f  War*
b y  th e  A s s i s t a n t  C o n s t r u c to r  o f  t h e  Navy
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3*+ F re n c h  ( 1 ) ;  and B r i t i s h  s h ip s  had more guns and o f  a
h e a v ie r  c a l i b r e  th a n  th e  F re n c h  ( 1 ) .  I n  1876 , th e
Ottomans w i t h  26 i r o n c l a d s ,  were p r o b a b ly  th e  f o u r t h
m ost p o w e r fu l  f l e e t ,  on p a p e r ;  b u t  t h e i r  s h i p s ’ a rm o u r
was th e  t h e n - o b s o le t e  *44-" p l a t i n g  and much o f  t h e i r  f l e e t
re m a in e d  i n  h a rb o u r  ( 2 ) .  The R o y a l Navy c o u ld  d o m in a te
any  s in g le  a d v e r s a r y  b u t  m ig h t  n o t  be a b le  t o  m a in t a in
and
B r i t i s h  n a v a l  suprem acy i n  H o m e ^ In d ia n  w a te rs  
s im u l t a n e o u s ly .  I f  B r i t a i n  l o s t  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  M e d i te r r a n e a n ,  
a f t e r  th e  o p e n in g  o f  th e  Suez C a n a l,  M a u r i t i u s  was, 
i n i t i a l l y ,  c o n s id e re d  t o  be a more v i t a l  n a v a l  base th a n  
Aden; b u t  l a t e r  t h a t  v ie w  changed and A d e n 's  v a lu e  was 
re c o g n is e d .
G e n e ra l S i r  W i l l i a m  M a n s f ie ld ,  C. i n  C. o f  th e  
Bombay Arm y, re c o g n is e d  i n  1862 t h a t  A d e n 's  h a rb o u r  and 
c o a l  d e p o ts  c o u ld  be c a p tu re d  b y  a n a v a l  'c o u p  de m a in '
(1 )  J . R . U . S . I .  V o l  XVI o f  18 72 , p . 58 6 /5 87  and 5 9 V 5 9 5 ,
W. V e rn o n  H a r c o u r t ,  Q .C . ,M .P . ,  1 5 * 5 .7 2
( 2) J . R . U . S . I .  V o l  XX 1876 , p . 3*4-6, L t .  C o l .  C .E .H .  V in c e n t  
"T h e  T u r k is h  F o rc e s  and th e  E a s te rn  Q u e s t io n  " ,  1 *4-. 2 .76
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im m e d ia te ly  a f t e r  a d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  w a r .  F o r e ig n  n a v a l  
sq u a d ro n s  and e s ta b l i s h m e n ts  ' . . .  i n  th e  E a s te r n  Seas . . . '  
had th e  s t r e n g t h  f o r  t h a t  ( 1 ) .  A s in g le  m odern 5° gun 
f r i g a t e  w i t h  r i f l e d  guns c o u ld  o u t ra n g e  and o u tg u n  th e  
19 sm ooth b o re  g u n s , w h ic h  w ere  th e  d e fe n c e  o f  A d e n 's  
h a r b o u r  ( 1 ) .  The h a rb o u r  e n t ra n c e  a t  S team er P o in t  was 
a b o u t  6,500 yds w id e ,  w i t h  deep w a te r  c lo .se u n d e r  th e  
L i t t l e  Aden s h o re .  R .N . C h a r ts  o f  th e  c o a s t l i n e  i n  i 860, 
were r e a d i l y  a v a i l a b l e .  Aden h a r b o u r  was known, and 
v u l n e r a b le ,  t o  f o r e i g n  n a v ie s .  B u t  w i t h o u t  h e a v y  
e x p e n d i t u r e ,  and a l a r g e r  g a r r i s o n ,  l i t t l e  c o u ld  be done 
t o  p r e v e n t  an enemy la n d in g  on th e  many s m a l l  s h e l t e r e d  
bays  a ro u n d  th e  p e n in s u la ,  o r  on L i t t l e  Aden. Aden 
needed n a v a l  p r o t e c t i o n .  I n s t e a d ,  a new b a t t e r y  was b u i l t  
t o  c o v e r  H o lk a t  B ay , a 'b a c k  e n t r a n c e '  t o  C r a t e r ;  th e  
M a in  Pass e n t ra n c e  t o  C r a te r  was s t r e n g th e n e d  and a b r id g e  
was b u i l t  o v e r  t h a t  pass t o  g iv e  th e  g a r r i s o n  g r e a t e r  
m o b i l i t y  ( 2) .
(1 )  IOL L /M I1 /& /6 M + -6 *+ 9 , q u o t in g  M a n s f i e l d ' s  M in u te  o f  
2 1 .1 0 .6 2  on A c t in g  Res, Maj . Gen. R.W. H o n n o r 's  
R e p o r t  o f  1 . 9 . 6 2  on A d e n 's  d e fe n c e s
(2) AaR 1867/68
lO . l f
L o rd  Mayo v i s i t e d  Aden and to u r e d  i t s  d e fe n c e s  w i t h  
L o rd  N a p ie r  o f  M agda la  on December 8t h  and 9t h ,  1868 .
C o lo n e l  S i r  O .T . Burne was th e n  L o rd  M a y o 's  P r i v a t e  
S e c r e t a r y ;  he had been M i l i t a r y  S e c r e ta r y  t o  th e  Commander- 
i n - C h i e f  i n  1861- 62. The G o ve rn o r  G e n e ra l D e s ig n a te 1s 
p a r t y  had e a r l i e r  v i s i t e d  th e  Suez C a na l W orks w i t h  
M o n s ie u r  de L e s s e p s ;  and t h e y  a c c e p te d  t h a t  th e  Suez C ana l 
was g o in g  t o  be opened . O f f i c i a l  B r i t i s h  o p in io n  had te n d e d  
t o  o v e r e s t im a te  th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  L o rd  Mayo summed up h i s  
c o n c lu s io n s  i n  a p r i v a t e  Memo w r i t t e n  a b o a rd  s h ip  a f t e r  
le a v in g  Aden ( 1 ) .  Aden was u n d e fe n d e d  a g a in s t  modern 
w a rs h ip s  and m odern a r t i l l e r y ;  i r o n - p l a t e d  m o n i t o r s  
and some h e a vy  a r t i l l e r y  w o u ld  be th e  c h e a p e s t  and m os t 
e f f e c t i v e  d e fe n c e ;  th e  s e t t le m e n t  w o u ld  g ro w , as a 
r e s u l t  o f  th e  new C a n a l,  t o  a t o m  o f  *4-0,000 p e o p le  ( 2 ) ,  
and i t  w o u ld  need an a d e q u a te  w a te r  s u p p ly ;  l o c a l  
c i v i l i a n  la b o u r  s h o u ld  have a new tow n  beyond th e  p r e s e n t  
s e t t le m e n t  ( 3 ) ;  L i t t l e  Aden s h o u ld  be a c q u i r e d ;  a
(1 ) IO L , L/M il/7 /6*4-*+-6*+9, A p p e n d ix  I X
( 2) See G raph E; p o p u la t i o n  re a c h e d  a b o u t  1905
(3) P.7.5 n.2
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r a i lw a y  should l i n k  th e  Is th m u s  d e fe n c e s  w i t h  S team er 
P o in t ;  and A d e n 's  d e fe n c e s  needed im m e d ia te  a t t e n t i o n .
Mayo b e l ie v e d  t h a t  a new d e fe n c e  scheme, t o  c o v e r  th e  
h a rb o u r  e n t r a n c e ,  S team er P o in t , a n d  th e  c o a l  d e p o ts ,  
m ig h t  be a te m p o ra ry  s o l u t i o n .  M a jo r  G e n e ra l E . L .  R u sse ll,  
t h e  R e s id e n t ,  had a l r e a d y  r a i s e d  m os t o f  th e s e  p o in t s  ( 1 ) .  
L o rd  N a p ie r  p re s s e d  f o r  a c t i o n  ( 2 ) ;  and h i s  a p p o in tm e n t  
as G. i n  G. I n d i a  f ro m  I 87O - I876 may have h a s te n e d  
a c t i o n .
A C o m m itte e , consisting o f  M a jo r  G e n e ra l S i r  WL 
M e re w e th e r ,  M a jo r  G e n e ra l E.L. R u s s e l l  and C a p ta in  J .  Mahon, 
R.A., was a p p o in te d  t o  r e p o r t  on th e  d e fe n c e s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  
th e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  th e  P o r t ,  th e  C r a te r  and L i t t l e  Aden ( 3 ) .  
T h e i r  r e p o r t  was s u b m it te d  on M arch  5 t h .  They p ro p o s e d  
fe w e r ,  b u t  l a r g e r ,  guns and a g a r r i s o n ,  d o u b le d  i n  s i z e ,  
o f  2 ,5 0 0  men (*+). They w a n ted  th e  E u ro pe an  -  b u t  n o t  th e
(1 )  AAR 1 8 6 7 /6 8 ,  p a ra  12
(2 )  IO L , L / K I I / 7/ 6M+—6*+9, M in u te  d a te d  26. 2.69
(3 )  IO L , L / K l l / 7 / 6 1+1+ -6*+9, Bombay G o v t .  Res 239 o f  5 * 2 .7 °
(*+) IO L , L / M i l / 7 / 6 l flf-6*+9, p a ra  *+9 o f  t h e i r  R e p o r t
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I n d i a n  -  t r o o p s  to  be is s u e d  w i t h  b r e e c h - lo a d in g  r i f l e s  ( 1 ) .  
The absence  o f  a n a v a l  o f f i c e r  on th e  C om in ittee  was 
p r o b a b ly  a m is t a k e ;  and th e  p re s e n c e  o f  th e  R e s id e n t  
and his p re d e c e s s o r  p o s s ib l y  w e ig h te d  th e  C o m m it te e 's  
v ie w s  i n  f a v o u r  o f  th e  R e s id e n c y 's  l o c a l  m i l i t a r y  and 
p o l i t i c a l  r e q u i r e m e n ts  and a g a in s t  p u r e l y  d e fe n s iv e  
m easures  a g a in s t  s e a -b o rn e  a t t a c k s .  M e re w e th e r  had 
a d v o c a te d  c o n t r o l  o f  th e  c o a s t a l  p l a i n  t o  p r e v e n t  t r i b a l  
r a i d i n g  ( 2) ;  and a l a r g e r  g a r r i s o n  w ou ld  be a v a i l a b l e  
i n  p e a c e t im e  t o  s u p p o r t  th e  Aden T ro o p  i n l a n d .
The S e c r e ta r y  t o  the G overnm ent o f  Bom bay 's  P u b l i c  
f o r k s  D e p a r tm e n t ,  C o lo n e l  M .K . K ennedy, R .E . ,  c r i t i c i s e d  
the C o m m it te e 's  p r o p o s a ls  f o r  ' l a r g e  e x p e n d i tu r e *  t o  make 
Aden ' . . .  an a lm o s t  im p re g n a b le  s t r o n g h o ld  . . . '  ( 3 ) .  Re 
saw no 'u r g e n t  g ro u n d s '  f o r  a c t i o n .  He b e l ie v e d  t h a t  
A d e n 's  v a lu e  as a c o a l i n g  s t a t i o n  f o r  I n d ia n  m a i l  s h ip s
(1 )  IO L , AM R e e l 318 , L o rd  H a l i f a x  -  Duke o f  A r g y l l ,  22.1.69. 
A t o p i c a l  s u b je c t  o f  c o n t r o v e r s y ,  s in c e  A r g y l l  was 
opposed to  I n d ia n  t r o o p s  h a v in g  b r e e c h - lo a d e r s
(2) p. 2.8 n. 1
( 3 ) IO L , L/K11/7/6M-1--6R9, M in u te  d a te d  IO.5.70
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m ig h t  d e c l i n e .  The o p e n in g  o f  t h e  c a n a l m ig h t  a l l o w  
c o a l  t o  be d e l i v e r e d  c o m p e t i t i v e l y  t o  Suez v i a  th e  C a n a l;  
and d e v e lo p m e n ts  i n  m a r in e  e n g in e e r in g  a l lo w e d  s te a m e rs  
t o  c a r r y  12 t o  I 1}- days  c o a l  s u p p ly .  Such s te a m e rs  m ig h t  
n o t  need t o  c o a l  a t  Aden. Aden was f a r  o f f  t h e  t r a c k  
o f  v e s s e ls  u s in g  th e  Red Sea and th e  C a n a l,  and n o t  
t o u c h in g  a t  Aden. P e r im  was a more s t r a t e g i c  n a v a l  base 
t o  command th e  s o u th e rn  e n t ra n c e  t o  th e  Red Sea. Kennedy 
fa v o u re d  s t r o n g  d e fe n s iv e  w o rk s  i n  P e r im , w i t h  two h e a vy  
m o n i to r s  based t h e r e ,  t o  c o v e r  t h e  12 m i le  w id e  S t r a i t s .  
He p ro p o se d  tw o  18 t o n  guns on each 11 k n o t  m o n i t o r .
18 t o n  guns had a ra n g e  o f  j u s t  o v e r  2\  m i l e s  (1 ) .
Kennedy d id  n o t  d e a l  w i t h  th e  p ro b le m  o f  w a te r in g  a 
g a r r i s o n  on P e r im ;  and h i s  p r o p o s a ls  d id  n o t h in g  t o  
im p ro v e  th e  d e fe n c e  o f  A d e n 's  c o a l  d e p o t  f ro m  an enemy 
a l r e a d y  i n  th e  I n d ia n  Ocean. Kennedy th o u g h t  such an 
a s s a u l t  u n l i k e l y .  L o rd  M a y o 's  C o u n c i l ,  h o w e v e r ,  
recommended th e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  a m o n i t o r  f o r  A d e n 's  d e fe n c e
(1 )  J . R . U . S . I .  V o l  XVI o f  1 8 72 , p .  58 "M o d e rn  S h ip s  o f  
W a r" ,  N. B a rn a b y , 2 9 .1 .7 2
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in August (1). In September, Lt. General A. Spence,
C. i n  C. Bombay Army, m in u te d  i n  f a v o u r  o f  th e  C o m m it te e 's  
p r o p o s a ls  and a g a in s t  C o lo n e l  K ennedy . B u t Spence a l s o  
p ro p o s e d  f o r t i f i c a t i o n s  t o  h o ld  P e r im .  M ea n t im e , 
im p ro v e d  9M r i f l e d  guns c o u ld  n o t  be m ounted on th e  
M o rb u t  and T a rs h a in e  F o r t s  because t h e i r  p l a t f o r m s  and 
c a r r i a g e s ,  o rd e re d  f ro m  E n g la n d ,  w ere  l a t e  i n  a r r i v i n g  ( 2) .
The Bombay Governm ent o f f e r e d  c o n f l i c t i n g  a d v ic e ,  
a p p l ie d  f o r  an E n g in e e r  o f f i c e r ,  f a m i l i a r  w i t h  ' . . .  th e  
l a t e s t  im p ro v e m e n ts  i n  th e  A r t i l l e r y  and th e  f o r m a t io n  
o f  b a t t e r i e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  f o r  H a rb o u r  d e fe n c e s ,  and whose 
ju d g e m e n t on such m a t te r s  may be t h o r o u g h ly  r e l i e d  
on . . . 1 (3). He was t o  r e p o r t  on A d e n 's ,  and B o m b a y 's ,  
n e e d s . C o lo n e l  J e r v o i s ,  C .B . ,  'D e p u ty  D i r e c t o r  o f  Works 
( F o r t i f i c a t i o n s )  and S e c r e ta r y  to  th e  W orks C om m ittee* 
was s e le c te d  by th e  I n d ia  O f f i c e .  J e r v o i s  had ' . . .  r e c e n t l y
(1 )  IO L , L /M il/7 /6 *+ *4—6*+9, Gov. i n  C o u n c i l  -  S o f  S, 1 9 .8 .7 0 ;
a c t i o n  p o s tp o n e d  b y  S o f  S, 2 0 .1 0 .7 0
(2 )  AAR 7 0 /7 1
(3) IO L , L / M i l / 7 / 6 U f - 6 ^ 9 >  B°  3 8 3 /2 0 2 0  MW o f  1 5 -1 0 .7 0  -  
C-ov. Gen. w i t h  e n c lo s u r e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  th e  c o n f l i c t i n g  
r e p o r t s
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s u rv e y e d  n a v a l  a r s e n a ls  i n  G re a t  B r i t a i n  and th e  C o lo n ie s  
. . . ’ (1). J e r v o i s ' r e p o r t  was re a d y  on *+th Jan ua ry^  1872.
I t  was p r i n t e d  i n  C a lc u t t a  on th e  25t h .  Over h a l f  t h e  
120 p a ra g ra p h  r e p o r t  d e a l t  w i t h  Aden. J e r v o i s  added 
s u g g e s t io n s  f o r  w o rk  a t  P e r im ,  i f  fu n d s  were a v a i l a b l e .
J e r v o i s  p ro p o se d  a d e fe n s iv e  'h o ld . 1 t o  c o v e r  
H e d j u f f  -  S team er P o in t  - R a s  M o rb u t  and Ras T a r s h a in e .
T h a t  w o u ld  se c u re  th e  a n c h o ra g e ,  th e  n a v a l  s to r e s  and 
th e  c o a l  d e p o ts .  J e r v o is  d o u b te d  w h e th e r  th e  f o r t i f i c a t i o n s  
c o u ld  b e a r  th e  f i r i n g  o f  t h e i r  e x i s t i n g  guns w i t h o u t  
c o l l a p s i n g .  He fa v o u re d  new b a t t e r i e s  p r o t e c t e d  b y  i r o n  
s h i e l d s ,  r a t h e r  th a n  t u r r e t s ;  s h ie ld s  were c o o le r  and 
th e  smoke and fumes w ou ld  c l e a r  away more q u i c k l y  a f t e r  
f i r i n g .  J e r v o i s  p ro p o se d  s h o re -b a s e d  to rp e d o  b a t t e r i e s  
t o  c o v e r  th e  m id d le  o f  t h e  Bay, and f a s t ,  s h a l lo w - d r a u g h t ,  
u n a rm o u re d , wooden g u n b o a ts ,  w i t h  1 8 - to n  gu ns , t o  c o v e r  
th e  f a r t h e r  s id e  o f  th e  h a rb o u r  to w a rd s  L i t t l e  Aden.
These b o a ts  w o u ld  s h e l t e r  f ro m  f i r e  i n  th e  s h a l lo w  w a te r  
n o r t h  o f  th e  L i t t l e  Aden p e n in s u la  u n t i l  r e q u i r e d .  The
(1) IOL, L/Mil/7/6*4f-6*+9? Argyll - Mayo 15*+ of 15.6.71
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s t r a t e g i c  la n d in g  p la c e  a t  T e le g ra p h  Bay, w here  th e  
t e le g r a p h  c a b le  came a s h o re ,  was t o  be c o v e re d  by  new 
p o s i t i o n s  on Ras T a r s h a in e .  O th e r  new, o r  a l t e r e d ,  
g u n p o s i t i o n s  w ere  on F l i n t  I s l a n d ,  on Ras M o rb u t ,  and 
on th e  H e d j u f f  -  S team er P o in t  r o a d .  J e r v o is *  p la n s  
r e q u i r e d  no in c r e a s e  i n  th e  g a r r i s o n 1s s t r e n g t h  b u t  more 
B u ro pe an  t r o o p s .  They c o s t  £*+2 p . a .  more p e r  s o l d i e r  
th a n  I n d ia n  t r o o p s .
M ayo ‘ s s u c c e s s o r ,  L o rd  N o r th b r o o k ,  had a copy  o f  
J e r v o i s  r e p o r t  on his voyage o u t .  A t  M a l ta  he met 
J e r v o i s  and d is c u s s e d  h i s  r e p o r t  ( 1 ) .  N o r th b r o o k  
c o n s id e re d  that i t  vould be 1. . .  o f  g r e a t  use . . . ,  th e  
o p in io n  . . .  o f  one o f  th e  b e s t  M i l i t a r y  E n g in e e rs  o f  t h i s  
o r  o f  a n y  o t h e r  c o u n t r y  . . . '  ( 2 ) .  N o r th b r o o k  d o u b te d  
t h e  w isdom  o f  i n c r e a s in g  I n d ia n  d e b ts  f o r  d e fe n c e  
e x p e n d i tu r e  on I n d ia n  m a in la n d  p o r t s  when he c o n s id e re d  
attacks u n l i k e l y ;  b u t  he was p re p a re d ,  a f t e r  more 
consideration, t o  s t r e n g th e n  A d e n ’ s seaward d e fe n c e s  ( 1 ) .
(1 )  IO L , AM R e e l 316, N o r th b r o o k  -  A r g y l l ,  27. i f.72
(2) NP, Northbrook - A r g y l l ,  if.if.72
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He was n o t  p re p a re d  t o  spend money on P e r im .  P e r im  was 
a l i a b i l i t y  w i t h o u t  B r i t i s h  c o n t r o l  o f  th e  sea . 
N o r t h b r o o k ’ s com prom ise was t o  a c c e p t  J e r v o i s ’ p la n s  
f o r  a ’ h o ld *  t o  c o v e r  S team er P o in t ,  b u t  t o  reject h i s  
p r o p o s a l  f o r  g u n b o a ts .  N o r th b r o o k  b e l ie v e d  t h a t  
a l t e r n a t i v e  f l o a t i n g  b a t t e r i e s  c o u ld  be im p r o v is e d  in 
an em ergency . These r e v i s e d  p la n s  were s t i l l  e s t im a te d  
t o  c o s t  £175,000, as a g a in s t  Jervois* £2if5,000, f o r  
e q u ip m e n t and c a p i t a l  expenditure (1). Probably Jervois’ 
report made Northbrook more aware o f  A d e n ’ s p r e c a r io u s  
d e fe n c e s  and t h e r e f o r e  more d e te rm in e d  to oppose Ottoman 
advances  s o u th w a rd s  i n  J a n u a ry  1873 (2).
Work p ro c e e d e d  s lo w ly  but c o n t in u o u s ly  i n  
s t r e n g th e n in g  the n a t u r a l  o b s t a c le s  be tw ee n  Ras T a rs h a in e  
and Ras M o rb u t  b y  e s c a rp m e n ts ,  u n t i l ,  by  1890, w o rk  i n  
that a re a  was ’ p r a c t i c a l l y  c o m p le te ’ ( 3 ) .  By 1877 , 
im p ro v e d  a r t i l l e r y  -  10 n in e  in c h  guns -  had been s i t e d
(1 ) L / M i l / 7 / 6 1+1+ -61+9, Bov. Gen. i n  C o u n c i l  No M+,
PW -  S o f  S, 2 8 .3 .7 6
( 2) 3 .2 7  -  3 .3 1
(3 ) aAR 90/ 91? p a ra  1^ +1
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as J e r v o i s  had s u g g e s te d  ( 1 ) ,  Cheap la b o u r  used  on th e  
f o r t i f i c a t i o n s  in c lu d e d  d e s t i t u t e  f r e e d  s la v e s ,  r e le a s e d  
by  th e  R o y a l Navy i n  Aden, and S o m a li  and Yemeni 
im m ig r a n ts .  By now, th e  B r i t i s h  no lo n g e r  f e a r e d  l o c a l  
a t t a c k s .  The m i l i t a r y  g u a rd  a t  th e  B a r r i e r  Gate was 
r e l i e v e d  i n  J a n u a ry ,  1882, b y  a s in g l e  p o l ic e m a n  (2).
B u t  Ad.en! s g a r r i s o n  s u f f e r e d  f ro m  in c r e a s in g  demands on 
i t s  s t r e n g t h  a f t e r  th e  B r i t i s h  o c c u p a t io n  o f  th e  S o m a li 
C o a s t  began i n  IB S 1* .  I n  1885? I n d ia n  t r o o p s  i n  Aden 
w e re  h a v in g  as l i t t l e  as two n i g h t s  p e r  week i n  bed , and 
t h e  t r o o p s 1 h e a l t h  s u f f e r e d  ( 3 ) .  By 1900, A d e n f s 
la n d w a rd  d e fe n c e s  rem a in ed  in a d e q u a te  t o  r e s i s t  an 
a t t a c k  s u p p o r te d  by  a r t i l l e r y  (*+).
+ + + + +
( 1 ) AAR 7 6 /7 7 ,  p a ra  38
( 2 ) AIA 885 , Res -  M a j . Gen. Commanding Aden B r ig a d e  
(The R e s id e n t )  1+ .1 .8 2  and 5*1»82
( 3 )  AAR 8V / 85 , S a n i t a r y  R e p o r t  by  th e  S u rg e o n , kth 
Bombay R i f l e s
C1* )  .a u to b io g ra p h y  o f  S i r  C^Moore C re a g h , London , 192^f, 
p .209 ( h e r e a f t e r  C reagh 1 A u to b io g r a p h y 1)
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S i r  B a r t l e  F r e r e  a d v is e d  th e  Duke o f  A r g y l l  i n  1873 
t h a t  th e  G o v e rn o r  G e n e ra l o f  I n d i a  needed a n a v a l  
a d v is e r  ( 1 ) .  F r e r e  r e c o g n is e d  t h a t  th e  c u t t i n g  o f  th e  
Suez C ana l had changed n a v a l  s t r a t e g y .  M e d i te r ra n e a n  
n a t i o n s  were now 10 days n e a r e r  th e  I n d ia n  Ocean th a n  
B r i t i s h  f l e e t s  i n  home w a te r s ;  and , i n  F r e r e 1s o p in io n ,  
th e  I n d ia n  Army was n o t  i n  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  s t a t e  t o  fa c e  
an i n v a s io n .  The C ana l c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  th e  in c r e a s e d  use 
o f  s te a m s h ip s ,  r e p la c in g  s a i l  v i a  th e  Cape, on th e  
E u ropean  r o u t e  t o  th e  E a s t .  So Aden became, l i k e  
G i b r a l t a r ,  M a l ta  and Hong Kong, a c o a l i n g  s t a t i o n ,  and 
an i m p e r i a l  n a v a l  base o f  p r im e  im p o r ta n c e .  B r i t a i n  
c o u ld  n o t  d e fe n d  a l l  h e r  c o lo n ie s  m i l i t a r i l y ,  b u t  i t  
was th e  B r i t i s h  i n t e n t i o n ,  b y  1891? t o  keep th e  B r i t i s h  
n a vy  a t  a s t r e n g t h  a t  l e a s t  e q u a l t o  a n y  o t h e r  two Powers 
com b in ed . F o r t r e s s e s  l i k e  A d e n ! s were o n l y  r e q u i r e d  t o  
h o ld  o u t  u n t i l  r e l i e v e d  b y  B r i t i s h  s e a -p o w e r .
+  -h +  +  +
(1) AM Reel 318, Frere - Argyll, 31-5.73
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B r i t i s h  i n f l u e n c e  i n  th e  G u l f  o f  Aden had depended 
upon th e  In d ia n .  N avy, u n t i l  t h a t  f o r c e  was d is b a n d e d  i n  
I 863. I h e  R o y a l Navy c o u ld  n o t  p r o v id e  a w h o l l y  a d e q u a te  
s u b s t i t u t e ;  R .N . o f f i c e r s  la c k e d  th e  l o c a l  e x p e r ie n c e ,  
because p a r t i c u l a r  R .N . v e s s e ls  and o f f i c e r s  w ere  n o t  
r e t a in e d  i n  th e  I n d ia n  Ocean a r e a .  T h e re fo r e  th e  need  
was r e c o g n is e d  t o  p r o v id e  ' a c la s s  o f  o f f i c e r s  
p o s s e s s in g  l o c a l  kno w led ge  and e x p e r ie n c e  to  a i d  Her 
M a je s t y 1s N a v a l F o rc e s  when em p loyed  on th e  A ra b ia n  and 
P e rs ia n  C o a s ts  . . . '  ( 1 ) .  B u t  th e  Aden R e s id e n c y  s t a f f  
were n o t  in c r e a s e d .  Nor was th e  Aden R e s id e n c2/  a lw a y s  
a b le  t o  c a l l  on an R .N . v e s s e l  f o r  a s s is t a n c e .  P r e v io u s l y  
an I.N. v e s s e l  was s t a t io n e d  a t  Aden. R .N . s h ip s *  
c a p ta in s  w ere  a b le  t o ,  and som etim es d i d ,  r e fu s e  
R e s id e n c y  r e q u e s t s .  C o rre sp o n d e n ce  on r e c o n s t r u c t i n g  
th e  I n d ia n  N avy , t o  meet th e  G overnm ent o f  I n d i a ' s  needs 
f o r  w a r s h ip s ,  d i d  n o t  rem edy t h i s  ( 2) .
Aden R e s id e n ts  c o n s i s t e n t l y  u rg e d  th e  need t o  have
(1 )  LB, Gov. B° Wo 15  -  S o f  S, 2 8 .3 .6 6
(2 )  PRO, A d m i r a l t y  1 2 7 /1 1 .  C o rre sp o n d e n ce  on t h i s  i n
th e  f i l e  a p p e a rs  t o  be m is s in g
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a g u a rd  s h ip  a t  Aden a f t e r  th e  o p e n in g  o f  th e  Suez C a n a l.  
Even b e fo r e  t h a t ,  f o r e i g n ,  and p a r t i c u l a r l y  F re n c h ,  
w a rs h ip s  w ere  more f a m i l i a r  v i s i t o r s  to  Aden th a n  R.N. 
v e s s e ls .  A f t e r  th e  E g y p t ia n  o c c u p a t io n  o f  B e rb e ra  i n  
1873? E g y p t ia n  v e s s e ls  were th e  m os t f a m i l i a r  w a rs h ip s  
i n  th e  G u l f  o f  Aden. B r i g a d i e r  J .S .  S c h n e id e r  w arned  
t h a t ,  w i t h o u t  an Aden based R.N. s h ip ,  B r i t i s h  i n f l u e n c e  
i n  th e  a re a  w ou ld  d e c l i n e ,  an d , t h a t  th e  R e s id e n c y  w o u ld  
be u n a b le  t o  c o l l e c t  a c c u ra te  l o c a l  i n t e l l i g e n c e  (1) .  
S c h n e id e r 's  s u c c e s s o r ,  B r i g a d i e r  F .A .E .  L o c h , made th e  
same p o i n t s .  L o c h 's  p r o p o s a l  f o r  an Aden based w a rs h ip  
was opposed b y  th e  C. i n  C. E a s t  I n d ia  S t a t i o n ,  R e ar 
A d m i r a l  J .  C o r b e t t .  One p r o b a b ly  o b je c t i o n  was a n a v a l  
d i s l i k e  o f  R .N . s h ip s ,  more s u i t a b l e  f o r  c o o le r  c l im a t e s ,  
b e in g  k e p t  on th e  A ra b ia n  C o a s t ,  i n  summer ( 2) .  B u t  th e  
S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  c o n s id e re d  t h a t ;  'A  v e s s e l  o f  w ar o u g h t  
c e r t a i n l y  t o  be a lw a y s  a t  Aden q u i t e  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  any  
^unarm ed I n d ia n  M a r in e ]  v e s s e l  . . .  a t  th e  R e s id e n t ' s
(1 ) IO L , P & S 76 f  105 , Res -  SGB ( v )  S o f  S, I 7A .76
( 2 ) PRO A d m i r a l t y  127 /31?  A d m i r a l t y  No 95 -  R ear A dm l. W. 
J o n e s ,  9A . 80, r e f e r r i n g  t o  i l l  h e a l t h  a b o a rd  H .M .S . 
S e a g u l l  i n  summer 1879
Gore
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d is p o s a l  . . . ’ ( 1 ) .  T h a t ,  h o w e v e r ,  w o u ld  have r e q u i r e d  
w i th d r a w in g  one o f  th e  3 v e s s e ls  on d u t y  i n  th e  P e r s ia n  
G u l f ,  o r ,  i n c r e a s in g  th e  I n d ia n  a n n u a l g r a n t  o f  £70,000 
f o r  R .N . s h ip s  i n  ’ th e  I n d ia n  s e a s ’ ( 2 ) ,  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  
c a l l s  on th e  Navy e ls e w h e re  in c r e a s e d .  I n  1 8 8 ^ -1 8 8 6  
a v a i l a b l e  n a v a l  f o r c e s  were p re o c c u p ie d  w i t h  d e v e lo p m e n ts  
i n  th e  Sudan ( 3 ) -  S u b s e q u e n t ly ,  th e  Red Sea became th e  
c o n c e rn  o f  t h e  M e d i te r r a n e a n ,  n o t  o f  th e  M ast I n d ie s  
S t a t i o n  ( i f ) .
Prom 188*+, t h e r e  were a d d i t i o n a l  c a l l s  f o r  n a v a l  
a s s is ta n c e  on th e  S o m a li C o a s t .  S u f f i c i e n t  R .N . s h ip s  
w ere n o t  a v a i l a b l e  t o  p r o v id e  s u r v e i l l a n c e  o f  a l l  th e  
c o a s ts  o f  th e  G u l f  o f  Aden; and some f o r e i g n  w a rs h ip s  
w ere  welcomed l o c a l l y .  I n  1 8 9 3 ? th e  F re n c h  c r u i s e r ,  
’ R t o i l e * ,  ’ . . .  was -supposed t o  have  had u n a u th o r is e d  
d e a l in g s  w i t h  . . . '  th e  W a h id i c h i e f  o f  B a lh a f  ( 5 ) .  I n
(1 )  IO L , P & S, V o l  5? N o te  on th e  M in u te  S h e e t on 
Res -  SGB ( r )  S o f  S, 7 - 2 .7 9
(2 )  IO L , P & S, V o l  5 ? M in u te  a n s w e r in g  n . l  above
(3 )  PRO, A d m i r a l t y  127/ 3^
(^r) Navy L i s t s ,  p u b l is h e d  f o r  H .M .S .0 .
(5 )  PRO, A d m i r a l t y  127/19?  Bombay & Aden R e co rd s  1891-9*+*
R e p o r t  b y  Cmdr. o f  HMS L a pw in g  -  R r Adral W K Kennedy,
N.3-9 3 ..............................................
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th e  absence  o f  c lo s e  c o n ta c t  be tw e e n  th e  R e s id e n c y  and 
th e  c o a s t a l  p o p u la t i o n ,  th e  B r i t i s h  w ere  opposed t o  
v i s i t s  b y  B r i t i s h  o r  f o r e i g n  n a t i o n a l s  t o  S ou th  A r a b ia .
They re m a in e d ,  t h r o u g h o u t  th e  p e r io d ,  s e n s i t i v e  a b o u t  
f o r e i g n  n a v a l  a c t i v i t y ,  and th e  a c t u a l ,  o r  ru m o u re d , 
e s ta b l i s h m e n t  o f  l o c a l  f o r e i g n  n a v a l  b a s e s .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  
th e  Lo rds  o f  th e  A d m i r a l t y  a p p a r e n t l y  had r e s e r v a t i o n s  t o o ;  
th e y  d i d  n o t  w an t 1 . . .  to o  much pow er £ g iv e n j  t o  th e  
I n d ia n  G overnm ent . . . ‘ even o v e r  th e  fe w  I n d ia n  D e fe nce  
V e s s e ls  w i t h  t h e i r  I . M .  O f f i c e r s ,  w i t h  R .N .R . s t a t u s  ( 1 ) .  
C o n t r o l  o f  th o s e  v e s s e ls  was t o  re m a in  w i t h  ! th e  I m p e r i a l  
G o v e rn m e n t1 ( 2 ) .  I n  th e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  A d e n ’ s n a v a l  
r e q u i r e m e n ts  were u n l i k e l y  t o  be g iv e n  much a t t e n t i o n  
w h i l e  Aden re m a in e d  an I n d ia n  de pe nd en cy .
+  +  + +  ■+■
(1 )  PRO, A d m i r a l t y  127/ 20, Sec. A d m i r a l t y  -  R ear A d m ir a l  
S i r  E .R . F r e /m a n t le ,  27. i l . 9D
(2 )  PRO, A d m i r a l t y  127/ 20, R e p o r t  o f  J o i n t  A d m i r a l t y  and 
I n d i a  O f f i c e  C om m ittee  on M ann ing  th e  F lo a t i n g  D e fe n ce s  
o f  th e  I n d ia n  H a rb o u rs
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The Aden T roop
Aden a lw a y s  r e q u i r e d  l o c a l  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s u p p l ie s ;  
and s c u r v y  re m a in e d  a h a z a rd  t o  th e  g a r r i s o n  u n t i l  l im e  
j u i c e  was is s u e d  t o  th e  t r o o p s  ( 1 ) .  W h i le  th e  G overnm ent 
o f  Bombay d id  n o t  w an t t o  become in v o lv e d  i n  Yemeni 
p o l i t i c s ,  1 . . .  th e  b e s t  e x e r t i o n s  . . .  o f  th e  c i v i l  and 
m i l i t a r y  a u t  o r i t i e s  a t  Aden to  a d o p t  th e  m os t e f f e c t u a l  
means f o r  s e c u r in g  th e  p la c e  a g a in s t  a t t a c k ,  and f o r  
p r o t e c t i n g  as f a r  as p o s s ib le ,  t h e  s u p p l ie s  . . . ’ were 
r e c u i r e d  f ro m  1839 ( 2 ) .  Commander S .B . H a in e s  s u g g e s te d  
th e  use o f  c a v a l r y .  O n ly  c a v a l r y ,  o r  c a m e lr y ,  c o u ld  
p r o v id e  such an arm a g a in s t  sem i-nom ads. The G overnm ent 
o f  I n d i a  s u g g e s te d  t h a t  as an I r r e g u l a r  H orse  had 
p r o t e c t e d  S in d  f ro m  i t s  fo r m e r  r a i d e r s ,  s i m i l a r  m e thods  
m ig h t  be s u c c e s s fu l  f o r  Aden ( 3 ) «  The c o m p a r is o n  was n o t  
w h o l l y  a p t .  S in d  had. th e  Bombay Army n e a rb y  t o  s u p p o r t  
th e  I r r e g u l a r  H o rs e ;  Aden d id  n o t .  H a in e s ,  h o w e v e r ,  d u ly
(1 )  A IA  107^-, R e p o r t  o f  S u rgeon M a jo r  J a c k s o n ,  l i+ . If . 8 7
(2) AF1 Gov. i n  C o u n c i l  B° -  Crndr. S.B. H a in e s ,  2 2 .3 * 3 9
(3) AFJ O f fg  Se c . ,  G o f  I, No 2070 o f  22.If.39 -  SGB
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r e c r u i t e d  a t r o o p  o f  20 A b d a l i  ho rsem en u n d e r  command of 
th e  S u l t a n ’ s son, F a d h l (1 ) ,  They w ere  u s e f u l  so long 
as B r i t i s h  and A b d a l i  i n t e r e s t s  c o in c id e d .  A f t e r  t h e i r  
d is b a n d m e n t,  t h e r e  were p la n s  t o  r e p la c e  them i n  1855 
b y  I n d ia n  I r r e g u l a r  c a v a l r y .  These c a v a l r y  were d i v e r t e d  
t o  th e  P e r s ia n  War, and I n d ia n  c a m e lr y  re p la c e m e n ts  
p ro v e d  i n e f f e c t i v e .  The Yemenis were much b e t t e r  
c a m e lm a s te rs .  The G overnm ent o f  I n d i a ,  h o w e ve r ,  f a v o u re d  
c a m e lr y  (2).
M a jo r  W i l l i a m  M e re w e th e r  had s e rv e d  w i t h  th e  S in d  
H orse w i t h  d i s t i n c t i o n  a g a in s t  B a lu c h i  r a i d e r s ;  and he 
b e l i e v e d  t h a t  I r r e g u l a r  C a v a l r y  were r e q u i r e d  1. . .  f o r  
p o l i c e  p u rp o s e s  a t  Aden . . . ‘ ( 3 ) *  A rg u in g  f ro m  h i s  
S in d  e x p e r ie n c e ,  he s u g g e s te d ,  two y e a rs  l a t e r ,  t h a t  such 
H o rs e ,  ’ . . .  b e in g  c o n s t a n t l y  on th e  move a b o u t ,  w i l l  p ro v e
(1 )  Jaco b  1 K i n g s 1 p . *+5
(2) LA, G o f  I  No 10M+ o f  9.12.65 - SGB (B° asked  
M e re w e th e r  f o r  h i s  v ie w s )
(3 )  L B° 1 8 6 3 -6 6 ,  Gov B° -  S o f  S No o f  30. 9 . 65, 
f o r w a r d in g  AAR 1 8 6 ^ /6 5 ?  w h e r e in ,  a t  p a ra  5°? was 
M e re w e th e r1s p ro p o s a l
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t o  th e  A ra b s  t h a t  Pier M a j e s t y ’ s Governm ent i s  i n
e a r n e s t  h e n  i t  p r o c la im s  t h a t  peace m ust be p re s e rv e d  . . . * ( 1 ) .
The H o rs e ,  r e c r u i t e d  i n  I n d i a  and known as th e  Aden T ro o p ,
a r r i v e d  i n  M a rch , 1 8 68 . I n  1867? M e re w e th e r  had
em phas ised  th e  l e s s  a g g r e s s iv e  d u t i e s  o f  th e  f u t u r e  t r o o p .
I t  was p r i m a r i l y  * . . .  t o  keep open th e  c o m m u n ic a t io n s  and 
t o  a f f o r d  p r o t e c t i o n  t o  convoys  com ing i n t o  Aden w i t h  
p r o v i s i o n s  and s to r e s  f o r  th e  G a r r is o n  and T o m  . . .  
w here h i t h e r t o  t r a d e r s  have been s u b je c t  t o  in c e s s a n t  
m o le s t a t io n  and l o s s  b o th  o f  l i f e  and p r o p e r t y  . . . '  (2 ) .  
M e n t io n  was made o f  th e  T r o o p ’ s c a p a c i t y  * . . .  t o  p ro v e  
t o  e v i l d o e r s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a pa ram o un t power r e a d y  and 
p re p a re d  t o  p u n is h  when p u n ish m e n t i s  n e c e s s a ry  . . . * ;  
b u t  M e re w e th e r  d id  n o t  th e n  s u g g e s t  th e  use o f  th e  T roop  
beyond ra n g e  o f  Aden. They were p r i n c i p a l l y  f o r  use 
b e tw ee n  Aden and S h a ik h  Othman t e r r i t o r y ,  p r e v io u s l y  i n  
d i s p u t e  be tw een th e  A b d a l is  and F a d h l i s .  T h e i r  l i n e s
(1 )  AAR 1 8 6 7 /6 8 ,  p a ra  13
(2 )  A IA  560 f  62 h , Res -  SGB, l ^ . ^ - ^ l ,  q u o t in g  M e re w e th e r*  s 
i+5/2lf3 o f  1 5 A . 6 7  -  SGB
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w ere on th e  K hor M aksa r p l a i n ,  beyond A d e n 's  f o r t i f i c a t i o n s .
The Aden T roop  needed t im e  t o  become a d a p te d  t o  
s e r v i c e  i n  th e  Yemen and l a t e r  on th e  S o m a li C o a s t .
The i s o l a t e d  T roop  l i n e s  were f a r  f ro m  Aden s u p p l ie s ;  
and th e  men, e n l i s t e d  i n  I n d i a ,  d e v e lo p e d  s c u rv y  (1 ) .
They w ere  moved t e m p o r a r i l y  t o  L a h e j .  T h e i r  f i r s t  
Commandant, L ie u te n a n t  M y e rs ,  was p r a is e d  f o r  c o n d u c t in g  
h i s  ' d e l i c a t e  d u t y '  o f  p a t r o l l i n g  i n  t r i b a l  t e r r i t o r y  
' w i t h  g r e a t  ju d g e m e n t* .  B u t  M y e rs '  h e a l t h  p o s s ib l y  
s u f f e r e d  f ro m  m a la r ia ,  c a u g h t  i n  L a h e j ( 2) .  He was 
succeeded by  C a p ta in ,  l a t e r  L t .  C o l . ,  G .S . S te v e n s ,  who 
a r r i v e d  i n  1870 and l e f t  i n  1885 ( 3 ) .  I k e  men S te v e n s  
came t o  command were armed w i t h  ’ cum bresom e*, d o u b le  
b a r r e l l e d ,  m u z z le  lo a d in g ,  smooth b o re  c a r b in e s ,  ' i l l -  
a d a p te d '  f o r  C a v a l r y  u se . T h e i r  a m m u n it io n  was s p e c i a l l y  
m a n u fa c tu re d  i n  th e  H yderabad A r s e n a l ;  t h a t  was 
in c o n v e n ie n t  and e x p e n s iv e .  B u t w o r s t  o f  a l l ,  ' . . .  many
(1) a AR 68/69
( 2) AAR 1 8 7 2 /7 3 .  T h is  happened t o  a n o th e r  A c t in g  
Commandant
(3 )  Com m iss ioned i n  2 0 th  H I ,  1 0 .1 2 .1 8 5 3
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o f  th e  [ ' l o c a l ]  A ra b s  . . .  p o ssesse d  R i f l e s  and o th e r  
im p ro v e d  E u ro pe an  f i r e a r m s  . . .  1 ; and even l o c a l  m a tc h lo c k s  
had a f a r  l o n g e r  ra n g e  th a n  th e  t r o o p e r s ’ c a r b in e s  ( 1 ) .
The R e s id e n t  knew t h a t  1 . . .  N a t i v e  C a v a l r y  . . .  
p ro c e e d in g  on s e r v i c e  . . . '  m ig h t  be is s u e d  w i t h  b re e c h -  
lo a d in g  r i f l e s  ( 2 ) .  As th e  Aden T ro o p  were p e rm a n e n t ly  
available f o r  a c t i v e  s e r v i c e ,  M a jo r  G e n e ra l 
C . J .  T rem enheere  a p p l ie d  f o r  r i f l e s  ( 3 ) .  The T roop  had 
o n l y  n a r r o w ly  escaped a r e v e r s e  by  a h a s t y  r e t r e a t  i n  
1871 (*+•). R i f l e s  would have made that s i t u a t i o n  l e s s  
p r e c a r i o u s .  P o l i t i c a l  o b je c t i o n s ,  h o w e ve r,  a r o s e .  The 
G overnm ent o f  I n d i a  had r e fu s e d  S n / i d e r  r i f l e s  f o r  th e  
Sind H o rs e ,  so th e  Commander i n  C h ie f  was u n w i l l i n g  t o  
recommend r i f l e s  f o r  th e  T roop  ( 5 ) .  P o s s ib l y  T re m e n h e e re 1s 
r a s h  use o f  the T ro o p  i n  1871? on an o f f e n s i v e  p a t r o l ,
( 1 )  A IA  57*+, Cmdr. Aden T roop  -  Res, 9 .X.71
( 2 )  IO L , A IA  57I+, M i l .  S e c . ,  G o f  I  ^852 o f  2 3 .1 1 .7 1 ,
c o p ie d  t o  GOC Aden f . i . o . c .  Aden T roop
(3 )  AIA 57I+, Res -  SGB, 8.3.72
(*+) p.2A8 n . l
(5 )  A IA  57*+ f  59, R e p o r t  o f  A d j t  Gen, 1 9 ^ . 7 2
10.23
was an a rg um e n t a g a in s t  i s s u in g  r i f l e s  (1 ) .  So lo n g  
as th e  t r o o p  was p a t r o l l i n g  th e  open p l a i n  be tw ee n  Aden 
and S h a ik h  Othman, on f i r m  g ro u n d ,  as o r i g i n a l l y  in te n d e d ,  
th e  T r o o p s ’ h o rs e s  c o u ld  o u t d is t a n c e  cam els  and t h e r e  was 
no danger of b e in g  ambushed i n  a c a c ia  s c ru b  ( 2 ) .  F u r t h e r  
away, t h e r e  was s o f t  sand, where  h o rs e s  w o u ld  soon be 
w in d e d  b u t  local cam e ls  would have  no t r o u b l e ,  and 
e ls e w h e re  t h e r e  was t h i c k  s c ru b .
T re m e n h e e re 1s re p r im a n d  i n  1871 p re v e n te d  th e  T ro o p  
operating without l o c a l  c o n s e n t  o u t s id e  th e  A b d a l i  and 
Aqrabi a re a s  ' u n t i l  a f t e r  1873 ( 2 ) .  I n  1872 , n e i t h e r  th e  
A la w i  n o r  th e  Ilaushabi c h i e f  even answ ered  l e t t e r s ,  
proposing a visit by th e  T roop  t o  t h e i r  t e r r i t o r i e s  ( 3 ) .  
But C a p ta in  S te ve n s  had begun to  p r o v id e  th e  f i r s t  
* . . .  v a lu a b le  r o u te s  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  th e  c o u n t r y  n e a r
Aden in 1 8 7 0 /7 1 .  The R e s id e n t  c o m m e n te d ; ' . . .  o u r
(1 ) p .2.50 -  2.51
(2 )  A IA  560 f  679 , Sec F o r  D ep t -  Ag SOB, *+ .7 -71 , l a t e r
fo rw a rd e d  to  R e s id e n t
(3 )  A IA  57b-, S te v e n s  -  T rem en he e re , 8 . 1 .7 2  and 
T rem enheere  -  S te v e n s ,  9 * 1 .7 2
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ig n o ra n c e  o f  th e  g e o g ra p h y  . . .  i s  r e m a rk a b le  . . . '  (1 ) .  
U n t i l  18 73 , th e  Aden T ro o p  d id  n o t ,  h o w e ve r ,  c r o s s  th e  
H a u sh a b i b o r d e r ,  n o r t h  o f  A b d a l i  t e r r i t o r y .  B u t ,  a f t e r  
th e  A n g lo -O t to m a n  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  o f  1873 ( 2 ) ,  S te v e n s  
was a b le  t o  t r a v e l ,  and t o  l i v e ,  i n  th e  H in t e r l a n d  f o r  
weeks a t  a t im e .  He mapped th e  c o a s t a l  p la n ;  he 
c o l l e c t e d  r e l i a b l e  s t a t i s t i c s  a b o u t  th e  c o u n t r y ;a n d  he 
became, e f f e c t i v e l y ,  th e  R e s id e n t 's  m ost kno w led ge a  l e  
A s s i s t a n t  on th e  H i n t e r l a n d  ( 3 ) *  The T ro o p e rs ,  w e l l -  
hand led. by  S te v e n s ,  l e a r n t  t o  m ix  w i t h  th e  Yemenis 
w i t h o u t  a p p a re n t  f r i c t i o n .  I n  1 8 8 1 , B r i g a d i e r  F .A .E .  Loch 
e u lo g is e d  S te v e n s '  a c h ie v e m e n ts ; ' . . .  t h e  T roop  . . .  has
more th a n  answ ered  a l l  e x p e c t a t i o n s ;  . . .  th e  m o ra l  e f f e c t  
o f  th e  T ro o p  has been g r e a t  . . .  ' (*+).
F o r  t h i s  w o rk ,  t r o o p e r s  were p a id  R s l3  As5 Psb  p . m . ;  
t h e y  had t o  buy  t h e i r  own fo o d  and c l o t h i n g  and pay  R s50 
f o r  t h e i r  c a r b in e s ;  and i f  t h e y  t o o k  le a v e  t o  I n d i a
(1 )  AAR 1 8 7 0 /7 1 ,  p a ra  55
(2) p.3.100
( 3 )  AIA 768, Res 7 0 /3 8 8  -  SGB, 10.*+ .77 
(*+) AIA 85*+ f  229
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t h e i r  se a -p a ssa g e  t o  Bombay c o u ld  c o s t  them R s67. They 
e n l i s t e d  f o r  l i f e  (1 ) .  ./hen E u ro p e a n  t r o o p s  s p e n t  o n ly  
1 y e a r  w i t h  th e  g a r r i s o n  ( 2 ) ,  and N a t i v e  t r o o p s  s p e n t  
tw o y e a r s ,  th e  lo n g  l o c a l  e x p e r ie n c e  o f  th e  Aden T ro o p e rs  
was p a r t i c u l a r l y  v a lu a b le .  B u t ,  i n  p e nn yw ise  f a s h io n ,  
t h e  Governm ent o f  Bombay r e fu s e d  S te ve n s  a p e r s o n a l  
a l lo w a n c e  o f  R s l5 0  p .m . ,  such as A s s i s t a n t  R e s id e n ts  
d re w  a f t e r  5 y e a rs  s e r v ic e  i n  Aden ( 3 ) .  S c h n e id e r  p o in te d -  
o u t  t h a t  t h e  T r o o p s1 q u a l i t y  depended upon i t s  Commandant; 
t h a t  th e  Com m andant's  l o c a l  kno w led ge  and p e r s o n a l  
in f l u e n c e  t o o k  t im e  to  a c q u i r e ;  t h a t  th e  Commandant
had t o  be c a r e f u l l y  p ic k e d ;  and t h a t ,  w i t h  an  e x t r a
a l lo w a n c e ,  an o f f i c e r  such as S te ve n s  w o u ld  have  l e s s  
in d u c e m e n t f o r  r e t u r n i n g  t o  a C a v a l r y  r e g im e n t  i n  I n d i a  
on p ro m o t io n  (*+).. The case f o r  th e  a l lo w a n c e  was c l e a r
(1 ) AIA 57*+, Cmdt. Aden T roop  -  Res, 1 1 .5 * 7 3
( 2 )  L / M i l / 7 / 6 1+*+-61+9, M i l  D e p t ' s  *+23 o f  2 8 .1 2 .6 9  by 
Gov, Genv i n  C o u n c i l  -  S o f  S
( 3 ) AIA 76 8 , SGB - Res, 1 5 .1 0 .7 7
(*+) AIA 768, Res -  SGB, 1 0 .b -.77
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l o c a l l y ;  b u t  t o  S e c r e t a r i a t  o f f i c e r s  i n  Bombay 
1. . .  th e  p r e s e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  .he f in a n c e s  o f  Bombay 
o v e r r u le d  any  o t h e r  a rg um e n ts  . . . * .  Bombay1s was n o t  
a f r o n t i e r  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  l i k e  th e  P u n ja u b  and i t s  
l a t e r  N . / / . F .P .  o f f s h o o t .  The v a lu e  o f  p e r s o n a l  r e l a t i o n s  
was i n s u f f i c i e n t l y  u n d e rs to o d .  Once a g a in ,  th e  Aden 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  s u f f e r e d  because  c o n d i t i o n s  were d i f f e r e n t  
and n o t  u n d e rs to o d  i n  Bombay.
■+■ 4* +  +  +
W here ve r th e  Aden T roop  a p p e a re d ,  i t s  p re s e n c e  
s y m b o l is e d  B r i t i s h  i n t e r e s t  i n  l o c a l  a f f a i r s ;  i t  
e f f e c t i v e l y  e x te n d e d  B r i t i s h  in f l u e n c e  a lo n g  th e  c o a s t a l  
p l a i n  beyond Aden. I t  was q u i c k l y  em p loyed  t o  r e a s s u r e  
th e  S u l t a n  o f  L a h e j o f  B r i t i s h  s u p p o r t  when O ttom an 
t r o o p s  came i n t o  L a h e j i n  O c to b e r ,  1873 ( 1 ) .  I t  was 
used i n  s u p p o r t  o f  A b d a l i  f o r c e s  i n  H a u sh a b i t e r r i t o r y ,  
i n  Decem ber, 1873? to  p e rsu a d e  th e  H a u s h a b is  t o  resume
(1) p.3.87 n.l and n.2
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r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  th e  R e s id e n c y  (1). It was used t o  watch 
f o r  O ttom an i n f l u e n c e  am ongst th e  w e s te rn  S u b a ih i  
s e c t io n s  i n  187^+ ( 2) .  The p o l i c y  was a d o p te d ,  i n  1875? 
o f  ' c u l t i v a t i n g 1 f r i e n d l y  t r i b a l  r e l a t i o n s  i n  p r e v i o u s l y  
u n f a m i l i a r  t e r r i t o r y  th ro u g h  p e r s o n a l  v i s i t s  b y  th e  
Commandant ( 3 ) *  B u t c a re  was ta k e n  to  a v o id  i n v o l v i n g  
th e  T roop  i n  i n t e r - t r i b a l  b o r d e r  d i s p u t e s ,  such as t h a t  
be tw een  t i e  A b d a l is  and th e  H a u s h a b is  ( 2) .  B u t when 
r e t r i b u t i o n  was r e q u i r e d ,  f o r  Yemeni a c t i o n  a g a in s t  B r i t i s h  
i n t e r e s t s ,  th e  t r o o p  was an e f f e c t i v e  weapon.. I n  18 8 1 , 
th e  B u ra im i  s e c t io n  o f  th e  S u b a ih is  were a t t a c k e d  f o r  
a m u rd e r  n e a r  S h a ik h  Othman. As a r e s u l t ,  t h e i r  S h a ik h  
came i n  and made peace w i t h  th e  B r i t i s h  (*+). I n  1879? 
th e  T roop  c o - o p e r a te d  w i t h  H .H .S .  Ready t o  c a p tu r e  th e  
f r a t r i c i d e  f a t h e r  o f  th e  F a d h l i  S u l ta n  a t  a s S a r r iy a h  
Some 80 m i l e s  f ro m  Aden ( 5 ) *  The same y e a r ,  a Q o t a i b i
(1 )  p3.-100
(2 ) a IA  6 *+3 f  601- 60*+, B r i g a d ie r  S c h n e id e r 's  Memo -  S te ve n s
(3 ) A IA  728 , Res -  S te v e n s ,  1 9 • 1 1 .7 5
(*+) AAR <j-i-/b2 , p a ra  *+
(5 )  AAR 76 /79?  p a ra  9
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'c u s to m s  p o s t '  d o m in a t in g  th e  D h a la  L a h e j ro a d  a t  
T h u m a ir  was b lo w n  up by  e n g in e e rs  e s c o r te d  by  T ro o p e rs .  
The Q u o ta ib is  had p r e v io u s l y  r e fu s e d  t o  v a c a te  i t  and 
t o  cease c o l l e c t i n g  t o l l s .
The f i r s t  B r i t i s h  v i s i t  t o  th e  D a h la  a re a  i n  th e  
summer o f  1880 was made b y  th e  T roop  ( 1 ) .  Such a p a t r o l  
was o n ly  p o s s ib le  w i t h  l o c a l  g o o d w i l l .  Even fo ra g e  f o r  
th e  T ro o p  w h i le  on th e  D h a la  p la t e a u  had t o  be s e n t  up 
f ro m  L a n e j ; and th e  T roop  were o p e r a t in g  beyond re a c h  
o f  any  s u p p o r t  f ro m  th e  Aden g a r r i s o n .  The succe ss  o f  
t h i s  f i r s t  p a t r o l  t o  D h a la  i l l u s t r a t e s  th e  good l o c a l  
r e l a t i o n s  t h a t  S te ve n s  had c u l t i v a t e d ,  th e  p r e s t i g e  o f  
th e  T ro o p ,  and p o s s ib l y  th e  p o l i t i c a l  s k i l l  o f  M a jo r  
P .M . H u n te r .  The T r o o p ' s  r e p u t a t i o n  e x te n d e d  beyond 
th e  Yemen. D u r in g  o p e r a t io n s  i n  E g y p t  i n  1882, th e  
A d m ir a l  commanding B r i t i s h  F o rc e s  a t  Suez asked  f o r  th e  
lo a n  o f  th e  T roop  (2) .  T h e i r  im m e d ia te  r e t u r n  f ro m  Suez 
was p r o b a b ly  due t o  G e n e ra l W o ls e le y 's  d i s l i k e  o f  th e
(1 )  A IA  855? p.M+5? S te v e n s '  R e p o r t
(2) A IA  891 f  1 5 .  G o f  I -  Res, t e l .  9-9.82
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I n d ia n  Army (1).
No s u c c e s s o r  c o u ld  be e x p e c te d  t o  h a n d le  t h e  T ro o p  
as S te v e n s  had done . They lacked h i s  p e r s o n a l  experience 
o f  th e  T ro o p e rs ,  o f  t h e  Yem en is , and o f  l o c a l  p o l i t i c s .
H is  s u c c e s s o r ,  L t .  L . A .  G ordon , of t h e  2nd L i g h t  C a v a l r y ,  
had been a t ta c h e d  to  th e  T roop  on i t s  a b o r t i v e  p o s t in g  
t o  Suez ( 2) .  B u t  th e  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  o f  o n ly  one European  
o f f i c e r  w i t h  th e  T roop  was a d is a d v a n ta g e  when th e  
Commandant needed t o  be r e p la c e d .  A n o th e r  f a c t o r ,  
w h ic h  may have re d u c e d  th e  T ro o p s *  e f f e c t i v e n e s s ,  was 
t h a t  T ro o p e rs  s ig n e d  on f o r  l i f e .  They had g row n o l d e r  
and were  p o s s ib l y  l e s s  w i l l i n g  t o  en du re  th e  d i s c o m f o r t s  
o f  p a t r o l l i n g  f a r  i n la n d  w i t h  a new, l e s s  e x p e r ie n c e d ,  
and younger,C om m andan t. N e c e s s a r i l y ,  th e  new Commandant 
was more de p e n d e n t upon h i s  t h r e e  N a t i v e  O f f i c e r s  th a n  
S te v e n s ;  and l a t e r  Commandants s e rv e d  f o r  s h o r t e r  p e r io d s .  
The T ro o p  was s t i l l  th e  m ost m o b i le  p a r t  o f  th e  Aden 
g a r r i s o n .  B u t i t  no lo n g e r  had th e  c lo s e  c o n t a c t  w i t h
(1 )  A IA  891 f  308 , t e l .  G o f  I  -  Hes, 2 1 .9 .8 2 .
See N a ls h  'S o m a l i  C o a s t * p .  172/7*+
( 2 ) S in k e r  'K e i t h  F a lc o n e r '  n.2*+5
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th e  Yemeni t r ib e s m e n ;  and i t  was a l s o  r e q u i r e d  f ro m  
188*+ f o r  use on th e  S o m a li  C o a s t .  I n e x p e r ie n c e  o f  l o c a l  
c o n d i t i o n s  c o u ld  be c o s t l y .  I n  J a n u a ry ,  I 89O, th e  T ro o p  
l o s t  a N a t i v e  O f f i c e r  and 12 T ro o p e rs ,  k i l l e d  i n  a S o m a li 
ambush (1 ) .
When R e s id e n c y  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  H in t e r l a n d  r e v iv e d  
f ro m  1900, p r o p o s a ls  were made f o r  a new, t r i b a l ,  l e v y .  
M a jo r  G e n e ra l P . J .  M a i t l a n d  r e a l i s e d  t h a t  l o c a l  t r ib e s m e n  
w o u ld  have more u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  th e  Yemenis th a n  I n d ia n  
t r o o p e r s .  The C h ie f  S e c r e ta r y  t o  th e  G overnm ent o f  
Bombay w as, p r i v a t e l y ,  s y m p a th e t ic ,  a l th o u g h  he c a u t io n e d  
p a t ie n c e  ( 2 ) .  Such a move was to o  o b v io u s  an i n d i c a t i o n  
o f  a ' f o r w a r d 1 p o l i c y  i n  th e  Yemen to  be welcome a t  th e  
I n d i a  O f f i c e ,  u n t i l  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  p ro v e d  i t  n e c e s s a ry .  
M a jo r  H .7 .  Jaco b  fa v o u re d  t r a v e l l i n g  w i t h  t r i b a l  l e v i e s ;  
and M a jo r  G e n e ra l H.M. Mason, h i m s e l f  a c a v a lry m a n ,  
s u g g e s te d  t h a t  such a f o r c e ,  composed o f  1 . . .  a c o u p le  o f  
h u n d re d  men . . .  w i t h  a B r i t i s h  I n s p e c t i n g  O f f i c e r  . . . * ,
(1 ) W alsh  'S o m a l i  C o a s t1 p .329- 331: S .C .A .R .  8 9 /9 0
( 2) A IA  G 35 D /0  S.W. E d g e r le y  - B r i g .  P.J. M a i t l a n d ,
I O .3 . I 90V
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should replace the Aden Troop (1). But the British 
withdrawal from Dhala in 19°7 prevented this policy being 
discussed further.
+ + + + +
The local political value of Aden*s trade and population 
growth
In 1865? Aden was an unimportant Indian outpost on 
the Bombay Suez steamer route, a minor free port (2), 
and a small, locally uninfluential, town. British 
influence around the Gulf of Aden was on the decline, 
following the abolition of the Indian Navy in 1863 and 
the closure of Aden as a permanent naval station. Yet, 
within +^0 years, imagined threats to Aden‘s security 
induced the British Cabinet to warn the Porte not to 
send urgently-needed reinforcements to the Yemen (3);
(1) AIA File ^3/2, Bes - SGB, 11.3.06
(2) Graph D
(3) P.9.83 n.l
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Aden's trade had increased over 6-fold (1); steamer 
tonnage using the harbour (2) had increased from under 
2 50,000 tons in I867/68 to nearly 3?000,000 tons in 
1905/06 (3); and Aden's population had roughly 
doubled The population increase was due to the
opening of the Suez Canal in 1869? to new telegraph 
links between India and Europe in I87O (5)? to the 
development of steamships at the expense of sailing 
vessels (3)? to increasing commercial opportunities, 
and the political stability and security in Aden, and 
to other factors. The immigrants included growing 
numbers of Indian, Arab, Somali, and a few European 
traders and businessmen, and artisans and labourers from 
the Indian Ocean countries.
Aden's trade was mainly in non-British hands; and 
Aden's population was swelled by temporary, Arab and
(1) Graph D
(2) Diag'Tahi C
(3) Graph B
(*+) Graph E
(5) E.g. AIA 532, Res - SGB, ^.3*70
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Somali, immigrant labourers, used to low living 
standards, and readily augmented on demand from the 
Yemeni and Somali Interiors. The population of Aden 
throughout this period was a racially mixed one, giving 
no community an absolute majority. In I872, there were 
8,2^1 Arabs, 5?3^6 Africans (mainly Somalis, but 
including freed slaves), 3?589 Indians, 1,^35 Jews 
and 209 Europeans (1)* In general, the Jewish community 
had a balanced mixture of men and women; many Somali 
women also cane, like their men, as immigrants, so that 
their community was more nearly balanced (2) than 
either the Arabs, or the Europeans. Aden was thus a 
foreign enclave on the Yemen coast.
Aden was valued, throughout the region, as a 
market for buying necessities and local luxuries, and 
for selling local produce, as well as for the employment 
it offered. Local communities suffered if they, or
(1) Census Figures, 21.2.72. The ‘Europeans' included 
one U.S. citizen
(2) AIA 853* Census figures, 1881, *+,079 African 
women to 5,0^8 men
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their produce, or their shipping, were banned from 
entering Aden, as a punishment for behaviour which the 
Aden Residency disapproved of. Even if trade was not 
banned, Somali, Yemeni, Hadhrami or Mahri tribesmen 
whose tribes had offended the Residency could only 
enter Aden at some personal risk of imprisonment. There 
was only the one land entrance to the peninsula and the 
one landing stage at Maala for coastal shipping. Even 
the building of Shaikh Othman, from 1882, made little 
difference. The village population was not large and 
strangers were readily discernible. So, while the 
divided local populations might suffer discomfort if 
barred from Aden, after 1867? the British were not 
dependent upon any one area for local supplies. From 
1881, a determined British effort was made to restrict 
the Aden peninsula population. In 10 years 7*000 people 
were compulsorily moved to Shaikh Othman and 8,000 were 
deported (1). Such considerations strengthened the 
position of the Residency staff in dealing with
(1) AAR 1890/91? para  b
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immigrants or with tribal leaders. The latter, too, 
were impressed by the growth in the shipping visting 
Aden, and by the growth in Aden's trade, as evidence 
of British power. At least half the shipping was 
British (1), throughout the period; but to many of 
the local visitors, who did not distinguish between 
the different European nations, all European shipping 
was 'English'.
Until the French arms trade developed at Djibouti, 
during the last two decades of the nineteenth century, 
the Residency was able, also, to impose a virtual 
embargo on the commercial import of arms from Europe 
into the Yemen and into Somali territory. Only Yemeni 
tribal leaders favoured by the British were able to 
obtain modern rifles, and ammunition, for their personal 
use or for their immediate supporters; and, along the 
entire coastline of the Gulf of Aden, local British 
naval blockades were applied, on occasions, at the 
bidding of the Resident. Britain's prestige was high,
(1) Graph A
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partly because of the absence of effective foreign 
commercial, naval, and political competition in the 
area. That came slowly, with the growth of the French 
position on the Dankali Somali Coast, and with the 
Italian establishment of Assab, in the last decade and 
a half of the century.
+ + + + +
The appointment of Aden Residents
The Indian Governments staffing of the Aden 
Residency gives an impression of indifference to Aden’s 
peculiar needs, and even to the best means of protecting 
British interests throughout the region. In forty years, 
Aden had 11 substantive, and 1 officiating, Residents (1). 
Many other officers acted for varying periods, often 
whilst the Residents were away on leave, sick, or on 
duty elsewhere. Four Residents were promoted on leaving
(1) /Diagram B
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Aden (1). The remainder were retired on leaving Aden, 
or shortly afterwards, justifying H.F. Jacob’s jibe 
that Aden suffered from being considered to be a 
convenient post for otherwise unemployed Generals (2).
Only liaj. Gen. C.W. Tremenheere had had previous 
military experience in Aden, as the Assistant Engineer, 
in l8*f6-l|-7. Rone of his successors had previously 
served in political posts, administering a territory. 
Ideally, the post required an active, adaptable nan, 
not more than forty (3)* Most appointees were in their 
fifties; some were older; and only Major W. Merewether
was as young* Some appointees found the post
unattractive; Maj. Gen. E. de Brath tried to avoid
the posting, because it gave no experience in exercising
a brigade of troops and so possibly damaged his chances 
of promotion to Divisional Command (*+). While Brigadier
(1) Only G. 0 ’Moore Creagh became a full General and 
C. in C., India
(2) Jacob ’Kings’ p.63
(3) IIP, K968, Lord Lanington Gov. Bo. - Lord Minto, 1.3*06 
(if) MP^M968, de Brath - P.S. to Viceroy, 7*3*06
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A.G.P. Hogg complained that his entertainment allowance 
of Rs 250 p.m. covered less than half the cost of his 
official entertaining; that essential new Residency 
furniture, a carriage and horses, cost him Bs 12,000; 
and that his daily travelling allowance of Bs 10 barely 
covered the cost of hiring half the 20 baggage camels 
he required on tour (1). Such complaints produced 
little result. General de Brath came and received no 
later promotion. Brigadier Hogg received no increases 
in his allowances. The Indian tax payer was not to be 
taxed for *... proposals, however desirable in 
themselves •••*, which local revenue in Aden, or in 
Somaliland, could not meet (2).
+ +- + +  +
The First Assistant Resident
When Residents were previously unfamiliar with
(1) AIA 985, Res - SGB, 20.lf.86
(2) AIA 1086, Bo Resolution No 5656 of 10.9.90, signed 
by W. Lee-Warner
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Aden, could speak little or no Arabic, and when none 
stayed longer than 5 years, and some stayed barely 2 
years, the post of First Assistant Resident was, 
potentially, a locally influential one (1). From 
187^-1896, four officers held the substantive post, 
providing a continuity that was conspicuously absent 
later (1). Of these four, F.h. Hunter was the most 
influential. He intervened in 1881 to end the Kasadi 
Quaiti fighting (2); he secured the cession of Shaikh 
Othman to Britain in 1882 (3); and he virtually 
Engineered! the British occupation of the Somali Coast 
between l881+“85 (*+) ♦ He also secured local agreement 
to the Protectorate Treaties with Somali and South 
Arabian tribes between lSS^-SS, which secured British 
influence over the shores of the Gulf of Aden and kept 
out foreign political competition. Hunter owed much to 
Salih Jaffer, the Residency Interpreter (5), But Hunter*s
(1) Ibiagram: B
(2) p..*+..81 n.l and *+.82 n .2
(3) p.7 .5 - 7.23
(W p.6.53 n.l and 6.31*- - 6.78
(5) p.10.50 n.l
10 Ao
success wa£ due to his tact and diplomacy. His length 
of service in Aden was probably an increasing asset;
Hunter had time to develop his local friendships and 
acquaintanceships; he had practical and personal 
experience of the prominent tribesmen who visited Aden; 
and he had visited many of their countries. He knew, 
through Salih Jaffer, the personal relationships of 
loyalty, jealousy and enmity which motivated tribal, 
and intertribal, politics. He was *in touch1 with the 
Yemen, Hadhramaut and the Somali Coast. He personified 
*the Government1 a).
That Government was popular, because it made no 
financial demands upon the Arab or Somali tribesmen, 
except as a punishment for interference with international 
shipping, or with land trade routes, or for murders 
within British territory or of British subjects. Unlike 
the Ottomans and the Egyptians, the British, in theory, 
did not intervene in tribal affairs and took no taxes.
In practice, the British seldom interfered and were
(1) Cf. Belhaven 1 Kingdom of Melchior1 pil86, London,1949.
(Her eafter Belhaven 1 Melchior* )
loAl
relatively generous in their public expenditure for 
entertaining tribal visitors, and for presents (1).
This won Hunter and Salih Jaffer local appreciation (2).
A little money, a small present, or hospitality in Aden 
were much appreciated at small cost by a hinterland 
population which had little money in circulation, living 
mainly by barter and on a subsistence economy.
‘Hunter was a Liberal in politics. Annexation 
did not commend itself to him: he would pacify the
adjoining territories by extending British influence and 
trade, without increasing British responsibilities, and 
would act so as to inspire confidence in the native mind, 
while showing the benefits of a British alliance ...’ (3)«
Hunter was opposed to the extension of British military 
garrisons, and officers, to the Somali Coast, because
(1) AIA 833 f 66 para *4-. By 1880, the Residency 
Interpreter was looking after over 1,000 visitors 
annually
(2) E.g. L/P&S/10/15. Copy of undated letter from Shaikh 
Abdul Kawi - Res Aden, received 29*1.06, referring to 
Hunter and Salih Jaffer, and their habitual presents to him.
(3) Jacob ‘Kings1 p.138, quoting a letter of Hunter*s
10 .*4-2
foreign troops provided a target for opponents of the 
British connection, and because of the extra expenses (1).
In raising in Aden a *+0-strong police nucleus for the
future Somali police force, Hunter showed foresight,
local underst aiding, and confidence in his own judgement (2).
He backed that judgement to the limit when he sent 
L.P. Walsh to Berbera in August, 188*4-, without authority.
It was probably a courageous gamble for a married man with 
a family ano no private means, apart from an earned 
entitlement to a £250 retirement pension (3)» This 
action showed that Hunter was prepared to do his duty, 
as he saw that duty, regardless of the damaging 
personal consequences of failure, or of official 
rejection of his action. Possibly he was influenced by 
the ea.rlier examples of Brigadier Sir W.M. Goghlan in 
occupying Perim in 1857 A), a^d of Major W. Merewether 
attacking the Fadhlis in 1865 (5), without authority to
(1) Walsh ‘Somali Coast ' p.211 and p*272/273
(2) p.6.36 n.l
(3) Walsh ‘Somali Coast1 p.100
(*+) I0L P.D. D/0 Corr. June 62 - July 73, Coghlan - Kay,13.12.62
(5) p.2.16 n.3
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do so. Their actions were successful and they were 
condoned, although they were contrary to official 
policy.
Some of Hunter's contemporaries understood that 
Hunter, on occasions, deliberately acted without forewarning 
his superiors of his intentions - because his reasons 
for action, or his methods, would not have been 
approved in advance. Thus, in 1888, he used Irregulars 
to apply military pressure, for political, ends, on the 
Jibril Aboker section of the Issa Somalis (1). There 
was a justification for military action; the Issa had 
been raiding caravans coming to Bulhar; but Hunter 
wished to demonstrate British power over the Issa to 
prevent French influence increasing amongst the tribe 
through the French Consul at Zeila. He achieved his 
ends; but he may have hastened his posting to India 
since Brigadier Hogg was anxious for Hunter to be 
transferred and he favoured more orthodox military measures (2).
(1) Walsh ‘Somali Coast1 p.275-278
(2) AIA 985 D/0 Res - a correspondent in the Foreign
Department (name illegible), 6.7.86
10.^
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Salih Jaffer, Residency Interpreter
Salih Jaffer, the son of Captain S.B. Haines1 
interpreter, Mullah Jaffer, was born in 1836. Salih 
was brought up in Aden. His father was dismissed from 
Government service in 18^3? following charges made 
against him by the Mansab of Aden. Haines supported 
Mullah Jaffer, but the Bombay Government insisted upon 
the Interpreters dismissal (1). Mullah Jaffer 
remained in Aden, carrying on private business. Salih 
described his father as *... a respectable and wealthy 
man of Aden ...* (2). The Reverend G.P. Badger, Chaplain 
at Aden from 18^ *6 - 1862, preferred the description 
'rogue1 (3)- Badger was, however, a firm supporter and 
friend of Jaffer!s enemy, the Mansab.- Salih entered 
Government service in 1851*, as a clerk in the Resident's
(1) Waterfield 'Sultans of Aden' p*192
(2) AIA 728 f 1217, Statement by Salih Jaffer in 1876
(3) AIA 560, Rev. G. Badger - Res, 2.3*71
i o.^j
Court at Crater, '... at ... £his] mother's earnest 
request ..., not for the sake of gain, for ... [he] 
had enough, but purely £f°r] gaining knowledge ...* (1). 
Salih's father was then dead.
Salih was unique; he was locally brought up and 
privately educated when Aden still had no European 
school. As a consequence, Aden's other administrative 
staff, outside the Qadhis's office, were drawn from 
Britain or from India, without any previous acquaintance 
with Aden. Salih spoke Arabic, English, Hindustani and 
Somali* But, still more important, Salih understood, 
and had grown up with Arabs and Somalis. Such an 
understanding, if it was ever attained by foreigners, 
needed years of local experience.. This experience of 
Salih's was of the greatest advantage to the Residency 
from 1870 - 1885; it contributed to preserving British 
hegemony in the Gulf of Aden, despite challenges by 
the Ottomans and the French. As the only official 
fluent Arabic writer, Salih was employed to assist 
the acting First Assistant, Captain G.R. Goodfellow,
(1) p.l0.¥f n.2
10A6
with the Residency Arabic correspondence in 1867? when 
Mr. Hormuzd Rassam, the Interpreter, had been sent to 
Abyssinia in 1861* Cl).
In I866/67> the Residency staff was heavily 
involved in preparations for the Abyssinian campaign 
of 1867/68. The Residency staff were extremely busy, 
yet Goodfellow only enlisted Salih's help '... much 
against his [own) inclination ...' (1)* Goodfellow 
did not elaborate his objections. Possibly Goodfellow 
had been prejudiced against Salih by Badger and by the 
previous Resident, Brigadier W.ll. Coghlan. Goodfellow 
favoured the appointment of a 'vernacular clerk1, 
recruited from India, as an Interpreter, '... a 
respectable and trustworthy man .♦*' rather than any
native Gentleman specially appointed for this duty • ••', 
as Hormuzd Rassam had been. In Goodfellow*s view,
'... Government might be inclined to look upon [such an 
Interpreter] ... as an Assistant to the Resident, which 
he could never be in anything but the native correspondence
(1) AIA 533? Goodfellow - Res, 18.11.68
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Salih Jaffer1s later career proved Goodfellow to be 
mistaken. Salih was appointed Residency Interpreter 
by Bombay Resolution No. 5°3 of 15*2.1870 (1).
Salih was closely involved with the Abdali chief
from 1866, when the latter appointed him as his Aden
agent instead of the Hahsab of Aden (2). In 1867*
Salih also became the Fadhli chief's Aden agent. These 
roles were incompatible with Salih's position as a 
Government employee. But the position was condoned by 
successive Residents, who knew that Salih drew the 
chiefs' stipends from the Treasury, because the 
arrangement was convenient to the Chiefs and to the
Residency. In I876, Salih ceased to act as the Chiefs'
Aden agent, because the Bombay Government had learnt 
of his additional, unorthodox, roles (2).
Salih probably worked as Residency Interpreter 
because he enjoyed the local prestige which his work 
gave him. He was promoted Native Assistant?but his pay
(1) AIA 533 f 563
(2) AIA 728, Res - SGB, 20.11.76
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was still only Rs 300 p.m.jin 1881 (1); the Government 
of India refused to sanction even a personal allowance 
of Rs 100 p.m., which Brigadier Loch proposed (2).
Salih1s personal fortune was mostly property, inherited 
from his father, and it was estimated at Rs 200,000 in 
I876 (3). He employed his own clerk to deal with his 
private affairs. By local standards, Salih was wealthy C1*). 
There were suspicions of his honesty, and he admitted 
s^orne minor misdemeanours in 1876, when he was accused 
of corruption by the Abdali chief and by other locals (5).
It is possible that Salih neglected action which he 
should have taken because of the pressure of his work, 
because of personal vanity, and even because he felt 
himself entitled to additional rewards for the unofficial 
work which he did. He had broken Government regulations,
(1) AIA 851** G of I Resolution 30^2 of 7*7*81
(2) AIA 85*+* Res - SGB, 3*1*81
(3) AIA 728 f 1217
(*+) Hunter 'Aden1 p.39
(5) AIA 728 f 1165 and f 1158
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but, in doing so, he had not been shown as misappropriating 
Government funds. His standard of acceptable behaviour 
was a local one; and Salih admitted that *... as an 
Arab he [sometimes] could not see things in the same 
light as Government did ...' (1). He spoke English; 
he understood the British, but he had not been educated 
to accept their standards of morality.
Salih had been recommended 1... without hesitation 
...' for the post of Interpreter by Major General E* 
Russell(2); and Russell claimed to have observed 
Salih's work carefully. Hunter, who had worked closely 
with Salih from 1871, testified in I876 that; !... Mr. 
Saleh Jaffer has established for himself a name for 
honesty and upright dealing with the surrounding Arab 
tribes - He is very shrewd and intelligent and above all 
he is a faithful servant of the British Government and may 
be fully trusted in any emergency to give every assistance 
even though in so doing he might be acting in conflict
(1) AIA 728 f 1160, Res - SGB, 20.11.76
(2) AIA 533, Res - SGB, 17.12.69
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with his religious feelings and his family ties ...' (1). 
Schneider accepted that Salih's misdemeanours justified 
a 'rating1 in I876, but felt that that lesson ' would 
secure us a really faithful servant for the future and 
one whose place it would be most difficult to supply 
...' (2). Schneider recommended Salih to his successor 
as '... thoroughly trustworthy ...' (3)* Loch paid 
tribute to Salih's 'long, zealous and faithful 
services' (4); and Salih was awarded the title of Khan 
Bahadur by the Indian Government, in recognition of his 
services, on 11th August 1884 (5)*
Salih was accessible to a wide cross-section of 
the region's population; they called on him at 
home (6); they wrote to him, giving news and expressing 
their views, from as far afield as Dhofar (7)* His
(1) AIA 854 f 214
(2) AIA 723, Res - SGB, 20.11.76
(3) AIA 854, Memo by Schneider left for Loch, May 1877
(4) AIA 854, Res - SGB, 3.1.81
(5) AAR 84/85 para 9
(6) AIA 728 f 1221, Statement by Sslih, in November 1876
(7) E.g. 5.21 n.2
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information was not always accurate about the remoter 
areas, but he could provide more information about 
local situations than any European officer. He, and 
his son, Muhammad, kept the Residency in touch with 
local affairs (1). He was a pragmatist, who could 
make himself agreeable to his contemporaries. R.N. 
officers praised his '... courteous and ready assistance
(2), and they gave him passages in H.M. warships 
which were usually offered only to European officers (3)* 
He was sent to Mecca in 1880 to discover '... all he 
could regarding the Sharif of Mecca and the country 
generally, which duty Mr. Saleh Jaffer has performed 
most satisfactorily ...' (4). He socialised with 
Redhwan Pasha, the Egyptian Governor of Berbera, to 
learn what progress the French and Italians were making
(1) L/P&S/10, File 758/1908, Brig. P.J. Maitland - SGB, 
10.5.03
(2) AIA 827 f 167 - f 173, Commander Berners, R.N. -
Brig. F.A.E. Loch, Dec. 1880
(3) AIA 827, Res - Cmdr. Berner, R.N., 4.12.80
(4) AIA 854, Res - SGB, 3*1.81
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on the Egyptian-claimed Somali-Dankali coast (1).
He was sent, briefly, to the R.N. Admiral in command 
at Suez, in 1882, as an Intelligence Officer (2). He 
was invaluable; and from 1870, until his death on 
18.2.1885, Salih took only five months leave (3)•
Salih died aged 49; the probable cause of his death 
was a cerebral aneurysm (4); and he was young, by 
medical standards, when he had his first attack of 
hemiphlegia in 1880 (3)(4). His original stroke, and 
later death, cannot, however, be attributed directly to 
overwork (4).
Most Residents depended upon their First Assistants, 
even as Assistant Residents relied heavily upon the 
Residency Interpreter and Native Assistant, until
(1) BSC PS Vol 6 f 971, Res - SGB, 13.6.79, enclosed
a copy of Salih's Report (f 981)
(2) AIA 924, AAR 1882/83, 29.6.82 - 20.7.82
(3) AIA 833, Sick Report of 16.4.80 granted sick leave;
and AAR 82/83, para 8, recorded 2 months 20 days
privilege leave
(4) Note by Dr. N. Malcolm, M.B., B.Ch., M.R.C.P., D.T.M.H., 
Assistant Health Adviser, Aden 1956-1960 and Registrar, 
Aden Hospital, 1962-64, dated 20.4.1971
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Muhammad Salih Jaffer1s dismissal for corruption in 
1900, when the post was abolished. Personal relations 
were always extremely important. Brigadier Hogg arranged 
Hunter's transfer to India in 1889, because he resented 
Hunter's position as the regional expert (1).
Brigadier Cunningham refused Captain Davies1 proposed 
return to Aden; and L.P. Mai sh failed to secure the 
appointment as First Assistant, in 1897, which he 
expected (2). That was possibly because he was an 
uncovenanted officer, had served most of his eleven 
years Residency service on the Somali Coast, and was 
critical of some Indian Army attitudes towards the 
Somali Coast administration. But, whatever Walsh's 
faults and vanities, it was the Residency's loss that 
there was no continuity of service in the post of First 
Assistant from 1897 (3); and that many of the Residency 
staff from 1897 appear to have lacked the character, 
adaptability, and possibly attachment to Aden, that
(1) p.10.43 n.2
(2) AIA C/10 D/0, Lt. Harrington - Lt. Col. W.B. Ferris,
1.11.95
(3) Tbjdgrum B
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gave their predecessors closer local contact (1). As 
a result, much authority was concentrated in the hands 
of Muhammad Salih Jaffer, the Native Assistant.
Brigadier G. 0'Moore Creagh castigated Muhammad for 
'the appalling swindling* in the administration, 
dismissed him, and exiled some of his relatives to 
the Somali Coast. But H.M. Abud implied later, in 
support of G.W. Bury, questionably dismissed for 
'accepting bribes' in 1904, that the Abdali chief's 
self-interest, and local intrigue, were partly 
responsible for Muhammad's downfall and for the charges 
against Bury (2). Creagh expressed a strong personal 
prejudice against Muhammad, *... an evil-looking rascal 
of mixed Arab and Persian origin ... 1; and he mentioned 
specifically that Muhammad's relations with the chiefs 
were poor (3). Creagh's own relations with the Abdali 
chief were particularly good (4). It is probable that
(1) H.F. Jacob and H.M. Abud are obvious exceptions
(2) IOL File 758/1908
(3) Creagh 'Autobiography* p.211
(4) Creagh 'Autobiography* p.216 and p.218
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any failings on Muhammad1s part were equalled 
by as much weakness in the organisation of the 
administration. That was the responsibility of 
the Government of Bombay and of the Foreign 
Department*
11.1
Conclusion
The only previous, detailed, historical study of 
part of this area and period was T.A.Marston's 'Britain's 
Imperial Role in the Red Sea Area, 1800 - 1878* (l).
Liarston wrote under considerable disadvantages. He 
worked from the Foreign Office Records, for the Anglo- 
Ottoman confrontation of 1873, believing wrongly (2) 
that Aden dispatches from 1872 - 1877 were generally 
passed to the Foreign Office by the India Office.
Liarston wrote many years after doing his research in 
London; he did not know the area; and there are many 
inaccuracies in recording names (3). When Marston worked 
from the Foreign Office files he obtained a distorted 
view of Anglo-Yemeni relations (4), and a view of Anglo- 
Ottoman attitudes in 1873 that was naturally (2) heavily
(1) Connecticut, U.S.A. 1962. (Hereafter Marston 'Red Sea')
(2) p.3.43 n.3 and p.3.43 - p.3.44
(3) e.g. Marston 'Red Sea' p.446 Dhala was not the 'Amiri* 
"capital", p.447 'Muhammad Musaed, a brother (sic cousin] 
of Ali ibn Mukbil'. p.450 Schneider talked to both 
Hathiri [sic Kasadi] and Ka'iti'.
(4) Cf Ibid p.395 with 2.
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prejudiced against the Ottomans. This latter view 
reflected India Office arguments to the Foreign Office 
in favour of strong British pressure to counter alleged 
Ottoman 'provocations' and 'aggression*.
+ + + '+ +
The initiatives for local British expansion 
originated at the Aden Residency; and, therefore, 
the Residency records have particular significance 
in studying this expansion. Aden files contain 
original, uncorrected, draft letters for despatch 
abroad (l), local correspondence and Residency Memos 
and Reports (2), and marginal comments on incoming 
mail, for Residency information only (3). There are 
declarations of personal views by Residency staff (4); 
there are expressions of local attitudes (5); and there
(1) E.G. 2.54 n.l
*
(2) E.g. 2.47 n.2 and p.2.50 lines 11 - 15
(3) E.g. p.9.14 n.l
(4) E.g. p.9*13 n.l
(5) E.g. p.8.27 n.1
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are details of what was actually happening (l). On 
controversial issues, material unfavourable to the 
Residency arguments (2), or to the conduct of the 
Resident (3), or to future Residency intentions (4), 
were sometimes withheld from Bombay or from the Foreign 
Department. Unfortunately, Aden Residency records are 
not complete; and some are damaged. But, the Aden 
Records still show much that cannot be discovered from 
India Office, or from Foreign Office, Records. At 
times, there is significance in what is omitted, or 
in surprising delays in reporting action (5). These
Aden records had not previously been used in any
detailed historical study, apart from R.J.Gavin's 
brief study of the capture of Aden (6).
(1) p.8.26 n.2
(2) E.g. p.8.27 n.l
(3) p. 2.54 n.l
(4) E.g. p.9.13 n.l
(5) E.g. p.7.18 n.l and n.2
(6) Submitted to the Government of Aden when Gavin was
employed in the Aden Archives. I have not referred 
to his later work, because my researches and the 
original drafts were completed before the publication 
of 'Aden, 1839-1967* ,London, 1974.
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The earlier records in the Aden Archives were 
neglected by later Aden administrators; even a 
retired Governor of Aden, with considerable local 
service, and ready access to the Archives, could be 
ill-informed about Aden's earlier history (l).Ingrams, 
as a senior officer, humo/rously recognised his 
ignorance of the origins of the Fadhli Yafai dispute, 
recorded in the files, when he was required to mediate 
between the tribes (2). Aden authorities were ill- 
informed about the earlier material in their Archives, 
so it is perhaps not surprising that accepted myths 
about past history in the region were never queried 
at the India Office or at the Foreign Office.That 
resulted in a consistently unsympathetic British attitude 
towards Ottoman claims in the area.
The files of the India, and of the Foreign^Offices, 
like those of the Aden Residency^ were casually kept by 
present-day standards. Thus the Foreign Office file
(1) S.g. Sir Tom Hickinbotham 'Aden', London, 1958, 
(published within a year of his retirement),
p.60-61, c.f. with p.3.63 - 3.104, allowing for a 
misprint of '1872' for '1873' in 'Aden'
(2) Ingrams 'Arabia' p.113-114, c.f. with p.2.72-2.74
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dealing with the Yemen crisis of 1873 (l) has no 
index, which would be particularly useful for later 
reference, no copies of India Office papers sent ’for 
information and return', and no cross-referencing to 
correspondence within the same or in other files. The 
India Office filing was no better; and India Office 
files were awkward because correspondence on Aden 
matters was filed in general, not subject, files, for 
much of this period. Useful supplementary information 
during the crisis of 1873, and during the Boundary 
Demarcation of 1902-05 (2), is available in the private 
papers of officials then in India and in London.
In the absence of private papers of Residency 
officials, the contemporary accounts of personal 
attitudes and of local happenings, described in 'popular' 
books written by Aden officials in th&ir retirement, 
help to illustrate what was achieved, and the circumstances 
in which that was done. L.P.Walsh's 'Under the Flag and
(1) PHO PO 78/2753
(2) The Aden files contain much demi-official correspondence
of, and to, the Officiating Resident during the
Boundary Demarcation.
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Somali Coast Stories1 provides corroboration of 
Hunter's unique role in the British occupation of 
the Somali Coast (l). H.F.Jacob in 'Kings of Arabia' 
confirmed the over rated importance given to the Amir 
of Dhala by the British Boundary Commissioners and by 
the officiating Resident (2). Bo did R.A.B.Hamilton 
(Lord Belhaven) in the 'Uneven Road'; he denied that 
the Shairis were independent, but implied that Jacob 
had considered the Amir to be less than suzerain over 
them (3). Hamilton's judgement on the Shairis shows 
the natural acceptance by a serving officer of govern­
ment policy (4). But Hamilton, who worked closely with 
Thabit Qassim alQotaibi, recognised that the Amir had 
no influence over the Qotaibis, one of the Amir's tribes 
in Residency eyes (5). Hamilton also pointed out the
(1) E.g. p.6.39 ns 1 and 2.
(2) Jacob 'Kings’ p.81.
(3) Belhaven 'Road' p.159.
(4) Ibid p.180.
(5) Ibid p.136.
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British error in mailing a treaty with Sharif Ahmad 
Mohsin of Beihan (l), on the Officiating Resident's 
initiative (2j; and Hamilton exposed G.W.Bury's 
invention of a tribal night attack on Bury's journey 
to Beihan (3). Bury did exaggerate, according to 
Colonel R. Meinertzhagen, who still wrote of him 
with respect (4). But Bury's account of contemporary 
conditions in the Yemen is valuable for comparison 
with official reports from Aden. Bury was sympathetic 
to the Yemenis (5) ; and he knew local conditions 
better than any official.
The criticisms by General Sir G.O'Moore Creagh 
of weaknesses in the selection of military officers 
for service in the Indian Civil (6), and of the Aden
(1) R.A.B.Hamilton (Lord Belhaven) 'Kingdom of Melchior' 
London, 1949, p.73.
(2) p.9.106 ns 2 & 3.
(3) Belhaven 'Road* p.80-81 and Bury 'Uz' p.237-239.
(4) Meinertzhagen 'Birds' p.360 & p.579.
(5) Meinertzhagen 'Birds' p.579.
(6) Creagh 'Autobiography* p.80.
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Administration (l), wore frank. Creagh admitted, too,
his own willingness to use effective, but unorthodox,
measures (2). Creagh was prejudiced by his own
experiences; he wrote particularly favourably of the
Abdali chief, Ahmad bin Eadhl (3). But all contemporary
records may be coloured by their recorder*s impressions, 
kt*
limited by knowledge, and sometimes selective,
because of their author*s purpose in writing them.
Official records are not immune to these failings.
There were skeletons in senior officers* cupboards.
Creagh admitted a minor one of his own u).
+ + + + + +
It may be suggested that disproportionate 
importance is given to the reminiscences of Bury,
Creagh, Jacob, and Walsh; and that there is insufficient 
evidence to show that the collective mentality of the 
Aden Residency, and the attitudes of individual officials,
(1) Creagh * Autobiography* p.211.
(2) Ibid p.212-213
(3) Ibid p.216 and p.218
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were important influences in shaping British policy 
in, and around, the Gulf of Aden. But a study of the 
Aden records shows that there was a very strong 
parochial loyalty at the Residency; that there was, 
often, an Aden 1 party line1, quite distinct from the 
official policy favoured by the Bombay Secretariat, 
or approved by the Foreign Department. Opinions at 
the Residency changed, because a strong Resident might 
impose his views, depite the experience of his Assistants, 
while Residents of weaker personality, or less interested 
in local affairs, might be guided by a knowledgeable 
First Assistant. But the view of Gulf of Aden affairs 
from the Aden Residency generally favoured more active 
intervention in local affaits than was considered at 
Bombay or than was acceptable at the Foreign Department.
It is unfortunate that contemporary opinions in letters 
have not been available from local Arabian and Somali 
sources to give more insight into the history of the 
period as seen through local eyes (l).
(l) Some material was previously available until 1967 in 
the local records of stipendiary chiefs in South 
Arabia.
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+ + + + + +
The development of British influence in and around 
the Gulf of Aden depended upon the Aden Residency staff, 
not upon any plans or foresight at the Foreign Department 
or in the India Office. The initiatives for action came 
usually from the Residency, but they required the later 
endorsement, or the support, of the Foreign Department, 
and sometimes, of the India Office. Only, in the case of 
the Anglo-Ottoman Boundary Commission, did the Ottoman 
request for a demarcation come from the Foreign Office. 
The Officiating Resident was, however, already interested 
in the disputed area, and the Ottoman request was a
i
response to the earlier British initiative at’^IDareja (l). 
The Resident's conduct, no less than the British Boundary 
Commissioners', resulted in a considerable expansion of 
territory at Ottoman expense. But it is arguable that 
little expansion of British influence occurred, once the 
Political Officer at Dhala was withdrawn in 1906.
At each period of expansion, in 1873 in the Yemen, 
in 1881 in Hadhramaut and in 1884-1886 on the Somali
(1) p.9.1 - 9.2
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Coast, and between 1902-1905 in the Yemen, the 
Indian authorities received strong support from the 
Secretary of State for India (l). On these occasions, 
the Foreign Office view was conciliatory and moderate. 
Without such strong India Office support it is possible 
that more moderate counsels might have prevailed at 
London,and[British expansion in Southern Arabia or on 
the Somali Coast would have been more restricted.
The erratic expansion of British territorial claims 
in the area, which had begun in 1839, came to an end 
in 1905, with minor exceptions (2).
British expansion was erratic because it occurred 
only when local opportunities were exploited by the 
Residency staff; and since the senior staff were few 
in number, attention to one area diverted the Residency's 
resources away from other areas. Thus from 1884-1898, 
South Arabian affairs were largely overshadowed by the
(1) With occasional limited reservations on Lord George 
Hamilton's part in 1902-03.
(2) The Audhali treaty in 1913 and the later definitions 
of the 'Beihani', 'Quaiti* and Mahri borders.
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needs of the Somali Coast. That coast was more 
attractive for other reasons. The country was easier 
to travel in, the ill-armed population was easier to 
influence, less tribally fragmented than in the 
Southern Yemen and Hadhramaut, and the Somalis came 
to look to the British as possible protectors against 
aggressive Shoan expansion at Somali expense. By 
contrast, the better armed Yemenis, and Hadhramis, 
in contact with the Residency, often did not want 
British intervention in local affairs, when there 
was no external enemy. In addition there was a direct, 
though numerically small, British administration on 
the Somali Coast, while there was no direct British 
administration in Arabia, outside Aden.
Aden Residency influence probably rose to its 
peak between 1873 and 1888, because of the quality, 
the qualifications, and the length of service, of the 
Residency staff. Schneider, Hunter, probably Salih 
Jaffer , ,, and, to a lesser extent, Stevens (of the
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Aden Troop) and Walsh, were mainly responsible for 
that growth. Following Salih Jaffer1s death, and 
Hunter’s transfer, after disagreements with Resident 
Hogg (l), the Aden Residency's influence probably 
declined from 1888-1898, under Hogg, Jopp and 
Cunningham, as had happened under Russell and 
Tremenheere after Merewether1s Residentship (2).But 
there was a marked improvement when Brigadier G-.
O'Moore Creagh became Resident.
+ + + + + +
Merewether enlarged the base for local British 
influence which Commander S.B.Haines had laid by 
capturing Aden in 1839; Frere and Schneider secured 
Merewether1 s gains in 1873? and Schneider extended 
them in the Yemen and on the Hadhramaut Coast between 
1873-1877. Hunter, as First Assistant Resident, 
continued to consolidate the British position, by 
securing Shaikh Othman in 1881-82, by imposing an
(1) p.10.43 n.2
(2) See B for details of their service
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unauthorised military solution to the Quaiti-Kasadi 
feud in Hadhramaut in 1881, and by establishing the 
British succession to Egyptian rule 011 the Somali 
Coast from 1884. Curzon, Maitland, Wahab and Fitzmaurice 
were responsible for a nominal British expansion in the 
Yemen from 1901-1905.
Once British involvement in South Arabian tribal 
politics occurred, the local pattern of tribal power 
was distorted. The major local beneficiary from the 
Anglo Fadhli conflict of 1865-1867 was the Abdali 
chiefly family. They were saved from possible absorption 
into the expanding Fadhli tribal confederation and 
enabled to expand at their neighbour's*expense. But, 
as the personal wealth of the Abdali chiefly family 
grew, from exploiting the local agricultural potential 
for supplying Aden, and from taxing the transit trade, 
the Abdalis had an increasing vested interest in a 
continuing British presence in the area to keep the 
Ottomans out. The British did not, however, control 
the Abdalis, or their other tribal clients, even where 
those clients were recognised by the Resident as behaving
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inequitably towards their neighbours. The British claim 
to 'control' the coastal area, thus keeping out rival 
Powers, depended upon the British Protected Chiefs 
remaining 'in power'. After Protectorate Treaties had 
been concluded along the South Arabian Coast, from 
1886, Indian officials found it expedient to support 
'legitimate' rulers, and their heirs, because they 
represented the sole basis for the British claim to 
exclude other Powers from South Arabia.
Residency officials knew that the Quaiti chiefs 
'authority', from 1882, from Burum eastwards towards 
i.Iuseinaa was a myth; that the Hadhrami tribes did not 
recognise Quaiti suzerainty; and that the Quaiti chief 
could not exercise any effective control outside the 
garrisoned coastal ports. Other Treaty Chiefs also 
lacked control of their areas. Therefore, the South 
Arabian chiefs could not guarantee foreign travellers' 
safety, not protect foreign commercial interests, outside 
their home villages or towns. But only an effective 
British quarantine of South Arabia, preventing European 
access, could avoid exposing the limitations of British
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influence and of the 'Chiefs11 control over 'their' 
tribesmen. An alternative - British administration — 
was suggested by the Kasadi Naqib at Mukalla. It 
was rejected, possibly because there was no prospect 
of local taxation meeting the cost of administration; 
and because there was no way in which a British 
involvement on the coast could be insulated from 
possible conflict with tribes further inland.
Any officially approved expansion into an 
unfamiliar area involved unknown military, financial, 
and staff, commitments. The G-overnment of India had 
no surplus resources available for questionable 
gambles in Arabia or on the Somali Coast. The Home 
Government had no interest in either area. It therefore 
required Lt.Col. F.L I.Hunter's exceptional foresight and 
skills to plan, and to achieve^the British occupation 
of the Somali Coast. For, once British prestige was 
apparently committed to a forward policy, withdrawal, 
particularly under foreign pressure, was difficult. 
Hunter, and his contemporaries who expanded British 
influence in the area, had to be opportunists (l).
(l) Cf. Cromer 'Egypt* II p.284.Cromer stressed this need 
for Anglo-Egyptian officials; but it applied more 
strongly to succesful Aden Residency officials.
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They might enjoy the private support of their superiors, 
hut there could be no planned expansion without the 
approval of the Home Government. Such approval was 
unlikely; and even when it was obtained for the purchase 
of Shaikh Othman, subsequent arbitary delays occurred. 
Further, once a proposal for expansion had been rejected 
by the Home Government, any limited local freedom of 
action for such a move was lost, so there had to be no 
premature disclosure of Residency intentions.
Circumstances particularly favoured Hunter in 
1884; as Consul for the Somali Coast he was under the 
British Consul-General in Cairo for Somali Coast affairs, 
and not under the Resident in Aden. In the negotiations 
in 1884 between the India and Foreign Offices, Hunter's 
proposals for the Somali Coast received the support of 
the Secretary of State for India, while the Foreign 
Secretary accepted Hunter's recommendations forwarded 
through Sir Evelyn Baring. Baring did not indicate his 
dependence on Hunter and the India Office probably (id 
not realise it. Conveniently for Hunter, Lord Ripon, as 
Viceroy, rejected Indian responsibility for the
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management of Somali Coast affairs in the transitional 
period. Hunter was, initially, left to establish an 
administration, effectively free of control by either 
Baring of1 the Foreign Department, for an 'independent1 
Somali Coast, to be governed in the interests of the 
Somalis themselves.
Possibly, Hunter might have been less successful 
if he had not had an -unorthodox civil servant to hand 
in L.P.Walsh. Walsh wanted political work; he had 
earlier worked under Hunter for two years; and, as an 
uncovenanted officer, he had little prospect of a 
permanent political appointment, except on the ^Dmali 
Coast. He was physically tough, unmarried, able to 
adapt to Somali Coast conditions, and anxious to prove 
himself in a role that mixed administration and 
soldiering. Walsh, also, was prepared to adopt practical 
measures, suitable for local situations, with the minimum 
regard for official regulations which v/ere designed for 
more orthodox, peaceful, situations. The combination of 
Hunter and Walsh was probably the best that could have 
been obtained; and, by comparison with Hunter and Walsh!e 
personal local assets, the French consular officers on 
the Somali Coast were newcomers, unfamiliar with the area 
and more closely associated, originally, with the Somalis'
11.19
Dankali enemies than with the neighbouring Issa 
Somalis. The achievement of occupying the coast 
from deila eastwards, against French competition, 
was Hunter's, shared by Y/alsh. It was not due to 
the Indian Government; and it was not due to either 
Blair (l) or Hogg as Residents.
The local expansion of British influence 
between 1865 and 1905 was a remarkable achievement 
by a few men; it was the more remarkable because 
official policy was, primarily, to avoid British 
involvement by land in local affairs. In addition, 
the appointment of Residents (2), who, mostly, did 
not previously know the area, or the language, and 
the scarcity of expatriate staff with long service 
in the area, s.otnetimes weakened the Aden Residency. 
"Tot homines tot sententiae.t!
(1) Except in so far as General Blair took leave 
most opportunely for Hunter's purposes, leaving 
Hunter to use Aden's local resources as he 
considered expedient on the Somali Coast.
(2) Xugg/r&Vn B.
12.1 - 12.12 Maps and A Nationality of shipping
Graphs. visiting Aden.
(lri back pocket)
B Steam, sail and country craft 
using Aden.
G Aden's Trade by Land.
I) Aden's Total Trade.
E Aden's Population.
Hap A Area of thesis.
B Haines' sketch map of 1839*
0 Tribal Areas of south central
Yemen.
I) Tribal Areas of south western 
Yemen.
E Aden and the nearer tribes.
P Anglo Ottoman claims in the
Dhala area, 1902-1903.
Gr The Somali Coast of the Gulf 
of Aden.
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I. MANUSCRIPT SOURCES.
1. India Office Records, India Office Library.
These files may be grouped into four categories
(i) India Office Correspondence from, and to, India. 
(Generally LI in the notes (l) ).
(ii) India Office Correspondence from, and to, Bombay. 
(Generally LB or BSC in the notes.)
(iii) India Office Correspondence from, and to, Aden (2). 
(Generally LA in the notes.)
(iv) Aden Archives files, transferred from Aden in 1967. 
(Generally prefixed AIA, for files studied here, 
and AF, for files studied in Aden, followed by the 
current, or the past, file number, in the notes).
For this thesis, the Aden Archives files (iv) 
provide, the bulk of the source material because the 
impetus for British expansion originated mainly in Aden.
(1) Otherwise, the India Office reference is used (e.g. 
the file no., or P(olitical) and S(ecret), followed 
by the year of the file, etc.)
(2) This includes other correspondence from Muscat, 
Zanzibar, and the Straits Settlements, for much of 
the period.
13.3
The correspondence with India (i), Bombay (ii), 
and Aden (iii) is therefore of marginal value in 
following the course of events in the region.
Minutes, marginal comments, and other indications 
in the files of attitudes at the India Office 
towards regional developments are the particular 
contributions of the India Office files.
The India Office Records mainly used are 
classified by the Library under the following 
groupings:-
l/P and S/6 (1).
Foreign letters received from the Governor General 
and the Government of India, covering 
political correspondence with India, up to 
1874.
Vols. 9 to Vol. 20A, 1865 to December, 1874.
Foreign letters and Enclosures from India.
Vols. 144 - 158, Jan.1873 - Dec.1874.
(l) P and S = Political and Secret. Prom, at least
1873, 'Political' letters in this context applied 
to events in India and 'Secret' letters to events 
outside India.
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Political letters received from Bombay up till 1874. 
Vol. 2, 1863 - 1866.
Vols. 4 - 1 0 ,  1871 - Dec. 1874, have indexes.
Political Despatches sent to India 1858 - 1874.
Vols. 8 - 1 7 ,  1865 - Dec. 1874. Volumes 16 
and 17 have indexes.
Collections to Indian Political Despatches.
Vols. 75 - 143A, 1865 - 1874.
Political Despatches sent to Bombay, 1858 - 1874.
Vols 7 - 1 4 ,  1865 - 1874. Vol. 13, 1872 - 73, 
has an index.
Collections to Bombay Political Despatches.
Vols. 50 - 87, 1865 - 73.
L/P and S/7.
Political and Secret Correspondence with India, 1875 
- 1911.
Political and Secret Enclosures received from India. 
Vols. 1 - 9 7 ,  (with index).
/
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Political and Secret letters and Enclosures from 
Bombay, 1875 - 19U .
Vols. 1 - 51, 1875 - 1905.
Political and Secret Despatches to India, 1875 - 
1896.
Vols. 1 - 2 2  (1).
Political and Secret Despatches to Bombay 1875 - 
1896.
Vols. 1 - 6 (l). All volumes are indexed.
L/P and S/8.
Demi Official Correspondence; First Series.
Demi official letters received in the Political 
and Secret Department, with Minutes, 
Memoranda, drafts and copies of letters sent. 
Vols. 1 - 9 ,  1872 - 1911.
(l) From 1897 Despatches and Letters to India, (and 
to Bombay) are bound with letters received from 
India, (and from Bombay).
13*6
Second Series*
Copies of Demi Official letters sent out, and
received by the Department with copies of 
Minutes and Memoranda.
Vols. 1 - 3 ,  June 1862 - 1894.
I/P and S/9.
Secret letters received from Aden, and other Areas 
outside India, 1793 - 1874.
Vols. 42 - 47, 1865 - Dec. 1874.
Secret letters received from 1875 - 1911.
Vols. 2 - 11.
Political letters to Aden, and to other Areas outside 
India.
Vol. 1, 1875 - 1896.
+ H* + + +
Enclosures to Indian and Bombay despatches to 
the Secretary of State have to be looked for in the
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following Registers (l)
2/I/P and S/6/12, 1866 - 1874.
z/l/P and S/7/l , 1875 - 1888.
Z/l/P and S/7/15, 1889 - 1897.
The Political and Secret Department Registers
and Indexes, beginning in 1897, cover not only the 
letters and despatches from and to, India, but also 
the letters from, and to, Aden, up to 1911.
+ + + + + 
l/P and S/lO.
Political and Secret Subject files, 1902 - 1931.
Included in this group are the files on the fAden 
Frontier Delimitation1, (File 37/1905, in 5 parts, 
from 1901 - 1911); on ’Aden Protectorate : Turkish 
Aggression1, 1904 - 1914, in two parts (File
(l) Enclosures with Despatches from India were kept
separately, and used in the preparation of answers. 
The enclosures were then later bound in sets of ten 
or more enclosures, according to their size, and 
filed under the number of the Secretary of State's 
answering Despatch.
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137/1904); and other files dealing with 'Aden 
hinterland affairs', with individual European 
travellers, with the contrababd arms traffic, 
and with other South Arabian subjects.
l/p and S/l8.
These Political and Secret Memoranda include 
some 24 Memoranda, prefixed by the letter 'B*, 
on South Arabian and Somali Coast affairs, from 
1885 - 1906. The more useful ones include
B 30. "Relations with the tribes in the 
vicinity of Aden, especially in reference 
to the Amir of Zhali", by Major P.M.Hunter 
and General J.W.Schneider, dated 1885.
B 136. 'Aden Demarcation' by Sir W.Iee Warner, 
1902.
B 137 'Aden Demarcation' by Brigadier P.J. 
Maitland, 1902.
B 156. 'Aden Frontier Delimitation', a Foreign 
Office Memo, 1906.
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L/P and S/20.
These are official books, pamphlets and reports, 
dealing with Aden, Africa, Arabia, Perim,
Red Sea, Socotra and the Middle East. Out of 11, 
of general interest for the region, covering the 
period between 1094 and 1923, E/60, Colonel 
(then Captain) R.A.Wahab's 1891/92 Survey Report 
is of particular interest for local Anglo Ottoman 
relations and the limits of the British sphere of 
interest in the Yemen from 1890 - 1905.
R/20.
The Aden Archives, now in the India Office Library.
The Aden Archives were visited by Dr. A. Toussaint, 
Chief Archivist of Mauritius, after the Second World 
War. Virtually no v/ork had, however, been done in 
classifying the material in the Archives, before the 
files were sent to the India Office Library in 1967. 
Throughout the period of research of some 1000 files, 
some were not available in the sequence in which they
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were required (l); there was, indeed, no sure means 
of knowing what sequence was the most suitable, since 
the files1 contents were usually unindexed and unknown 
to Library staff. Some important series, such as those 
of the Annual Reports and the Annual Trade and 
Navigation Returns are incomplete. Some files were 
in poor condition, from termite, and other, damage (2), 
until repaired by the India Office Library. Reference 
to an original Aden Archives Index of 1905 (3) shows 
that some earlier files were removed (4j; other files, 
from 1875, were marked as 'missing1; and one file of 
1877 v/as '...eaten by white ants....' (5J. A number of 
Aden Residency files on Somali Coast affairs were 
transferred to the Somali Coast in 1899.
(1) E.g. AIA 1234 - the Administrative Report for 
1895/96 - was still not available 011 20.12.1971, 
but '...waiting to be repaired...'
(2) In some files the pencil marginal notes are so 
faded that they can only be read with difficulty 
if at all.
(3) Z/B/20/l.
(4) E.g. Aden Audit Files up to 1854.
(5) No. 763 Political Local, Part II.
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Private Papers and Microfilmed Papers,
India Office Library.
Argyll Papers. Microfilms of the 8th Duke's papers 
whilst Secretary of State for India. The original 
papers are at Inverary Castle.
Sir Hugh Barnes' Papers (l). Foreign Secretary, 1900 
- 1903.
Lord Curzon1s Papers. The series covering events from 
1901 - 1905 have been used, when Lord Curzon was 
Governor General.
Lord Dufferin Papers. Microfilms of originals with
the Marchioness (l).
Lord George Hamilton's Papers. As Secretary of State 
his corresjjondence with Lord Curzon is useful for the 
period 1901 - 1905.
Lord Kilbracken's Papers. As Sir Arthur Godley he was 
Permanent Secretary at the India Office (2).
Lord Lamington's Papers., covering the period while 
he was Governor of Bombay (2).
(1) = no material quoted in this thesis.
(2) = of little use for this thesis.
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Sir lalter Lawrence's Papers. 16 boxes of these papers 
were unsorted in the Library. Dr. R.J. Bingley however 
obtained Lawrence's final diary of 1902 for me to read, 
but there was no reference to Aden affairs or visitors. 
Lord Northbrook's Papers, as Governor General were 
useful for the events of 1873 and for his attitude 
towards defending Aden.
Lord Salisbury's Papers. Microfilms of originals at 
Christ Church, Oxford (l).
Sir Richard Temple.(Governor of Bombay, 1877-1880) Papers. 
Sir William Lee Warner's Papers.' '.
1.(2). Public Record Office.
Foreign Office Papers (2); FO 78; The Ottoman Empire.
This series covers Anglo Ottoman interest in the 
Yemen, the Hadhramaut Coast, Dhofar, Socotra and the 
Somali Coast, as seen by the Foreign Office.
The files are particularly useful for details
(1; = no material quoted in this thesis.
(2) See 'The Records of the Foreign Office 1782 - 19391, 
H.Li.S.O. London, 1969.
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on Anglo-Ottoman co-operation against French plans 
to occupy Shaikh Said from 1869 (l); for the Anglo- 
Ottoman confrontation in 1873 (2j; and for a contrast 
between British indecisiveness over the Egyptian 
occupation of the Somali Ooast between 1869 - 1874 
and British firmness against the Porte in the Yemen 
in 1873; for the British occupation of the Somali 
Coast from 1884 - 1888 (3); and for the Anglo-Ottoman 
Boundary Commission in 1902 - 1905 (4).
Other correspondence with Emoassies, in Paris 
(FO 27), and in Rome, (FO 48) is useful during periods 
of British rivalry in the region with the French or 
the Italians.
FO l:Abyssinia. Papers dealing with the 
Egyptian withdrawal before the Mahdi;in 1884, are of
(1) FO 78/5387 - FO 78/5388.
(2) FO 78/2753 - FO 78/2754.
(3) There are 4 Volumes in 1884, FO 78/3725 to /3728; 
and 7 Volumes in 1887.
(4j The series begins with FO 78/5242 covering 
January - May, 1902.
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interest for developments on the Somali Coast (l). 
Admiralty Records.
ADM 53 is the series covering the Logs of H.M. 
Warships. Information in the logs gives details 
of British naval behaviour on visits to coastal 
ports during sensitive local negotiations, 
illustrating how psychological pressure was 
sometimes applied.
ADLI 127 covers the R.N. records of the East India 
Station.
The following files have some interest for 
this study:
ADM 127/11 1866 - 1870 Aden and the Red Sea.
127/34 Aden, Egypt and the Sudan 1883/84.
I (2) Public Record Office, Private Papers.
Arthur Balfour Papers (B.P. ) PRO 30/60 (2)
(1) PO l/3l Frontier Questions with Egypt 1884/85.
(2) PR0/30/60/49 Cabinet Papers & Confidential Points 
concerning India.
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Cromer Papers (Cr.P) PRO/633.
Vol.1, 1872 - 1873.
Vol.V, for correspondence with P.M.Hunter 1885/1886. 
Granville Papers (Gr.P). PRO 30/29.
PRO 30/29/62 Correspondence with Gladstone Jan.73 - May,
1874.
PRO 30/29/51, Correspondence with Argyll, 1669 - 1873. 
PRO 30/29/106, Correspondence with Lord Tenterden,
1871 - 1874.
PRO 30/29/102, Correspondence on Turkey 1872 - 1874. 
Hammond Papers (H.P.) PO 391.
fr
PO 391/21 Letters *£ Sir H.Elliot*. 1866 - 1871.
/22 Letters tie' Sir H. Elliot. 1872 - 1873.
Middleton Papers (St.John Broderick) PRO 30/67 (l). 
Kitchener Papers PRO 30/57 (1).
(l) No material quoted in this thesis.
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I (3) British Museum - Private Papers (l).
Arthur Balfour Papers.
Volume XVI Cabinet Memoranda, 1896 - 1906.
Volume XLVI, 1903 - 1904.
Volume XLVII, Oct. 1904 - 1908.
Volume LI, for correspondence v/ith Curzon, from 1904. 
W.E.Gladstone Papers (G.P.)
(4) National Library of Sootland.
Minto Papers (M.P). The papers of the 
Earl of Minto.
M 827. Volume 3 •* Aden and dependencies.
M 845. Volume 3 : Foreign Department Report (including
Aden).
M 887, M 889, M 891, Arabia 1906 - 1908.
M 995 Correspondence with England and abroad, with 
Minto1s replies, 1905 - 1908.
M 999 Secretary of State, and Permanent Secretary, India 
Office, to Minto, 1905 - June, 1906.
(l) These collections are of marginal interest for this 
thesis.
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(5) Miscellaneous.
Lansdowne Papers (of the 5th Marquess). Lord 
Lansdowne restricts access to authors commissioned 
to write for publication (l).
Argyll Papers. There is no record of any 
private political Journals or Diaries, recording 
Argyll's personal opinions on the Anglo-Ottoman 
confrontation in 1873, in the Muniment Room at 
Inverary Castle (2).
The National Liaritime Museum, Greenwich, has 
no collections of private naval papers of interest 
for developments in South Arabia during this period.
II (i) Printed Documentary Sources, British Museum, 
State Paper Room.
(a) Parlimentary Papers, and Reports of Parliamentary 
Debates, for the period. In particular, C 920, 
Parliamentary Papers Vol. LXXVI, p.405, of 1874,
(1) Correspondence with Lord Lansdowne in 1972/73.
(2) Correspondence with the Chamberlain of Argyll, 
April, 1973.
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gives the official British account of 'Turkish 
proceedings in the Neighbourhood of Aden' in 
1873.
(b) Trade Returns from Aden, 1867 - 1870 (l).
Aden P o r t  T r u s t  A d m in is t r a t io n  R e p o rt up to 
3 1 s t M a rch  1901 ( 1 ) .
(ii) Maps.
(a) The India Office library Catalogue is W/l/p 
auid S. The collection does not include all maps 
referred to in official correspondence, even when 
the map referred to is not bound in with the 
covering correspondence. The collection of maps 
in Drawer A of Map Cabinet No. 2 in Room 147 is, 
however, the most useful collection of maps on S.\7. 
Arabia of the period; it includes some on the Somali 
Coast. It ranges from 'Tribes in the Neighbourhood 
of Aden* , printed from Commander S.B.Haines sketch 
map of 1839 (A9), to the 1906 Map of the Aden 
Frontier, showing tribes within the new 'Aden frontier',
(l) These papers are kept in store outside London.
The Aden Port Trust Report was published in Aden 
from 1910. The series from 1901/02 to 1908/09 are 
pissing.
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(A92). The few maps sent with, the Aden Archives in 
1967 added nothing new to the India Office collection, 
for this period.
It.Col. G-.S. Stevens1 Map of the Ameeri 
Territory and adjacent country, i860, sent as an 
enclosure to Bombay's Political Depatch No. 7 of 
24.3.1881 (BSC, Vol. 19, Jan-Apr. 1881) - is a 
particularly useful early map, with Captain P.M. 
Hunter's Sketch Map of Amiri Country, printed at 
Poona in i860 (A 70). These two maps show the small 
extent of the Amir of Dhala's control and the basis 
for Ottoman claims to control villages around Dhala, 
at the time of the first British visit to the area.
The next important maps dealing with this subject 
&te Capt. ii.A.Wahab' s 'Survey of the Tribal Country 
around Aden' of 1893 (A 73), and his 1892 Map showing 
the distribution of the Tribes round Aden (A 74).
The British Museum Map room has copies of maps 
also in the India Office Library (l).
(l) E.g. IOL Map A 9 (Haines sketch map of 1839» 
referred to above) is 49215 (2) in the BM.
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III CONTEMPORARY, AND LATER, BOOKS OE BIOGRAPHY, 
HISTORY, REFERENCE AND TRAVEL (l).
ADMIRALTY Handbook of Arabia, Egham, 1916.
C.U.AITCHISON 'A Collection of Treaties, Engagements 
and Sanads, Relating to India and Neighbouring 
Countries', Vol. XIII, Calcutta, 1909 edn. (except
ARGYLL, GEORGE DOUGLAS, 8th Duke of, 'Autobiography and
G.R.BAIN, 'The Clans and Tartans of Scotland*, Glasgow,
SALIH alBAKRI 'Tarikh Hadhramaut asSiyasi', 2 Vols.
Cairo, 1936.
(l) References in square brackets refer to abbreviations 
used in the notes, where the book is referred to more 
than once. A few books referred to in the footnotes 
on minor points have been omitted; and a few others, 
not mentioned in the text, which provide useful 
contemporary, or local, views are included.
where another edition is quoted) [Aitchison 'Treaties
2Vols., London, 1906. [Argyll 'Autobiography]].
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SIR EVELYN BARING, see Cromer.
BELHAVSI'I, LORD, see R.A.B.Hamilton.
THEODORE AND MRS.BENT, ’Southern Arabia’, London, 1900.
G-.V/.BURY, ’The land of Uz' , London, 1911 {Bury *Uz]].
•Arabia Infelix* , London, 1915 [Bury 'Arabia"]].
THE CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, Vol XII, Cambridge, 1910. 
COLONIAL No. 123, see H.F.Ingrams.
SIR G. 011.100RE CREAGH, 'Indian Studies', London, 1918. 
'Autobiography1, London, 1924. [breagh 
1 Autobiography]).
CROMER, EARL OP, 'Modern Egypt', 2 Vols., London, 1908.
(Cromer ' Egypt][.
D.DILK^S. 'Curzon in India', 2 Vols., London, 1969-70.
C.M.DOUGHTY, 'Travels in Arabia Deserta, Cambridge, 1888, 
reprinted London, 2 Vols., January 1949.
[Doughty ' Desert a *1.
LORD ELTON, 'General Gordon', London, 1954. [Elton 'Gordon]). 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, 10th edn., 1902 - Article on
Arabia by Sir. T. Holdich. [Britannica 'Arabia^.
R.A.B.HAMILTON. (Lord Belhaven). 'The Kingdom of Melchior1, 
London, 1949.
'The Uneven Road', London, 1955. [Belhaven 'Road]].
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G.HARDY, 'Histoire de la Colonisation Francaise',
Paris, 5th edn., 1947. [Hardy 'Colonisation]. 
Y/.B.HARRIS. 'A Journey Through Yemen' , London, 1893. 
SBIYID MUHAMMAD BIN HASKIM, 'Tarikh adDolah alKathiriah* , 
locally printed, 1948.
T.P.HUGHES, 'Dictionary of Islam', London, 1888, [Hughes 
' Islam]].
F.II.HUNTER, 'Account of the British Settlement of Aden' , 
1877, reprinted London 1968. [Hunter 'Aden]].
F .L I.HUNTER AND C.V/.H.SEALEY, 'Arab Tribes in the Vicinity 
of Aden* , Bombay, 1909.
SIR. \7.77.HUNTER, 'Earl of Mayo', Rulers of India series, 
Oxford, 1891, [hunter 'Mayo]).
SIR  TOM HICKINBOTHAM, 'Aden', London, 1958.
HAROLD INGRAMS, 'Colonial Office Publication No. 123 on 
Hadhramaut', H.M.S.O. 1936. [colonial 123^\ 
'Arabia and the Isles', London, 1942,
[ingrams 'Arabia^.
H .F .JACOB, 'Kings of Arabia', London, 1923 [Jacob Kings']].
F . L .JAMES, 'The Unknown Horn of Africa', London, 1893.
D.JARDINE, 'The Mad Mullah of Somaliland', London, 1923.
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J.B.KELLY, 'Britain and the Persian G-ulf, 1795-1880' ,
Oxford, 1968 {holly ' Gulf[|.
R.H.KIERNAN, 'The Unveiling of Arabia', London, 1937*
SIR W.LAWRENCE, 'The India We Served' , London, 1928. 
(Lawrence ' India^ ].
C.R.LOW, 'History of the Indian Navy', 2 Vols., London,
1877.
C.P.LUCAS, 'Historical G-eography of the Mediterranean
and Eastern Colonies', 2nd edn., Oxford, 1906.
ERIC MACRO, 'Yemen and the Western World', London, 1968.
G-.B.MALLESON, 'History of the Indian Mutiny', Vol. Ill, 
London, 1880.
ABDULLAH L1AQTARI, 'Water Rights and Irrigation Practices 
in Lahj', Oxford, 1972.
T.E.LIARSTON, 'Britain's Imperial Role in the Red Sea Area, 
1800-1878', Connecticut, U.S.A., 1962, [karston 
'Red Sea].
COLONEL R. ME INERT ZHAG-EN, 'Birds of Arabia' , Edinburgh, 1954.
W .G.PALGRAVS, 'Central & Eastern Arabia', London, 1871, 
[Palgrave 'Arabia**].
CAPTAIN R.L.PLAYFAIR, 'A History of Arabia Felix',
Bombay, 1859. (Playfair 'Arabia^.
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LORD ROBERTS, 'Forty One Years in India', cheap edn.,
Aden, (no date; possibly (?) 1946).
R. BOSWELL SUITE, 'Life of lord Lawrence', 2 Vols,
VAN DEN BERG-, ' Le Hadhramout et Les Colonies Arabes dans
L'Archipel Indien', Batavia, 1886,
L.P. WALSH, 'Under the Flag and Somali Coast Stories',
London, 1932. [walsh 'Somali CoastJI.
London y _
G.WATERFIELD, 'Sultans of Aden'[Waterfield 'Aden^ J. 
iiAI'TS WEIIR, 'A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic* ,
J.WESTLAKE, 'International Law', 2nd edn., Cambridge, 1910. 
REV.S.U. ZWEMER, 'Arabia, the cradle of Islam', Edinburgh, 
19 QO.
London, 1905. [Roberts 'India]).
REV. A. SINKER, 'Memorials of the Hon. I. Keith-Falconer', 
Cambridge, 1888. jsinker 'Keith-Falconer]].
IT. COL. R.H. SMITH, 'The Tribes of British Somaliland',
London, 1883. [s m ith , 'Lord Lawrence]]. 
W.THESIGER, 'Arabian Sands', Penguin reprint, 1968. 
[ihesiger ' Sands]].
Wiesbaden, 1961,
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IV Magazine Articles, and other miscellaneous 
sources.
The Journals of the Royal United Service 
Institute provide useful contemporary information, 
of particular use on defence matters.
The Geographical Journal, Vol. LIV, No. 6, 
of December 1919 has an article, 'Reminiscences 
of the Map of Arabia and the Persian Gulf1 by Lt. 
Col. P.Fraser Hunter.
T .A.Hcathcote's Ph.D. Thesis on 'British 
Policy and Baluchistan, 1854 - 1876' provides 
examples of Sir \7. Kerewether's actions in 
Baluchistan, for comparison with his behaviour 
against the Fadhlis in 1865 - 67 (l).
Other material obtained in the Yemen and in 
Hadhramaut includes records of conversations, the 
A1 Ba Alwi Agreement between the Seiyids of 
Hadhramaut, and copies of official Handing Over 
Notes in the Aden Protectorate.
(1) Ph.D. Thesis, London University, 1969/70 Index.
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The United Society for Propagating the Gospel 
(U.3.P.G.) has religious papers with some articles 
on missionary work and journies in the Yemen and 
on the Somali Coast towards the end of this period.
A Tribal Confederation.
The Senior Residency Staff, 
1865-1905.
Causes of vessels calling at 
Aden, 1875-1895.
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Table showing Ha.ior Causes of Vessels Calling at Aden
1 8 7 5  - 1 8 9 5
G a l l e d G a l l e d  to t a k e  on. C a l l e d C a l l e d C a l l e d
to / d i s c h a r g e c a r g o for for for
Co a l p r o v e s R e n a i r s O r d e r s
S t e a m e r s  'bailing or
V e s s e l s w a t e r
1 8 7 5 / 7 6 3 0 ^ **•77 3 7 n . s . s . n . s . s . n . s . s .
77 3 1 ^ k l 2 36 n . s . s . n . s . s . n . s . s .
7 8 M 36 n . s . s . 21 9 1 2
7 9 326 >+31 n . s . s . 28 2 5
8 0 3 2 6 1+56 n . s . s . 3 2 1 0 n . s . s .
81 if98 (**95 1 7 8 n . s . s .
+ 1 8  (1 )
8 2 591 551+ n . s . s . 2 5 1 6 1 0
83 7 ^ 9 ^ 0 .8 l;-5 n. s.s. 19 8 3 1
+  8 Cl)
8*f 83 +^ 7 3 2 5 3 8 9 1 8
+  1 s a i l ­
ing ship
8 5 535 7 3 0 d 8 l b
86 5^8 7 7 2 3 b l 1 1 l b
(3 ) 87 33;5 5 6 .6/5 n  » s 0 s • ■ 8£ .6/5 (2 ) . * ^ ( 2 )
+ . 3V ;  (1 )
(3 ) 88 3 5 . 5/' 56?i n . s . s . 3 .1 # . 555(2 ) .5/5(2 )
+ 1 .1 5 ^ ( 1 )
(3 ) 89 3 7 .96^ 5 3 .3 7 £ , v n . s . s . 2 ..21{S 1 .08?5 .3853
+ 2 .1 6 ^ ( 1 )
(3 ) 90 3 ^ . 11^ 5 5 -87J5 , n . s . s . 2 .79^ .5555 .3555
+ 2 .1 8 :5(1 )
(3 ) 91 2 9 .92;$ 5 5 . 5i/», s n . s . s . 3 *01^ .3555 l - 5**/5
+ 2 .3155(1 )
92 W l 8 3 0 n . s . s . 3 8 3 3 1
+  2 8  (1 )
93 356 8 5 ** n . s . s . 33 5 1 2
+  1 1  (1 )
9 *t 3 0 7 9**9 N o  s h i p s 8 7 5
1 8 9  V 9 5 2 9 8 969 N o  s h i p s l*t 7 8
n . s • s « = no separate statistics
1V.5
Dtagr/aia G
IJotes
(1) Described as Entered to land or embark passengers*.
(2) Printed without the decimal point.
(3) Calculations do not come out to the full 100p: 
they are therefore only a guide: after 5 years the
figures were no longer expressed in percentages*
i5oi
Abbreviations
AAR Aden Annual Report, followed by* it^sf
year from 1st April - 31st March.
AIA Aden file numbers in 10L.
ADM Admiralty prefix for files in PRO.
AF Aden file number obtained in Aden before
removal to London.
AM Microfilms of 8th Duke of Argyll1s
papers, 10L.
EM British Museum.
BP Arthur Balfour Papers, BM.
BSC Bombay Secret Correspondence, 10L.
CrP Papers of Sir Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer, EM.
CP Curzon Papers.
DO Demi official (letter)
EAP Eastern Aden Protectorate
f i  for  i n f o r m a t i o n
F O . Foreign Office
15*2
G of I Government of India
G*P. ¥«E. Gladstone Papers, BM
Gr.P. Granville Papers, PBO
HEMA Her Brittanic Majesty1s Ambassador
HP Hammond Papers, PRO
Lord HP Lord George Hamilton^ Papers:
10 India Office
IOL India Office Library
KP Kilbracken Papers (Godley, PS, 10)
LA (LA, M,PG) Letters from Aden, IOL
LB Letters from Bombay, IOL
LI Letters from India, IOL
LP Lord Lamington Papers, IOL
LW(P) Sir William Lee-Warner Papers, IOL
NLS Rational Library of Scotland, Edinburgh
NP Northbrook Papers, IOL.
MM
MP
6th Earl Mayo Microfilms, IOL 
Lord Minto Papers NLS
15.3
PD Political Department* or* Parliamentary
Debates, SPR, BM 
PSD Political & Secret Department, 10
PRO Public Records Office, London
PS Permanent Secretary, Foreign, or India
Offices:
P & S Political & Secret
RA Resident Adviser
Res* Resident, Aden
SCAR S omali Coast Annual Report
SGE Secretary to Government of Bombay,.
Political and Secret Department; post
changed to Chief Secretary in I876
SM Lord Salisbury Microfilms IOL
(Originals at Christ Church, Oxford)
SPR State Paper Room, BM
S of S Secretary of State, India Office
U/S Permanent Under Secretary at India, or
Foreign, Offices 
USPG United Society for Propagating the Gospel,
15 Tufton Street, London SW1
